Cueing Foreign Elite Consensus or Division: The Effect of Unanimity in International Organizations on Public Opinion

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Abstract

How do international organizations (IOs) affect public opinion? Recent scholarship shows that members of the public tend to be rationally ignorant about international affairs and form an opinion by observing unity or disagreements among well-informed and trusted elites. Building on that insight, this study argues that the effect of IOs on public opinion depends on whether they signal consensus or divisions among member states' representatives. Specifically, unanimous policy decisions signal consensus among international elites in support of a policy, which rallies support for the policy among members of the public who trust the organization. In contrast, approval despite vocal dissent or non-approval due to vetoes cue divisions between international elites, and they have a smaller effect on public opinion. Four survey experiments administered to large samples of American citizens in 2016 and 2018 test this argument in the issue area of international security. They show that the unanimous endorsement of a U.S. military intervention by the UN Security Council increases American popular support for the use of force by six to ten percentage points, in comparison to the Council's approval of the same action despite dissent. Causal mediation analyses provide evidence on the mechanisms at work.

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The public debate on American foreign policy is said to be dominated by two issues: the dispute between isolationists and internationalists and the controversy over unilateralism and multilateralism (Corbetta and Dixon, 2004, 5). Numerous studies have found that the American public generally prefers U.S. military interventions that are undertaken with multilateral support over unilateral American military actions; and it is particularly supportive of U.S. interventions that have been endorsed by the UN Security Council (Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Eichenberg, 2005; Chapman, 2009; Grieco et al., 2011; Tingley and Tomz, 2012; Bearce and Cook, 2018). Surprisingly, we still lack evidence to explain the puzzle of why interveners routinely seek the Security Council's unanimous support even though they only require nine out of the fifteen Council members' votes under the organization's rules. Interveners even agree to costly compromises and side-payments to secure consensus in the Council (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014; Mikulaschek, 2016). Drawing on recent insights on the effect of elite cues on American public opinion, this study presents the argument that unanimous support in an international organization signals agreement among foreign elites while the adoption of a policy despite vocal dissent in the same organization cues disagreements between foreign elites. Elite-cue theory implies that these two signals have different effects on public attitudes about the policy: the signal of elite consensus causes a much larger public opinion rally behind the intervention than the cue of foreign elite divisions. Evidence from survey experiments administered to national samples of American respondents in 2016 and 2018 supports this argument. The endorsement of military interventions by a unanimous UN Security Council causes far greater public support for the use of force than the authorization of the same military actions by a divided Council, which conveys a similar signal of foreign-elite disagreements as non-approval due to a great-power veto.

This study makes four contributions to the literature on international organizations and public opinion. First, it reports the results from the first test of the proposition that the same international organization can convey multiple different signals about a given policy to members of the American public. Specifically, the policy's approval by a united organization

does not send the same signal as its endorsement by a divided institution. In contrast, previous studies do not allow us to disentangle the effects of foreign elite unity or disagreements, because they conceive of the signals conveyed by international organization as binary (support of a policy or opposition to it) without taking into account whether the organization's decision cues foreign elite consensus or divisions.[1]

Second, the study leverages causal mediation analysis to conduct the first test of all four causal mechanisms that may plausibly explain why the American public tends to prefer multilateral use of force by the United States over unilateral interventions.[2] The study adjudicates between the alternative propositions that Americans value UN approval as a second opinion about the president's decision to intervene, that they interpret UN approval as heralding burdensharing with other countries, that Americans' preference for UN-authorized interventions stems from a normative attachment to international law, or that they view Security Council resolutions as public commitments to intervene that they wish to uphold.

Third, this study improves on previous studies on the effect of the Security Council's approval of the use of force by conducting two separate survey experiments that vary across several dimensions that affect American public attitudes: the principal political objective of the U.S. intervention, its cost, and its salience to American national interests and human rights. Thus, the study takes seriously the concern that the results of survey experiments are sensitive to the wording of the vignette (Gilens, 2011; Hiscox, 2006). Both experiments were administered to national samples in the summers of 2016 and 2018 to ensure that the results are not contingent on a specific real-world political context (e.g., a Democratic or Republican U.S. president). Since the experiments generate consistent results in different settings we can be confident about the external validity of the findings.

Fourth, the study contributes to the debate whether elites are merely a conduit for public opinion or whether their signals have an independent effect on mass opinion. Domestic

[1]Other studies have shown that the signals an international organization conveys vary over time as its membership changes (Gray, 2013) or as its pivotal member diplomatically realigns itself (Chapman, 2009).

[2]This inquiry builds on Tingley and Tomz (2012) and Wallace (2017) who investigate multiple, but do not test all four mechanisms.

elites are responsive to domestic public opinion and simultaneously seek to influence it. This pattern renders the relationship between the opinions of domestic elites and publics theoretically and empirically endogenous (Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Saunders, 2015). While even foreign elites may strategically react to American public opinion, they tend to be more responsive to their own domestic audience, which holds the key to their removal from office. Consequently, foreign elites' opinion tends to be more independent from U.S. public opinion than domestic elite opinion. This makes foreign elite opinion a particularly good case to e elites affect public attitudes.

This paper is organized as follows. The first part introduces the puzzle of great powers' desire to secure the unanimous backing of the UN Security Council. The following part presents the argument that the unanimous backing of an international organization cues consensus among foreign elites while the endorsement despite vocal dissent signals disagreements among foreign elites. Part three summarizes the research design of two survey experiments that test the effect of these signals on the American public. Parts four and five describe the results and robustness checks. The final part concludes.

1 The UN Security Council and U.S. military interventions

It is increasingly common for great powers to seek and obtain authorization by international organizations prior to the use of force abroad. During the Cold War, only 8% of the episodes in which the U.S. used force abroad were authorized by an international organization. During the 1990s, the corresponding figure quadrupled to 32% (Tago, 2005). One study concludes that "foreign intervention without some effort to gain external approval is now virtually obsolete" (Thompson, 2006, 2). The UN Security Council has come to play a uniquely important role in authorizing the use of force after the Cold War; even in cases when it did not endorse military interventions, interveners made intense diplomatic efforts to gain its approval (Thompson, 2006). The 2003 Iraq war exemplifies this pattern. By 2003, "Council approval had become the critical test of legitimacy and legality. ... That the world's sole

superpower - and an administration quite skeptical of the United Nations - felt compelled to seek council approval was a telling gauge of how the world had changed [since the end of the Cold War]" (Bosco, 2009, 225).

Remarkably, great powers consistently pursue the UN Security Council's unanimous approval even though the Council's formal rules do not require unanimity. The UN Charter stipulates that decisions are adopted if nine of the Council's fifteen members cast a positive vote and the permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and U.S.) do not use their veto. Even so, great powers routinely seek the unanimous approval of their preferred policies. At a recent retreat Security Council members declared that "consensus is always the preferred option" (United Nations, 2016, 34). The fact that 89% of all resolutions are adopted unanimously suggests that this is not a hallow claim. 13 of the 18 international crises that involved the U.S. after the Cold War were addressed by unanimous Security Council resolutions while the crisis was unfolding, and three other crises were the subject of resolutions that were issued by a divided Council.[3] Great powers also incur costs for securing unanimity for their preferred policies: they share disproportionately large influence on the Council's work with minor powers that temporarily serve on the Security Council (Mikulaschek, 2016), and they allocate additional aid and loans to buy votes in the Council (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). A former ambassador of Singapore on the Council explains that the desire of the five veto powers to attain consensus levels the playing field between them and less powerful Council members (Mahbubani, 2004, 258). British, Tanzanian, and Ugandan diplomats who served on the Council during the past fifteen years concur with this assessment.[4]

Do great powers pursue consensus in the UN Security Council since the unanimous endorsement of their preferred policy has a particularly strong effect on public opinion? Anecdotal evidence from a former British ambassador on the Security Council suggests that they

[3]Author's calculation based on UN voting records and International Crisis Behavior Data compiled by Brecher et al. (2017).

[4]Author's interviews in Kampala on 17 July 2014, in Dar-es-Salaam on 28 July 2014, and phone interview conducted on 11 March 2015.

do: "It is generally reckoned that the wider the support for a resolution in the Council, the greater its impact ... As a result, ... there was a tendency to try to achieve consensus, which ... by giving the impression of a united Council, has a much greater impact on public opinion." (Crowe, 1981, 95). Lim and Vreeland (2013, 39) present the related conjecture that "the elected members effectively serve as the voice for the 'rest of the world,' and the legitimacy that their votes confer makes unanimity highly coveted". Similarly, Clark (2005, 197-8) concludes that, before the 1991 Iraq War, U.S. "Secretary of State Baker wanted a Council authorization to strengthen domestic support for military action. He said that the United States wanted to preserve maximal international consensus and preferably all of it." Baker (1995, 305) explains that he "was much less interested in grammatical purity [of UN resolutions] than in overwhelming numerical superiority in the Security Council," and that he anticipated that a sharply divided vote in the Council would undermine the U.S. intervention, even though such a vote could duly authorize the war according to the UN Charter. Finally, U.S. presidents frequently stress *unanimous* approval of their desired outcome in the Security Council in their public statements (see, e.g., Clinton, 1999; Office of the White House Press Secretary, 2002, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2016; Trump, 2017). A plausible explanation of U.S. presidents' habit of emphasizing the Security Council's unanimous support for their preferred policy is that they believe that signaling the backing of a united Council increases public approval of the policy. The following section presents a theoretical argument about the signaling effect of international organizations on public opinion, which explains why great powers have an incentive to seek and stress the Security Council's unanimous approval of their preferred military actions.

