The Power of the Weak: How Informal Power-Sharing Shapes the Work of the UN Security Council*

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Abstract

To what extent can minor states constrain great powers? Do institutional practices shape state behavior? This study presents the argument that great powers engage in informal power-sharing in international organizations to attain unanimity, which enhances the signaling effect of these institutions. The pursuit of unanimity lends weight to additional votes beyond those needed for decision-making under the formal rules. In turn, informal power-sharing to attain unanimity enables minor powers to exert more influence than they could if only material power and formal rules were decisive. A mixed-methods analysis of the UN Security Council tests this argument. It identifies several power-sharing practices. Design-based causal inference and a case study reveal that minor powers have disproportional influence over the deployment of UN peace operations. Their influence is particularly pronounced during crises, when great powers are most eager to secure small states' votes through power-sharing, and while minor powers preside over the Council.

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To what extent is the work of international organizations shaped by their most powerful member states? Three observers of the study of international organizations concluded that "the consensus view is that small states do not affect IO behavior in significant ways" (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 2006, 56). The notion that states' power reflects their national capabilities has a long tradition, as does the argument that international organizations are merely fora for power-based interactions between their member states (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994). Thus, Drezner (2007, 5) argues that a great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for global governance. In a similar vein, liberal intergovernmentalism explains regional cooperation in terms of the preferences of, and bargaining between a region's most powerful states (Moravcsik 1998). The rational design approach to the study of international institutions presents the related conjecture that asymmetries of member states' power translate into differential control of the institution by its member states (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001). Proponents of the English school concur that great powers dominate international organizations (Bull 1977; Hurrell 2007, 11).

Several arguments form the basis of the conventional wisdom that international organizations are controlled by their most powerful members. Minor powers lack attractive unilateral outside options for realizing the gains they could obtain through institutionalized cooperation (Katzenstein 1985; Stone 2011). Even in international organizations with majority voting rules, minor powers' strength in numbers does not enable them enact changes against the will of great powers, because attempts to do so would lead the latter to withdraw their vital support from these institutions (Krasner 1985).

Recent studies on international financial institutions (IFIs) and the European Union (EU) challenge the conventional wisdom that minor powers do not exert substantial influence in international organizations. Lyne, Nielson and Tierney (2006) and Copelovitch et al. (2013) show that the formal rules of IFIs allow weak powers to shape their work. Stone (2011)

finds that the formal rules of IFIs and the EU endow minor powers with disproportionately large influence while informal practices enable great powers to control these organizations under exceptional circumstances when powerful states' core interests are at stake. Their overrepresentation in the Council of the EU and their formal veto right give small states oversized bargaining power in the EU (Aksoy and Rodden 2009; Schneider 2011). In short, the formal rules of IFIs and the EU allocate substantial influence to minor powers, contrary to the conventional wisdom about great-power dominance.

Neither the conventional wisdom nor the recent findings on formal rules of international organizations can explain informal practices in international institutions that cede disproportionately large influence to minor powers. Yet such informal power-sharing practices are ubiquitous across international organizations. Specifically, many institutions follow the practice of requiring unanimity even when their formal rules prescribe majority voting. This practice turns every member of the organization into a pivotal voter - even those whose material capabilities and voting power under the formal rules are negligible. For instance, the executive intergovernmental bodies of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) follow the practice of always deciding by unanimity, even though their formal rules prescribe qualified-majority voting; in turn, some small states are extraordinarily influential in the AU (Sturman and Hayatou 2013; Hartmann and Striebinger 2015). The practice of accommodating preference outliers with intense interests also plays a central role in the EU, and the prevalent consensus decision-making systematically departs from the formal rules (Thomson et al. 2006). In a similar vein, "virtually all GATT/WTO legislative decisions (except on accessions and waivers) have been taken by consensus" despite the formal requirement of qualified majority voting (Steinberg 2002, 342); coalitions of minor powers can leverage the consensus practice to block trade agreements (Narlikar 2005). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development also take most decisions by consensus and without the voting described in the

formal rules (Wolfrum 1997, 267).

This paper presents a theoretical argument that explains why great powers consent to informal practices in international organizations through which disproportionately large influence is given to minor powers. Great powers engage in power-sharing in order to attain unanimity in international organizations, which enhances compliance and reduces the cost of implementing their decisions. The choice of sharing power through informal practices (rather than by changing the formal rules) enables great powers to quickly adjust the extent of power-sharing in response to major events that increase or decrease the returns from pursuing unanimity by bolstering the influence of minor powers.

This paper uses decision-making in the United Nations (UN) Security Council as a case study to test this argument. It shows that the Council follows several informal practices through which great powers generate unanimity and minor powers gain substantial influence. Minor powers' influence grows when crises render the organization's agenda particularly salient, because it is at these moments that great powers are most eager to achieve unanimity by making concessions to minor powers even on unrelated issues. In addition, minor powers' influence is more pronounced while they hold a privileged position in the organization to which Council members informally delegate authority, e.g. when they hold the Security Council's rotating presidency.

To empirically test this argument, this study relies on a mixed-methods research design, which combines novel randomization inference with a qualitative case study. The quantitative tests leverage three exogenous sources of variation in minor powers' influence in the Security Council to solve the the identification problem posed by the fact that the UN Security Council's changing composition is endogenously determined. While five great powers have permanent membership in the Council, the other ten members are elected. This poses a challenge for causal inference: it may not be the influence of elected Council members that

leads the Council to respond to the security threats that are most salient to these states, but rather the fact that states whose security threats are in the center of the Security Council's attention seek election to this body.[1] To cleanly identify minor powers' influence in the Security Council this study exploits the exogenous rotation of two Council seats between four African regions. To investigate variation in minor powers' clout, the study leverages the rotation of the Council's presidency as well as major events outside Africa that alter the salience of the body's work and that are exogenous to the rotation of African Council seats.

The paper finds that during years when an African region is represented on the Security Council, the UN responds more actively to civil wars in that region than it does when no state in the region serves on the Council. An African region's representation on the Security Council causes the deployment of 920 additional UN peacekeepers per year to civil-war countries in that region, on average. This effect amounts to more than half of the average number of blue helmets deployed to an African civil-war country. The rotation of Council seats has a similarly strong impact on the budget of UN peace operations. These effects are particularly pronounced during crises outside Africa, when great powers are most eager to secure African votes by making concessions on unrelated issues, and while African minor powers benefit from the informal influence of the Council's presidency.

A qualitative case study on the Security Council's response to the civil war in Somalia during Uganda's term on the Council appears in the Appendix due to space constraints. It shows that Uganda strongly influenced the Council's decision to deploy a UN field mission in Somalia and to impose sanctions on Eritrea in 2009. Primary sources and interviews with diplomats who served on the Council indicate that Uganda's influence stems from great powers' desire to secure Uganda's vote on unrelated issues in order to attain unanimity on

[1]This endogeneity concern is similar to the one discussed in the literature on United States Congressional committee influence (Rundquist, Lee and Rhee 1996). Assessing the effect of committee membership is complicated by the fact that committees tend to be composed of congressmen whose districts are most affected by the committee's work. A similar selection effect operates in elections of Security Council members.

those decisions that mattered most to great powers (e.g., Iran sanctions).

Great powers' preferences cannot explain the variation in the UN's response to civil wars found by this study, because it is implausible that the preferences of the Council's permanent members undergo regular swings in two-year intervals. At the same time, the result is not due to great powers' indifference over multilateral intervention in Africa. Protracted diplomatic disputes about the UN's role in Darfur and Libya are but two examples that show that the Council's permanent members have intense preferences over conflicts in Africa, where 81 percent of UN blue helmets in the world are stationed.

This study makes several contributions. First, it sheds new light on informal governance in international organizations. While recent scholarship emphasizes that informal governance can strengthen great powers' control over international organizations (Stone 2011), this study shows that great powers also rely on informal practices to attain unanimity through power-sharing. Second, the finding that exogenous variation in minor powers' participation in the Council has a strong impact on the deployment of UN peacekeepers challenges the conventional wisdom that the five great powers with a veto enjoy a near-monopoly on influence in the Security Council. Third, the argument on the strategic pursuit of unanimous decisions generalizes to international and domestic bodies that cannot enforce their decisions (e.g., the United States Supreme Court adopted an informal practice of deciding unanimously when its authority was still fragile).

This paper is organized as follows. The first two parts present the context of decision-making in the Security Council and the argument on informal power-sharing in international organizations. Parts 3 and 4 describe the design-based inference strategy and present the results. Part 5 summarizes robustness checks, sensitivity analyses, and a placebo test, which leverage original data on multilateral peacekeeping missions. Part 6 concludes.

1 Decision-making in the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council is responsible for countering threats to international peace and security, which take the form of interstate disputes, military aggression, civil war, mass atrocities, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has vast discretion, and its tool kit includes authorizing military interventions, deploying peace operations, imposing sanctions, initiating international criminal proceedings, and sponsoring crisis diplomacy. The Council has fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The UN General Assembly elects the other ten members for non-renewable two-year terms. The permanent members have a veto right. The adoption of a decision by the Council requires nine positive votes. These institutional characteristics make the Security Council a particularly hard case for testing the influence of minor powers in international organizations. Their veto right, permanent membership, and preponderant national material capabilities put great powers at a formidable advantage in bargaining with minor powers that temporarily serve on this body.

The conventional wisdom about decision-making in the Security Council holds that the five great powers with permanent seats and vetoes leave the ten other members with virtually no influence over the body's decisions (see, e.g, Zaum 2013, 70). Formal models of decision-making in the Security Council suggest that the body's five permanent members monopolize almost all voting power (Voeten 2001; Hosli et al. 2011, 171). O'Neill (1996, 235) pointedly concludes that, as far as voting power is concerned, "the Security Council has five members". Formal models presented in Winter (1996, 820) yield the related insight that "the bargaining power of the nonveto members is effectively null." Empirical studies concur with this assessment and characterize the Council as an elite pact between great powers (Voeten 2005; Rosecrance 1992; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, 501-4). The telling title of a recent history of the Council refers to the five great powers with permanent membership as *Five*

To Rule Them All (Bosco 2009).

The conventional wisdom about the dominating role of the Council's five permanent members serves as motivation or premise for many recent studies. Hurd (2002, 41) reasons that since "effective decisionmaking power in the Council is monopolized by the Permanent Five" minor powers seek Council seats to attain status, not influence. Stojek and Tir (2014, 10) posit that "[c]learly, P5 states have a hold on Security Council decision-making and their interests ultimately drive the outcomes in the Security Council". Similarly, Johns (2007, 252) characterizes deliberations in the Security Council as "controlled by a small number of states with effective veto power" (see also Chapman 2011, 25). Passmore, Hart and Shannon (2015, 23) claim that "members of the P5 establish [UN peace operations] in countries where they have significant interests to protect". Finally, Allen and Yuen (2014, 622) argue that the Council's oversight of UN peacekeepers is also a function of permanent members' preferences.

conclude that P5 preferences are the primary determinant of the UNSC's agenda, but do not systematically examine how E10 preferences may affect the UNSC's agenda (except by looking at UNSC's president).

A different set of recent studies challenges the conventional wisdom that non-permanent Council members lack influence in the body's decision-making process. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) show that great powers give more aid to non-permanent Council members in an attempt to buy their votes on the Council. Non-permanent members of the Security Council also receive more favorable treatment from the IMF and the World Bank (Vreeland and Dreher 2014), from the Asian Development Bank (Lim and Vreeland 2013), and more EU aid (Mazumder, McNamara and Vreeland 2013) than other states. These studies ascribe such benefits of temporary Security Council membership to 'global horse trading' of minor powers' votes in exchange for side payments from great powers. Clearly, great powers would

not spend precious resources to buy the favor of non-permanent Council members if minor powers on the Council had no influence on the body's work, as the conventional wisdom would suggest.

The recent finding that great powers incur significant costs to woo non-permanent Security Council members raises an important question: Do great powers merely offer financial side payments to secure minor powers' votes or do they also compromise over the substance of the Council's decisions in order to gain minor powers' assent? Put differently, do non-permanent members trade away their entire influence in exchange for aid and loans or do they utilize some of it to shape the Council's decisions? A recent literature investigates the effects of temporary Council membership on economic and political outcomes in member states (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Besley and Persson 2011), but it does not examine whether their temporary presence on the Council influences the UN's work. This paper systematically investigates that question.

2 Informal power-sharing in international organizations

States' power in international organizations can be understood as their ability to change the work of these organizations or the actions of other member states.[2] Great powers engage in power-sharing in international organizations when they consent to rules and practices that allocate influence in these bodies to minor powers that is disproportionate to the resources of the latter. Power-sharing serves the purpose of ensuring that most states voluntarily cooperate with international organizations and comply with their decisions. To give effect to their decisions, international organizations habitually rely on the cooperation of a diverse set of actors: non-member states' governments, other international organizations, and domestic

[2]This definition echoes the seminal definition of power as the probability of getting others to do what they would not have done otherwise.

interest groups. For instance, broad acceptance of the Council's measures by states outside this body is a prerequisite for giving effect to its decisions (Voeten 2008; Krisch 2008). Specifically, the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the Council depends on their universal application (Haufler 2015), and non-Council members supply most of the blue helmets that the Council dispatches to conflict zones. Similarly, the World Bank's aid conditionality is only successful if other IFIs or states do not make competing aid offers with less stringent conditions. Great powers could use coercion to secure the compliance and cooperation that international organizations need to succeed. However, in order to do so they would have to continuously incur the cost of coercion. It is less costly for great powers that seek to maximize their own utility to secure voluntary cooperation with international organizations through power-sharing than by enforcing the decisions of these organizations through coercion (Martin 1993; Ikenberry 2001).

Unanimity in international organizations increases the likelihood of voluntary cooperation and compliance by actors outside the organization. This is because unanimous decisions convey a stronger signal to government elites and publics than decisions that are adopted by a divided international organizations. Governments that adopt a policy preferred by great powers need a 'veil of multilateral agreement' to isolate them from the domestic pressure not to cave in to great powers (Martin 1993). Unanimous decisions by an international organization provide a uniquely thick veil, because they enable governments to argue that they are simply subscribing to an international consensus rather than taking sides in a contentious policy debate. At the same time, the unanimous adoption of a policy cues consensus among foreign elites to the public, whereas an international organization's approval despite dissent signals to the public that foreign elites are divided over the policy. Public opinion scholarship shows that most members of the public are rationally ignorant about foreign policy and form their opinions by observing unity or disagreements among well-informed and trusted elites (Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2007). International organizations are

among the elites from which publics take cues (Thompson 2006; Chapman 2011). The unanimous endorsement of a policy by an international organization has a larger signaling effect on public opinion in member states than the approval of that policy by a divided institution (Mikulaschek 2018).

The pursuit of unanimity lends weight even to votes that are not needed for the adoption of a policy under the organization's formal rules. To get unanimity on issues that are particularly salient to them, great powers share disproportionately large influence on the organization's work on other topics that matter most to minor powers. The extent to which great powers are willing to make concessions to minor powers in order to attain unanimity varies as a function of the salience of the organization's work to great powers. At times when great powers are most eager to secure the unanimous adoption of their preferred policy by the organization they are most likely to engage in power-sharing.

