Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars: Governance, Leadership Change, and Support for Violent Groups in Iraq^{*}

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Abstract

The 'hearts and minds' model of combating rebellions holds that civilians are less likely to support violent opposition groups if the government provides public services and security. Building on this model, we argue that a political event that raises popular expectations of future public service and security provision increases support for the government and decreases sympathy for violent opposition groups. To test this argument, we leverage a unique research design opportunity that stems from the unforeseen announcement of the resignation of Iraq's divisive prime minister in August 2014 while an original survey was being administered across the country. We show that the leadership transition led Iraq's displeased Sunni minority to shift support from the violent opposition to the government. In line with our argument, this realignment was due to rising optimism among Sunnis that the new government would provide services and public goods - specifically security, electricity, and jobs.

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The 'hearts and minds' model of combating rebellions indicates that civilians in civil war theaters are less likely to support armed opposition groups if they are satisfied with the provision of public services and security by the government (Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2012; Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2011). If the government effectively signals that it will address the grievances of a certain displeased group, then this group will reward the government with support in return; and simultaneously, this group will reduce support for insurgents, terrorists, and anti-government militias. The model implies that an unexpected major political event that increases a group's expectation of future security and public service delivery by the government will be associated with an increase in support for the government and a decrease in sympathy for the violent opposition. Iraq's recent past offers an example of such a seminal event: the abrupt announcement of the resignation of prime minister Nouri al-Maliki on 14 August, 2014, which resulted in the first transition of the government's leadership in eight years and which replaced a divisive leader by a successor viewed as less sectarian. This paper investigates the effect of the prime minister's announced resignation on Iraqi public attitudes vis-à-vis the government and violent opposition groups. The study leverages original data from a national survey conducted in Iraq in the summer of 2014 immediately before and after the resignation was announced. It shows that the announcement of the resignation was associated with a strong decrease in support for violent opposition groups among Sunnis, Iraq's largest minority. The study concludes that this drop in sympathy is consistent with the explanation that Sunnis became more optimistic about the future provision of key public services and security by the government. In sum, these results lend strong support to the argument on public goods, services, and civilian attitudes derived from the 'hearts and minds' model.

The literature on civil war ascribes a decisive role to the civilian population. The primary constraints on the production of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence are the insurgency's ability to recruit combatants (Dube and Vargas, 2013) and the willingness of civilians to share actionable intelligence with counterinsurgency forces (Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall and Wilson, 2009;

Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2011). In a conventional civil war, the production of direct violence also requires the cooperation of the local population, which can enable a group to identify enemies in the areas under its control (Balcells, 2010). While civilians' collaboration with combatants is not simply a function of their preferences (Kalyvas, 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008), civilians' attitudes vis-à-vis the conflict parties shape their wartime behavior (Wood, 2003; Balcells, 2010). Therefore, understanding popular support for armed groups "remains a first-order concern" for scholars of civil war and for policymakers (Shapiro and Fair, 2010, 84). According to a recent study, a "near consensus now exists among practitioners around the notion that counterinsurgency wars are decided by the relative success each combatant enjoys in winning support from the civilian population" (Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013, 680).

Given the important role of civilians in insurgencies and conventional civil wars, there is surprisingly little empirical research investigating public attitudes in conflict theaters. A recent survey of political science research on post-9/11 wars and insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq reveals that only eleven studies analyzed public opinion in these two countries while almost five times as many examined the wars' impact on U.S. public attitudes (Mikulaschek and Shapiro, 2018). The difficulty of researching public opinion in war theaters goes a long way in explaining the striking dearth of knowledge about civilian attitudes during conflict.

This study empirically investigates Iraqi public attitudes vis-à-vis the government and violent opposition groups in order to examine how major political events affect the attitudes of civilians in rebellious environments. We exploit a unique research design opportunity that stems from the resignation of the Iraqi prime minister while a national survey on civic attitudes and violence was being administered in Iraq. Al-Maliki was a divisive leader whom many consider to have marginalized the Sunni minority (see below). This marginalization drove many Sunni Iraqis to support armed opposition groups, including ISIS, which capitalized on widespread resentment in order to take control of North-Western Iraq. We show that the announcement of al-Maliki's resignation had a strong impact on the attitudes of the

aggrieved. Specifically, the share of Sunnis that expressed sympathy for armed opposition groups sharply declined from 49% within two weeks before the resignation was announced to 26% within two weeks after the resignation. We then demonstrate that this fall in sympathy is linked to improved perceptions of the government's future 'performance legitimacy', not 'process legitimacy.' In other words, in the wake of the announced resignation, the drop in sympathy was due to minorities feeling increasingly optimistic that the new government would provide the necessary security and public services to address their grievances, but not necessarily incorporate the minorities' voices in the governing process.