2 Public opinion and approval of interventions by a unanimous or divided UN Security Council

A large literature shows that public opinion influences American foreign policy and military interventions (see, e.g., Holsti, 2004; Page and Shapiro, 1992). Public attitudes affect the administration's decisions on the use of force (Sobel, 2001) and Congressional support for military interventions (Hildebrandt et al., 2013). This is because policy-makers correctly anticipate that voting decisions are partly based on attitudes about U.S. military interventions (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler, 2019), which tend to be more salient to the public than other foreign affairs issues (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987).

What determines public attitudes on the use of force abroad? The literature presents two broad strands of theories. First, event-response theories posit that public opinion responds to the characteristics and the course of armed conflict. Thus, public attitudes reflect the number of casualties (Mueller, 1973) or their rate (Slantchev, Alexandrova and Gartzke, 2005) or trend (Gartner, 2008), the principal objective of the intervention (Jentleson, 1992) or the probability of success (Eichenberg, 2005). This set of explanations has been challenged by studies that show that most members of the public do not closely follow foreign affairs and lack the information that would be necessary to form an opinion based on the probability of success or trends in casualty rates (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Holsti, 2004). Moreover, the public's perception of the objectives of interventions is endogenous to elites' efforts to frame these events opportunistically (Baum and Potter, 2008).

The second set of explanations, elite-cue theories, does not dismiss that public attitudes about military interventions reflect the characteristics and the course of a war, but it instead focuses on how the public learns about foreign events. Since most members of the public are rationally ignorant about foreign affairs, they form their opinion on the basis of signals conveyed by knowledgeable and trusted elites (Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2007).[5] When citizens

[5]Following Brody (1991, 65) the term elites is used to refer to "individuals - often but not exclusively government officials - who by role, experience, or expertise are in a position to comment on matters of public

form an opinion on a foreign intervention, they consider whether elites agree or disagree on the merit of using force: "when elites uphold a clear picture of what should be done, the public tends to see events from that point of view ... When elites divide, members of the public tend to follow the elites sharing their general ideological or partisan predisposition" (Zaller, 1992, 9). If elites in the same group are divided, they convey contradictory cues to the public, and thereby they weaken the influence the group has on the members of the public that trust the group (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries, 2007). Thus, political parties whose elites are divided over a foreign policy question muddle the party message and fail to sway partisan opinion on this issue (*Ibid.*).

Signals about elite consensus have a particularly strong effect on public attitudes when they are counter-intuitive and unexpected, e.g. when even the opposition praises the government (Baum and Groeling, 2009). These signals are credible to the public because they are costly (i.e., potentially self-damaging) for the elites that convey them (Eagly, Wood and Chaiken, 1978; Baum and Groeling, 2009).[6]

In line with elite cue theory, studies have shown stark differences in the public's response to signals of elite unity and cues about elite divisions. Brody (1991) explains that the presence or absence of elite consensus around the decision by the U.S. president to use force influences the magnitude of a 'rally around the flag' effect (see also Baker and Oneal, 2001). Information that contradicts the president's preferred message or elite debate about the use of force attenuates rallies (Colaresi, 2007). Elite debate hastens the dissipation of the information gap between the public and the government, which is most pronounced at the onset of a crisis, and it thereby increases the potential for the public to interfere in the policy-making process (Baum and Potter, 2008, 51). Unity among elites has the opposite effects. If elite consensus on a U.S. intervention is strong, public support remains high even if the number of American casualties grows (Larson, 2000). Elite consensus also mitigates

concern and are seen to be in that position by those who would contribute to public understanding ...".

[6]Leaders whose support of a policy goes against type are most persuasive (Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998; Schultz, 2005).

audience costs from backing down during crises (Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012).

While most elite-cue theories posit that citizens form their opinions based on signals from domestic elites, a growing literature emphasizes that foreign government officials also transmit elite cues that influence the domestic public's opinion about military interventions (Thompson, 2009; Hayes and Guardino, 2011; Murray, 2014). International organizations in particular convey informative signals about foreign elite opinion to the domestic public (Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Chapman, 2011; Grieco et al., 2011; Tingley and Tomz, 2012; Bearce and Cook, 2018). Among international organizations, the UN Security Council "offers a uniquely strong signal to the American public" (Chapman and Reiter, 2004, 887; see also Thompson, 2009, 37), because its members tend to hold more dovish preferences about U.S. military intervention than the American president. The Council's approval of an American intervention contradicts this perceived bias, and therefore it conveys a credible signal about the merit and legitimacy of the intervention (Chapman, 2011; Grieco et al., 2011) and about the likelihood that other states will share the burden of the intervention (Recchia, 2015; Voeten, 2005, 528). The foreign elite cues emitted by international organizations reach the public primarily through the mass media's news coverage. Such signals receive intense coverage, because journalists tend to focus on reporting the opinions of authoritative elites who are in a position to influence policy outcomes - such as officials of foreign governments that may help the U.S. or hamper its chances to succeed militarily (see Baum and Groeling, 2010, 4 and below).

Elite-cue theory implies that a united international organization conveys a fundamentally different signal to the American public than a divided organization. Unanimous approval of a U.S. military intervention by an international organization signals consensus among foreign elites in favor of the use of force by the U.S. This cue should rally public opinion in support of the intervention. In contrast, support for the intervention by a divided international organization signals that foreign elites are split over the intervention. Consequently, support of a military intervention by a divided international organization should have a much smaller

positive impact on support for the intervention within the American public. The nonapproval of the use of force due to a great-power veto in the Security Council conveys a similar signal about foreign elite divisions as the intervention's approval despite dissent. Therefore, elite-cue theory expects that approval with dissent and a veto that blocks approval should have similar effects on American public attitudes. The added value of unanimous support from an international organization (as opposed to the organization's endorsement despite vocal dissent) should be particularly pronounced for those Americans who trust the judgment of the organization, because they are most likely to consider the organization's position an informative cue from a trustworthy elite body. These members of the public should respond to cues about unity and divisions in the organization when they form their own opinion, whereas those who distrust the international organization would discount the signals that it conveys.

Signals on consensus or disagreement among foreign elites, which can be conveyed by international organizations, are particularly informative at the start of military interventions. This is precisely the time when the UN Security Council approves the use of force - either unanimously or with dissent - or declines to endorse it. At the onset of hostilities, U.S. Congressional elites often refrain from taking a position on the use of force under high uncertainty, because they face little electoral advantage from claiming credit for being on the right side even though they risk being blamed for making the wrong choice (Schultz, 2003). During this period, opposition leaders tend to avoid critical comments or make cautiously supportive statements (Brody and Shapiro, 1989, 355), and the U.S. administration is the primary domestic source of information (Baum and Potter, 2008). When domestic elites are reluctant to express criticism and do not offer original insights beyond tentative support of the government, the media cover dissent among foreign elites when they try to balance the messages conveyed by the administration (Hayes and Guardino, 2011). This explains why the mass media transmit cues about foreign elite opinion to the public when the government decides to use military force abroad. A content analysis of news media reports confirms that

the mass media indeed transmit cues about foreign elite unity or disagreements to the public (see below).

3 Research design

Two survey experiments were designed to test the argument about the effect of cues of foreign elite unity or divisions conveyed by the UN Security Council. In each experiment, respondents were confronted with a hypothetical scenario, which involved a country's invasion by its neighbor and a genocide committed in another country, respectively. After reading a vignette about the scenario, respondents were asked whether they favor or oppose military action by the U.S. in response to this situation. Both online experiments were administered in random order as part of the same two surveys fielded in 2016 and 2018. Each experiment was introduced with the following script: "You will read about a situation our country has frequently faced in the past and will likely face again. This situation not about any specific country in the news today. We will ask for your opinion on a response to this situation by the United States."

The 'war' experiment confronted respondents with the following scenario, which is similar to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990:[7]

> "A country sent its military to take over a neighboring country in order to get more power and resources. The attacking country has a weak military in comparison to the United States. Victory by the attacking country would hurt the safety and economy of the United States."

In the 'genocide' experiment, respondents read about a different crisis, which shares some similarities with atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s and in Srebrenica ten years earlier:

> "Genocide started in a region of a foreign country. The violence killed more than

[7]This vignette and parts of the introductory script are loosely based on a survey experiment on audience costs in Tomz (2007, 824).

13,000 civilians. It would not take a major effort for the United States military to stop the genocide."

The two scenarios vary across several dimensions that may affect American public attitudes: the principal political objective of the intervention, its cost, and its salience to U.S. national interests and humanitarianism. These differences make it unlikely that results obtained from both experiments would be an artifact of the specific context provided to respondents. Following (Tomz and Weeks, 2013) names of specific countries or leaders were omitted to avoid priming respondents. Moreover, responses to a follow-up question that probes whether respondents thought about specific countries when they formed opinions on the scenarios do not indicate context effects (see below).

Immediately after reading the vignette of either experiment, respondents were asked about their attitudes on a possible U.S. intervention in response to the situation: "Would you favor or oppose military action by the United States to push out the attacking country/to stop the genocide?" Respondents could choose between five options on an ordinal scale (strongly favor, somewhat favor, neither favor nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose). This dependent variable was dichotomized to make the results more easily interpretable, but the results are robust to using the untransformed five-point variable in OLS or ordinal logit models (see Appendix Tables A.10-A.11). The question was posed as a forced-choice question, which is less prone to invite acquiescence by less educated respondents than the alternative option of presenting a policy choice (e.g., the president's decision to initiate military action) to be agreed or disagreed with (Schaeffer and Presser, 2003). A secondary dependent variable, which was only recorded for the 'war experiment' due to budget constraints, measured respondents' blame attribution if the intervention does not unfold according to plan: "Imagine that the military action by the United States turns out to be more costly and to take longer than the United States government, the United Nations Security Council, and most experts expected. Should we blame the United States government

for this outcome?"[8] Response options included "Completely", "Very much", "Moderately", "Slightly", and "Not at all". Appendix Table A.1 displays descriptive statistics for all outcome measures.