The choice of sharing power through informal practices - rather than by changing the formal rules - enables great powers to quickly adjust the extent of power-sharing in response to major events that increase or decrease the returns from attaining unanimity by bolstering the influence of minor powers. At the same time, informal power-sharing practices are more than mere logrols. They institutionalize channels of influence and thus give weak powers the confidence that they can shape the organization's work themselves on the issues that matter most to them - even if the formal rules of an organization give them negligible leverage - if they vote with more powerful member states on the issues that are most salient to the latter.

In the UN Security Council, great powers engage in power-sharing by consenting to a series of informal practices, which systematically depart from the institution's formal rules and augment the influence of minor powers. While the Council's formal rules prescribe qualified majority voting and great power vetoes, the Council operates in accordance with practices that privilege unanimity among Council members and the delegation of power to

positions that are mostly occupied by minor powers. Thus, a British diplomat described the process by which the Council works as "generally hidden" and as different from its formal rules (Aust 1993, 365).

Five informal practices in the Security Council serve the purpose of generating unanimity by augmenting the influence of minor powers. First, the Council delegates critical aspects of its work (such as imposing and enforcing sanctions against terrorist groups) to its subsidiary organs, which constitute "the de facto executive branch of the Security Council" (United Nations 2006). These subsidiary bodies follow the informal practice of requiring unanimity on all decisions. No official document has formalized this practice, but it is contained in the non-binding guidelines of the Council's committees (Sievers and Daws 2014, 530). Second, on those matters that are not delegated to subsidiary bodies the Council issues almost two in three of its decisions as Presidential Statements and Press Statements, and it follows the practice of requiring unanimity on these types of decisions.[3] Only one third of the Council's decisions - i.e., the resolutions - are adopted through qualified majority voting in accordance with the Council's formal rules. Third, even when the Council opts for adopting a resolution, its sponsors consistently aim to secure unanimous approval. Consequently, 89 percent of all draft resolutions are adopted unanimously.[4]

Fourth, great powers engage in power-sharing by allowing the Council's president to influence the body's work even though this practice mostly benefits minor powers, which hold the presidency most of the time. The president possesses almost no formal powers (Bailey and Daws 1998, 130-1) but her de facto discretion greatly exceeds her formal writ (see Appendix for examples). Council members frequently task the president informally with conducting consultations to reach consensus in the Council. They also allocate agenda-setting power

[3]Presidential Statements have the same legal status as resolutions (Talmon 2003). They can override earlier resolutions (Sievers and Daws 2014, 375). Substantively they address security threats just as resolutions do.

[4]Author's calculation based on UN voting records from 1988 to 2014.

to the president, enabling the latter to launch initiatives that shape the Council's work on an issue (Dedring 2008, introduction). Since the presidency rotates on a monthly basis between all fifteen members, it is held twice as often by a non-permanent member as it is occupied by a great power with permanent membership. Therefore, the non-permanent Council members benefit more from the practice of delegating tasks to the president than do the five veto powers.

Finally, great powers on the Council engage in power-sharing by allowing nonpermanent members to chair most of the Council's sanctions committees (e.g., on Al-Qaeda and ISIS) and working groups (e.g., on peacekeeping). Between 1997 and 2015, non-permanent members of the Security Council chaired 98 percent of these subsidiary bodies.[5] Chairs of sanctions committees are "expected to play a leading role in forging consensus" among Council members (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [New Zealand] 1995, 46). These positions allow non-permanent Council members to influence the Council's substantive work (see Appendix for examples).

In conclusion, the argument about informal power-sharing implies that the impact of minor powers on the Security Council's work is disproportionate to their influence under the body's formal rules and minor powers' material capabilities. Power-sharing explicates the causal logic of the main hypothesis - namely, that minor powers have a substantial impact on the work of the Security Council (hypothesis 1).

The extent to which great powers are willing to make concessions to minor powers in order to attain unanimity within the Security Council varies as a function of world events, which render the Council's agenda more or less salient to great powers at different times. During crises, great powers tend to be particularly eager to secure the unanimous adoption of their preferred policy by the Security Council. Thus, they make concessions to minor

[5]Author's calculation based on UN records.

powers on other topics discussed in the Council in order to get the latter's consent on the salient policy proposal. This implies that minor powers that serve on the Council at a time when the Council's work is particularly important to great powers exert more influence on the work of the Council than minor powers that serve on the Council at other times - even on entirely unrelated issues on the Council's agenda (hypothesis 2).

The Council's informal power-sharing practices do not equally benefit each minor power at all times. The de-facto power of the presidency temporarily boosts minor powers' influence in this body. Therefore, minor powers with a seat on the Council should have more influence on the body's work when they hold the rotating presidency than they do at other times (hypothesis 3).

If power-sharing is motivated by great powers' pursuit of unanimity, then minor powers should only exert disproportionately large influence in the Council when they contribute to unanimity on the issues that are salient to great powers (hypothesis 4). The analysis of this hypothesis is presented in the Appendix, because it requires a different empirical approach than the tests of the other observable implications of the argument, which are described below.

3 Design-based empirical strategy

This section explains the empirical test of the argument about minor powers' influence on the work of the Security Council. It addresses the identification strategy, estimation procedure, and the data. This study relies on a design-based empirical approach, which rests on the identification of opportunities where the causal factor of interest varies due to some 'as if' random manipulation.

3.1 Identification strategy and estimation procedure

Participation of African states in decision-making in the Security Council provides a natural experiment that can be leveraged to test minor powers' influence in this body. The UN General Assembly elects ten Council members for nonrenewable two-year terms. Under a formula devised by the General Assembly in 1963, three of these seats are reserved for African states (United Nations 1963). The AU and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), decided that Central and North African states rotate one of these three Security Council seats every two years, that Eastern and Southern African states rotate the other seat every two years, and that the third African seat is always occupied by a West African state (Security Council Report 2010). Figure 1 displays a map of the five African regions. This arrangement implies that Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa are represented on the Security Council for two years in a row and not represented for the following two years. This system of rotation between African regions has been consistently implemented since the 1970s.[6] Table 1 lists all Security Council members from the Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern African regions since the end of the Cold War. In conclusion, a rigid schedule pre-determines whether one of the four African regions is represented on the Security Council in a given year. This rotation scheme is unique to Africa.

Since the temporal scope of the study is limited to the post-Cold War era (1988-2014) and starts more than 20 years after the rotation was established, it is reasonable to assume that this rotation is exogenous to the outcome of interest, the influence of states in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa on the Council's response to security threats in

[6] In most years, African states propose only one candidate for each Council seat that is reserved for an African region, effectively leaving the UN General Assembly with no choice but to elect this candidate (Vreeland and Dreher 2014). In other years, two states in the same region compete for a seat, and their contest is settled through negotiations or a vote in the General Assembly. Even when African states in the same region compete over a seat reserved for that region, they never violate the principle of rotating seats between African regions. To clarify, the natural experiment consists in the rotation of Security Council seats between African *regions* and not between *states*.

Africa since 1988. Covariate balance tests presented below confirm that the characteristics of African conflicts, which affect the UN's response, are not systematically different while the conflict theaters' regions are represented on the Security Council than they are at other times.[7]

If minor powers wield substantial influence in the Security Council, exogenous variation in the representation of different African regions should have a visible effect on the Council's work. Specifically, the Council's decisions should align more closely with the preferences of states in a given African region during years in which that region is represented on the Council than in other years. In contrast, if great powers dominate decision-making in the Security Council, as the conventional wisdom suggests, variation in the representation of African regions should not affect the Council's work. Thus, it is possible to evaluate the influence of African states in the Council by comparing the outcome of the Council's decision-making processes in years with and without regional representation.

The identification of the effect of African countries' influence on the work of the Security Council requires two assumptions about the preferences of Council members. First, the preferences of the permanent Council members are assumed not to systematically vary together with the representation status of African regions on the Council. This assumption is plausible since there is no reason to believe that the preferences of these permanent members over UN intervention in Africa exhibit a pattern of regular swings in two-year intervals.[8] While the preferences of the Council's permanent members do not undergo cyclical changes, these great powers are not indifferent about whether, where, and when the Council deploys

[7] Between 1988 and 2014 three states switched regional groups: Mauritania shifted from Western to North Africa in 2004 (African Union 2004), Rwanda from Central to Eastern Africa around 2002, and Angola from Central to Southern Africa in 1995 (Endeley 2009, 41). These shifts did not allow these three countries to escape the rotation principle, which ensures that they are only represented on the Council by a state from their region half of the time.

[8] Two regions rotate a seat in even years while the other two rotate a seat during odd years. Therefore, electoral cycles in the United States or elsewhere cannot explain the observed outcome across all regions.

Figure 1: Map of African regions



Note: The map displays the five African regions (as of 1988) in different colors. Eritrea and South Sudan, which gained independence after 1988, are part of Eastern Africa. Western Sahara is administered by Morocco and does not belong to any region. For the composition of the groups see Endeley (1998, 2009).

Table 1: North, Central, East, and Southern African members of the UN Security Council, 1988-2014

Year	North Africa	Central Africa	Eastern Africa	Southern Africa
2014		Chad	Rwanda	
2013	Morocco		Rwanda	
2012	Morocco			South Africa
2011		Gabon		South Africa
2010		Gabon	Uganda	
2009	Libya		Uganda	
2008	Libya			South Africa
2007		Rep. of Congo		South Africa
2006		Rep. of Congo	Tanzania	
2005	Algeria		Tanzania	
2004	Algeria			Angola
2003		Cameroon		Angola
2002		Cameroon	Mauritius	
2001	Tunisia		Mauritius	
2000	Tunisia			Namibia
1999		Gabon		Namibia
1998		Gabon	Kenya	
1997	Egypt		Kenya	
1996	Egypt			Botswana
1995		Rwanda		Botswana
1994		Rwanda	Djibouti	
1993	Morocco		Djibouti	
1992	Morocco			Zimbabwe
1991		Zaire		Zimbabwe
1990		Zaire	Ethiopia	
1989	Algeria		Ethiopia	
1988	Algeria			Zambia

Note: The table displays Security Council members in those four African regions that rotate two seats on the Council. Note that Rwanda shifted from the Central African to the Eastern African group (see fn. 7).

peacekeepers in Africa either. First, their colonial past and present-day trade relations give great powers an acute interest in conflicts in Africa. Second, great powers know that even the failure of a UN peace operation in a peripheral setting (e.g., in Somalia in 1993) harms perceptions of the Council's authority and effectiveness around the world. Third, UN interventions in African civil wars set precedents for multilateral interference in internal conflict in other world regions. Fourth, the five veto powers bear more than half of the cost of UN peace operations, which currently amounts to 7.3 billion USD per year. They also incur most of the burden of assembling troops through side payments to troop contributors (Henke 2012). Finally, UN blue helmets are a scarce resource, and the opportunity cost of deploying more than 80 percent of them in Africa is high.

The second identifying assumption is that African states that temporarily serve on the Council prefer the deployment of larger UN peacekeeping missions in response to civil wars in their own region. This assumption can be justified as follows. Civil wars generate negative economic externalities in the region where they occur (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). In fact, neighboring countries bear 87 percent of the economic cost of state failure, which often results from civil war (Hoeffler 2010). Internal armed conflicts raise the risk of interstate war in the region (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008). Refugee flows caused by civil war frequently lead to conflict diffusion to neighboring countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). International peace operations reduce the risk of conflict contagion to neighboring countries by securing borders, by stemming refugee flows, and by facilitating repatriation and resettlement (Beardsley 2011). Moreover, UN peace operations help attain sustainable peace in civil-war countries, and large multidimensional missions have a particularly strong effect (Fortna 2008). African members of the Security Council consistently express a preference for the deployment of larger UN peacekeeping missions in response to ongoing civil wars in their own region: between 1988 and 2014, the Security Council deployed 33 civilian or military peace operations in response to African civil wars during years in which the region of the

civil-war country was represented on the Council, and in each case, the representative of that region voted in favor of establishing the peace operation.[9] African states often express regret about the Security Council's unwillingness to undertake more peacekeeping efforts in Africa (see Appendix). Preference outliers among African states, which are hostile to UN peacekeeping in Africa, are consistently kept from being elected to the Council, and therefore the preferences of African Security Council members do not perfectly align with those of African states, on average (Lai and Lefler 2017).[10]

On the basis of these two assumptions it is possible to test the first hypothesis on the influence of African Security Council members by comparing the average change in the size and budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region during years when this region is represented on the Security Council with the corresponding figure for years when no state in that region serves on the Council. If African states are able to influence the substantive work of the Council, they will successfully lobby for more and better funded blue helmets in civil-war countries in their region. Consequently, the size and budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries should increase at a higher rate when the region of the civil-war country is represented on the Council than at times when the region is absent from the Council. The estimator of the average treatment effect is the difference between the change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during months when the region is represented on the Security Council (treatment group) and the change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during months when the region is not represented on the Council (control group). The unit of analysis is the region-month. In line with the definition of the estimator above, region-months are only included in the analysis if at least one civil war was ongoing in

[9]Author's calculation based on UN voting records. This figure includes UN missions in West Africa.

[10]For instance, attempts by Libya and Sudan to gain membership in the Security Council were thwarted in 1995 and 2000, respectively. Since 1988 only two countries in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa served on the Council while undergoing a civil war (Ethiopia in 1989-90 and Rwanda in 1994-5). The results are generally robust to excluding them (see Appendix).

the region at the time. The secondary estimator is the difference between the change in the budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during years when the region is represented on the Security Council (treatment group) and the corresponding measure during years when the region is not represented on the Security Council (control group). This analysis is conducted with region-year units, because monthly budget data is not available. All analyses are conducted at the geographic level of treatment assignment, which is the region, in order to account for clustered treatment assignment to all countries in the same region. Since the clusters vary by size, cluster totals are used instead of cluster means to avoid ratio-estimator bias. The Appendix expresses the estimators in mathematical terms.

The test of the second hypothesis that minor powers' influence on the work of the Security Council is larger when the Council's work is highly salient to great powers than it is at other times compares the difference between the effect of African regions' Council representation on the size of UN peace operations in African civil-war theaters during months when the Security Council's agenda is highly salient to the corresponding effect during months when the Council's work is less important. In addition to the two previously stated assumptions, this analysis rests on the identifying assumption that temporal variation in the salience of the Council's agenda is not systematically related to the rotation of Council seats between African regions. Since this assumption may not hold for the significance of the Council's work in Africa, I only take into account variation in the salience of the Council's role in other continents. This variation is plausibly exogenous since there is no reason to believe that events that render the Council particularly important in the Balkans, the Korean peninsula, or elsewhere outside Africa are a function of the rotating representation of African regions on the Council.[11] The estimator indicates a difference-in-difference: it is the difference

[11]See Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Vreeland and Dreher (2014) for justifications of the related but more demanding assumption that the salience of the Council's agenda is exogenous to the composition of the set of fifteen Council member states.

between the average effect of an African region's rotating Council representation on the number of UN blue helmets deployed to African civil-war countries during months when the Council's agenda is important outside Africa and the corresponding effect at other times (see Appendix).