These findings have several major implications. First, many Iraqi Sunnis do not support violent groups (e.g., ISIS) for purely ideological reasons and are willing to support a Shia-led government if they expect the government to improve their plight. Second, leadership change in civil-war countries with a history of personalized dictatorship can drastically shift mass political attitudes even when the new head of government is a member of the same sect, political party, and ruling coalition as his predecessor, as long as the transition improves public perceptions of future service delivery to aggrieved communities. Third, while the recent literature shows that leadership transitions in weakly institutionalized regimes alter public goods and service provision (Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015), this study indicates that the public's expectation of such changes triggers a realignment of popular support from violent opposition groups to the government. Thus, effective signals about future public service delivery start to at least temporarily win over 'hearts and minds' even before any concrete policy change.

Theory

What determines civilians' support for combatants during wartime? Recent studies show that civilian attitudes are responsive to the behavior of warring factions. Public opinion research conducted in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Palestinian Territories indicates that civilian casualties adversely affect (at least temporarily) popular perceptions of the perpetrator (Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013; Jaeger et al., 2012; Bullock, Imai and Shapiro, 2011). Research on Iraq is consistent with this finding as it shows that civilians are less likely to share information with the counterinsurgency when the government inadvertently kills civilians and are more likely to supply intelligence when the insurgents are responsible for civilian deaths (Shaver and Shapiro, 2016).

Clearly then, the government's posture towards civilians influences popular support for warring factions. One implication is that counterinsurgent forces can buy the allegiance of civilians by providing aid to them. Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2012) find that an Afghan government program tasked with delivering services and with building village-level representative institutions improved economic welfare, attitudes toward the government, and perceptions of security. Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011) show that a U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq, which enabled counterinsurgent commanders to launch small-scale projects that responded to the needs of local communities, reduced insurgent attacks because such provision of public goods incentivized civilians to share information with the counterinsurgents, thus enhancing the latters' effectiveness. In the Philippines, a conditional cash-transfer program in conflict-affected areas reduced insurgents' influence and led to a decrease in violence (Crost, Felter and Johnston, 2016). On the other hand, a public works program in India increased the number of attacks by the police on Maoist insurgents and triggered retaliatory attacks by Maoists on civilians; but the authors show that this effect is consistent with the argument that the government program made civilians more willing to share actionable intelligence with the police (Khanna and Zimmermann, 2015). Similarly, Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014) find that the start of a community-driven development program in the Philippines increased attacks by insurgents, who anticipated that successful program implementation would weaken their popular support.

These results on the effect of public goods and service delivery are consistent with the 'hearts and minds' model, which conceives of civil conflict as a competition between the government and its violent opponents over legitimacy (Mao, 1937; Thompson, 1966; Berman and Matanock, 2015).¹ In the words of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps (2006, 1-20), counterinsurgent "success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides." If the government is viewed as legitimate by the population the rebels claim to represent (e.g., a sectarian group), support for the violent opposition evaporates, and the uprising cannot be sustained. To win over the hearts and minds of these civilians, a government confronted with a civil conflict needs to address their grievances and provide salient public goods and services such as security and electricity. This reasoning implies that a major event that improves perceptions of governance and service provision among members of the rebellion's constituency should be associated with a decrease in support for the violent opposition. When a government suffers from a legitimacy deficit, which gave rise to the violent conflict in the first place, a major reform of the government can strengthen the latter's claim to legitimacy (Malkasian, 2006; Isaac et al., 2008, 348). A transition in government leadership will enhance the government's legitimacy if the population expects the incoming leader to be more willing and able to deliver services and address grievances. The 'hearts and minds' model implies that such a change will increase popular support for the government among aggrieved parts of the population, and that it will simultaneously decrease the popularity of armed opposition groups. Public attitudes will start to change as soon as the displeased group's expectations of future governance and service provision rise. Therefore, a leadership transition that affects these expectations can shift public support for the government and the violent opposition even before the new government implements policy changes.

Key sources of government legitimacy include democratic or process legitimacy, which is accumulated when the processes of state decision-making correspond to widely held notions of appropriateness, and output or performance legitimacy, which accrues to the government

¹While the notion of winning hearts and minds has been used in various ways, 'hearts and minds' as a theoretical model rests on three propositions: First, the behavior of warring factions influences civilian attitudes. Second, civilian attitudes affect civilian actions (e.g., intelligence-sharing). Third, civilian actions influence the course of the conflict. This study tests the first proposition.

when it provides salient public goods and services (see, e.g., François and Sud, 2006; Lipset, 1959, 91).² A major political event in the civil-war country can win over 'hearts and minds' of an aggrieved population by improving the government's democratic or performance legitimacy or both. The observable implication of an increase in democratic legitimacy consists of a rise in the perceived ability of citizens to participate in political decision-making following the event. An increase in performance legitimacy manifests itself in a surge in popular expectations of future public goods and service provision by the government. The 'hearts and minds' model implies that either of these changes in the attitudes of aggrieved parts of the population will be associated with a decline in support for armed opposition groups.