Each experiment manipulated respondents' perception of the UN Security Council's stance on the use of force by the U.S. Respondents who were randomly assigned to the 'unanimous UNSC approval' treatment condition read the following sentence at the end of the vignette displayed above: "In a unanimous vote, the United Nations Security Council authorized military action by the United States." In contrast, respondents in the 'UNSC authorization with dissent' condition were informed that "The United Nations Security Council authorized military action by the United States, but all three small countries that are near the attacked country voted against authorizing this military action, because they opposed such military action." Two additional treatment conditions conveyed the information that "The United Nations Security Council did not authorize military action by the United States since Russia cast a veto, because it opposed such military action." or that "The United Nations Security Council did not authorize military action by the United States, because most countries in the world opposed such military action." Respondents in the control condition did not receive any cue about the Security Council.

Content analyses of news articles about the onset of NATO airstrikes in Libya in 2011 indicate that the information in the experimental vignettes resemble cues conveyed in the mass media. These analyses rely on a dataset of 463 English-language news reports published in 162 newspapers in 38 states on the first day of the airstrikes.[9] 88% of these newspapers reported that the UN Security Council had authorized the airstrikes against Libya. 44% reported that the Council's vote was not unanimous. Moreover, nine different CNN news programs covered the lack of unanimity in the Security Council throughout the first day of

[8]The reference to the Security Council was omitted for the control condition (see below).

[9]The dataset was compiled by searching the LexisNexis Academic database for newspaper articles that appeared on 19 March 2011 and contained the word "Libya" anywhere in the article. This search yielded 463 articles that were at least partly dedicated to the conflict. Letters to the editor, front-page teasers of other articles, and financial market reports that mentioned Libya in passing were omitted.

the airstrikes.[10] The news media's attention to the signal of foreign elite opinion conveyed by the Security Council is remarkable for two reasons. First, even though there were no negative votes in the Security Council more than four in ten papers reported on the dissenting opinions of Council members that abstained from the vote. Second, newspapers and television news had already covered the Security Council's vote when it was taken two days earlier. Even so, the media found it important to remind their readers and viewers of the Council's stance when they reported on the onset of hostilities. This news content analysis provides anecdotal evidence that shows that the information about foreign elite cues in the experimental vignettes resembles the signals about the Security Council that mass media convey to citizens when the U.S. launches a military intervention.

Two manipulation checks confirm that the experimental treatments are not unrealistically strong. The real-world equivalent of the experiments would be short news reports about U.S. military interventions. Some viewers or readers would miss the summary of the UN Security Council's position in the report. Analogously, the treatment should be so subtle that some respondents fail to absorb it (Kinder, 2007, 157). 64% of respondents in the 2018 sample were able to correctly state whether the vignette for the 'war experiment' mentioned the UN Security Council or not, and 52% remembered the Council's position on the use of force by the U.S. The corresponding figures for the 'genocide experiment' are 58 and 46%.[11] All models include the respondents who did not pass the manipulation checks. Thus, they estimate an intention-to-treat effect, which is more conservative and less likely to overestimate real-world effects of mass-media cues than the treatment effect on the treated, which is estimated from the subset that takes up the treatment (see Barabas and Jerit, 2010). Thus, the intention-to-treat effect approximates the effect we would observe in a non-experimental setting where only five in ten citizens who hear about foreign elite opinion from the mass media absorb

[10]The transcripts of all CNN programs aired in the U.S. on 19 March 2011 were searched in the LexisNexis Academic database.

[11]78% of the respondents in the 2016 sample recalled whether the vignette for the 'war experiment' mentioned the UN Security Council, and 71% remembered the Council's position. The corresponding figures for the 'genocide experiment' were 73 and 66%.

this information.

Pretreatment attitudes on the UN Security Council were assessed on a five-point scale that captures respondents' answers to a question about whether they trust this body's judgment about taking military action. The question was asked at the end of the survey to avoid priming effects in the two experiments.[12]

Randomized treatment assignment makes it unnecessary to add demographic controls to the model for the purpose of causal identification, but the results are robust to including these covariates: respondents' age, gender, education, income level, political orientation, and interest in politics and foreign affairs (see Appendix Table A.1 for descriptive statistics). OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to estimate the impact of the signals conveyed to respondents. The baseline is established by the responses of the group assigned to the unanimous UNSC approval condition. Dichotomous treatment variables indicate whether respondents were told that the Council authorized the intervention despite dissent, that Russia vetoed an authorization, or that most states opposed it. Causal mediation analysis investigates the causal mechanisms that explain the effect of these treatments (Imai et al., 2011).

Both experiments were administered to two national samples of adult U.S. citizens. Most recently, 2,450 American adults who were located in the U.S. took the survey between July and August 2018. This sample is nationally representative in terms of age, gender, and state of residence. The survey company Qualtrics recruited these respondents using an opt-in methodology and administered the experiments online.[13]

Two years earlier, the same experiments were administered online through Amazon MTurk to a national sample of 3,824 adult U.S. citizens in August 2016. All respondents

[12]The experimental treatments did not affect respondents' levels of trust, which are balanced across treatment conditions. These results are available from the author.

[13]In order to be included in the sample, respondents had to pass a basic attention check with five answer options that asked them to "select the third answer option from the top to show that you are paying attention to this question".. They also had to spend at least 8 minutes on the survey (median duration = 13 minutes, mean = 15 minutes).

were located in the U.S.[14] Survey respondents recruited through Amazon MTurk tend to be younger, more likely to be female, more educated, and more liberal than the American public, but they have been found to display treatment effects that are consistent with prior research conducted with national probability samples (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2011). A comparison of demographic characteristics of the sample recruited on MTurk with those of recent nationally representative samples in Appendix Table A.2 indicates patterns that align with those observed by Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2011).

4 Results

Effect of cues about united or divided foreign elite opinion

In line with the argument on cues about divided or united foreign elites, respondents' attitudes on the use of force greatly varied depending on whether the members of the UN Security Council unanimously approved it or could not agree on it (see Figure 1). Moreover, the effect of signals about foreign elite consensus or divisions were remarkably stable between 2016 and 2018, when the same survey was administered to different samples. In the 'war experiment' that was conducted in 2016, 75% favored an intervention that was unanimously authorized by the Security Council. In contrast, approval by a divided Council was associated with 10 percentage points less popular support. UN authorization despite the opposition of three small states with seats on the Security Council signals divisions among foreign elites, and it had almost the same effect as the UN's non-approval due to a Russian veto in the Security Council, which conveys a similar cue of foreign elites' disagreements. Both signals of foreign elite divisions significantly reduced support for the intervention ($p<0.01$), in comparison to the signal of unanimous support by foreign elites, which serves as the baseline in the models

[14] 112 (2.9%) of these responses had to be discarded, because respondents took the survey in 4 minutes or less (median duration = 8 minutes, mean = 11 minutes), which makes it inconceivable that they expressed genuine attitudes. This approach follows the recommendation in Mutz (2011, 88) to drop responses that were provided at an unreasonable speed. Another 47 respondents (1.2%) were dropped since they failed the attention check described in fn. 13. The 2016 survey was shorter than the one administered in 2018.

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of support for U.S. use of force



Note: The figure depicts the predicted probabilities of support of U.S. military action in five treatment conditions, which were derived from models 2 and 4 in Table 1 and from models 8 and 10 in Table 2).

in Table 1. The effect of widespread foreign elite opposition was even more pronounced than the effect of foreign elite divisions. Support for the intervention dropped to 54% when the Council did not authorize the use of force due to the opposition of most states in the world. All results are robust to the omission of covariates that describe respondents' socio-economic characteristics, location, and political orientation. Figure 1 shows that the differences between the predicted probabilities of support for the intervention in the different treatment conditions are statistically significant. It reveals that previous studies on the signaling effect of the Security Council, which conceive of the institution's signals as binary (approval or opposition), miss much of the variation in support for the intervention.

The 'war experiment' attained remarkably similar results when it was conducted again in 2018. Specifically, the signal of foreign elite unity conveyed by a unanimous vote in the Council caused larger support among American citizens than the cue about foreign elite divisions. The added value of unanimous support in the Council amounted to 9 percentage points in comparison to support despite the dissent of minor powers, 8 percentage points in comparison to Council opposition due to a Russian veto, and 15 percentage points in comparison to broad opposition in the Council (see model 2 in Table 1 and Figure 1).

Even though the 'genocide experiment' presents a strikingly different scenario, its results are consistent with those of the 'war experiment'. In 2016, 85% of the respondents favored the intervention that was backed by a united Security Council. Support declined to 79 and 76% when the Security Council was divided due to dissent by three small states or a Russian veto, respectively. Widespread opposition in the Security Council caused a drop in support to 74% (see Figure 1). Two years later, support for a U.S. intervention that was unanimously supported by the Security Council amounted to 88%. Support dropped by seven and nine percentage points when dissent by minor powers or a Russian veto divided the Council, respectively. Widespread opposition in the Council reduced support to 78% (see Figure 1).[15]

[15]Support for a U.S. intervention was high across treatment conditions. This is likely due to the fact that all respondents learned that it would not take a major effort for the U.S. military to stop the genocide. This result echoes strong support for the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in December 1992 and January 1993, when 76-80% of survey respondents favored the deployment of U.S. troops (Klarevas, 2000, 533) while

Table 1: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions and cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements: Results from OLS models of 2018 sample

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in war experiment		Favor intervention in genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.088***	−0.094***	−0.069***	−0.068***	0.083***	0.083***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.028)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.060**	−0.076***	−0.092***	−0.092***	0.065***	0.062**
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.028)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.150***	−0.149***	−0.103***	−0.101***	0.154***	0.149***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Female		−0.058***		−0.017		−0.022
		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.022)
Age		0.002***		−0.000		−0.002**
		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.001)
Income		0.001*		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		0.004		0.007		0.003
		(0.023)		(0.021)		(0.029)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.022		0.006		−0.050
		(0.031)		(0.027)		(0.036)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.008		−0.011		−0.001
		(0.027)		(0.025)		(0.033)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		−0.026		0.033		−0.044
		(0.036)		(0.031)		(0.045)
Interested in politics		0.040***		0.021**		0.001
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.014)
Interested in foreign affairs		−0.006		0.018*		0.029*
		(0.012)		(0.010)		(0.015)
Liberal		−0.050***		−0.010		0.049***
		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.010)
Observations	1,966	1,928	1,961	1,926	1,722	1,690
R^2	0.019	0.081	0.014	0.034	0.012	0.043

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood of a respondent's support for the intervention (models 1-4) or the likelihood that she will blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties with the intervention (models 5-6). All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the Security Council. Models 2, 4, and 6 include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. *N* varies across models due to missing values.