The third hypothesis that minor powers wield more influence on the Security Council's work while presiding over the body is tested by investigating whether the effect of African regions' Security Council representation on the size of UN peace operations is larger when the region's representative also holds the presidency than it is otherwise. The timing of minor powers' presidencies over the Security Council is exogenously determined, because the presidency rotates on a monthly basis among the body's fifteen members in alphabetical order of their name. The estimator measures the difference between the average number of UN blue helmets deployed to civil-war countries in regions that are represented on the Security Council to the corresponding number deployed while the region's representative on the Council also presides over the body (see Appendix). Due to anticipation effects, the incoming presidents are also expected to benefit from the heightened leverage associated with the presidency. At the same time, some of the additional peacekeepers may only arrive in African conflict theaters shortly after the month-long presidency ends. Therefore, the two months before and after the presidency are also part of the period during which minor powers are expected to derive benefits associated with presiding over the Council.[12]

3.2 Permutation tests

The approach to causal inference that was chosen for this study is based on randomization inference. Unlike model-based inference strategies, this design-based approach does not

[12] Additional permutation tests indicate that the results are robust to specifying different time periods (see Appendix).

require any parametric assumptions and avoids the risk of bias from incorrect assumptions about the error structure (Keele, McConnaughy and White 2012).

If the null hypothesis is correct and minor powers lack influence in the Security Council, the institution's response to civil wars in Africa is the same, in expectation, irrespective of whether the region of the civil-war theater is represented on the Council or not. Since the treatment is immaterial for the outcome if the null hypothesis is true, one should obtain outcomes that are similar to the observed outcome even if the treatment is randomly reassigned across observations. Permutation tests of the first hypothesis are conducted by randomly reshuffling the representation status of African regions in a given month across observations many times. To test the second hypothesis, African regions' representation status on the Council and the salience of the Security Council's non-Africa-related work are independently randomized. The test of the third hypothesis randomly reassigns when African regions benefit from the Council's presidency. 200,000 permutations of the data are generated for each test. The null hypothesis is tested by calculating a one-sided p-value on the proportion of permutations with a value of the test statistic that is at least as supportive of the alternative hypothesis as the average treatment effect observed in the original data (Dafoe and Caughey 2016). If only a small number of permutations yield values that are as extreme as the observed value of the test statistic, the null hypothesis is rejected with great confidence. Except for the test of hypothesis 3 on the month-long presidency, all tests account for the clustering of region-month observations in region-two-year units, which correspond to Council members' two-year terms. The Appendix provides details and presents additional permutation tests with different parameters.

To show that the results are robust to alternative specifications of the null hypothesis (instead of the 'sharp null' of no treatment effect for all observations), all analyses are

replicated through non-parametric bootstraps and parametric Welch's t-tests.[13] In addition, change in UN peace operations' size is analyzed with country-fixed-effects OLS models. Even though the OLS models and Welch's t-tests depend on parametric assumptions that make them more prone to bias than permutation tests and non-parametric bootstraps and despite the differences in the null hypothesis, all four sets of analyses yield similar results. Tables A.6 and A.9 in the Appendix compare the results from permutation tests, t-tests, bootstrapping, and OLS models.

3.3 Data and variables

Two treatment variables indicate whether an African region was represented on the Security Council in a given month and whether its representative held the presidency, respectively. Both measures are binary. The third treatment is the salience of the Council's non-Africa-related agenda. It is measured by a proxy that indicates the intensity of news media coverage and records the number of *New York Times* articles with the words "Security Council" and either "United Nations" or "UN" during the most recent six months. To exclude reports on African security issues, articles that mention Africa or African countries that experienced armed conflict during the period of analysis or the preceding two decades were removed. On average, the *New York Times* published 175 articles on the Security Council's non-Africa-related agenda. Months that fall above the mean are categorized as periods when the Council's work was highly salient. Figure A.2 in the Appendix displays a time series for this measure. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics and data sources for all variables.

The two outcome variables capture the UN's response to African civil wars by measuring

[13]Welch's t-test is an adaptation of Student's t-test. It allows for possibly unequal variances of the treatment and control groups. It also accounts for clustering at the level of regions' two-year terms on and off the Council.

monthly change in the number of personnel of UN peace operations in civil-war countries and annual change in their budget. The study uses the conventional definition of civil war in Themnér and Wallensteen (2014). Between 1988 and 2014, Eastern African states experienced civil wars during twenty-three years, states in Central Africa underwent civil wars during fifteen years, and Southern and North African states went through civil wars during eight and seven years, respectively. Table A.3 in the Appendix lists these civil wars.

Twelve UN peace operations were deployed to civil-war countries in Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa between 1988 and 2014. On average, 1,710 peacekeepers were deployed to civil-war countries in these regions. In addition, seven civilian UN missions were deployed to Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa during civil wars between 1988 and 2014. These civilian missions engaged in mediation, crisis diplomacy, and reconstruction, but unlike peace operations they did not perform military tasks. An original data set of the end-of-year staff size of these missions was compiled for this study from UN reports and from other primary sources. Table A.4 in the Appendix lists all civilian missions and peace operations.

All peace operations and civilian missions were endorsed by the Security Council, which also adopted the mandates of peace operations and decided their size. The appropriation of funds for these missions required the approval of the UN General Assembly to a budget prepared by the Secretary-General on the basis of Security Council's decisions. Since the General Assembly reviews the budgets for peacekeeping operations "rather lightly"(Sagasti, Casabonne and Prada 2007, 35), the Security Council's decisions and the Secretary-General's steps to implement them are the main determinants of the resources available to UN peace operations. An original data set of yearly UN peace operations budgets was compiled for this study from more than 250 UN budget appropriations.

Since the UN largely refrained from peacekeeping in African civil wars during the Cold

War, the temporal scope of this study is restricted to the period from 1988 to 2014. After the Cold War peacekeeping in Africa became an increasingly central part of the Council's agenda. 81 percent of all UN blue helmets were deployed in Africa (including 22 percent in Western Africa) as of December 2014. Almost five in ten dollars spent on UN peacekeeping worldwide financed peace operations in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern between 1988 and 2014; this share gradually rose to more than six in ten dollars by the end of 2014. Figure A.1 in the Appendix displays the growth of UN peacekeeping in Africa.

4 Results

Despite being minor powers, African members of the Security Council wield substantial influence on the body's work. During months when the Council included a state from one of the four African regions with rotating Security Council representation, 59 additional peacekeepers deployed to civil-war countries in that region, on average. During months when a region with rotating representation was absent from the Council, 18 peacekeepers were withdrawn from civil-war countries in that region, on average. Thus, the UN deployed 77 more blue helmets to civil-war theaters in an African region during months when that region was represented on the Council than it did during other months. Over the course of a year, the average effect of African countries' non-permanent Council membership amounted to 920 peacekeepers, which is more than half the average number of UN blue helmets deployed to civil-war countries in the four African regions with rotating representation on the Council. This annualized effect corresponds to the size of an entire battalion. It is substantively highly significant, because deploying more peacekeepers is associated with fewer killings of civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013), more cooperation by the warring factions (Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen 2013), and greater overall success of the peace operation (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård 2018). A permutation test rejects the null hypothesis that

Figure 2: Average effect of an African minor power's participation in the Security Council on the size and budget of UN peace operations deployed to civil-war theaters in the minor power's region (1988-2014)



Note: The panel on the left displays the average monthly change in the size all of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region during years when that region was represented on the Security Council and during years when no state in that region served on the Council, as well as the difference between both means. The panel on the right shows the average yearly change in the budget of all UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region in constant 2014 USD during years when that region was represented on the Security Council and during years when no state in that region held a seat on the Council, as well as the difference between these means. 90% (in bold) and 95% confidence intervals obtained through bootstrapping are plotted around these point estimates.

minor powers in Africa cannot influence the Security Council's work ($p<0.02$). If the null hypothesis is assumed to be true and if the representation status of African regions in each year is randomly reshuffled many times, then only 1.6 percent of all data permutations that are generated in this process display a positive effect of Council representation on peacekeeping deployments that is at least as large as the value observed in the actual data (see Figure 3). In short, random chance is a very unlikely explanation of the observed effect of African minor powers' participation in the Security Council on the UN's response to civil wars in the minor powers' regions.

African minor powers' participation in the Security Council also has a significant effect on

Figure 3: Distribution of the observed ATE and the ATE in 200,000 permutations



Note: The four plots display the observed average effect of a seat on the Security Council held by a minor power as a dashed line. They also depict the distributions of this effect we would expect to see under the null hypothesis, i.e. if minor powers lacked influence on the Council's work. These distributions were obtained from 200,000 randomly drawn permutations of the observed data. For the two upper plots, region-month and region-year data is permuted so that the same Security Council representation status is randomly assigned to all observations in the same region-two-year interval. If the null hypothesis is true, the chance of observing an effect on UN peace operation size that is at least as positive as the actual effect - simply due to random chance - is 1.6% (upper left panel). For the effect on UN peacekeeping budget size this likelihood is 6.2% (upper right panel). When the analyses are replicated at the level of treatment assignment, i.e. with region-two-year observations, only 2.3% of permutations display an effect on UN peacekeeping budgets that is at least as positive as the one observed in reality (lower right panel). The chance of seeing the observed effect on the size of UN peace operations or an even more positive one merely by coincidence is 3.2% (lower left panel).

Figure 4: Heterogeneous effect of African minor powers' participation in the UN Security Council by salience of Council's agenda in other world regions and by Council presidency



Note: The upper panel shows that the effect of holding a seat on the Security Council tends to be particularly large at times when exogenous events outside Africa render the Council very important. The panel below displays the added influence on peacekeeping deployments that minor powers gain from holding the Council's presidency, in addition to having a seat on it. 90% (in bold) and 95% confidence level intervals obtained through bootstrapping appear around each point estimate.

the funds allocated to UN peacekeeping in Africa. During years when the Council included a state from a given African region, the aggregate budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in that region increased by USD 53 million, on average. In contrast, peacekeeping budgets declined by USD 17 million when no state in the region of the civil-war theater served on the Council. Thus, the average effect of a single Council seat held by an African minor power amounted to an additional USD 70 million per year. This effect corresponds to 38 percent of the average amount spent on UN peace operations in civil-war countries in Africa. It is substantively important since an increase in UN peacekeeping budgets are associated with a decline in the risk of further armed conflict (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård 2018). A permutation test shows that this effect is unlikely to have arisen by chance ($p<0.07$). Figure 2 displays these results.

Minor powers wield a particularly large influence on the work of the Security Council when the body's agenda is most salient outside Africa and when they hold the Council's presidency (see Figure 4). Since monthly data on UN peace operations' budgets is unavailable, the tests of hypotheses 2 and 3 focus on peacekeeping staff size. When a state in a given African region presided over the Council ($\pm$2 months), the UN deployed 127 additional blue helmets to civil-war theaters in that region, on average.[14] In contrast, the number of UN peacekeepers only increased by 26 when the region was represented on the Security Council but did not hold the presidency. A permutation test indicates that it is unlikely that we would observe such a strong positive difference in effects (101 additional peacekeepers per month) merely due to random chance ($p<0.01$). This result lends support to the hypothesis that minor powers' influence in the Security Council is partly due to the delegation of de-facto power to the institution's president.

When the Security Council's work is very important in other world regions an African region's representation on the Council has a particularly positive effect on the number of blue helmet the UN dispatches to civil-war countries in that region: at these times a seat on the Council translates into 129 additional peacekeepers per month. Permutation tests show that this increase is significant ($p<0.02$). In contrast, the effect shrinks to 38 additional blue helmets and becomes statistically insignificant when the Council is less relevant in other world regions ($p<0.16$). Permutation tests of the difference between the effect during salient years and less salient years show that the chance of seeing an increase in the number of peacekeepers that is at least as large as the observed difference is less than 6 percent. This result provides suggestive evidence in favor of the hypothesis that great powers' willingness to make concessions to minor powers - even on unrelated issues on the Council's agenda - varies as a function of world events that render the Council more important during crises

[14]This result is robust to widening or narrowing the window around the month of the presidency (see Appendix).

than at other times.

Variation in great powers' preferences cannot explain the finding that minor powers' influence tends to be larger when the Council's work is more important outside Africa. Some events (e.g., a new U.S. administration) may increase great powers' appetite for UN intervention in Africa and simultaneously render the Council more salient in other world regions. Such changes in great powers' preferences would imply that the number of blue helmets increases across Africa when the Council becomes more active in other world regions. They cannot explain why periods of intense Council diplomacy outside Africa are only associated with an influx of peacekeepers in those African regions that are represented on the Council. Instead, great powers' concessions to minor powers with a seat on the Council to secure the latters' consent to policies pursued outside Africa are the most plausible explanation.

5 Robustness checks, sensitivity analysis, and placebo test

The results reported in the previous section hold in several robustness checks in the Appendix. First, they are robust to including UN civilian missions in the analysis in addition to UN peace operations. Second, they hold when blue helmets provided by the African Security Council member during its term on the Council are excluded. This test shows that the results are not an artifact of the tendency among temporary Council members to increase their own peacekeeping contributions (Voeten 2014). Third, the results are robust to replicating the analyses at the level of treatment assignment by aggregating the monthly data into region-two-year observations. Thus, the results reported above are not due to serial correlation between monthly observations in the same two-year term on the Council.

The 'as-if-random' assignment of the treatments implies that the characteristics of regions are equal in expectation while they are present on - or absent from - the Council.

However, African civil-war parties might pursue different strategies when a state in their region serves on (or presides over) the Council than at other times. Covariate balance tests do not reveal evidence of such strategic behavior. They do not find significant differences between treatment and control groups in the number of battle-related deaths, the rate at which peace agreements were concluded or broken, foreign troop support, or political regime characteristics (see Appendix).

A placebo test addresses the concern that covariate balance tests cannot capture unobservable confounders. While the treatment effect estimates the impact of minor powers' Council representation on UN peacekeeping deployments, the placebo effect captures the corresponding effect on non-UN peace operations. This is because the rotation of Security Council seats should primarily affect UN deployments if the argument presented in this paper is right. The significant treatment effect of 920 additional UN peacekeepers per year contrasts with an insignificant placebo effect of 45 fewer staff of non-UN peace operations. Therefore, African regions were not represented on the Council at times when the unobserved baseline probability of international peacekeeping was particularly high, because in this case the same regions would also have experienced an influx of more non-UN peacekeepers while they were present on the Council (see Appendix).

6 Discussion and conclusion

This study presents the argument that great powers engage in informal power-sharing in the UN Security Council in order to attain unanimity. A series of informal practices in the Council, which systematically depart from the organization's formal rules, help generate unanimity while also augmenting the influence of minor powers. This argument challenges the conventional wisdom that the five great powers with permanent Council membership and vetoes all but monopolize control of this institution. To test this argument, this study

exploits the natural experiments of rotating Security Council seats and presidencies. When a given African region is represented on the Council, the UN deploys more 920 blue helmets per year to civil-war theaters in that region than it does when no state in that region is a member of the Council, on average. This effect of a single Council seat held by an African minor power corresponds to more than half of the average number of blue helmets deployed to African civil-war countries. African minor powers' influence is particularly strong during crises, when great powers are most eager to attain unanimity through power-sharing, and while minor powers benefit from the informal authority of the Council's rotating presidency. Permutation tests confirm that the effect of minor powers' participation in the Security Council on that body's work is unlikely to have arisen by chance. A qualitative case study on the UN's deployment of a field mission in Somalia in 2009 corroborates these findings with process-tracing evidence. Additional analyses in the Appendix show that minor powers' disproportionately large influence in the Council is tied to their willingness to contribute to unanimity on responses to security threats in different world regions.