The civil war in Iraq is a hard case for testing the argument that the government can win over the 'hearts and minds' of the uncommitted middle of the population the violent opposition claims to represent, because this conflict is fought along sectarian lines. This implies that it is more difficult to shift the allegiance of civilians than it is in ideology-based civil conflicts (Isaac et al., 2008). If we find evidence in support of our argument even in the Iraqi context, we thus have reason to believe that the relationship between public goods, governance, and popular support for warring factions is even stronger in civil wars that revolve around ideology.

Context of the Iraqi prime minister's resignation

The political developments that surrounded al-Maliki's resignation are summarized in the Appendix on pp. 1-9 and briefly outlined here due to space constraints. Al-Maliki became prime minister after the 2005 elections. The alliance that included his party had its stronghold in Iraq's predominantly Shiite south. After 2011, al-Maliki gradually marginalized Sunni members of his cabinet, tried to arrest the Sunni vice-president, and neglected to provide Sunnis with basic public services such as electricity. Protests in predominantly Sunni areas erupted in 2012. During the first half of 2014, ISIS capitalized on widespread

²A government is viewed as legitimate when it is believed to have the right to rule.

Sunni frustration when it conquered towns and villages in Nineveh and other Iraqi provinces with initial support from Iraqi Sunni tribal groups. In the words of a former U.S. intelligence officer in Iraq, "the vanguard is ISIS. The breadth and depth of this is basic Sunnis who are fed up" (Sullivan and Jaffe, 2014). In late June, the government's battlefield losses led to calls for leadership change in Iraq. Under intense pressure from the U.S., Iran, Saudi Arabia, and domestic sources, al-Maliki agreed to resign on August 14, 2014. His announced successor, Haider al-Abadi, was viewed more favorably by Sunnis even though he was also a Shiite who belonged to al-Maliki's party, and Sunni political parties, clerics, and tribal leaders publicly voiced support of the leadership transition. Thus, prime minister al-Maliki's resignation can be seen as a credible signal that the new Iraqi government was going to address the grievances of Sunnis. If this is the case, the 'hearts and minds' model suggests that Iraqi Sunnis should become less likely to support violent opposition groups in the wake of the resignation, and that they should also become more optimistic about future government policies.

Research design

This study relies on design-based causal inference to estimate the effect of the leadership transition on Iraqi Sunnis, the country's main displeased minority. In turn, we summarize the identification strategy, data, measurement, and model specifications.

Identification strategy and data

We leverage a unique research design opportunity that stems from the abrupt resignation of the Iraqi prime minister while a national survey on civic attitudes and conflict was being administered across Iraq. Respondents who were interviewed before the announcement of al-Maliki's resignation on August 14 form part of the control group, whereas respondents interviewed after that date are in the treatment group. The treatment is being aware of al-Maliki's announced resignation. As the timing of this critical event was not influenced by the administration of the survey, respondents who fell on either side of this date should not be systematically different, in expectation, because the order in which the survey was administered across Iraqi provinces was as-if-randomly determined long before anyone knew whether and when the prime minister would resign. Figure 1 displays the proportion of respondents in each governorate who were interviewed before and after the resignation was announced. Covariate balance analyses reported in the robustness section confirm that respondents who were interviewed shortly before the resignation was announced were not systematically different from those interviewed soon after this event on key determinants of political attitudes, such as sectarian affiliation, age, and education level. Therefore, we can estimate the effect of al-Maliki's resignation by investigating differences in attitudes between the two sets of respondents that were interviewed shortly before or soon after the resignation was announced.

The survey was administered by 4points, a private Iraqi survey company, for the humanitarian organization Mercy Corps. This paper-based survey was administered in Arabic and Kurdish to a sample that is representative of 17 of Iraq's 18 governorates; it could not be conducted in Nineveh due to the conquest of the province by ISIS.³ The sample size was 5,232, and respondents were chosen through a multi-stage cluster sampling method. Samples were allocated to governorates and districts based on the probability proportional to size (PPS) approach. Sub-districts were then randomly selected within districts. The KISH grid method was used to select respondents within a household.