Table 2: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions and cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements: Results from OLS models and 2016 sample

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in war experiment		Favor intervention in genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government	
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.100***	−0.103***	−0.059***	−0.062***	0.059***	0.061***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.133***	−0.132***	−0.091***	−0.098***	0.142***	−0.143***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.209***	−0.208***	−0.104***	−0.105***	0.241***	−0.239***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Female		−0.045***		0.034**		−0.036*
		(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.019)
Age		0.001		−0.001**		0.000
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)
Income		0.047*		0.026		−0.012
		(0.026)		(0.022)		(0.029)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		−0.005		−0.005		−0.025
		(0.030)		(0.026)		(0.035)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.031		0.005		−0.013
		(0.036)		(0.030)		(0.040)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.010		0.010		−0.041
		(0.030)		(0.025)		(0.034)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		0.014		0.012		−0.038
		(0.034)		(0.030)		(0.040)
Interested in politics		0.016		0.007		0.009
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.013)
Interested in foreign affairs		0.006		0.027***		0.013
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.014)
Liberal		−0.054***		−0.001		0.018**
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.008)
Observations	2,926	2,858	2,932	2,867	2,561	2,500
R^2	0.029	0.062	0.012	0.024	0.032	0.040

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood of a respondent's support for the intervention (models 1-4) or the likelihood that she will blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties with the intervention (models 5-6). All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the Security Council. Models 2, 4, and 6 include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. *N* varies across models due to missing values.

Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of blaming U.S. government for unanticipated complications



Note: For four treatment conditions the figure depicts the predicted probability of respondents who assign blame to the U.S. government if the military action in the 'war experiment' takes longer and is more costly than expected. The predictions were derived from model 6 in Table 1 and model 12 in Table 2.

The models in Tables 1-2 indicate that the differences between a signal of foreign elite unity and the three other cues were highly significant in 2016 and 2018 ($p<0.01$).

Signals about foreign elite unity and divisions also affect whether American citizens blame their government if a military intervention turns out to be more costly and less swift than decision-makers and experts had anticipated. In 2016, only 20% of the respondents assigned blame for unexpected difficulties to the U.S. government if the intervention was authorized by a united Security Council (see Figure 2). In contrast, 26 and 34% blamed the government if the Council was divided due to negative votes by small states or a Russian veto, respectively. 44% blamed the government for the adverse outcome of an intervention that faced widespread opposition in the Security Council. In 2018, 22% blamed the U.S. government for troubles with an intervention that was unanimously supported by foreign elites in the Security Council. In contrast, 31 and 28% of American respondents assigned

the costs of using force were believed to be low.

Figure 3: Results on heterogeneous effects of foreign elite cues conveyed by UN Security Council



Note: This table depicts the predicted probability of favoring U.S. military intervention in the 'war experiment' by respondents' pre-treatment level of trust in the UN Security Council. It shows that the four cues about foreign elite opinion do not cause variation in the attitudes of U.S. citizens who have no or little trust in the Security Council's judgment about using force. In line with elite-cue theory, signals of unanimity or disagreements among foreign elites strongly affect the attitudes of those respondents who view the Security Council as a trustworthy elite body. In the 2018 survey (right panel), the difference between the cue of unanimous support by foreign elites and the signal about disagreements among foreign elites (i.e., Council approval with dissent) triples in size from an insignificant 4% among respondents with no trust in the Council to a significant 14% among those who trust this body completely. In the 2016 survey (left panel), this difference doubles from an insignificant 7% at the lowest level of trust in the Security Council to a significant 14% when trust in this body is very high. All predicted probabilities were derived from models 13 and 15 in Appendix Table A.3.

blame to their government if foreign elites were divided because of dissent by three minor powers or by Russia, respectively. 37% blamed the U.S. government for difficulties with an intervention that was broadly opposed by other Council members. Models 5-6 and 11-12 in Tables 1-2 show that all effects on blame attribution are statistically significant.

In line with elite-cue theory, the signal of unanimous backing of the use of force by the UN Security Council tends to have a strong effect on the public attitudes of those Americans who view the Council as a trustworthy elite body. In both surveys, respondents who reported that they did not trust the Council's judgment presented very similar views on a U.S. intervention in the 'war experiment' regardless of whether the UN Security Council

had unanimously approved or opposed it (see Figure 3). Unanimous approval (rather than opposition) by the Security Council significantly improved the attitudes of respondents who placed at least moderate trust in the Council's judgment. For respondents who completely trusted the Council the cue about unanimous approval in this body translated into a 29 percentage point increase in support for the use of force in the 2018 survey (in comparison to a cue about broad opposition in the Council); in the 2016 survey the corresponding effect even amounted to 45 percentage points. Similarly, the difference between the average effect of foreign elite consensus (cued by unanimous Council endorsement) and foreign elite divisions (Council endorsement with dissent) was significant in the 2016 survey for all respondents except for the small minority (13%) who did not trust the Council at all (see Appendix Figure A.1 for the distribution of respondents' trust in the Security Council). Similarly, in 2018 the Council's unanimous support had a larger positive effect on public attitudes than an endorsement by a divided Council for the large majority of respondents who harbored at least moderate trust in this institution: The effect of unanimous approval (as opposed to approval with dissent) increased from 8 to 14 percentage points and became statistically significant as respondents moved from no trust to complete trust in the Council's judgment in the 2016 survey. The corresponding increase (from an insignificant 4 percentage points to a statistically significant 14 percentage points) was even stronger two years later.[16]

Causal mechanisms

Causal mediation analyses shed light on the mechanisms that explain the effect of the signal of foreign elite consensus on U.S. public opinion. Specifically, they investigate the changes in respondents' beliefs about the U.S. military interventions that are triggered by the cues

[16]In the 'genocide experiment', the signaling effect of foreign elite consensus (compared to foreign elite disagreements) was not significantly different for respondents who trusted the Security Council's judgment than it was for others (see Appendix Table A.3). This result is likely due to a ceiling effect: three in four respondents who did not trust the UN and who received the cue of unanimous support among foreign elites in the Security Council favored military action. This relatively high rate of approval (71% in 2016 and 79% in 2018) left little room for an additional effect of the cue about foreign elite consensus for those respondents who placed high trust in the Council.

about the UN Security Council, and they test which of these changes in beliefs lead to greater support for the use of force by the U.S.[17] Causal mediation analyses indicate that the added value of the Security Council's unanimous approval of an intervention - as opposed to an authorization with dissent - stems from U.S. citizens' belief that consensus among foreign elites in favor of an American intervention leads to more burdensharing with other countries, a better cost-benefit balance for the U.S. in case of an intervention that counters military aggression, and that an intervention that is endorsed by a united Security Council has a more robust legal status under international law than an intervention that is authorized by a divided Council. Figure 4 displays the results for all mediators whose average causally mediated effect was significant at the 95% confidence level in at least one experiment in 2016 and weakly significant in both of these experiments.

In contrast, a cue about unanimous foreign elite support for a U.S. intervention does not alter public support for that intervention by affecting citizens' perceptions of the likelihood that the military action will succeed or that other countries will refrain from obstructing it. Causal mediation analyses also do not uncover robust evidence that indicates that unanimous backing by foreign elites shapes U.S. public attitudes by affecting their judgments on the intervention's morality or their assessments of America's moral duty to use force. Appendix Tables A.4-A.5 summarize all results from the causal mediation analyses. Overall, these results underline that concerns about the cost-benefit balance of a military intervention, which are partly a function of burdensharing with other countries, drive American public attitudes. Moreover, they point to an interesting misconception about international law, which makes it rational for U.S. presidents who want to signal to the American public that they follow due process under international law to seek consensus in the Security Council

[17]These analyses are conducted by sequentially fitting two sets of OLS regressions. The first set of models estimates the effect of unanimity in the Security Council on respondents' beliefs about the intervention's legality, morality, costs and benefits, and about other countries' burdensharing behavior. The second set of regressions estimates how these beliefs influence support for the intervention, holding constant unanimity (or its absence) in the Security Council (see Imai et al., 2011). One caveat about applying causal mediation analysis to this setting where the mediators cannot be randomly assigned is that we have to assume that all confounders are included in the model (Imai, Tingley and Yamamoto, 2013). Appendix Table A.1 displays descriptive statistics for all mediators.

Figure 4: Results from causal mediation analysis



Note: This figure displays the average effect of unanimity in the Security Council on public attitudes about a U.S. intervention that is causally mediated by three sets of respondents' beliefs about military actions that are authorized by a united Security Council. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around the point estimates. The plot omits alternative mediators that are not associated with the effect of foreign elites' unanimous backing of the intervention on public support for the use of force.

even though the UN Charter does not require unanimity.