These findings challenge the "the marked tendency in IR scholarship to focus solely on the most powerful players in an IO to the exclusion of all other actors. While this is often convenient analytically, it is equivalent to setting the weights for all of the neglected actors at zero." (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 2006, 43) This study provides an estimate of the weight of minor powers in an institution whose design makes it a hard case for testing the proposition that minor powers wield substantial influence in international organizations. The findings do not support the realist argument that international organizations are "basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world", and that their decisions are entirely shaped by great powers (Mearsheimer 1994, 7).

The findings also shed new light on the role of formal and informal governance in international organizations. While Stone (2011) shows that formal rules in IFIs and the EU

are biased in favor of minor powers while informal rules benefit great powers, this study indicates that the opposite dynamic unfolds in the UN Security Council. Since the formal rules give minor powers' negligible leverage, only a systematic departure from these rules can explain why minor powers wield substantial influence on the Council's work. By identifying five power-sharing practices in the Council, the paper shows that the set of informal governance practices in international organizations is more diverse than the previous literature suggests: while some may facilitate great powers' informal control, other practices originate in a choice by great powers to share influence with minor powers to attain unanimity in these institutions.

The finding that minor powers exert substantial influence on decisions to deploy and withdraw UN blue helmets reveals a gap in the literature on the determinants of UN intervention in armed conflict, which focuses on three factors: the preferences of warring factions, the human cost of hostilities, and the interests of the Security Council's five permanent members (Fortna 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Stojek and Tir 2014). Future work should also consider the interests of Security Council members in the region of the conflict theater as an additional explanation of variation in the UN's response to violence.

The findings also have implications for multilateral diplomacy. They cast doubt on the the policy recommendation that states should not seek to join the Security Council since members without vetoes lacked influence in that body (O'Neill 1996). This study shows that minor powers can shape the institution's work where it matters most to them - in their own region. This benefit of non-permanent membership may often outweigh the cost of campaigning for election onto the Council. Consequently, even states that are not motivated by the desire to accumulate prestige (Hurd 2002) or aid (Vreeland and Dreher 2014) have an incentive to compete for seats at the Council's famous horseshoe table.

With respect to a possible reform of the Security Council, this study suggests that an

increase in the number of its members will alter the body's work if the regional distribution of its membership changes. This implication holds even if a reformed Council will neither add additional permanent members nor more veto powers. Most reform proposals entail a shift in the share of seats on the Security Council away from Europe and toward Africa and Asia. If some world regions will be more strongly represented on the Council than they are at present, the substantive focus of the organization's work will likely shift as well.

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Online Appendix for: The Power of the Weak: How Informal Power-Sharing Shapes the Work of the UN Security Council *(Not for Publication)*

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Contents

1 Qualitative case study

Qualitative evidence from a case study on Uganda's role as Eastern Africa's representative on the Security Council in 2009 and 2010 supports the argument on power-sharing in the Security Council. The case study investigates the return of a UN field mission to Somalia and the imposition of UN sanctions against Eritrea over its support to Somali rebels during Uganda's term on the Council. It shows that Uganda wielded substantial influence on the Security Council's decisions on peace operations and sanctions in Eastern Africa, because great powers were eager to secure Uganda's votes on unrelated issues. Inferences are made by triangulating evidence from primary sources and from interviews with Ugandan officials, including the country's current prime minister, and with diplomats who represented other states on the Council during Uganda's term.

Uganda's role in influencing the UN's response to the Somali civil war is a hard case for testing the power of minor powers inside the Security Council. First, realist scholars who view the distribution of power inside international organizations as mirroring the distribution of material capabilities would expect Uganda to have little power, because it is relatively poor and small even in comparison to other African countries that serve on the Security Council.[1] Second, Somalia was an unlikely setting for a successful push by a minor power to deploy a UN field mission. This is because the UN never deployed a field mission to Somalia ever since the failure of its ambitious attempt to end the civil war in the early 1990s.

[1] Uganda has the population size of an average African Security Council member, but its GDP and its per capita GDP amount to only a quarter of the corresponding mean among its African peers on the Council, and its military expenditures equate just 18 percent of those of the average African Council member (author's calculation based on data from the World Bank and SIPRI).

1.1 UN deployment to Somalia

Uganda had a vital interest in containing the Islamist insurgency in Somalia (Apuuli 2013) before it spread to Kenya's coast, whose ports are the most important trading route for land-locked Uganda. Uganda's government also feared the proliferation of Somali arms to Uganda's unstable Northeastern Karamajong region (Parliament of Uganda 2007). Therefore, Uganda became the first and largest troop contributor to AMISOM, the AU-sponsored peace operation deployed to Somalia in early 2007.[2] AMISOM deployments were far behind schedule due to lacking funds (Among 2007). In 2007 and 2008, the majority of Security Council members and the UN Secretary-General opposed deploying a UN peace operation to replace the faltering AMISOM mission (Security Council Report 2007; Charbonneau 2008; Associated Press 2008). Since Eastern Africa was absent from the Council, Somalia lacked a strong advocate among African Council members during these years.

When Uganda joined the Council, it closely collaborated with great powers on drafting all resolutions on Somalia that were adopted in 2009 and 2010.[3] During its two presidencies, Uganda scheduled four Council meetings on Somalia to focus member states' attention on Somalia, and it leveraged its position as chair of the Council's working group on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa to draft the Council's decisions on its cooperation with the African Union.[4] Uganda did not push for a transition from the African Union's mission to a UN peace operation but instead advocated the establishment of a UN mission to support and fund AMISOM, whose largest contributor was Uganda itself.[5] During its first month on

[2]Additional motivations include Uganda's desire to improve relations with its allies and donors. Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni reportedly said at a an internal meeting that Uganda deployed its forces to Somalia in order to provide an exit strategy to its ally Ethiopia, which had conquered Mogadishu in December 2006 (interview with a participant in the meeting, conducted in Kampala on 22 July 2014). The intervention in Somalia also helped bolster Uganda's image as a Western ally in the 'war on terror' (Fisher 2012).

[3]Interview with Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda's former ambassador on the Council, conducted in Kampala on 17 July 2014.

[4]Interviews with two Ugandan diplomats on the Council, conducted in Kampala on 17 and 21 July 2014.

[5]Interview with Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Associate Professor of Political Science at Makerere University, conducted in Kampala on 22 July 2014. See also United Nations (2009*a*, p. 17-8).

the Council, Uganda co-authored a resolution that established a UN field support mission in Somalia (UNSOA) with the mandate to bolster AMISOM (United Nations 2009*d*). The resolution also spelled out the first Council mandate for the UN's Nairobi-based diplomatic field mission for Somalia (UNPOS) (Hirsch 2016, fn. 14). Remarkably, the resolution authorized support to AMISOM through the UN's core budget, even though France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and other Council members who were large contributors to the UN budget were opposed to such an arrangement (Security Council Report 2009*b*; Hirsch 2016).

When Uganda became concerned about delays in implementing the resolution caused by some other Council members (Security Council Report 2009*a*), it drafted a Press Statement issued by the Security Council, which called upon Council members and others to support AMISOM (United Nations 2009*a*,*c*). The next month a donor conference for Somalia was held, and the reimbursement rate for AMISOM troops almost doubled (Williams 2009, p. 519-520).

In 2010, Uganda co-sponsored resolutions that increased the size of AMISOM and broadened the scope of UNSOA's support to AMISOM. In July 2010, AMISOM soldiers' pay was increased by 50 percent and the mission's rules of engagement were strengthened at Uganda's request (Kasasira and Muyita 2010). During the same month, the UN established a regional base in Uganda, which was tasked with supporting all UN peace operations in Central and Eastern Africa. This decision was taken due to Uganda's membership in the Security Council.[6]

By the time Uganda left the Security Council, UNSOA's authorized size had grown to 249 UN staff (United Nations 2011, para. 11). UNPOS' personnel increased by 46 percent to 105 authorized posts over the course of Uganda's two-year term (United Nations 2010*b*, 2008*a*). The support for AMISOM Uganda secured from the UN enabled the mission's staff to grow

[6]Interview with a diplomat at Uganda's mission to the UN in 2009 and 2010, conducted in Kampala on 22 July 2014.

from 2,650 to 7,296 during Uganda's two years on the Council.[7] When Uganda's term on the Council ended, it remained heavily engaged in Somalia. In May 2011, Uganda's president and the UN Secretary-General's special representative brokered the Kampala Agreement between the conflict parties, which extended the mandate of the transitional government by a year (Hirsch 2016, p. 607).

1.2 UN sanctions against Eritrea over its role in Somalia

Uganda did not only use its influence in the Security Council to push for a UN field presence in Somalia, but it also took the lead in imposing UN sanctions on Eritrea over its role in Somalia. Eritrea supported Somali armed groups (United Nations 2008*b*, 2006) that opposed the government backed by AMISOM, Uganda, and Ethiopia, Uganda's ally. In 2007, Ethiopia's prime minister unsuccessfully tried to convince the United States government to support sanctions against Eritrea (Tesfamariam N.d.). In May 2009, the Council of Ministers of IGAD, the organization of Eastern African states, called on the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Eritrea (Intergovernmental Authority on Development 2009).

In a meeting with her Ethiopian colleague in August 2009, United States ambassador to the UN Susan Rice deflected a request for American help by responding that any proposal to impose UN sanctions against Eritrea should be an IGAD initiative led by Uganda (Tesfamariam 2011). Representatives of France and the United Kingdom concurred that African Council members should take the lead on UN sanctions against Eritrea when they met with their American colleague in September (*Ibid.*). During the same month, Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni met the United States' ambassador to the United Nations, who endorsed IGAD's proposal to sanction Eritrea (*Ibid.*). Uganda drafted the resolution that

[7]Interview with Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda's former ambassador on the Council, conducted in Kampala on 17 July 2010. For AMISOM's size in 2008 and 2010, see Center on International Cooperation (2009, p. 183) and Center on International Cooperation (2011, p. 156).

imposed targeted sanctions on Eritrea in December (United Nations 2009*b*). IGAD members were the strongest backed of the resolution, while France, the United Kingdom, and the United States offered less active support.[8]

1.3 What explains Uganda's influence on the Council's decisions?

Why did great powers allow Uganda to influence the Security Council's decisions on two issues of great importance to Uganda, even though its voting power in the Council and its material power were very small? Participants in the negotiations on the Council explain this pattern by great powers' desire to secure Uganda's vote on unrelated issues. In the words of Uganda's representative on the Council, a minor power "gets courted by big powers, especially in search for votes for resolutions, and also courts them back to advance its interests ... Indeed, Uganda used its seat to successfully push the anti-Eritrea resolution" (cited in Tabaire and Okao 2010, p. 7). When asked whether this characterization of bargaining on the Council matched his own recollection, a former representative of the United Kingdom confirmed that it did: "This is normal lobbying and interaction. It is part of the normal work of a committee. There is nothing unusual about that statement" by Uganda's ambassador to the UN.[9] Ambassador Günther Pleuger, who represented Germany on the Security Council in 2002 and 2003, agrees that this pattern is not unique to the time when Uganda served on the Council; he holds that in multilateral diplomacy around the Council's horseshoe table "concluding deals across different issues is the most normal thing in the world."[10]

Why were great powers eager to secure Uganda's vote? Diplomats answer that great powers consistently desire to reach consensus rather than pass resolutions with the qualified

[8]Interview with a member of Uganda's mission to the United Nations in 2009 and 2010, conducted in Kampala on 17 July 2014.

[9]Phone interview conducted on 11 March 2015.

[10]Interview conducted in Berlin on 18 February 2015.

majority that suffices under the formal rules. A Ugandan diplomat explains that "the desire to keep the Council united is the driving force".[11] A Costa Rican diplomat who served on the Council during Uganda's term concurs that great powers' desire for consensus was the primary source of minor powers' influence inside the Council.[12] Singapore's former ambassador on the Council agrees that minor powers can gain leverage by threatening to break unanimity, and he concludes that the practice of unanimity levels the playing field between great powers and minor powers (Mahbubani 2004, p. 258). A former ambassador of the United Kingdom confirms that the five great powers with a veto "always aim at consensus", and that they "are always uncomfortable if they only get nine or ten votes" even though these votes are sufficient under the formal rules.[13]

The most intensely debated issue on the UN Security Council's agenda during Uganda's term were sanctions against Iran over its nuclear weapons program. The five countries that joined the Council in January 2009 were expected to "influence the Council's dynamics" on the Iran sanctions issue, because Turkey, Mexico, and Austria prioritized negotiations over new sanctions (Security Council Report 2009*a*). After Russia had blocked the imposition of a fourth set of sanctions in 2008 (Pan and DeYoung 2009), the United States and other proponents of new sanctions knew already at the start of 2009 that the Council would soon conduct fresh negotiations on Iran. Thus, the United States were concerned when Uganda's president paid a state visit to Iran in May 2009 (Observer 2009). Internal memos reportedly show that the United States embassy in Kampala worried about the implications of Iran's promised investment for Uganda's foreign policy decision-making (Butagira 2011).

Negotiations in the Council on additional UN sanctions against Iran accelerated after President Obama secured Russia's consent to discuss new sanctions in September (Cooper

[11]Interview conducted in Kampala on 17 July 2014.
[12]Interview conducted in Princeton on 30 May 2014.
[13]Phone interview conducted on 11 March 2015.

2009). Talks on specific sanctions measures started in February 2010 (Security Council Report 2010*a*). Several Council members including Brazil, Turkey, and Lebanon remained skeptical about new sanctions (Security Council Report 2010*a*). United States negotiators perceived a tension between seeking strong measures and maintaining consensus in the Council (Crawford et al. 2010). Faced with this trade-off, diplomats said that they were willing to accept weaker sanctions in order to build broad support in the Council (Richter and Stack 2010). At a press conference in late March, President Obama (2010) summarized this approach: "Now, do we have unanimity in the international community? Not yet. And that's something we have to work on." Once the Council's permanent members were in agreement, the position of the ten elected members became a "key issue", and great powers focused on consulting them (Security Council Report 2010*b*). A diplomat of a country that favored sanctions explained that "avoiding 'no' votes would make a big symbolic difference", because the proponents of sanctions were eager to "display international unanimity" (Richter 2010).

While Western great powers were eager to secure the votes of minor powers, Iran worked tirelessly to thwart this outcome. It hosted a conference on nuclear disarmament with sixty countries in Tehran in April 2010 (APS Diplomat News Service 2010). The next month, Iran signed an agreement with Council members Turkey and Brazil, promising to send 1,200 kilograms of its Uranium to Turkey (IRIS 2010). According to two Brazilian diplomats, the five veto powers on the Council objected to this agreement, which was reached after these great powers had agreed on imposing new sanctions.[14] When Uganda's ambassador to the UN met his Iranian colleague on April 20, Iran's ambassador expressed the hope that Uganda would join Turkey in trying to help resolve the dispute without new sanctions.[15] Three weeks before the vote on the new sanctions resolution, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

[14]Interview with a member of Brazil's mission to the UN during its term on the Council 2009 and 2010, conducted in Berlin on 18 February 2014. See also Uziel (2014, p. 10-11). United States Secretary of State called the agreement "a transparent ploy" to head off the UN sanctions the United States had been painstakingly pursuing for months (McManus 2010).