For the main analyses, we focus solely on the 1,894 survey responses that were collected in August, i.e., about two weeks before and after the resignation announcement in order to mitigate the risk that other events confound the estimation of the impact of this event on public attitudes.⁴ Covariate balance tests show that respondents interviewed in August were not systematically different on any pre-treatment covariates from respondents who took the

³Appendix Tables 46-50 provide details on the survey.

⁴Mutz (2011, 88-9) recommends dropping responses that were provided at an unreasonable speed. 27 responses were discarded since these respondents completed the survey in 12 minutes or less (median duration=35 minutes, mean=36 minutes), which makes it inconceivable that they expressed genuine attitudes.



Figure 1: Composition of sample and assignment to treatment condition by governorate

Note: The panels on the left display the proportion of respondents in three samples that were interviewed before the prime minister's resignation was announced; the remaining responses were gathered after that date. The panels on the right show the number of respondents by governorate (grey circles) and the share of respondents in each governorate divided by the proportion of the Iraqi population that lives in this governorate (shade depicts over-/underrepresentation).

survey in the same governorate during other months. The results are robust to including all responses provided within three weeks from the date on which the resignation was announced (increasing the sample by 43%) and to restricting the analysis to respondents who took the survey within two weeks from that date (shrinking the number of observations by 10%). Figure 1 displays the distribution of these three samples by governorate. It indicates that neither of these samples is nationally representative, because they were generated through the as-if-randomly assigned timing of each interview. Figure 1 also shows that the composition of the three samples varies considerably, making it all the more remarkable that they support the same results. These results also hold in weighted OLS models summarized below.

Recent studies use survey experiments (Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro, 2014; Blair et al., 2013) or field experiments (Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2012) to investigate the determinants of public attitudes towards violence and militant groups. While such research designs have yielded many valuable insights, they cannot easily estimate the effect of major political events on civilian attitudes. Seminal events rarely unfold in the context of randomized experiments, and survey experiments administered after salient events cannot directly measure changes in public attitudes that are triggered by those events because these changes materialize across all treatment conditions. Relying on the research design opportunity that stems from the unanticipated timing of the event and the as-if-randomly determined scheduling of each interview before or after this event provides an attractive alternative identification strategy.

This research design allows us to address three distinct challenges for public opinion research in conflict theaters that often lead researchers to conduct survey experiments: safety, social desirability bias, and nonrandom refusal to participate (Blair et al., 2013; Bullock, Imai and Shapiro, 2011; Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013, 682). First, to ensure the safety of enumerators and respondents, the survey was not administered in Nineveh, which was controlled by ISIS.⁵ Second, the risk of social desirability bias arises particularly when individuals in

⁵Direct questions about sensitive subjects in conflict settings may pose risks to respondents and enumerators. To conduct the survey in an ethical manner, Mercy Corps took several steps to mitigate these risks: It

conflict theaters are surveyed in public settings (Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013, 682). Therefore, enumerators interviewed respondents at their homes unless interviewees preferred a different location; 88% of the interviews were conducted at respondents' homes, and 74% of the respondents were alone with the enumerators during the interview. The results are robust to omitting all interviews that were conducted outside the respondent's home or with others present (see Appendix Tables 26-29). To avoid a situation where respondents believe that future aid receipts depend on their responses, enumerators were asked not to disclose that the survey was conducted for Mercy Corps. The robustness section summarizes numerous tests that probe and rule out bias from social desirability effects. Third, there is a concern that respondents who refused to answer or replied that they "don't know" introduce bias. Those who chose not to give an informative answer could be systematically different from those who revealed an attitude. Non-responses would only bias the estimated effect of the prime minister's resignation if respondents' choice to answer or to refuse to do so systematically changed after the resignation was announced. However, the incidence of "don't know" or "refused to answer" replies was not significantly different before and after August 14. Moreover, the probability of non-response was associated with very few pre-treatment covariates.⁶ Consequently, non-responses should not confound the estimate of the effect of the prime minister's resignation.

The announcement of al-Maliki's resignation would have the hypothesized impact on Iraqi public attitudes if two conditions hold. First, the resignation should not be widely anticipated to occur on or close to August 14. Second, Iraqis should not expect al-Maliki's

piloted sensitive questions (e.g., on attitudes toward violent groups) by conducting interviews in two cities, and none of the interviewees indicated discomfort about answering these questions. Survey respondents could select the "don't know" answer option if they felt uncomfortable expressing an opinion, and they could choose to "refuse an answer" if they preferred not to express that they did not have a view. Respondents could also end the survey at any time. Moreover, the questions on the survey did not ask respondents to reveal any identifying information. Enumerators emphasized from the beginning that participation was voluntary, and they were instructed to conduct interviews in the privacy of respondents' homes unless the latter preferred different settings. Most respondents were alone with enumerators during the interview (see below). Enumerators were chosen based on prior survey experience, vetted, and trained to ask sensitive questions. The Appendix provides further details on pp. 97-99.