Alternative explanations

Further analyses show that alternative explanations cannot explain the effect of the cue about foreign elite consensus. First, respondents might plausibly react to a cue about 'unanimous' support without paying close attention to the identity of the supporter. Alternatively, respondents might value the unanimous backing of the Security Council because they infer widespread support among domestic elites from a signal about consensus among foreign elites. Both alternative explanations imply that respondents would react positively to a signal about foreign elite opinion even if they are indifferent to the views of those actors. In that case, the effect of the cue would change in the presence of a second cue about consensus

among domestic elites. To test this proposition, half of the respondents in each experiment were assigned to a second treatment that consisted in the information that "Democrats and Republicans in Congress supported military action by the United States to push out the attacking country" or "to stop the genocide". This treatment was randomized independently of the cue about the Security Council. In both experiments, the effect of unanimous support by foreign elites is robust to adding the cue about consensus among domestic elites to the model. Appendix Tables A.6-A.7 show that the signal about domestic elites changes neither the magnitude nor the significance of the effect of the foreign elite cue. These results indicate that respondents assign an intrinsic value to cues about foreign elite opinion and do not merely use such signals as proxies for the views of domestic elites.

Interestingly the cue about consensus among foreign elites has a bigger effect on American public attitudes than the signal about bipartisan consensus in Congress. While the difference between unanimous Security Council approval and endorsement despite dissent translated into 6-7 and 9-10 percentage points in public approval (in the genocide and war experiments conducted in 2016 and 2018, respectively), the cue about consensus between Democrats and Republicans in Congress increased popular support by 3-4 percentage points in the same experiments (see Appendix Tables A.6-A.7).[18] In contrast to unanimous approval by the Security Council, bipartisan support in Congress did not have a significant effect on the attribution of blame for unforeseen complications with the intervention.

Evidence from a third independently randomized treatment disconfirms a second alternative explanation. Respondents might plausibly react to a cue of unanimous backing in the Security Council since they expect that such a signal would influence elites and publics in other countries so that the latter would contribute blood and treasure to the U.S. intervention. This rationale would lead even those Americans who do not view cues about foreign elite opinion as informative to take such cues into account - simply because they expect that others value those signals. If the effect of unanimity in the Security Council on

[18]Both cues are of similar length. The vignette displays one directly below the other.

U.S. public attitudes was merely driven by the expected impact on foreign countries, then the American public's response to the signal of foreign elite consensus would change in the presence of a second cue that clarifies that a number of other countries actively participate in the intervention. To test this proposition, half of the respondents in each experiment were assigned to vignettes that described an intervention by "a large coalition of states led by the United States" and asked them to indicate their attitude about military action by this group of countries. The other respondents read the version of the vignette described in the research design section, which named the U.S. as the intervening power.

In both experiments, the cue of foreign elite consensus sent by the Security Council's unanimous endorsement of the intervention had the same effect regardless of whether the U.S. was described as intervening alone or at the helm of a large coalition of states (see Appendix Tables A.8-A.9). While the signal of unity among foreign elites had a large impact on American public attitudes, the number of coalition partners did not consistently sway American public opinion about the use of force. This result echoes the null finding on the number of coalition partners in survey experiments conducted in Japan (Ikeda and Tago, 2014). Only in one of four experiments, the 'genocide experiment' conducted in 2018, public support for the intervention increased by three percentage points if a large coalition conducted the intervention. At the same time, respondents were less likely to blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties over the course of the intervention if the U.S. used military force in conjunction with a sizable group of states. This effect of coalition size on blame attribution did not attenuate the effect of the cues about foreign elite opinion conveyed by the UN Security Council. We can thus conclude that members of the American public do not merely respond to cues about foreign elite opinion because they expect that such cues will lead foreign publics and leaders to favor contributing blood and treasure. When the American public forms an opinion about military interventions, coalitions of the willing do not substitute for the signal of foreign elite consensus that is conveyed by unanimity within international organizations.

Sensitivity analyses and context effects

Randomization ensured that respondents in each treatment condition were equal in expectation, and sensitivity analyses do not detect significant differences between them. Eight models regress binary indicators of assignment to cues about the Security Council (unanimous approval, approval despite dissent, non-approval due to a veto, and non-approval due to broad opposition) on all covariates in the models that examine the 'war experiment' conducted in 2016 and 2018. Only 4 of the 104 demographic covariates in these models significantly predict treatment assignment. In the same tests for the 'genocide experiment' only 6 of the 104 covariates are significant.[19] Random chance is the most plausible explanation, and the results from the main models do not change when these covariates are included in the models (see Tables 1-2). Thus, balance on numerous observables makes the assumption of covariate balance on unobservable confounders plausible.

Additional analyses do not detect context effects that might explain the results if the wording of the vignette reminded respondents of an actual past intervention and thereby triggered an idiosyncratic reaction to this specific situation rather than evoking a response to the hypothetical scenario. Only 6% of the respondents to the 2016 survey named a specific country that they thought the vignette of the 'war experiment' describes. The corresponding share is one percentage point lower for the 'genocide experiment'. All results are robust to excluding these respondents from the sample.[20]

5 Discussion and conclusion

This study presents the argument that a policy's approval by a single international organization can convey multiple different signals to the American public, depending on whether the endorsement was unanimous or not. Specifically, a unanimous vote conveys a cue of

[19] These results are available from the author.

[20] Additional results are available from the author. Russia was most frequently named in the 'war experiment' and Syria in the 'genocide experiment'.

consensus among foreign elites in support of a policy, whereas approval despite dissent or non-approval due to a veto signals that foreign elites are divided over the policy. Drawing on public opinion scholarship, which shows that members of the public tend to be rationally ignorant about foreign policy and form an opinion by observing unity or disagreements among well-informed and trusted elites, this paper argues that the signaling effect of international organizations on public opinion depends on whether they cue consensus or divisions. Two survey experiments were administered twice to large samples of U.S. citizens in 2016 and 2018 to test this argument in the issue area of international security. They consistently show that the unanimous endorsement of a U.S. military intervention by the UN Security Council increases popular support for the use of force by 6-10 percentage points, in comparison to the Council's approval of the same action despite dissent. In addition, unanimous backing by foreign elites significantly reduces the likelihood that Americans blame their own government for unanticipated difficulties that arise during the intervention. In line with elite-cue theory, the effect is driven by the majority that considers the Security Council a trustworthy foreign elite body. Remarkably, cues about unanimous support of an American intervention in the Security Council have a larger effect on public attitudes about the use of force than bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress. Causal mediation analyses suggest that the effect of unanimity in the Security Council on American public attitudes is due to the way it shapes the public's assessment of the costs and benefits of the intervention and the likelihood that other countries will share the burden, and that it is also driven by the surprising misconception that unanimously adopted Security Council resolutions carry more legal weight than those adopted under the qualified majority required under the UN Charter. The external validity of these results stems from the fact that they were consistently found, both in 2016 and 2018, in two scenarios with different contexts.

The effect of unanimity in the Security Council on public opinion may explain why great powers typically agree to costly compromises and side-payments in order to secure the consent of all Council members - rather than passing their preferred policy by the qualified majority

required under the institution's formal rules. In turn, this impact on public opinion may help answer the question why unanimity is the Security Council's default decision-making practice.

The findings also improve our understanding of states' behavior in elections onto the Security Council. The added value of unanimity in the Council may be the reason why the U.S. consistently tries to keep preference outliers, which would make unanimity less likely or more costly to attain, from attaining a seat on the Council. Thus, the U.S. campaigned against Libya, Sudan, and Venezuela when these countries unsuccessfully competed for election onto the Council in 1995, 2000, and 2006, respectively (Pisik, 2000; Trevelyan, 2006).

This study leaves open the question whether unanimity in the Security Council really increases the prospect of burdensharing with other countries and improves the cost-benefit balance of American military interventions. Tago (2005, 593, 596) argues that in many cases in which the U.S. used force as part of a multilateral coalition, the U.S. paid most of its allies' material costs in order to secure their participation (see also Kreps, 2011, 83 and Keohane, 1971, 163). Nonetheless, a large majority in the American public seems to believe that the unanimous approval of the American use of force increases the prospect of burdensharing. This raises the possibility that the U.S. seeks the unanimous endorsement of the Security Council not in order to share the burden with other countries, but to convince the American public that the financial and human toll of the intervention will be partly borne by other countries.

In real life, most cues about consensus or disagreements among foreign elites in the UN Security Council are delivered to the public through the news media and by domestic elites. Therefore, framing effects may significantly impact the effect of signals from foreign elites (Baum and Potter, 2008). For instance, such framing effects might explain why intense media coverage of foreign elite opinion about the 2003 Iraq war did not keep the American public from misreading the Security Council's stance on the conflict. In a poll conducted on February 21, 2003, 68% of Americans agreed that the unanimously adopted Security Council

resolution 1441 (2002) authorized the Iraq War (Chapman and Reiter, 2004, 894) even though legal experts would disagree with this assessment. Framing effects introduce interesting twists in the way in which the political processes examined in the two survey experiments would play out in a non-experimental setting. Future studies could investigate how these framing effects shape the perception and impact of cues about foreign elite consensus and divisions in international organizations.

While this study shows how unity and divisions in the Security Council affect U.S. public attitudes, it leaves open the question whether these cues also influence the opinions of foreign publics and domestic elites. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the anticipation of such effects (in addition to the impact on U.S. pubic opinion) explains why members of the Security Council pursue unanimity in this body. Before the 1991 Iraq War, the U.S. administration pursued every single vote in the Council partly in order to pressure a reluctant Congress to give the president "the support that countries like Ethiopia and Malaysia and Zaire had given him in the Security Council" (Baker, 1995, 332). This strategy bore fruit when Congress approved the war. This suggests that signals about unity in international organizations affect elite decisions, and not just public opinion. Systematic analyses of how unanimity and divisions in international organizations influence the attitudes of domestic elites and foreign publics are fruitful avenues for future research.