[15]A meeting record prepared by a participant is on file with the author.

came to Uganda for a two-day state visit to discuss UN sanctions (Ntale 2010). Iran offered to help Uganda build an oil refinery and to fund a tractor factory and a housing complex in an apparent attempt to sway Uganda's vote (*Ibid.*, Mulliro 2010).

In the end, Uganda voted in favor of stringent new UN sanctions, which were imposed against Iran on June 9 (United Nations 2010*a*,*c*). Thereby Uganda responded in kind for the goodwill great powers had displayed by allowing Uganda to influence the Council's decisions on Somalia and Eritrea. This decision was consistent with a choice to influence the Council's response to nearby crises while consenting to great powers' policy choices on far-away disputes. A senior diplomat in charge of Security Council affairs at the French foreign ministry described this strategy in the following terms: "If you are Uganda, you are interested in the Lord's Resistance Army, South Sudan, and the Horn of Africa, and not Iran and North Korea. I believe that there is a lot of diffuse reciprocity in the Council."[16] Even though Iran sanctions were not a highly salient issue for Uganda, its high-level bilateral diplomacy with Iran in 2009 and 2010 signaled to great powers that they could not take Uganda's vote on Iran sanctions for granted. Since the great powers sought the largest possible consensus and thus valued Uganda's vote on this and other issues, they understood that the Council had to address Uganda's most pressing concerns in return. Thus, Uganda voted in favor of sanctions on Iran without being pressured to do so by the United States (Vatanka 2016).

Two alternative explanations of the UN's deployment of a UN mission in Somalia are implausible. They are based on a change in the preferences of great powers and the UN Secretary-General, which might have coincided with the onset of Uganda's term on the Council. First, the UN Secretary-General was opposed to deploying a UN field presence in Somalia before and during Uganda's term on the Council; his position was due to the

[16]Interview conducted in Paris on 5 August 2015.

high risks associated with this mission and the aversion of his understaffed bureaucracy to take on additional tasks (Associated Press 2008; Security Council Report 2009*a*). Second, the incoming Obama administration, which took office twenty days into Uganda's term on the Council, was less supportive of a UN field presence in Somalia than its predecessor; at her confirmation hearing in the Senate, the new American ambassador to the UN Susan Rice expressed skepticism about the merit of a UN deployment in Somalia (Kessler 2009). Thus, concern about deteriorating piracy off the coast of Somalia did not increase American support for a UN field mission in Somalia in 2009. Similarly, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia were reluctant to give the UN a coordinating role on counter-piracy and did not seek a UN mission that would perform this task (Security Council Report 2009*a*).

To summarize, Uganda influenced the Security Council's decisions on two closely related security challenges in Eastern Africa: the civil war in Somalia and Eritrea's support for rebels. This pattern can be explained by great powers' desire to secure Uganda's vote on unrelated issues, including UN sanctions on Iran, which mattered more to great powers than the conflict in Somalia while being less salient to Uganda than peace in the Horn of Africa. The case study provides suggestive evidence for the argument that great powers strategically share influence with minor powers in order to secure unanimity in the Security Council. The case study also shows that the argument has explanatory power beyond the scope of the quantitative analyses in this paper (i.e., the deployment of UN peace operations). First, it also explains the imposition of sanctions on states in the region of minor powers that serve on the Security Council (e.g., Eritrea). Second, the case study shows that in addition to pushing for UN field missions (e.g., UNSOA and UNPOS) African Council members can also use their influence to lobby for UN support for regional peace operations (e.g., AMISOM).

2 Evidence on the informal influence of the Council's president and of chairs of the Council's subsidiary bodies

As stated in the main text, the informal influence of the Security Council's president greatly exceeds her formal writ. Presidents can violate the Council's formal rules out of political expediency. For instance, Zaire refused to convene an emergency meeting of the Council during Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, even though it lacked the authority to refuse this request (Bosco 2009, 162). In December 2002, the Colombian president of the Council handed the highly sensitive documentation of Iraq's nuclear program, which had been submitted to the UN's weapons inspectors by the Iraqi government, to United States diplomats even though he had been unsuccessful at obtaining the authorization that is required under the Council's formal rules (Bosco 2009, 228).

Council members frequently task the president informally with conducting consultations to reach consensus in the Council. For instance, in late February 1991 the outgoing and incoming presidents (Zimbabwe and Austria) consulted Council members on the terms of a resolution on the cessation of hostilities between Iraq and the U.S.-led coalition to liberate Kuwait (Freudenschuss 1994, 499). As Council president in October 2001, Ireland conducted a series of consultations to achieve unanimity on the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which was created in the wake of 9/11 (Doyle 2004, 84-5).

Council members also allocate agenda-setting power to the president. Council presidents often launch initiatives that shape the Council's work on an issue (Dedring 2008, introduction). As president in January 1999, Brazil organized panels on Iraq's weapons programs and UN sanctions against Iraq, which yielded a framework for the return of UN inspectors to Iraq (Fonseca 2011, 392). As Council president in June 2007, Belgium organized a series of debates and shaped a decision on the exploitation of natural resources in Central Africa

and in particular in its former colony, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Genin and Fischer 2007).

Even though the Council's president lacks formal authority, Council members are acutely aware of its informal influence. In 1990, for instance, the United States rushed to adopt a resolution against Iraq during its own presidency in November and prior to the presidency of Iraq's ally Yemen during the following month, which would "significantly complicate council diplomacy" (Bosco 2009, 159).

In addition to holding the Council's presidency, chairing subsidiary bodies of the Security Council enables minor powers to influence the body's substantive work. Chairs are "expected to play a leading role in forging consensus" among Council members (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [New Zealand] 1995, 46). For instance, Austria's chairmanship of the Iraq sanctions committee in 1991-2 enabled it to broker a compromise between Western and non-aligned members of the Council, to secure humanitarian exemptions, and to augment the importance of the Austrian capital as a hub for UN negotiations (Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten 1993). As chair of the Security Council committee in charge of UN sanctions in Angola in 1999 and 2000, Canada galvanized the Council into taking determined action and into appointing a panel of experts whose devastating report on compliance with the sanctions triggered the creation of a monitoring mechanism (Ryan 2003). Between 1997 and 2015, minor powers with non-permanent membership of the Council held 98 percent of all chairmanships of the Council's working groups and committees.[17]

[17]Author's calculation based on UN records. Unfortunately data on earlier periods is currently not available.

3 Evidence on the plausibility of the assumption about the preferences of African members of the UN Security Council

The evidence in Table A.1 substantiates the plausibility of the assumption that African states that serve on the UN Security Council favor larger UN peace operations in civil-war countries in their own region over smaller or no peace operations. It briefly summarizes 46 statements by African heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, or representatives to the UN in New York who either call for more active interventions by the UN Security Council in African civil wars or criticize the Council for neglecting African civil conflicts. These statements were delivered between 1988 and 2014 either before, during, or after these countries' terms on the Security Council. The name of the country is underlined in Table A.1 if it served on the Security Council when the statement was made. In addition to frequently speaking out in favor of more active UN intervention in civil wars in their region, African Security Council members voted in favor of establishing each of the thirty-three civilian or military peace operations deployed in response to African civil wars during years in which the region of the civil-war theater was represented on the Council (see footnote 9 in the main text). As stated in the main text, preference outliers among African states, which are hostile to UN peacekeeping in Africa, are consistently kept from being elected to the Council.

Since 1988 only two countries in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa served on the UN Security Council while undergoing a civil war: Ethiopia in 1989-90 and Rwanda in 1994-5. While these countries supported the deployment of UN peace operations in their regional neighborhood, they were more skeptical about UN blue helmets in their own country.[18] Even if these two cases do not align with the assumption about the preferences

[18] As a Council member in 1989 and 1990 Ethiopia did not favor the deployment of a UN peace operation in response to its own civil war. In the fall of 1993, Rwanda's lobbying for a UN peace operation in its own country had a decisive impact on the establishment of UNAMIR (de la Sablière 2013, 101-2). During the first four months as a Council member in 1994, Rwanda obstructed this mission and filibustered the Council's consultations on the subject (Keating 2004; Kovanda 2010). As the RPF rebels advanced, the Rwandan

of African Council members, the results generally hold when these outliers are excluded (see Table A.6 and the section on robustness checks below).

government changed its mind and called for UNAMIR to be reinforced in May (United Nations 1994). The government subsequently formed by the RPF also favored a strong UN peace operation (Gambari 2002). The Security Council decreased the size of UNAMIR during the Rwandan government's obstructionist phase and increased it again in May.

Table A.1: African states' expressions of support of UN peace operations in Africa (page 1 of 2)

Summary of statement	**Year**	**Source**
Angola calls for more energetic UNSC action in Angola	1993	Speech at UN
Botswana criticizes UN for neglecting UNPOs in Africa	1992	Kramer (1992)
Botswana pushes UNSC to expand UNPO in Angola	1995	Endeley (2009)
Botswana criticizes that UNPOs in Africa took back seat	2000	Speech at UN
Burkina Faso hopes for quick UNPO in Somalia	2009	Speech at UN
Cameroon welcomes UNPO in Central African Republic	2003	Speech at UN
Cape Verde accuses UN for turning blind eye to Somalia	1992	Liégeois (1993)
Cape Verde seeks more active UN role in African conflicts	1992	Speech at UN
Côte d'Ivoire calls for decisive UN effort in Liberia	1992	Speech at UN
Côte d'Ivoire regrets UNSC's cautious response in Africa	1999	Speech at UN
Djibouti backs UNAMIR during Rwanda genocide	1994	Keating (2004)
Djibouti calls UNAMSIL tragic, laughable PK on the cheap	1999	Speech at UN
DRC calls UNSC timid, wants prompt UN action in DRC	1998	Letter to UNSC
ECOWAS calls on UNSC not to withdraw UNOMIL	1995	Communiqué
Ethiopia justifies presence in Somalia by lack of UNPO	2007	BBC (2007)
Gabon warns against delays of UNPO in DRC	1999	Speech at UN
Gambia finds UNSC's reluctance in Africa unacceptable	1999	Speech at UN
Kenya is concerned about lack of UNPOs in Africa	2000	Speech at UN
Liberia calls for decisive UN action in Liberia	1992	Speech at UN
Liberia asks UN to make same effort there as elsewhere	1995	Speech at UN
Libya criticizes UNSC for lip service to African conflicts	1999	Speech at UN
Libya calls for a UNPO in Somalia	2009	Speech at UN

Table A.1: African states' expressions of support of UN peace operations in Africa (page 2 of 2)

Summary of statement	**Year**	**Source**
Malawi criticizes UNSC for being less attentive to Africa	1999	Speech at UN
Mauritius calls UN essential for avoiding tragedy in Liberia	1992	Speech at UN
Morocco accuses UNSC of turning blind eye to Somalia	1992	Liégeois (1993)
Namibia wants fast UNPO deployment in Sierra Leone	1999	Speech at UN
Namibia urges UN to deploy UNPO to DRC without delay	1999	Speech at UN
Nigeria backs UNAMIR during Rwanda genocide	1994	Keating (2004)
Nigeria pushes for expansion of UNPO in Angola	1995	Endeley (2009)
Nigeria criticizes UNSC's inadequate response in Africa	1999	Speech at UN
Rwanda campaigned for UNPO in Burundi	1993	Ould-Abdallah (2000)
Rwanda backs UNAMIR expansion in May	1994	Speech at UN
Rwanda is angry about UNAMIR delays in the summer	1994	Gambari (2002)
Rwanda pushes for expansion of UNPO in Angola	1995	Endeley (2009)
Rwanda calls for aviation units for UNPO in Sudan	2014	Security Council Report (2014)
Senegal criticizes UNSC for reluctant response in Africa	1999	Speech at UN
Sierra Leone appeals for urgent action by UNSC in Liberia	1992	Speech at UN
Sierra Leone regrets delay in expansion of UNPO in S. L.	1999	Speech at UN
Tanzania deplores lack of political will for UNPO in DRC	2000	Speech at UN
Togo calls for urgent measures by UNSC in Liberia	1992	Speech at UN
OAU Sec.-Gen. says that UNSC's inaction in Africa kills	1999	Speech at UN
Uganda urges UNSC to establish UNPO in Somalia	2009	Speech at UN
Zambia desires increase in size of UNPO in Namibia	1989	Hampson (1996)
Zambia asks UN to respond faster in African crises	1999	Speech at UN
Zimbabwe says UNSC is turning blind eye to Somalia	1992	Liégeois (1993)
Zimbabwe calls for immediate UNSC measures on Liberia	1992	Speech at UN

4 Estimators for the design-based analyses of hypotheses 1-3

4.1 Hypothesis 1 on the influence of African minor powers

The estimator of the average treatment effect is the difference between the change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during months when the region is represented on the Security Council (treatment group) and the change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during months when the region is not represented on the Security Council (control group). This estimator can be expressed as

$$\overline{\Delta\, Y_T} - \overline{\Delta\, Y_C} = \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i_t \epsilon T} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}}) - \frac{1}{N_C} \sum_{i_t \epsilon C} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}}) \tag{1}$$

where Y_{i_t} is the number of military and civilian personnel of UN peace operations deployed to any civil-war country in region i in month t, $i_t \, \epsilon \, T$ designates the as-if-random assignment of African region i to the treatment group in month t under the rotation system devised in the 1960s, and $i_t \, \epsilon \, C$ designates the as-if-random assignment of region i to the control group in month t, while $t-1$ designates the month prior to month t, and N_T and N_C are the number of observations in the treatment and control group, respectively. Thus, the unit of analysis is the region-month, and the treatment status indicates whether region i is represented on the Security Council during month t or not. In line with the definition of the estimator above, region-months are only included in the analysis if at least one civil war was ongoing in the region at the time.

The secondary estimator is the difference between the change in the budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during years when the region is represented on the Security Council (treatment group) and the corresponding measure during years when the region is not represented on the Security Council (control group). The same

equations are used to express this quantity, except that Y_{i_t} is now defined as the size of the budget of UN peace operations deployed to any civil-war country in region i in year t and $Y_{i_{t-1}}$ is the corresponding figure during the year prior to year t. This analysis is conducted at the level of the region-year since the UN does not adopt monthly peacekeeping budgets.

All analyses of the size and budget of UN peace operations are conducted at the geographic level of treatment assignment, which is the region, in order to account for clustered treatment assignment to all African countries in the same region. Since the clusters vary by size, cluster totals are used instead of cluster means to avoid ratio-estimator bias (Dunning 2012, 184-5).

