Abstract: To what extent can minor states constrain great powers? Do institutional practices shape state behavior? This study presents the argument that great powers engage in informal power-sharing in international organizations to attain unanimity, which enhances the signaling effect of these institutions. The pursuit of unanimity lends weight to additional votes beyond those needed for decision-making under the formal rules. In turn, informal power-sharing to attain unanimity enables minor powers to exert more influence than they could if only material power and formal rules were decisive. A mixed-methods analysis of the UN Security Council tests this argument. It identifies several power-sharing practices. Design-based causal inference and a case study reveal that minor powers have disproportional influence over the deployment of UN peace operations. Their influence is particularly pronounced during crises, when great powers are most eager to secure small states’ votes through power-sharing, and while minor powers preside over the Council.
The Promise of Peacekeeping: Protecting Civilians in Civil Wars, with Allison Carnegie. Under Review (R&R), International Organization.
Abstract: Do peacekeepers protect civilians in civil conflict? Securing civilian safety is a key objective of contemporary peacekeeping missions, yet whether these efforts actually make a difference on the ground is widely debated. This paper argues that because peacekeeping forces often need to maintain close ties with host governments, peacekeepers reduce civilian fatalities inflicted by rebels, but not those caused by governments. To test our claim, we overcome common problems of endogeneity and selection bias by using a novel natural experiment. Specifically, we leverage exogenous variation in which countries hold power in the United Nations Security Council to show that states that wield more power send more peacekeepers to their preferred locations, and that these peacekeepers in turn help to protect civilians from rebel factions.
Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?, forthcoming in Review of International Organizations.
Abstract: What explains the outcome of interstate negotiations in international organizations (IOs)? While existing research highlights member states’ power, preference intensity, and the IO’s institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in IOs: Through issue linkage members of an IO leverage privileged positions in other IOs to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes. Specifically, European Union members are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Inside the UNSC EU members can promote security interests of other European countries, and they can use their influence to secure side-payments from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating new EU budget data, and it shows that EU members obtain 1.7 billion Euro in additional net receipts during a two-year UNSC term, on average. Thus, bargaining processes in the EU and the UN are intricately linked.
Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars: Governance, Leadership Change, and Support for Violence in Iraq, with Saurabh Pant and Beza Tesfaye. Under Review (R&R), American Journal of Political Science.
Abstract: The ‘hearts and minds’ model of counterinsurgency holds that civilians are less likely to support an insurgency if the government provides basic public services and security. Building on this model, we argue that a major political event that raises popular expectations of future public service and security provision will increase support for the government and decrease sympathy for the insurgency. To test this argument, we leverage a unique research design opportunity that stems from the unforeseen announcement of the resignation of Iraq’s divisive prime minister in August 2014 while an original survey was being administered across the country. We show that the leadership transition led Iraq’s displeased minorities to shift support away from the insurgency to the government. In line with our argument, this realignment was due to rising optimism among minorities that the new government would provide basic services and public goods – specifically security, electricity, and jobs.
Lessons on political violence from America’s post-9/11 Wars. With Jacob Shapiro. Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(1): 174-202.
A large literature has emerged in political science that studies the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This paper summarizes the lessons learned from this literature, both theoretical and practical. To put this emerging knowledge base into perspective we review findings along two dimensions of conflict: factors influencing whether states or sub-state groups enter into conflict in the first place; and variables affecting the intensity of fighting at particular times and places once war has started. We then discuss the external validity issues entailed in learning about contemporary wars and insurgencies from research focused on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars during the period of U.S. involvement. We close by summarizing the uniquely rich qualitative and quantitative data on these wars (both publicly available and what likely exists but has not been released) and outline potential avenues for future research.
The Peace Science Digest 1(6) featured a summary of the article.
Abstract: This study presents the first experimental evidence to test the proposition that a single international organization can convey various different signals to members of the American public. Specifically, a unanimous vote conveys a cue of consensus among foreign elites in support of a policy, whereas approval despite dissent or non-approval due to a veto signals that foreign elites are divided over the policy. Drawing on American public opinion scholarship, which shows that members of the public tend to be rationally ignorant about foreign policy and form an opinion by observing unity or disagreements among well-informed and trusted elites, this paper argues that the signaling effect of international organizations on public opinion depends on whether they cue consensus or divisions. Survey experiments administered to national samples of U.S. citizens in 2016 and 2018 test this argument in the issue area of international security. The study finds that the unanimous endorsement of a U.S. military intervention by the UN Security Council increases popular support for the use of force by six to ten percentage points, in comparison to the Council’s approval of the same action despite dissent. In addition, unanimous approval – as opposed to approval by a divided organization – significantly reduces the likelihood that Americans blame their own government for unanticipated difficulties that arise during the intervention. In line with elite cue theory, the large majority that places at least a modicum of trust in the UN Security Council is driving these effects. Causal mediation analyses provide evidence on the mechanisms at work.
From Paper to Peace? Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions in Civil War
Abstract: How do international organizations influence the behavior of states and nonstate actors? How do they secure compliance with the rules they adopt? This paper investigates the puzzle of compliance with resolutions issued by the UN Security Council. The existing literature on compliance with international regimes and armed conflict termination does not explain why warring factions comply with international organizations’ demands for the cessation of hostilities. This paper aims to close this lacuna and presents explanations of compliance derived from managerialism, enforcement theory, and the literature on international security organizations. The study empirically tests the competing arguments using original data. The findings corroborate enforcement theory, but they do not lend support to managerialist explanations of compliance. This paper introduces a new data set on compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. It presents the results of the first empirical analysis of compliance with a large set of Security Council resolutions to date.
Mikulaschek, Christoph, Terje Rod-Larsen, and Hans Winkler (eds.). 2010. The UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process, and Practice, special issue of Favorita Papers, 2010/1.
Boutellis, Arthur and Christoph Mikulaschek. 2012. Strengthening Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation: Istanbul Retreat of the UN Security Council. New York: International Peace Institute.
Mikulaschek, Christoph and Paul Romita. 2011. Conflict Prevention: Toward More Effective Multilateral Strategies. New York: International Peace Institute.
Cockayne, James, Christoph Mikulaschek, and Chris Perry. 2010. The UN Security Council and Civil War: First Insights From a New Dataset. New York: International Peace Institute.
Cockayne, James and Christoph Mikulaschek. 2008. Transnational Security Challenges and the United Nations: Overcoming Sovereign Walls and Institutional Silos. New York: International Peace Academy.