⁶See Appendix Table 21. All models control for those measures that are significantly associated with respondents' choice to express their attitudes.

successor, al-Abadi, to continue his predecessor's divisive policies. News reports written shortly before and after the resignation suggest that both conditions were satisfied. If the resignation had been anticipated, then Iraqis would have adjusted their attitudes prior to August 14; in this case our analyses would underestimate the effect of the resignation on public attitudes. However, the resignation was not a fait accompli as al-Maliki remained defiant against calls for him to stand down even a day before he announced his resignation (AFP, 2014).

Second, although al-Maliki's successor al-Abadi was also a Shiite and a member of the same political party as al-Maliki, he enjoyed much broader support among Sunnis when al-Maliki's resignation was announced (Taylor, 2014; see Appendix on pp. 1-9). Thus, the sudden announcement of al-Maliki's resignation would be associated with the expectation of substantial changes in government policies vis-à-vis Iraq's largest minority.

Measurement

Our primary measure of sympathy for the violent opposition is based on the following survey question: "Thinking about the reasons that armed opposition groups (militia, terrorist groups) used violence during the past year, would you say that you in general have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for these armed opposition groups?" Responses to this direct question were measured on a three-point ordinal scale from "no sympathy at all" to "a little sympathy" to "a lot of sympathy" (in addition to the answer options "don't know" and refuse answer). Given that relatively few people expressed "a lot of sympathy", we collapsed a little and a lot of sympathy into a single category, but the results are robust to using a three-point measure (see Appendix Table 3). Supplementary analyses investigate an alternative measure based on respondents' attitude toward violence by citizens against the Iraqi government (see Appendix Table 8).

To investigate whether a decrease in sympathy for armed opposition groups coincided with an improvement in attitudes vis-à-vis the Iraqi government and a rise in expectations of future security and public service provision (performance legitimacy) we analyze four additional dependent variables. The first one is based on the following question: "How would you rate each of the following institutions; very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable?" where one institution is the federal government. Four options were arranged on a scale from "very unfavorable" to "somewhat unfavorable" to "somewhat favorable" to "very favorable" (in addition to "don't know" and "refuse"). Three questions (collapsed here for convenience) on performance legitimacy probe expectations of future security and public service provision:⁷ "In your opinion, how likely is it that the government will improve conditions in your province in terms of [security/ jobs/ electricity]?" The answer options were: "Not at all likely", "not very likely", "somewhat likely", "very likely", "don't know", and "refuse".

Two questions measured the government's democratic legitimacy: "In your personal opinion, how likely is it that you can influence government decisions?" and "How would you describe the current situation of democracy in Iraq?" Answer options were arranged on four-point scales.⁸ Supplementary analyses investigate alternative measures of democratic legitimacy based on the respondents' self-reported ability to sign petitions, contact government officials, and run for office without fear.

Control variables include respondents' self-reported age, gender, education, employment status, economic situation, and size of hometown. Since insurgent tactics could affect respondents' opinions, we also control for violence in the interviewee's governorate. We verified that our results are robust to using seven alternative measures (see Appendix Tables 36-43): casualties and fatalities from terrorist attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017), insurgent fatalities, civilian deaths, and fatalities on the government side (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017). The main models control for

 $^{^{7}69\%}$ of the respondents identified security, employment or electricity as Iraq's biggest problems. Therefore, these were the most salient public goods and services the Iraqi government could provide.

⁸The first scale ranged from "not at all likely" to "not very likely" to "somewhat likely" to "very likely". The second scale ranged from "very bad" to "somewhat bad" to "somewhat good" to "very good". The other response options were "don't know" and "refuse".

violence in the respondent's governorate on the day of the interview or the previous day, but the results are robust to controlling for violence over a four-week period. Appendix Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.

Model

The main models have the following OLS specification:

$$DV_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 Z_i + \beta_4 T_i * Z_i + \beta_5 F E_i + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

The subscript *i* refers to the respondent. The DV_i measures her political attitudes. The binary treatment variable, T_i , indicates whether the respondent was surveyed before or after August 14. If the respondent was interviewed after August 14, then $T_i = 1$. The variables contained in X_i describe individual-level socioeconomic characteristics and the local security situation, and the measures contained in Z_i designate respondents' sectarian and ethnic group affiliation. We interact T_i with these sectarian/ethnic variables in order to investigate heterogeneity in the treatment effect across Iraq's different communities. We also include governorate fixed effects (FE_i). For our main specifications, the standard errors are clustered by governorate, and a wild bootstrap procedure with 10 million bootstrap replicates is used to account for the relatively small number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008). The results hold in a robustness check with standard errors clustered by district (see Appendix Tables 6-7). We use OLS models for easier interpretation, however, the results from logit and ordered logit models are consistent with those obtained from linear models (see Appendix Tables 10-11).