4.2 Hypothesis 2 on variation in African minor powers' influence by the salience of the Security Council's work outside Africa

The estimator indicates a difference in difference: it measures the average difference between the effect of an African region's rotating Council representation on the number of UN blue helmets deployed to African civil-war countries during months when the Council's agenda is important outside Africa and the corresponding effect at other times. In other words, it measures the average difference between the quantity described in equation 1 during important years and the corresponding quantity during other years. It can be expressed as

$$(\overline{\Delta\, Y_{T_1}} - \overline{\Delta\, Y_{C_1}}) - (\overline{\Delta\, Y_{T_2}} - \overline{\Delta\, Y_{C_2}}) = \tag{2}$$

$$\Big(\frac{1}{N_{T_1}} \sum_{i_t \epsilon T_1} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}}) - \frac{1}{N_{C_1}} \sum_{i_t \epsilon C_1} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}})\Big) - \Big(\frac{1}{N_{T_2}} \sum_{i_t \epsilon T_2} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}}) - \frac{1}{N_{C_2}} \sum_{i_t \epsilon C_2} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}})\Big)$$

where T_1 designates the as-if-random assignment of African region i to representation on the Security Council in month t while the Council's non-Africa-related agenda is highly salient,

T_2 designates the as-if-random assignment of African region i to representation on the Council in month t when the Council's non-Africa-related agenda is less critical, C_1 designates the assignment of African region i to absence from the Council in month t when the Council's non-Africa-related agenda is highly salient, and C_2 designates the assignment of African region i to lack of Council representation in month t when the Council's non-Africa-related work is less important.

4.3 Hypothesis 3 on variation in African minor powers' influence due to the rotating presidency of the Council

The estimator measures the difference between the average number of UN blue helmets deployed to civil-war countries in regions that are represented on the UN Security Council to the corresponding number deployed while the region's representative on the Council is not only a member of the Council but also benefits from holding the Council's presidency (see Online Appendix). This estimator can be expressed as follows:

$$(\overline{\Delta\, Y_{T_3}} - \overline{\Delta\, Y_C}) - (\overline{\Delta\, Y_{T_4}} - \overline{\Delta\, Y_C}) = \overline{\Delta\, Y_{T_3}} - \overline{\Delta\, Y_{T_4}} = \tag{3}$$

$$\frac{1}{N_{T_3}} \sum_{i_t \epsilon T_3} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}}) - \frac{1}{N_{T_4}} \sum_{i_t \epsilon T_4} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}})$$

where T_3 designates the as-if-random assignment of African region i to the treatment group in month t while i's representative derives an additional benefit from presiding over the Council, T_4 designates the as-if-random assignment of African region i to the treatment group in month t without holding the presidency, and C_1 designates the assignment of African region i to lack of representation on the Council in month t. Due to anticipation effects, the incoming presidents are also expected to benefit from the heightened leverage associated with the presidency. At the same time, some of the additional peacekeepers may

only arrive in African conflict theaters shortly after the presidency ends. Therefore, the two months before and after the presidency are also part of the period during which minor powers are expected to derive benefits associated with presiding over the Council.[19]

[19]The results are robust to specifying different time periods (see section 7 below).

5 Descriptive statistics

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Median	Min.	Max.
Outcome variables					
Monthly change in UNPO size	636	14	0	-6,721	2,689
Annual change in UNPO size	53	168	0	-6,013	5,241
Annual change in non-UNPO size	53	536	0	-448	8,615
Annual change in UNPO budget (in MM USD)	53	11.9	0	-561.5	503.7
As-if-randomly assigned treatments					
UNSC representation	636	0.42	0	0	1
UNSC salience: important period	636	0.40	0	0	1
UNSC presidency ±1 months	636	0.08	0	0	1
UNSC presidency ±2 months	636	0.14	0	0	1
UNSC presidency ±3 months	636	0.18	0	0	1
Covariates for multivariate models and covariate balance tests					
Number of battle deaths	588	4,788	2,642	1,000	56,740
Civil wars with foreign troop support	492	0.43	0	0	2
New peace agreements	600	0.04	0	0	1
Peace agreements broken	600	0.01	0	0	1
Democratic regime (avg.)	532	-4.80	-6.00	-7.50	5.00

Note: The table provides summary statistics for the region-months dataset, except for the change in UN peace operations budgets, which are adopted annually and therefore cannot be temporally disaggregated below the level of region-years. The measures of change in UNPO size and budget, battle-related deaths, foreign interventions, and new and broken peace agreements represent the sum of the respective measure for all civil wars in a region during the same month. The democratic regime measure indicates the median political regime characteristics for all civil-war countries in a region during the same month. Variation in the number of observations is due to the fact that some control variables have not been coded for the entire period of observation (see note in Table A.2 in the Online Appendix) and missing values on democratic regime characteristics for some civil-war countries.

Data on African regions' representation on the Security Council was obtained from the Council's website. Data on Security Council presidencies was extracted from the Security Council's meeting records and coded for this study. The number of New York Times articles with the words "Security Council" and either "United Nations" or "UN" over the most recent six months was obtained by searching the Lexis Nexis Academic database; to exclude articles on African security issues, articles that mention Africa or any African country that experienced armed conflict during the period of analysis or the preceding two decades were not taken into account.

Data on battle deaths was coded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2014) and data on peace agreements was presented by Högbladh (2012). Due to limited data availability, the analyses of battle deaths and peace agreements are restricted to the periods from 1989 to 2013 and from 1988 to 2011, respectively. Data on political regime characteristics was coded by Marshall and Jaggers (2002) until 2013. The number of civil wars per region in which either side received foreign troops was only investigated for the period from 1990 to 2009, for which Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér (2011) coded this variable.

Table A.3: List of civil wars in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, 1988-2014

Location	**Duration**	**UN peace operation**	**UN civ. mission**	**non-UN peace op.**
Algeria	1994-1999	No	No	No
Angola	1988-1990, 1992-1994, 1998-2001	Yes	Yes	No
Burundi	2000-2002	No	Yes	Yes
Chad	1990, 2006	Yes	No	Yes
DRC	1996-2000, 2013	Yes	No	Yes
Ethiopia	1988-1991	No	No	No
Libya	2011	No	Yes	Yes
Mozambique	1988-1991	No	No	No
Rep. of Congo	1997-1998	No	No	No
Rwanda	1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2009	Yes	No	Yes
Somalia	1988, 1990-1992, 2007-2012, 2014	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Sudan	2013	Yes	No	Yes
Sudan	1988-1992, 1995-2004, 2006, 2010-2012	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uganda	1988-1989, 1996, 2002, 2004	No	No	No

Note: The table lists all countries in the four African regions with rotating Security Council representation that experienced civil wars between 1988 and 2014. The study relies on the conventional definition of civil war in Themnér and Wallensteen (2014). Civil war is defined as one or several simultaneous disputes over generally incompatible positions that: 1) concern government and/or territory in a state; 2) are causally linked to the use of force, resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths during a given year during the conflict; and 3) involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties are the government of the state where armed force is used, and one or several non-state opposition organizations. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (2014, 1-3, 8). Data on battle-related deaths from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2015) was used to identify civil wars.

The table also indicates whether a UN or non-UN peace operation was deployed at any point during the civil war or in its immediate aftermath; peace operations that were established more than a year after the end of the civil war are not taken into account. Data on the end-of-month staff size of these peace operations was obtained from the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Data is missing from this source prior to November 1990. These missing values were imputed from the official Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council and from other primary sources.

Figure A.1: UN peace operations in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, and worldwide, 1988-2014



Note: The figure on top displays the number of personnel in UN peace operations deployed in Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Africa (solid line) and worldwide (dashed line). The figure in the middle shows the total expenditure in constant 2014 US dollars for UN peace operations in these four African regions (solid lines) and across the world (dashed line). The figure at the bottom displays the size (solid line) and budget (dotted line) of UN peace operations in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa as a percentage of the size and budget of all UN peace operations in the world. During the entire post-Cold War era, almost one third of UN peacekeepers worldwide was deployed to Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa, and almost four in ten US dollars spent on UN peacekeeping financed peace operations in these four regions. During the 2000s, the share of these four regions steadily increased to 63 percent of the UN's total peacekeeping budget and 59 percent of the personnel deployed to UN peace operations (as of December 2014).

Table A.4: List of UN peace operations and civilian missions in civil-war theaters in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, 1988-2014

Acronym	**Civil war**	**Type**	**Start date**	**End date**	**Max. staff size**	**Max. budget in MM USD**
UNAVEM I	Angola	PO	12/1988	5/1991	70	10.4
UNAVEM II	Angola	PO	5/1991	2/1995	487	117.4
MONUA	Angola	PO	6/1997	2/1999	4,220	251.0
UNOA	Angola	civ.	10/1999	8/2002	114	N/A
UNOB	Burundi	civ.	10/1993	6/2004	58	N/A
UN Assist. to Burundi Peace Process Facilitator	Burundi	civ.	3/1996	1/2001	3	N/A
MONUC	DRC	PO	11/1999	6/2010	20,819	1,444.2
MONUSCO	DRC	PO	7/2010	ongoing	21,485	1,571.2
UNSMIL	Libya	civ.	9/2011	ongoing	246	N/A
UNAMIR	Rwanda	PO	10/1993	3/1996	6,138	361.1
UNOSOM I	Somalia	PO	4/1992	3/1993	947	122.2
UNPOS	Somalia	civ.	4/1995	6/2013	90	N/A
UNSOA	Somalia	PO	1/2009	ongoing	489	458.2
UNSOM	Somalia	civ.	6/2013	ongoing	59	N/A
UNMISS	South Sudan	PO	7/2011	ongoing	11,451	926.8
UNAMIS	Sudan	civ.	6/2004	3/2005	342	N/A
UNMIS	Sudan	PO	3/2005	7/2011	10,519	1,216.3
UNAMID	Sudan	PO	11/2007	ongoing	23,466	1,928.8
UNISFA	Sudan	PO	6/2011	ongoing	4,128	344.5

Note: The table describes all 12 UN peace operations (PO) and 7 civilian missions (civ.) that were deployed during civil wars in Central, Eastern, Southern, or North Africa between 1988 and 2014. UN peace operations that were established after the end of the civil war are not taken into account. Missions are described as ongoing if they were in place at the end of the temporal scope of analysis in December 2014. For each peace operation, maximal budget size corresponds to the largest amount that was appropriated for a single calendar year (in million 2014 USD). Data on the budget of civilian missions is not yet available.

Between 1988 and 2014, six peace operations were located in Eastern Africa, five in Central Africa, one in Southern Africa, and none in North Africa. Three civilian missions were located in Eastern Africa while Central hosted two. Two missions were located in North and Southern Africa, respectively.

Table A.5: List of non-UN peace operations and civilian missions in civil-war theaters in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, 1988-2014

Acronym	**Intervening IO or state**	**Civil war**	**Start date**	**End date**	**Maximal staff size**
OMIB	OAU	Burundi	2/1994	7/1996	67
OAU Observer Mission	OAU	DRC	11/1999	11/2000	33
EUSEC RD Congo	EU	DRC	6/2005	ongoing	82
EUPOL RD Congo	EU	DRC	7/2007	ongoing	57
OUP	NATO	Libya	3/2011	10/2007	8,080
Opération Turquoise	France	Rwanda	6/1994	8/1994	2,500
UNITAF	Coalition	Somalia	12/1992	5/1993	35,000
AMISOM	AU	Somalia	3/2007	ongoing	17,590
EU NAVFOR Somalia	EU	Somalia	10/2008	ongoing	1,945
Operation Ocean Shield	NATO	Somalia	8/2009	ongoing	800
Anti-piracy mission	China	Somalia	10/2009	ongoing	800
EUTM Somalia	EU	Somalia	4/2010	ongoing	142
EUCAP Nestor	EU	Somalia	10/2012	ongoing	59
EUAVSEC South Sudan	EU	South Sudan	10/2012	1/2014	49
AMIS	AU	Sudan	5/2004	12/2007	7,239
EU support for AMIS	EU	Sudan	5/2004	12/2007	47

Note: The table describes all 16 non-UN peace operations and civilian missions that were deployed during civil wars in Central, Eastern, Southern, or North Africa between 1988 and 2014. Missions that were established after the end of the civil war are not taken into account. Missions are described as ongoing if they were in place at the end of the temporal scope of analysis in December 2014. On average, these 16 missions fielded 1,789 civilian and military staff to African civil-war countries, and they were thus similar in size to UN peace operations. Civil-war theaters in Eastern Africa hosted ten non-UN peace operations. Five missions were sent to Central Africa, one to North Africa, and none to Southern Africa. An original data set of yearly changes in the size of non-UN peace operations was coded for this study from various primary and secondary sources.

Figure A.2: Measure of salience of UN Security Council's agenda



Note: The figure displays the time series of the measure of the salience of the UN Security Council's non-Africa-related agenda between 1988 and 2014. It shows the moving average over the most recent six months of the number of New York Times articles that refer to the UN Security Council. To exclude references to the Council's conflict-related work in Africa, articles were excluded if they mention either Africa or any African county that experienced an armed conflict either during the period of analysis or in the preceding two decades. The dashed horizontal line depicts the mean of this measure. Observations above the mean are months during which the Council's non-Africa-related agenda was highly salient and are highlighted in grey. The plot also identifies crises that preoccupied the Council at times during periods when its work outside Africa was particularly important.

6 Summary of results from quantitative analyses

Table A.6 displays the results of three sets of tests of the effect of exogenous variation in African regions' representation on the Security Council on the size and budget of UN peace operations deployed in civil-war countries in these regions (average treatment effect). It shows that the p-values obtained from Welch's t-test and from non-parametric bootstraps with 5,000 bootstrap replicates are largely consistent with those obtained from a permutation test with 200,000 randomly drawn permutations of the data. Analyses of the staff size of civilian UN missions and of non-UN peace operations and analyses of UN peace operations' budgets are conducted with region-year observations, because monthly data on these variables is not available. The other tests are conducted with region-month observations. The tests of the effect of representation on the Security Council (hypotheses 1 and 2) cluster region-months observations in region-two-year intervals that correspond to terms on or off the Council. Since the tests of hypotheses 2 and 3 leverage monthly variation in the salience of the Council's agenda and in the incumbency of the presidency, they are only conducted with data on the staff size of UN peace operations, because monthly data on UN peace operations' budgets is not available. Since budget data is not yet available for civilian UN missions and non-UN peace operations, the placebo test and the robustness check that includes civilian UN missions only investigate the change in the size of peace operations. For detailed descriptions of the robustness checks and placebo test see sections 7 and 9 below.

Summary of hypotheses:

Hyp. 1: The average increase in the staff size (budget) of UN peace operations in civil-war theaters is larger when the region of the civil-war theater is represented on the Security Council than it is when the region lacks representation on the Council.

Hyp. 2: The positive average effect of representation on the Security Council on the staff

size of UN peace operations in African regions with rotating representation on the Council is larger when this body's agenda outside Africa is particularly salient than it is at times when the Council's work in other continents is less important.

Hyp. 3: The average increase in the staff size of UN peace operations in civil-war theaters is larger when the region of the civil-war theater benefits from holding the Security Council's presidency than it is when the region is merely represented on the Council.