Do the findings generalize to other international organizations? Some scope conditions directly follow from the argument. The U.S. public only responds to signals from international institutions when it considers them trustworthy elite bodies; it is likely that only a minority of organizations with politically salient agendas are well-known and trusted enough to meet this criterion. The World Trade Organization and its dispute settlement mechanism likely fall into this category, and thus Lewis (2006) explains that the its habit of deciding trade disputes unanimously (rather than by the majority vote prescribed by the formal rules) is motivated by the institution's quest to be viewed as legitimate by speaking with one voice. More generally, Greenhill (2019) conjectures that organizations have a greater potential to

shape public opinion when they follow inclusive, consensus-based decision-making practices. Therefore, the dynamics found in the Security Council may also play out in other well-known and politically salient international organizations. Future research should empirically examine the signaling effect of unanimity and divisions in other international organizations.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

	2018 sample			2016 sample			Both samples	
Variable	***N***	**Mean**	**St.d.**	***N***	**Mean**	**St.d.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
Dependent variables								
Support for military action ('war experiment')	1,966	0.724	0.394	2,926	0.637	0.439	0	1
Support for mil. action ('war exp.'): 5-point scale	1,966	3.678	1.206	2,926	3.343	1.212	1	5
Support for military action ('genocide experiment')	1,961	0.816	0.341	2,932	0.785	0.369	0	1
Support for mil. action ('genocide exp.'): 5-pt scale	1,961	4.029	1.121	2,932	3.861	1.107	1	5
Blame U.S. government for difficulties	1,722	0.284	0.451	2,561	0.290	0.454	0	1
Blame U.S. government: 5-point scale	1,722	2.754	1.293	2,561	2.881	1.153	1	5
Randomized treatments								
Unanimous UNSC approval ('war exp.')	1,966	0.250	0.433	2,926	0.255	0.436	0	1
Unanimous UNSC approval ('genocide exp.')	1,961	0.251	0.434	2,932	0.250	0.433	0	1
UNSC approval with dissent ('war exp.')	1,966	0.250	0.433	2,926	0.248	0.432	0	1
UNSC approval with dissent ('genocide exp.')	1,961	0.249	0.432	2,932	0.252	0.434	0	1
UNSC non-approval: Russian veto ('war exp.')	1,966	0.250	0.433	2,926	0.248	0.432	0	1
UNSC non-approval: Russian veto ('genocide exp.')	1,961	0.250	0.433	2,932	0.251	0.434	0	1
UNSC non-approval: Broad opposition ('war exp.')	1,966	0.249	0.433	2,926	0.249	0.433	0	1
UNSC non-approval: Broad opposition ('genocide e.')	1,961	0.250	0.433	2,932	0.247	0.431	0	1
Bipartisan consensus in Congress ('war exp.')	1,966	0.501	0.500	2,926	0.496	0.500	0	1
Bipartisan consensus in Congress ('genocide exp.')	1,961	0.500	0.500	2,932	0.492	0.500	0	1
Large U.S.-led coalition of states ('war exp.')	1,966	0.499	0.500	2,926	0.505	0.500	0	1
Large U.S.-led coalition of states ('genocide exp.')	1,961	0.499	0.500	2,932	0.502	0.500	0	1
Mediating variables								
Benefits exceed costs ('war experiment')	1,966	0.500	0.318	1,468	0.436	0.287	0	1
Benefits exceed costs ('genocide experiment')	1,961	0.453	0.324	1,439	0.332	0.293	0	1
Burdensharing ('war experiment')	1,966	0.522	0.284	1,481	0.482	0.268	0	1
Burdensharing ('genocide experiment')	1,961	0.587	0.281	1,449	0.561	0.277	0	1
Legality ('war experiment')	1,966	0.699	0.459	1,506	0.608	0.488	0	1
Legality ('genocide experiment')	1,961	0.746	0.435	1,470	0.667	0.471	0	1
Nonobstruction by other countries ('war exp.')	1,966	0.434	0.272	1,481	0.482	0.268	0	1
Nonobstruction by other countries ('genocide exp.')	1,961	0.462	0.293	1,483	0.491	0.277	0	1
Likelihood of success ('war experiment')	1,966	0.782	0.240	1,457	0.763	0.228	0	1
Likelihood of success ('genocide experiment')	1,961	0.777	0.233	1,493	0.755	0.228	0	1
Morality ('war experiment')	1,966	0.747	0.435	1,419	0.685	0.465	0	1
Morality ('genocide experiment')	1,961	0.902	0.297	1,462	0.882	0.322	0	1
Moral obligation ('war experiment')	1,966	0.620	0.485	2,926	0.459	0.498	0	1
Moral obligation ('genocide experiment')	1,961	0.762	0.426	2,932	0.719	0.450	0	1
Pretreatment covariates								
Trust in UNSC's judgment	1,961	3.100	1.124	2,932	3.276	1.006	1	5
Female	1,961	0.506	0.500	2,932	0.615	0.487	0	1
Age	1,961	46.346	17.133	2,932	36.257	12.115	18	92
Family income (in USD 100,000k)	1,961	0.502	0.336	2,932	0.547	0.329	0.050	1.200
Educ. (no more than high school degree)	1,961	0.269	0.444	2,932	0.099	0.299	0	1
Educ. (some college, no degree)	1,961	0.295	0.456	2,932	0.269	0.444	0	1
Educ. (Associate's degree)	1,961	0.124	0.330	2,932	0.112	0.315	0	1
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)	1,961	0.217	0.412	2,932	0.362	0.481	0	1
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)	1,961	0.094	0.292	2,932	0.157	0.364	0	1
Interested in politics	1,961	3.464	1.130	2,932	3.373	1.075	1	5
Interested in foreign affairs	1,961	3.207	1.087	2,931	3.142	1.015	1	5
Liberal	1,961	2.917	1.152	2,932	3.198	1.185	1	5

Note: In line with the empirical strategy of this study, the descriptive statistics describe the set of respondents assigned to four treatment conditions with cues about foreign elite opinion.

Table A.2: Comparison of demographic characteristics of MTurk sample and nationally representative samples

Variable	Category	Percent in MTurk sample	Percent in nationally representative samples: CPS, ANES 2016	2018 survey
Age	18 to 24	15.52	12.33	12.69
	25 to 34	39.64	17.10	17.76
	35 to 44	21.77	15.38	16.57
	45 to 54	12.88	17.25	17.71
	55 to 59	4.78	9.21	7.92
	60 to 64	3.11	8.21	8.53
	65 to 74	2.15	12.03	15.06
	75+	0.10	8.50	3.76
Education	No more than high school	9.54	37.96	27.02
	Some college, no degree	27.14	20.25	29.55
	Associate's degree	11.45	10.18	12.37
	Bachelor's degree	36.60	20.22	21.88
	Master's or Doctorate	15.28	11.38	9.18
Gender	Female	61.11	51.15	50.90
	Male	38.89	48.85	49.10
Political attitudes (self-reported)	Conservative	31.03	43.60	38.69
	Moderate	23.92	28.34	32.49
	Liberal	45.04	28.06	28.82

Note: The table compares demographic characteristics of the sample for this study, which was recruited through Amazon MTurk, to those of the subset of adult U.S. citizens in two nationally representative surveys. One of the nationally representative datasets was gathered for this study through the polling company Qualtrics in 2018. The other set of nationally representative data comes from two sources: Age, education, and gender measures come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 2016 conducted by the United States Census Bureau (2016). The subset of non-U.S. citizens was dropped to establish an appropriate comparison to the MTurk sample of U.S. citizens. The data on political attitudes was gathered during the pre-election waves of the American National Election Study (ANES) 2016. The distribution of respondents in this survey was retrieved from the SDA Archive at the University of California, Berkeley (Survey Documentation and Analysis, 2017). In order to treat the CPS and ANES surveys as the best estimates of true population parameters, weighted results from these surveys are reported. The unweighted characteristics of the raw CPS and ANES samples somewhat under-represent some parts of the population that are also underrepresented in the MTurk sample (e.g., women and citizens with low education: see Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2011). Some variable categories were collapsed to facilitate comparison. The middle category of the political attitudes variable was labeled "Moderate, middle of the road" in the ANES survey and "Neither conservative nor liberal" in the surveys conducted for this study through MTurk in 2016 and through Qualtrics in 2018.

Figure A.1: Distribution of respondents' level of trust in the judgment of the UN Security Council and the U.S. government about using military action: Descriptive statistics



Note: The upper two histograms display the distribution of respondents' level of trust in elites' judgment about taking military action in the 2016 survey. The upper left panel shows that 40% of respondents reported a moderate amount of trust in the judgment of the UN Security Council. Relatively few respondents completely trusted the Council (3%) or did not trust this institution at all (13%). The upper right histogram displays respondents' trust in the U.S. government's judgment about taking military action. The lower two histograms show that the patterns were very similar in the 2018 survey. 38% of respondents placed moderate trust in the Security Council. 7% completely trusted the Security Council, whereas 14% did not trust this body's judgment at all. On average, both samples placed similar trust in the UN and in the U.S. government. While the 2016 trusted the UN slightly more than its government (mean = 3.276 for the UN and mean = 3.287 for the U.S. on a five-point scale from 'completely trust' [1] to 'do no trust at all' [5]), the pattern was reversed in the 2018 survey (mean = 3.09 for the UN and mean = 3.08 for the U.S. on the same scale).