Results

As shown below, the announcement of the resignation of the divisive prime minister al-Maliki decreased support for violent opposition groups among Iraq's Sunni minority. At the same time, Sunnis assigned more favorable ratings to the government after the resignation than they did before, and they revised their expectation of future security and public goods provision by the government upwards. The finding that a major political event that improves the perception of the government's ability and willingness to address popular grievances decreases support for armed opposition groups is consistent with our theoretical expectations derived from the 'hearts and minds' model.

Support for armed opposition and government's performance legitimacy

During the first half of August - i.e., before the resignation was announced - 49% of Sunni respondents indicated some or a lot of sympathy for armed opposition groups. During the second half of August - immediately after the announcement of the resignation - the corresponding share dropped sharply to 26%. Bivariate models in Appendix Table 2 indicate that this shift in attitudes is statistically significant. This result holds when governorate fixed effects and controls for respondent characteristics and for the local security situation at the time of the interview are included in the model (see Model 1 in Table 1). To glean from this model whether Sunni attitudes changed after al-Maliki announced his resignation, we sum the coefficients for the resignation measure and its interaction with Sunni sectarian affiliation. Using the estimates from Model 1, Figure 2 illustrates how sympathy for armed opposition groups among Sunni respondents dropped by almost 20 percentage points after the resignation was announced. Sunnis also became less favorable of the use of violence against the government in the wake of this event (see Appendix Table 8). We find support for the proposition that the effect of al-Maliki's announced resignation on Sunnis' sympathy for violent opposition groups was tied to the impact of the same event on Sunni attitudes visà-vis the government. As can be seen in Figure 2, after mid-August Iraq's largest displeased minority rated the government higher and felt more optimistic about the future provision of security, jobs, and electricity by the government. These changes in Sunni attitudes were substantively and statistically significant. Sunni support for the government improved by about a quarter of a standard deviation of the dependent variable, and the jump in Sunni expectations of electricity, jobs, and security provision amounted to more than half, almost four tenths, and one third of a standard deviation, respectively.