Table A.6: Comparison of results of permutation tests, Welsh's t-tests, and non-parametric bootstrapping

Test	**Average treatment effect**	**N obs.**	**N clusters**	**p (Perm. test)**	**p (Welch's t-test)**	**Boot-stap**
Analyses of change in the size of UN peace operations' staff						
Main analyses						
Effect of SC representation (hyp. 1)	77 PO staff/month	636	33	0.02	0.03	0.01
Effect of SC repres.: important periods (hyp. 2)	129 PO staff/month	253	23	0.02	0.03	0.02
Effect of SC repres.: less important periods (hyp. 2)	38 PO staff/month	383	27	0.16	0.18	0.13
Diff-in-diff: Effect of SC repres. (hyp. 2)	90 PO staff/month	636	33	0.06	N/A	0.08
Effect of SC presidency (hyp. 3)	101 PO staff/month	264	15	0.01	0.03	0.03
Robustness checks						
Effect of SC repres.: incl. civilian missions (hyp. 1)	911 PO staff/year	53	33	0.02	0.02	0.01
Effect of SC repres.: excl. regional staff (hyp. 1)	77 PO staff/month	636	33	0.02	0.03	0.01
Effect of SC repres.: excl. reg. staff: imp. periods (hyp. 2)	129 PO staff/month	253	23	0.02	0.03	0.02
Effect of SC repres.: excl. reg. staff: less imp. per. (hyp. 2)	38 PO staff/month	383	27	0.16	0.18	0.13
Effect of SC repres.: excl. reg. staff: diff-in-diff (hyp. 2)	91 PO staff/month	636	33	0.06	N/A	0.08
Effect of SC presidency: excl. reg. staff (hyp. 3)	87 PO staff/month	264	15	0.03	0.05	0.05
Effect of SC repres.: region-two-year observations (hyp. 1)	1,948 PO staff/2 ys.	33	none	0.04	0.04	0.02
Effect of SC presidency: pres. ±1 month (hyp. 3)	103 PO staff/month	264	15	0.03	0.09	0.07
Effect of SC presidency: pres. ±3 months (hyp. 3)	87 PO staff/month	264	15	0.02	0.02	0.05
Effect of SC repres.: excl. Eth., Rwa. (hyp. 1)	64 PO staff/month	612	32	0.04	0.05	0.03
Effect of SC repres.: excl. Eth., Rwa.: imp. periods (hyp. 2)	98 PO staff/month	241	22	0.05	0.04	0.05
Effect of SC repres.: excl. Eth., Rwa.: less imp. per. (hyp. 2)	40 PO staff/month	371	27	0.15	0.18	0.13
Effect of SC repres.: excl. Eth., Rwa.: diff-in-diff (hyp. 2)	58 PO staff/month	612	32	0.18	N/A	0.19
Effect of SC presidency: excl. Eth., Rwa. (hyp. 3)	51 PO staff/month	240	14	0.07	0.05	0.10
Placebo test						
Effect of SC repres. on non-UN PO staff (placebo effect)	-45 PO staff/year	53	33	0.57	0.55	0.55
Effect of SC repres. on UN PO staff (treatment effect)	920 PO staff/year	53	33	0.02	0.02	0.01
Analyses of change in the size of UN peace operations' budget						
Effect of SC representation (hyp. 1)	USD 70 MM/year	53	33	0.07	0.04	0.05
Effect of SC repres.: region-two-year observations (hyp. 1)	USD 208 MM/2 ys.	33	none	0.03	0.03	0.02

Note: Please refer to the explanation of this table on the preceding two pages. For details on the robustness checks and placebo test see sections 7 and 9 below. For the results of the covariate balance tests please refer to Table A.7 below.

7 Robustness checks

The results reported in the main text hold in several robustness checks. First, they are robust to including annual data on seven civilian missions in addition to the twelve peace operations analyzed in the previous section. During years when a state in a region that experiences a civil war is represented on the Security Council, 911 more staff, on average, were dispatched to peace operations or civilian missions in that region than in years without a regional representative on the Council. Table A.6 shows that this difference is significant in permutation tests ($p<0.02$).[20]

A second robustness check confirms that the results are not an artifact of troop contributions by the African state that temporarily represents the region of the civil-war theater on the Security Council, even though temporary Council members often increase their own contributions to peace operations (Voeten 2014). This test replicates the analyses in the previous section without taking into account blue helmets that an African Security Council member provided in its region. The size and significance of the effect of African regions' representation on the number of UN peacekeepers remain unchanged (77 more staff per month; $p<0.02$). The results on the stronger effect during important crises outside Africa and while holding the Council's presidency are generally robust to excluding these peacekeepers as well (see Table A.6 above).

The third robustness check shows that the results are not caused by serial correlation between the monthly observations in the same two-year term on the Council. Since every non-permanent Security Council member serves on this body for two consecutive years, a region's treatment status in a given month is not independent of its treatment status during the previous month. Therefore, the data is aggregated to the level of region-two-year units

[20]Data on the budget of civilian UN missions and monthly data on their size, which would be needed to test the second and third hypotheses, is unavailable.

for this test. Aggregation reduces the number of observations by 95 percent, from 636 to 33, but it does not substantively alter the results.[21] The average number and budget of UN peacekeepers sent to civil-war theaters in a region that was represented on the Council were significantly higher (by 1,948 staff and USD 208 million over the course of a two-year term) than the corresponding figures for two-year intervals during which no state in the region was a member of the Council. Permutation tests show that these differences are unlikely to have arisen merely by chance ($p<0.03$ and $p<0.04$ for UN peacekeeping budgets and size, respectively: see Figure 3 in the main text and A.6 above).

Fourth, additional permutation tests show that the results on the Council's presidency are robust to specifying different time periods during which minor powers are expected to benefit from presiding over the Council. In the main analyses, the two months before and after the monthlong presidency are part of the period during which minor powers are expected to derive benefits associated with presiding over the Council.[22] When this time period is extended to ± 3 months or shortened to ± 1 month, the effect of holding the Council's presidency remains significant in permutation tests ($p<0.02$ and $p<0.03$, respectively: see Table A.6 above).

Finally, additional robustness checks remove the only two African countries that experienced civil wars while serving on the UN Security Council from the analysis. Ethiopia experienced a civil war during its term on the Council between 1989 and 1990 and Rwanda went through a civil war while it was a Council member in 1994 and 1995. For these two states the identifying assumption that African members of the Security Council favor more and better funded UN blue helmets in civil-war theaters in their own region may not hold,

[21] Permutation tests are well-suited for this low number of observations (Keele, McConnaughy and White 2012).

[22] Due to anticipation effects, the incoming presidents are also expected to benefit from the heightened leverage associated with the presidency. At the same time, some of the additional peacekeepers may only arrive in African conflict theaters shortly after the month-long presidency ends.

because they may also have had competing incentives to avoid multilateral intervention in their own domestic armed conflict. Fn. 18 above provides qualitative evidence on the preferences of these two states during their term on the Council. The results are generally robust to excluding Ethiopia's and Rwanda's terms on the Security Council in 1989-90 and 1994-5 (see Table A.6 above). The effect of holding a seat on the Council remains significant in all tests. As expected, tests of heterogeneous effects show that this effect is only significant at the conventional level when the Council's agenda outside Africa is particularly important. At the same time, dropping some observations attenuates the significance of the effect of the Council's presidency in two of the three analyses; this is presumably due to the loss of statistical power.

8 Covariate balance

The 'as-if-random' assignment of the representation status of African regions on the Security Council implies that the pretreatment characteristics of region-months with and without regional representation on the Council are equal in expectation. The fact that the four regions rotate on and off the Council suggests that the treatment and control groups are balanced with respect to time-invariant factors that determine the likelihood of UN peacekeeping (such as terrain or colonial ties with a permanent member of the Security Council). Even so, African civil-war parties or their external supporters might take into account the region's representation (or lack thereof) on the Security Council in their planning, and they could thus pursue different strategies during years when a region is represented on the Council than at other times. Sensitivity analyses do not reveal any evidence of such strategic behavior. Permutation tests do not show significant differences between months when the region of the conflict theater was represented on the Council and years when no state in that region served on the Council on these measures: the number battle-related deaths they inflicted, the rate at which they concluded or broke peace agreements, the extent of foreign troop support they received, or the characteristics of the governing regime (see Tables A.2 and A.7 for results, descriptive statistics, and data sources). Additional permutation tests indicate that that there are no significant covariate imbalances on these variables between months when the Security Council's agenda outside Africa was particularly important and months when its work was less salient. Finally, they do not indicate systematic differences (at the 95 percent confidence level) between months when a country in the region of the conflict theater presided over the Council and other months.

Table A.7: Covariate balance tests

Variable	N	Mean in treatment group	Mean in control group	Difference in means	p-value (Perm. test)
Comparison of months with and without a seat on the UN Security Council					
Number of battle deaths	636	6,493	3,577	2,917	0.29
Foreign troop support	492	0.56	0.35	0.21	0.20
New peace agreements	600	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.23
Peace agreements broken	600	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.26
Democratic regime	532	-5.04	-4.62	-0.43	0.34
Comparison of months with and without salient UN Security Council agenda					
Number of battle deaths	636	4,618	4,900	-282	0.40
Foreign troop support	492	0.30	0.57	-0.28	0.12
New peace agreements	600	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.16
Peace agreements broken	600	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.42
Democratic regime	532	-5.25	-4.53	-0.72	0.24
Comparison of months with and without UN Security Council presidency					
Number of battle deaths	636	5,895	4,612	1,283	0.12
Foreign troop support	492	0.56	0.42	0.14	0.07
New peace agreements	600	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.48
Peace agreements broken	600	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.16
Democratic regime	532	-4.83	-4.79	-0.04	0.48

Note: This table displays the results of covariate balance tests, which confirm that those characteristics of civil-war countries that may determine the baseline prospects of UN blue helmet deployments are not systematically different while they are represented on the UN Security Council, while their region benefits from the influence of the Council's presidency, and while the Council's agenda in other world regions is particularly salient than they are at other times. Permutation tests investigate the alternative hypothesis that the absolute value of the difference in means is significantly larger than zero; evidence of covariate imbalance is found if the null hypothesis is rejected. The first five tests are conducted with region-month observations clustered in region-two-year intervals that correspond to a term on the Council. The models shown in Table A.9 show that the OLS regression results are robust to controlling for these potential confounders. Note that the considerable (albeit insignificant) difference between the mean number of battle deaths during years when the civil-war theater's region was represented on the Council and the corresponding average during other years is largely due to Ethiopia's civil war in 1990, which is an outlier in terms of the numbers of battle-related fatalities. Omitting it reduces the treatment group mean to 4,234 battle deaths and the difference in means to 657 fatalities. This difference in means is also insignificant ($p<0.35$) in a permutation test.

9 Placebo test

A placebo test addresses the concern that the sensitivity analyses cannot capture unobservable confounders of the estimates presented above. If African regions were represented on the Security Council during years in which the baseline probability of international peacekeeping deployment was particularly high, we would expect that more non-UN peacekeepers were dispatched to civil wars during those years than during other years. On the other hand, we would not expect such a difference in non-UN peacekeeping deployments if the observed difference in UN peacekeeping deployments was due to variation in Africa's participation in the Security Council's deliberations and decision-making, because the rotation of UN Security Council seats should primarily affect UN deployments. The placebo test compares the average change in the size of 16 non-UN peace operations during years when an African region was represented on the UN Security Council to the corresponding figure during years when no state in that region served on the Council (see Table A.5 in the Online Appendix). The insignificant placebo effect of 45 fewer staff for non-UN peace operations contrasts with the significant treatment effect of 920 additional UN peacekeepers per year. While it is impossible to rule out that the difference between placebo effect and treatment effect is due to diverging logics of UN intervention and other interventions, the placebo test suggests that the Security Council's particularly active response to African civil wars when the region of the civil-war theater was represented on the Council was not due to systematic differences between the pre-treatment characteristics of civil wars in the treatment and control groups.

10 Procedure for conducting permutation tests and additional tests

The permutation tests reported in the main text are conducted by executing the following procedure. First, a matrix composed of three vectors is constructed. The first vector records the change in the number of UN peacekeepers from the previous month for each region-month observation. The second vector records the treatment status for each region-month. The third vector contains the region-two-year cluster ID of each region-month observation. Subsequently, the values of the second vector are randomly reassigned many times so that all units in the same cluster share the same treatment status, and the resulting matrices are stored. The analysis of UN peacekeeping budgets follows the same procedure, except that the first vector records the change in the budget from the previous year. The test of hypothesis 2 relies on a matrix with four vectors, which include two treatment vectors, whose values are independently reshuffled. The two treatments in this test are African regions' rotating representation on the Security Council and the salience of the Council's work outside Africa, respectively. The test of hypothesis 3 does not require all units in the same region-two-year cluster to share the same treatment status, because it investigates the effect of holding the Council's month-long presidency.

10.1 Additional tests of the effect of representation on the Council

These permutation tests replicate the data-generating process except that they relax the restriction that each region must be represented on the Council for two years in a row and absent for the subsequent two years. Implementing this restriction drastically reduces the number of possible permutations of the observed pattern of rotation of Council seats between African regions. Figure A.3 depicts all 24 possible permutations of the rotation schedule,

which includes the observed pattern (on the top left). If the null hypothesis is correct and minor powers lack influence in the Security Council, the Council's response to civil wars in Africa is the same, in expectation, irrespective of whether the region of the civil-war theater was represented on the Council or not. Since the treatment is immaterial for the outcome if the null hypothesis is true, one should obtain outcomes that are similar to the observed outcome even if the treatment is randomly reassigned across observations. The 24 plots in Figure A.3 depicts all possible ways in which the treatment can be randomly reshuffled across observations while following the restriction that for each region two years on the Council must be followed by two years without Council representation. For each data permutation the figure also displays the average difference between the number of UN blue helmets dispatched to civil-war countries during months with Council representation and the corresponding figure during other months (ATE). Only one of these average differences is as strongly positive as the observed ATE. Thus, the likelihood that random chance would generate a positive result that is at least as pronounced as the actual ATE is less than 5%. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that representation on the Council does not have any effect on the deployment of UN blue helmets. In conclusion, the permutation test that implements the restriction that is relaxed for the permutation tests that are reported in the main text yields substantively the same results.

The permutation test described in the previous paragraph replicates the data-generating process except that it relaxes a single restriction in the real-world rotation schedule: one Council seat is always held by Central or Northern Africa while the other is alternately held by Eastern or Southern Africa. When this restriction is implemented, the number of possible data permutations further declines to eight, which include the observed outcome. They are labeled as permutations 1-8 in Figure A.3. Neither of these permutations produces a positive result that is at least as pronounced as the observed ATE (see Figure A.3). Thus, we can conclude that random chance is an unlikely explanation of the observed positive

Figure A.3: Permutation tests of the effect of representation on the UN Security Council with alternative assumptions on the data-generating process



Note: The top left plot displays the observed rotation of Security Council seats between African regions and its observed effect on the monthly number of additional UN blue helmets dispatched to civil-war countries in a given region when that region is represented on the Council (ATE). The other plots depict permutations of this rotation pattern and the corresponding average difference between months with and without Council representation. Only one of these average differences is as strongly positive as the observed ATE. Thus, the likelihood that we would observed a positive result that is as extreme as the actual ATE merely due to random chance is less than 5%. Years with Council representation are shaded in grey and other years appear in white. The region names are abbreviated as follows: N = North Africa; C = Central Africa; E = Eastern Africa; S = Southern Africa.

effect of minor powers' Council representation on the body's response to civil wars in the minor powers' regional neighborhood ($p<0.01$).[23] The result of this additional permutation test corroborates the findings from tests reported in the main text and in the preceding paragraph.