Table A.3: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions, cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements, and trust in foreign elite opinion: Results from OLS models of 2016 and 2018 survey data

	2018 Survey		*2016 Survey*	
	Dependent variable:			
	Favor intervention in ...			
	war experiment	genocide experiment	war experiment	genocide experiment
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.161***	−0.024	−0.159**	−0.017
	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.069)	(0.056)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.133**	−0.128**	−0.444***	−0.215***
	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.062)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.362***	−0.216***	−0.592***	−0.213***
	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.073)	(0.065)
Trust in UNSC's judgment	−0.056***	−0.047***	−0.110***	−0.079***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Trust * UNSC approval with dissent	0.024	−0.014	0.017	−0.014
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Trust * Russian veto	0.021	0.014	0.095***	0.038**
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Trust * Broad opposition	0.071***	0.039*	0.117***	0.035*
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Female	−0.060***	−0.022	−0.050***	0.025*
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Age	0.002***	−0.000	0.001	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.000	0.000	0.039	0.014
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Educ. (some college, no degree)	0.006	0.011	−0.002	−0.000
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.025)
Educ. (Associate's degree)	−0.018	0.012	−0.028	0.010
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.029)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)	−0.005	−0.004	−0.011	0.011
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)	−0.023	0.034	0.013	0.012
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.029)
Interested in politics	0.038***	0.018*	0.014	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Interested in foreign affairs	−0.008	0.014	0.003	0.021*
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Liberal	−0.053***	−0.015**	−0.064***	−0.014**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Observations	1,928	1,926	2,858	2,867
R^2	0.091	0.053	0.088	0.056

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood of respondent's support for the intervention. All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the UN Security Council and complete trust in the Council's judgment about using force. All models include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. N varies across models fit with data from the same survey due to missing values.

Table A.4: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions and cues about foreign elite consensus: Results from causal mediation analyses of the 2018 survey data

	Mediator:						
	Benefits exceed costs	Burdensharing	Legality	Nonobstruction	Likelihood of success	Morality of intervention	Moral obligation
War experiment	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)
ACME	0.054***	0.113***	0.058***	0.004	0.037	0.069**	0.059**
ADE	0.279***	0.217***	0.276***	0.330***	0.293***	0.264***	0.274***
Total Effect	0.333***	0.331***	0.334***	0.334***	0.332***	0.334***	0.321***
Prop. Mediated	0.161***	0.343***	0.173***	0.009	0.119	0.206**	0.176**
Observations	968	968	968	968	968	968	968
Genocide experiment	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
ACME	0.021	0.091***	0.055***	0.011*	0.028	0.018	0.061**
ADE	0.229***	0.157**	0.193***	0.238***	0.222***	0.230***	0.186***
Total Effect	0.249***	0.248***	0.247***	0.250***	0.249***	0.248***	0.248***
Prop. Mediated	0.080	0.366***	0.222***	0.042*	0.109	0.073	0.247**
Observations	968	968	968	968	968	968	968

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Stars designate significance level of Average Causally Mediated Effect (ACME), Average Direct Effect (ADE), total effect, and the proportion of the total effect that is causally mediated. In all models, the total effect consists in the difference in responses in the unanimous UNSC treatment condition and the UNSC approval with dissent condition. Models 17-23 implement causal mediation analyses for the war experiment. Models 24-30 conduct the same analyses for the genocide experiment. In contrast to the 2016 survey, which administered questions for different mediators to different randomly selected subsets due to budget constraints, all respondents to the 2018 survey answered all questions for the mediators. Even so, the analyses of the 2018 data rely on the same empirical approach as the models of the data collected two years earlier (see Table A.5) in order to facilitate comparison between the findings.

Table A.5: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions and cues about foreign elite consensus: Results from causal mediation analyses of the 2016 survey data

	Mediator:						
	Benefits exceed costs	Burdensharing	Legality	Nonobstruction	Likelihood of success	Morality of intervention	Moral obligation
War experiment	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)
ACME	0.058*	0.045**	0.071***	0.001	0.037	0.074	0.052**
ADE	0.214*	0.211***	0.342***	0.371***	0.331***	0.163**	0.269***
Total Effect	0.273***	0.256***	0.372***	0.258***	0.368***	0.237***	0.321***
Prop. Mediated	0.211*	0.174**	0.002	0.174**	0.101	0.308	0.162**
Observations	737	725	736	725	705	706	1,443
Genocide experiment	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)
ACME	0.043**	0.077***	0.047***	0.018	0.030	0.073*	0.027
ADE	0.225***	0.106	0.096	0.274***	0.208***	0.264***	0.218
Total Effect	0.268***	0.183**	0.143*	0.292***	0.239***	0.337***	0.244***
Prop. Mediated	0.160**	0.415**	0.311*	0.059	0.126	0.216*	0.108
Observations	697	706	708	736	745	734	1,442

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Stars designate significance level of Average Causally Mediated Effect (ACME), Average Direct Effect (ADE), total effect, and the proportion of the total effect that is causally mediated. In all models, the total effect consists in the difference in responses in the unanimous UNSC treatment condition and the UNSC approval with dissent condition. Models 31-37 implement causal mediation analyses for the war experiment. Models 38-44 conduct the same analyses for the genocide experiment. *N* varies across models because the questions for different mediators were administered to different randomly selected subsets due to budget constraints.

Table A.6: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions and cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements and domestic elite consensus: Results from OLS models of 2018 survey data

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in war experiment		Favor intervention in genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government	
	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)	(49)	(50)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.088***	−0.094***	−0.068***	−0.068***	0.083***	0.083***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.028)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.060**	−0.076***	−0.092***	−0.092***	0.065**	0.062**
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.028)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.150***	−0.149***	−0.103***	−0.102***	0.154***	0.149***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Bipartisan consensus in Congress	0.041**	0.040**	0.040***	0.042***	−0.001	0.000
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Female		−0.058***		−0.017		−0.022
		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.022)
Age		0.002***		−0.000		−0.002**
		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.001)
Income (in 100k USD)		0.049*		0.021		0.019
		(0.028)		(0.025)		(0.037)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		0.003		0.010		0.003
		(0.023)		(0.021)		(0.029)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.022		0.008		−0.050
		(0.031)		(0.026)		(0.036)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.009		−0.008		−0.001
		(0.027)		(0.024)		(0.033)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		−0.025		0.037		−0.044
		(0.037)		(0.031)		(0.045)
Interested in politics		0.039***		0.020**		0.001
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.014)
Interested in foreign affairs		−0.005		0.018*		0.029*
		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.015)
Liberal		−0.050***		−0.010		0.049***
		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.010)
Observations	1,966	1,928	1,961	1,926	1,722	1,690
R^2	0.021	0.083	0.017	0.038	0.012	0.043

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood of respondent's support for the intervention (models 45-48) or the likelihood that she will blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties with the intervention (models 49-50). All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the UN Security Council and no cue about domestic elite opinion. Models 46, 48, and 50 include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. *N* varies across models due to missing values.

Table A.7: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions and cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements and domestic elite consensus: Results from OLS models of 2016 survey data

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in war experiment		Favor intervention in genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government	
	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.100***	−0.103***	−0.059***	−0.062***	0.059***	0.061***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.133***	−0.131***	−0.091***	−0.098***	0.143***	0.143***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.208***	−0.207***	−0.103***	−0.105***	0.241***	0.239***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Bipartisan consensus in Congress	0.034**	0.041**	0.029**	0.027*	0.005	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Female		−0.047***		0.034**		−0.036**
		(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.019)
Age		0.001		−0.001**		0.000
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Income		0.048*		0.025		0.018
		(0.026)		(0.022)		(0.029)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		−0.007		−0.005		−0.025
		(0.030)		(0.026)		(0.035)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.034		0.003		−0.013
		(0.036)		(0.030)		(0.040)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.009		0.010		−0.042
		(0.030)		(0.025)		(0.034)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		0.015		0.012		−0.038
		(0.034)		(0.030)		(0.040)
Interested in politics		0.016		0.007		0.009
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.013)
Interested in foreign affairs		0.008		0.028***		0.013
		(0.012)		(0.010)		(0.014)
Liberal		−0.054***		−0.001		0.018**
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.008)
Observations	2,926	2,858	2,932	2,867	2,561	2,500
R^2	0.031	0.064	0.013	0.026	0.032	0.040

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood of respondent's support for the intervention (models 51-54) or the likelihood that she will blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties with the intervention (models 55-56). All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the UN Security Council and no cue about domestic elite opinion. Models 52, 54, and 56 include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. *N* varies across models due to missing values.

Table A.8: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions, interventions by large U.S.-led coalitions, and cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements: Results from OLS models of 2018 survey data

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in war experiment		Favor intervention in genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government	
	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.088***	−0.094***	−0.069***	−0.068***	0.083***	0.083***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.028)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.060**	−0.076***	−0.092***	−0.092***	0.065**	0.063**
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.028)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.150***	−0.149***	−0.103***	−0.101***	0.131***	0.125***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Large U.S.-led coalition	0.001	0.009	0.024	0.031**	−0.047**	−0.050**
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Female		−0.058***		−0.017**		−0.021
		(0.017)		(0.016)		(0.022)
Age		0.002***		−0.000		−0.002**
		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.001)
Income (in 100k USD)		0.050*		0.024		0.020
		(0.029)		(0.025)		(0.037)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		0.004		0.008		0.002
		(0.023)		(0.021)		(0.029)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.021		0.005		−0.053
		(0.031)		(0.027)		(0.036)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.008		−0.012		−0.002
		(0.027)		(0.025)		(0.033)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		−0.026		0.030		−0.044
		(0.036)		(0.031)		(0.045)
Interested in politics		0.040***		0.021**		0.001
		(0.012)		(0.010)		(0.014)
Interested in foreign affairs		0.006		0.018*		0.029**
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.015)
Liberal		−0.050***		−0.010		0.049***
		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.010)
Observations	1,966	1,928	1,961	1,926	1,722	1,690
R^2	0.019	0.081	0.015	0.037	0.014	0.046

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood of respondent's support for the intervention (models 57-60) or the likelihood that she will blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties with the intervention (models 61-62). All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the UN Security Council for an intervention conducted by the U.S. Models 58, 60, and 62 include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. *N* varies across models due to missing values.