Our argument implies that the same Sunnis whose sympathy for armed opposition groups declined in the wake of the announced resignation also improved their rating of the government and their expectations of future public service and security provision. Since every respondent was only interviewed once, individual-level data on change in attitudes are unavailable. Causal mediation analyses cannot be conducted since the sequential ignorability assumption is implausible in the context of this study (Imai et al., 2011). The next best approach is to analyze changes in the attitudes of subsets of Iraqi Sunnis to probe whether sympathy for the armed opposition in each subset moved in the opposite direction as government ratings and expectations of future public service and security provision. We divided Sunni respondents into eight subsets that vary by educational attainment and employment status. In five subsets, change in all or three of the four measures of the government's performance legitimacy has the opposite sign as change in sympathy for armed opposition groups, as expected (see Appendix Table 4). In all but one subset, at least half of the measures of change in performance legitimacy tended in the opposite direction as change in sympathy for armed groups, as expected. For both subsets whose sympathy for the armed opposition tended to increase after the prime minister's resignation was announced, the estimated change in government ratings is negatively signed, as expected. Overall, the same subsets of Sunnis whose attitudes vis-à-vis armed opposition groups deteriorated also tended to improve their ratings of the government and their expectations of future public service delivery.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
Resign	0.0734*	-0.116	-0.103	-0.0572	0.0130
	(0.0359)	(0.189)	(0.143)	(0.103)	(0.0721)
Sunni	0.225^{**}	-0.175	-0.507**	-0.290**	-0.328**
	(0.0793)	(0.127)	(0.0994)	(0.0491)	(0.0786)
Kurd	0.0335	0.0802	-0.162	0.0987	0.216
	(0.0687)	(0.317)	(0.206)	(0.141)	(0.177)
Other	0.0439	-0.0865	-0.0577	0.137	-0.0600
	(0.103)	(0.259)	(0.132)	(0.163)	(0.175)
Resign*Sunni	-0.270**	0.377^{*}	0.441**	0.371**	0.443**
0	(0.0516)	(0.161)	(0.114)	(0.0877)	(0.145)
Resign*Kurd	-0.142**	0.382	0.130	0.225	-0.0635
0	(0.0488)	(0.222)	(0.164)	(0.149)	(0.208)
Resign*Other	-0.141	0.0225	-0.000619	-0.0465	0.324
1000-Bill O thiol	(0.0974)	(0.277)	(0.146)	(0.206)	(0.182)
Casualties	-0.000551	0.000356	0.00222	-0.00146*	-0.00186*
	(0.000853)	(0.00167)	(0.00142)	(0.000726)	(0.000746)
Female	-0.0351	-0.136*	0.0341	0.0128	0.0199
1 emaile	(0.0253)	(0.0606)	(0.0583)	(0.0600)	(0.0679)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0117	0.185*	-0.104	0.171	0.153*
	(0.0422)	(0.0727)	(0.0823)	(0.101)	(0.0760)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00565	0.245*	-0.141*	0.0840	0.102
	(0.0498)	(0.0968)	(0.0655)	(0.0857)	(0.0952)
Educ: Uni	-0.0564	0.0175	-0.237**	0.0604	0.160
Lado, om	(0.0310)	(0.0986)	(0.0741)	(0.0806)	(0.105)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0453	-0.102	-0.0505	-0.0887	-0.192
010000 0000 20000	(0.0660)	(0.323)	(0.162)	(0.182)	(0.138)
Urban: $< 50k$	-0.0420	-0.170	-0.0695	-0.114	-0.185**
	(0.103)	(0.300)	(0.194)	(0.156)	(0.0563)
Bural	-0.00981	-0.00921	0.0236	-0.0389	-0.0580
Italai	(0.0798)	(0.337)	(0.111)	(0.142)	(0.0695)
Unemployed	-0.0935	-0.242	-0.118	-0.130^{*}	-0.00941
Chemployed	(0.0564)	(0.177)	(0.0674)	(0.0606)	(0.0951)
Not gainfully empl	-0.0870*	-0.105	-0.0644	-0.127	-0.0569
not gaintuny chipi.	(0.0442)	(0.0880)	(0.0420)	(0.0680)	(0.0505)
Good econ situation	(0.0112)	-0.0980	0.152*	0.0640	(0.0301)
Cood ccon. situation	(0.00110)	(0.0834)	(0.162)	(0.107)	(0.0833)
Constant	-0.683**	-2 61**	-2 67**	-2 70**	-2 18**
C 5110 00010	(0.112)	(0.315)	(0.234)	(0.215)	(0.137)
Governorate f.e	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves
4 age controls	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves	Ves
1 920 00101010	105	105	100	100	105
Observations	1,302	1,216	$1,\!396$	1,406	1,430
R-squared	0.131	0.198	0.335	0.0845	0.216

Table 1: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on attitudes vis-à-vis armed opposition and government's performance legitimacy: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. **p < .01; *p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on dependent variables.



Figure 2: Estimated change in Sunni and Shiite attitudes after al-Maliki's announced resignation

Note: The figure displays the estimated change in Sunni and Shiite attitudes derived from Models 1-7 (with 95% confidence intervals). The upper panel shows that Sunni sympathy for armed opposition groups declined while Sunni ratings of the government and Sunni expectations of future public service delivery improved; in contrast most Shiite attitudes did not significantly change. The estimated change in sympathy with armed opposition groups appears smaller than the other attitudinal shifts due to different scales. Figure 1 in the Appendix displays all results on a common scale. The lower panel indicates that the announced resignation did not significantly alter Sunni and Shiite perceptions of the government's process legitimacy.

We examine Shiite and Kurdish respondents' attitudes in order to rule out that the changes in Sunni attitudes also materialized among other ethnic and sectarian groups. A change across all communities would be more consistent with alternative explanations such as a honeymoon effect than with our argument. Importantly, we do not detect differences between trends in Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish attitudes during the three months before the prime minister's resignation was announced (see Appendix Table 51). In line with our argument, we find that the decline in sympathy with violent opposition groups after this event only unfolded among members of the displeased Sunni minority that improved its expectations of future public goods and service provision by the government as well as its opinion about the government. The announced resignation did not strongly affect the attitudes of the Shiite majority, which was the main constituency of the outgoing and the incoming prime ministers. The coefficient of the resignation measure, which indicates whether the respondent was interviewed before or after August 14, indicates the effect of the announced resignation among Shiites, who form the baseline group. It shows that the announcement of the resignation potentially led to an increase in Shiite sympathies with armed opposition groups, which is estimated at 7 percentage points in Model 1 but is insignificant in several robustness checks reported below. At the same time, Shiite attitudes vis-à-vis the government and their expectations of future security and public service provision did not significantly change (Models 2-5).