10.2 Additional tests of the effect of the Council's presidency

The permutation tests of the third hypothesis that are reported in the main text replicate the data-generating process except that they relax the restriction that the names of the countries that hold successive presidencies follow each other in the English alphabet within the set of fifteen Council members. When this restriction is implemented, the number of possible permutations drastically declines to fifteen. In each of these permutations, a different Council member held the presidency during the first month in the period of analysis (January 1988), and the timing of all subsequent presidencies follows from the order of Council members' names in the English alphabet. In the observed version of this rotation pattern, the Council's presidency was assigned to the United Kingdom in January 1988, and thus the United States presided over the Council during the subsequent month, followed by Yugoslavia. For each permutation the average difference between the number of UN blue helmets dispatched to civil-war countries during months in which the Council's president was a minor power in the region of the conflict theater (± 2 months to account for anticipation effects and deployment delays: see main text) and the corresponding figure during other months can be calculated. In neither permutation this average difference is as large as the actually observed difference (ATE). The permutation test, which compares the observed outcome to the result in fourteen permutations of the data where the treatment variable was reshuffled, thus indicates that random chance is an unlikely explanation of the real-world

[23] Since permutation tests do not rely on any parametric assumptions they are well-suited for this low number of observations (Keele, McConnaughy and White 2012).

ATE. Therefore we can reject the null hypothesis that holding the Council's presidency does not have any effect on the deployment of UN blue helmets. In conclusion, the findings from the permutation tests reported in the main text are not merely due to the fact that these tests relaxed a restriction for the data-generating process. The results hold when this additional restriction is implemented. Table A.8 displays the result for each permutation as well as the observed ATE. For each permutation, the table also identifies the country that held the presidency in January 1988.

Table A.8: Permutation tests of the effect of the UN Security Council presidency with alternative assumptions on the data-generating process

Permutation number	**UNSC president in January 1988**	**ATE**
Observed	**United Kingdom**	**101**
1	United States	14
2	Yugoslavia	-6
3	Zambia	-3
4	Algeria	-7
5	Argentina	-8
6	Brazil	-8
7	China	-10
8	France	-11
9	Germany	-12
10	Italy	-11
11	Japan	97
12	Nepal	41
13	Senegal	41
14	Soviet Union	41

Note: The top row of this plot displays the observed rotation of the Security Council's presidency between the fifteen Council members and its observed effect on the monthly number of additional UN blue helmets dispatched to civil-war countries in a given region when a minor power in that region benefited from the presidency's informal authority (ATE). The other rows indicate the 14 alternative permutations of this rotation pattern and the corresponding average difference between months with and without presidency. Neither of these average differences is as large as the observed ATE. Thus, we can conclude at the conventional confidence level that a positive result that is as extreme as the actual ATE unlikely materializes merely due to random chance. This result aligns with the findings from permutation tests reported in the main text. Thus, the findings are robust to alternative assumptions about the data-generating process.

11 OLS regressions

OLS models yield findings that are fully consistent with those obtained from the permutation tests, bootstrapping, and Welch's t-tests, which are reported in the main text. The models in Table A.9 summarize results from regressions that explain the effect of African regions' representation on the UN Security Council on the number of UN blue helmets deployed to civil-war countries in those regions. The unit of analysis is the country-month. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by country.

Models 1-3 investigate the main effect of holding a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (hypothesis 1). Model 1 indicates that the UN deploys 50 more UN mission staff per month when a state in the region of the civil-war theater has a seat on the Security Council than it does at other times, on average. Model 2 shows that this result is robust to controlling for several characteristics of the conflict setting that determine the baseline prospects of the deployment of a peace operation. Due to the as-if-random assignment of the rotating representation of African regions on the Council, it is not necessary to include these controls to causally identify the effect of a seat on the Council. Model 3 shows that the results from the pooled regression hold when country-fixed effects are added to the model in order to hold constant all time-invariant observable or unobservable characteristics of civil-war countries.

Models 4-6 test hypotheses 2 and 3 on the heterogeneity of minor powers' influence on the UN Security Council. When the Council's agenda is highly salient in different world regions, great powers are particularly eager to attain unanimity inside the Council by making concessions to minor powers even on unrelated issues (such as UN deployments to conflict theaters in their regional neighborhood). At those times having a seat on the Council is associated with a larger increase in the UN's responsiveness to African civil wars than

serving on the Council at less important times (as indicated by the significant coefficient of the interaction between representation on the Council and the salience of the body's work). In contrast, the insignificant coefficient of the main effect of the importance of the Council's agenda measures the impact of the salience of the Council's work on peacekeeping deployments in African regions that are absent from the Council. Great powers lack a motive to make concessions to minor powers while their region does not have a voice in the Council, and therefore we would not expect the pursuit of unanimity in the Council during important times to cause a larger influx of UN blue helmets in those regions that are not represented on the Council.

The significant coefficient of the Council's presidency in Models 4-6 shows that the UN dispatches more blue helmets to civil-war countries in the region of an African minor power while the latter benefits from the informal authority of the Council's presidency. The insignificant coefficient of representation on the Council in these three models indicates the effect of having a Council seat without presiding over the body and when the Council's agenda outside Africa is not important. While Models 1-3 show that minor powers' representation on the Council has an effect on the UN's response to civil-wars in their region, Models 4-6 reveal that this effect only materializes while minor powers benefit from either presiding over the Council or from the body's important agenda in other world regions. This finding supports both hypotheses 2 and 3. The rotation of seats between African regions and of the body's presidency is as-if-randomly determined, and the timing of crises in other world regions is plausibly exogenous to both. Therefore, the effects of sitting on - or presiding over - the Council at times when the Council's agenda is highly salient and at other times is cleanly identified even in the model without controls (Model 4). The results from this model are robust to controlling for potential confounders (Model 5) and to adding country fixed-effects that control for all time-invariant idiosyncrasies of individual civil-war countries (Model 6).

Table A.9: Results of OLS models of change in the size of UN peace operations, 1988-2014

Variable	(1) UNPO size	(2) UNPO size	(3) UNPO size	(4) UNPO size	(5) UNPO size	(6) UNPO size
UNSC representation	49.55*	50.57**	43.18*	8.46	2.99	-3.76
	(28.86)	(24.21)	(22.99)	(25.91)	(9.54)	(14.17)
UNSC presidency				60.62**	64.79**	63.09**
				(29.61)	(26.75)	(26.18)
Important period				2.02	-11.30	-17.03
				(15.15)	(14.39)	(14.98)
UNSC repres. * imp. period				54.92**	80.00*	90.37***
				(27.72)	(42.17)	(31.89)
Number of battle deaths		-1.63*	-1.73		-1.32*	-1.63
		(0.99)	(1.55)		(0.71)	(1.46)
Foreign troop support		-36.39**	-41.55		-37.41**	-22.13
		(18.03)	(54.18)		(14.69)	(40.63)
New peace agreements		103.3	109.4		98.82	105.0
		(79.19)	(76.26)		(84.56)	(78.60)
Peace agreements broken		143.0	146.6		138.2	145.9
		(127.5)	(121.3)		(120.6)	(111.1)
Democratic regime		-0.66	-0.65		-0.82	-0.56
		(1.88)	(2.15)		(2.25)	(2.52)
Country f.e.			Yes			Yes
Constant	-12.56	2.52	-48.40	-13.29	5.46	-65.25*
	(14.41)	(8.63)	(22.99)	(19.10)	(8.44)	(35.03)
N	948	659	659	948	659	659

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. The heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country. The four models with control variables are restricted to the period from 1990 to 2009, i.e. the period for which all controls have been coded. This explains the difference in N across model specifications (in addition to missing values for political regime characteristics). The coefficient of the number of battle deaths indicates the effect of an increase by 1,000 fatalities.

12 OLS regressions to test hypothesis 4

If great powers' pursuit of unanimity in the UN Security Council motivates informal power-sharing in this body, then minor powers should only have disproportionately large influence in the Council when they contribute to unanimity on the issues that are salient to great powers (hypothesis 4). Minor powers' impact on the Council's work should be particularly pronounced if their votes are aligned with those of the United States, which is the most powerful permanent member of the Council and the country that most frequently seeks the Council's authorization of coercive responses to salient security threats outside Africa (e.g., by pursuing the authorization of the use of force against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Haiti in 1994, and Afghanistan in 2001 and of sanctions against al-Qaeda, Iran, Iraq, ISIS, and North Korea). In fact, 13 of the 18 international crises that involved the United States after the Cold War were addressed by a unanimous Security Council resolution while the crisis was unfolding, and three other crises were the subject of a resolution that was issued by a divided Council.[24]

On the basis of the two assumptions about the preferences of Security Council members that are discussed in the main text[25] it is possible to test hypothesis 4 by comparing the following two quantities: (1) the average change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in African regions during years when these regions are represented on the Council by countries that most frequently votes with the United States and (2) the corresponding average change in the number of blue helmets during years when states that frequently do not vote with the United States represent these regions on the Council. In contrast to the

[24]Author's calculation based on UN voting records and International Crisis Behavior data compiled by Brecher et al. (2017).

[25]First, the preferences of the five great powers with permanent seats on the Council do not systematically vary with the representation status of African regions on the Council. In other words, these preferences do not undergo cyclical swings in two-year intervals. Second, African countries that serve on the Council prefer larger UN peace operations in civil-war theaters in their own regional neighborhood to smaller missions or no peacekeeping.

timing of the presidency, of the representation of African regions, and of crises outside Africa that increase the body's salience in other world regions, the votes cast by African minor powers are not exogenously assigned. While the effect of serving on - or presiding over - the Council at important or less important times can be cleanly identified without holding other explanatory variables constant, it is necessary to control for confounders of the relationship between minor powers' votes and the deployment of UN blue helmets. Consequently, the test of hypothesis 4 cannot rely on the same design-based empirical approach as the tests of the other three hypotheses, which is described in the main text. Instead, hypothesis 4 is tested through conventional model-based inference with OLS regression models. These models have the same specifications as the full models 3 and 6 in Table A.9 above. They include fixed effects to control for all time-invariant country-specific factors that may confound the causal relationship of interest (e.g., colonial history). Additional covariates hold time-varying confounders constant. The heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered by country.

The analyses rely on a time-varying measure of African minor powers' voting alignment with the United States, which records the mean of the absolute value of the difference between the votes of the United States and African Council members during the most recent six months.[26] This variable ranges from 0 to 2, because the value 1 is assigned to positive votes and negative votes are coded as -1. It takes into account all votes on draft decisions in the Security Council. Thus, it reflects votes on decisions that were adopted and on those proposals that the Council did not pass. The measure does not take into account votes on African security issues. This is because the assumption that great powers' preferences do not systematically vary with the representation status of African regions on the Council is implausible for preferences over the Council's response to crises in Africa. A dataset on

[26]This time period was chosen to ensure consistency between this measure and the variable that indicates the salience of the UN Security Council's agenda outside Africa.

Security Council votes was compiled for this study from the Council's voting records, which are published on the organization's website.

On average, the voting distance between African minor powers and the most powerful member of the Security Council amounts to 0.108 on a scale from 0 (complete alignment) to 2 (disagreement on all votes). Whenever an African Council member's voting distance falls below this value, the country's region is categorized as being represented by a state with relatively high voting alignment with the United States. When an African region is absent from the Council, the voting alignment of its representative on the Council is not treated as a missing value, but instead the value of the representative of the other region that shares the same rotating seat is recorded. For instance, when no Eastern African state serves on the Council, the Southern African Council member's voting alignment with the United States is recorded for Eastern and Southern African states, because Eastern and Southern Africa rotate the same seat on the Council. This coding decision makes it possible to conduct a placebo test, which is described below.

The empirical analyses yield results that align with hypothesis 4. Model 7 indicates that minor powers' influence in the UN Security Council is conditional on whether they tend to vote with the most powerful member of this body or not. The coefficient of the main effect of representation on the Council indicates the impact of having a seat on the Council when the minor power's votes are aligned with those cast by the United States. When the African state frequently votes the same way as the United States on the UN's response to security challenges in different world regions, the UN tends to deploy an additional 71 UN blue helmets per month to civil-war countries in the African Council member's regional neighborhood. In contrast, the monthly increase in the number of UN peacekeepers associated with representation on the Council shrinks to 7 and becomes insignificant if the Council member tends to vote differently than the United States. The insignificant coefficient of the main effect of

voting alignment indicates the result of a placebo test: it shows that the voting alignment of a different region's representative is not systematically associated with the number of UN blue helmets that are dispatched to a given African region while that region itself is absent from the Council.

Model 8 indicates that the effect of holding the Council's presidency is also conditional on minor powers' voting alignment. When the average voting distance between an African country and the United States is relatively low, the former can leverage the informal authority of the presidency to attain the deployment of an additional 80 UN blue helmets to nearby civil-war theaters per month, on average. However, the marginal effect of presiding over the Council shrinks to an insignificant 32 peacekeepers per month if the president's voting distance to the United States is relatively large. The effect of holding the Council's presidency materializes on top of the impact of serving on this body, which is significant and large when the body's agenda outside Africa is important (88 additional UN peacekeepers per month, on average). In line with hypothesis 2, Model 8 confirms the result of Model 6 that an African region's representation on the Council translates into larger UN deployments in that region when the body's work is highly salient to great powers than at less important times. The insignificant coefficient of the main effect of representation on the Council indicates the impact of having a seat on the Council without presiding over the body *and* while the Council's work is not salient to great powers. In line with hypotheses 2 and 3, minor powers wield substantial influence when they *either* benefit from the informal authority of the presidency or great powers' desire to attain unanimity when the Council suddenly becomes highly important in a different world region. Finally, the main effect of minor powers' voting alignment with the United States represents a placebo test, and its insignificant coefficient shows that the voting alignment of a different region does not affect UN deployments to a region that is absent from the Council.

In conclusion, the results in Table A.10 support hypothesis 4, because they show that minor powers' disproportionately large influence in the Security Council - as well as the impact they have on the body's work while presiding over it - are conditional on their voting alignment with the Council's most powerful member state. Minor powers' presence on the Council only translates into a more active UN response to civil wars in their own regional neighborhood when those minor powers help the United States attain unanimity on responses to security threats in different world regions.

Table A.10: Results of OLS models of change in the size of UN peace operations that test hypothesis 4, 1988-2014

Variable	(7) UNPO size	(8) UNPO size
UNSC representation	70.80**	12.51
	(28.80)	(21.72)
UNSC voting difference	9.75	9.93
	(17.34)	(13.02)
UNSC repres. * voting diff.	-63.49***	-26.01
	(21.73)	(22.31)
UNSC presidency		80.17**
		(35.86)
UNSC presid. * voting diff.		-48.55**
		(22.02)
Important period		-12.97
		(12.12)
UNSC repres. * imp. period		75.08**
		(31.95)
Number of battle deaths	-1.24	-1.16
	(1.29)	(1.27)
Foreign troop support	-36.36	-22.53
	(48.69)	(39.78)
New peace agreements	106.4	106.0
	(72.34)	(77.05)
Peace agreements broken	142.1	138.7
	(115.9)	(106.7)
Democratic regime	-0.80	-0.66
	(2.39)	(2.49)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes
Constant	-54.85	-73.89*
	(21.86)	(33.04)
N	659	659

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. The heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country. The coefficient of the number of battle deaths indicates the effect of an increase by 1,000 fatalities.

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