Table A.9: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions, interventions by large U.S.-led coalitions, and cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements: Results from OLS models

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in war experiment		Favor intervention in genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government	
	(63)	(64)	(65)	(66)	(67)	(68)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.100***	−0.103***	−0.059***	−0.062***	0.059***	0.061***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.133***	−0.132***	−0.091***	−0.098***	0.143***	−0.143***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.209***	−0.208***	−0.103***	−0.105***	0.216***	−0.215***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Large U.S.-led coalition	0.005	0.003	−0.005	−0.005	−0.049***	−0.048**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Female		−0.045***		0.034**		−0.036**
		(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.019)
Age		0.001		−0.001**		0.000
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Income		0.047*		0.026		0.001
		(0.026)		(0.022)		(0.029)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		−0.006		−0.005		−0.025
		(0.030)		(0.026)		(0.035)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.031		0.005		−0.013
		(0.036)		(0.030)		(0.040)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.010		0.010		−0.041
		(0.030)		(0.025)		(0.034)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		0.014		0.012		−0.037
		(0.034)		(0.030)		(0.040)
Interested in politics		0.016		0.007		0.008
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.013)
Interested in foreign affairs		0.006		0.028***		0.013
		(0.012)		(0.010)		(0.014)
Liberal		−0.054***		−0.001		0.018**
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.008)
Observations	2,926	2,858	2,932	2,867	2,561	2,500
R^2	0.029	0.062	0.012	0.025	0.035	0.042

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood of respondent's support for the intervention (models 63-66) or the likelihood that she will blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties with the intervention (models 67-68). All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the UN Security Council for an intervention conducted by the U.S. Models 64, 66, and 68 include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. *N* varies across models due to missing values.

Table A.10: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions and cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements: Results from OLS models of 2018 and 2016 survey data with five-point ordinal outcome variables

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in 2018 war experiment		Favor intervention in 2018 genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government (2018)	
	(69)	(70)	(71)	(72)	(73)	(74)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.317***	−0.343***	−0.244***	−0.245***	0.287***	0.283***
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.079)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.217***	−0.274***	−0.313***	−0.313***	0.222***	0.227***
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.079)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.486***	−0.494***	−0.360***	−0.352***	0.461***	0.438***
	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.103)	(0.101)
Female		−0.242***		−0.063		−0.114*
		(0.053)		(0.051)		(0.062)
Age		0.005***		−0.002		−0.009***
		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)
Income (in 100k USD)		0.159*		0.056		−0.052
		(0.086)		(0.083)		(0.104)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		0.021		0.022		−0.056
		(0.069)		(0.068)		(0.081)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.036		−0.010		−0.172
		(0.091)		(0.087)		(0.106)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.035		−0.058		−0.015
		(0.081)		(0.079)		(0.092)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		−0.126		0.083		−0.120
		(0.110)		(0.103)		(0.124)
Interested in politics		0.153***		0.116***		−0.031
		(0.036)		(0.033)		(0.041)
Interested in foreign affairs		−0.022		0.055		0.088**
		(0.038)		(0.035)		(0.042)
Liberal		−0.163***		−0.045*		0.213***
		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.027)
Observations	1,966	1,928	1,961	1,926	1,722	1,690
R^2	0.021	0.101	0.015	0.049	0.014	0.088

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in 2016 war experiment		Favor intervention in 2016 genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government (2016)	
	(75)	(76)	(77)	(78)	(79)	(80)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.306***	−0.319***	−0.228***	−0.240***	0.167***	0.166***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.058)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.408***	−0.414***	−0.320***	−0.335***	0.429***	0.425***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.059)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.620***	−0.623***	−0.388***	−0.398***	0.679***	0.680***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Female		−0.125***		0.061		−0.159*
		(0.046)		(0.043)		(0.047)
Age		0.001		−0.006***		−0.007***
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Income		0.141*		0.101		−0.076
		(0.071)		(0.067)		(0.074)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		−0.008		−0.010		−0.032
		(0.087)		(0.078)		(0.091)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.111		−0.010		−0.024
		(0.100)		(0.089)		(0.106)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.048		0.033		−0.016
		(0.085)		(0.078)		(0.088)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		0.061		0.013		0.028
		(0.096)		(0.090)		(0.100)
Interested in politics		0.061*		0.036		0.001
		(0.032)		(0.030)		(0.033)
Interested in foreign affairs		0.017		0.097***		0.041
		(0.034)		(0.031)		(0.035)
Liberal		−0.168***		0.005		0.089***
		(0.019)		(0.018)		(0.019)
Observations	2,926	2,858	2,932	2,867	2,561	2,500
R^2	0.034	0.076	0.017	0.036	0.042	0.064

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on the likelihood of respondent's support for the intervention (models 69-72, 75-78) or the likelihood that she will blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties with the intervention (models 73-74, 79-80). The outcomes are measured on five-point ordinal scales from strongly oppose to strongly favor (models 69-72, 75-78) and from do not blame at all to completely blame (models 73-74, 79-80). All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the UN Security Council. Models 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, and 80 include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. *N* varies across models due to missing values.

Table A.11: U.S. public attitudes about American interventions and cues about foreign elite consensus and disagreements: Results from ordinal logit models of 2018 and 2016 survey data with five-point outcome variables

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in 2018 war experiment		Favor intervention in 2018 genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government (2018)	
	(81)	(82)	(83)	(84)	(85)	(86)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.542***	−0.601***	−0.398***	−0.428***	0.406***	0.427***
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.116)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.372***	−0.481***	−0.513***	−0.533***	0.320***	0.334***
	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.116)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.747***	−0.800***	−0.565***	−0.572***	0.652***	0.658***
	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.147)	(0.152)
Female		−0.425***		−0.132		−0.155*
		(0.085)		(0.087)		(0.091)
Age		0.008***		−0.004***		−0.013***
		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Income (in 100k USD)		0.275**		0.124		−0.061
		(0.086)		(0.141)		(0.151)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		0.059		−0.043		−0.071
		(0.108)		(0.115)		(0.118)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.000		−0.085		−0.249
		(0.145)		(0.146)		(0.156)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.006		−0.121		−0.017
		(0.127)		(0.129)		(0.135)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		−0.174		0.077		−0.175
		(0.169)		(0.178)		(0.178)
Interested in politics		0.273***		0.241***		−0.053
		(0.059)		(0.056)		(0.063)
Interested in foreign affairs		−0.018		0.122**		0.133**
		(0.061)		(0.061)		(0.064)
Liberal		−0.261***		−0.087**		0.308***
		(0.038)		(0.039)		(0.042)
Observations	1,966	1,928	1,961	1,926	1,722	1,690
AIC	5747.9	5474.7	5168.9	5005.4	5290.7	5090.2

	Dependent variable:					
	Favor intervention in 2016 war experiment		Favor intervention in 2016 genocide experiment		Blame U.S. government (2016)	
	(87)	(88)	(89)	(90)	(91)	(92)
UNSC approval with dissent	−0.499***	−0.531***	−0.462***	−0.479***	0.265***	0.272***
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.094)
UNSC non-approval (Russian veto)	−0.652***	−0.704***	−0.601***	−0.616***	0.683***	0.697***
	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.093)	(0.096)
UNSC non-approval (broad opposition)	−0.956***	−0.992***	−0.710***	−0.733***	1.086***	1.098***
	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.120)	(0.122)
Female		−0.224***		0.069		−0.237***
		(0.072)		(0.073)		(0.075)
Age		0.003		−0.010***		−0.011***
		(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.003)
Income (in 100k USD)		−0.223**		0.156		−0.112
		(0.112)		(0.114)		(0.121)
Educ. (some college, no degree)		−0.030		−0.017		−0.054
		(0.135)		(0.128)		(0.151)
Educ. (Associate's degree)		−0.207		−0.064		−0.048
		(0.154)		(0.146)		(0.177)
Educ. (Bachelor's degree)		−0.101		0.081		−0.016
		(0.131)		(0.127)		(0.088)
Educ. (Master's or Doctorate)		0.048		0.011		−0.030
		(0.149)		(0.147)		(0.147)
Interested in politics		0.142***		0.0976*		0.004
		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.054)
Interested in foreign affairs		0.013		0.184***		0.061
		(0.055)		(0.053)		(0.057)
Liberal		−0.291***		0.002		0.149***
		(0.032)		(0.031)		(0.032)
Observations	2,926	2,858	2,932	2,867	2,561	2,500
AIC	8580.5	8259.7	7968.7	7747.0	7659.5	7448.8

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Ordinal logit models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Positive coefficients designate variables' positive marginal effects on latent variables that measure the likelihood of respondent's support for the intervention (models 81-84, 87-90) or the likelihood that she will blame the U.S. government for unforeseen difficulties with the intervention (models 85-86, 91-92). The outcomes are measured on five-point ordinal scales from strongly oppose to strongly favor (models 47-50, 87-90) and from do no blame at all to completely blame (models 85-86, 91-92). All effects are measured in comparison to the baseline of unanimous support in the UN Security Council. Models 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, and 92 include three dummies designating geographic region, whose coefficients are not displayed. *N* varies across models due to missing values.