The announced resignation also did not greatly affect Kurdish attitudes. Kurdish respondents rated the federal government higher but did not significantly change their attitudes on the other four outcome measures. These findings are consistent with our understanding of the Iraqi Kurdish ethnic group and its relationship to the federal government. 92% of Kurdish respondents in our main sample live in areas administered by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which provides electricity and public sector jobs in Iraqi Kurdistan and has its own security forces. Therefore, we would not expect a change in the Iraqi prime minister to transform Kurdish perceptions of public goods provision by the government as Kurdish respondents view the KRG as the primary provider of public services and security.

Government's democratic legitimacy

So far, we have provided evidence to show that the change in attitude of Sunnis towards violent opposition groups in the wake of al-Maliki's announced resignation was related to the government's improved 'performance legitimacy' in the eyes of Iraqi Sunnis, which stems from their expectation of improved provision of security and public services by the government. The results do not imply that Sunni perceptions of 'process legitimacy', which reflects a change in the expected processes of government decision-making, also improved. Table 2 indicates the results of analyses of the effect of the prime minister's announced resignation on perceptions of the situation of democracy and the ability to influence government decisions. Before al-Maliki announced his resignation, Sunnis assessed the situation of democracy in bleaker terms than Shiites. As Figure 2 shows, after al-Maliki announced his resignation, neither Sunnis nor Shias significantly changed their attitudes on this topic, nor did they revise their assessment of the ability to influence government decisions. This is not surprising considering that al-Maliki's successor, al-Abadi, was also a Shiite from the same party. Appendix Table 9 presents results from three models with alternative measures of 'process legitimacy' based on citizens' ability to sign petitions, contact government officials, and run for office without fear, which are consistent with those reported here. Overall, these results do not support the argument that al-Maliki's announced resignation improved popular perceptions of 'democratic legitimacy'. Along with the results in Table 1, our findings suggest that Sunnis did not expect the emergence of a new system of governance, but instead believed that the new government would only better address their grievances by more effectively providing public goods and services.

	(6)	(7)			
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of			
variable	decisions	democracy			
Resign	-0.0802	0.0688			
	(0.0902)	(0.0450)			
Sunni	-0.188	-0.196*			
	(0.123)	(0.0918)			
Kurd	0.0360	-0.0915			
	(0.181)	(0.247)			
Other	-0.316	-0.275			
	(0.163)	(0.145)			
Resign*Sunni	0.117	-0.0813			
ő	(0.0959)	(0.105)			
Resign [*] Kurd	0.0151	-0.177*			
0	(0.125)	(0.0901)			
Resign*Other	0.111	-0.188			
	(0.216)	(0.337)			
Casualties	0.00113	-0.000103			
0 000 0000000	(0.00151)	(0.00102)			
Female	-0.112	-0.0179			
	(0.0780)	(0.0555)			
Educ: J.H. school	0.0603	0.0330			
	(0.0706)	(0.120)			
Educ: S.H. school	0.0565	0.0821			
	(0.147)	(0.124)			
Educ: Uni	-0.00745	-0.108			
	(0.127)	(0.159)			
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0507	(0.130) 0.0270			
orban. oon 200n	(0.158)	(0.153)			
Urban: < 50k	-0.335*	-0.0560			
	(0.134)	(0.0945)			
Bural	-0.0867	(0.0013)			
itarar	(0.170)	(0.112)			
Unemployed	-0.166	-0.0381			
onempioyeu	(0.125)	(0.0922)			
Not gainfully empl	-0.235**	-0.0793			
root gammany empi.	(0.0659)	(0.0717)			
Good econ situation	0.0131	0.0416			
Coold Ceoll. Situation	(0.100)	(0.0450)			
Constant	-2.68**	-2 58**			
Computin	(0.121)	(0.219)			
Governorate f.e	Ves	Ves			
4 age controls	Ves	Ves			
+ age controls	1.02	1 05			
Observations	1 301	1 337			
R-squared	0.177	0.150			
abtained from wild beatstrand and beatstrand from					

 Table 2: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. **p < .01; *p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on dependent variables.

Alternative explanations

While the empirical evidence is consistent with the argument derived from the 'hearts and minds' model, it does not support three plausible alternative explanations of the observed shift in public attitudes. First, the results do not merely reflect a transitory 'honeymoon effect' that is often observed when a new leader is elected. This effect can be explained by favorable media coverage due to temporary deference to the new leader's democratic election (Brody, 1991, 28-30). Therefore we would not expect a new leader to benefit from this effect if he is not elected. If the effect materialized even in the absence of a democratic election, it should affect the attitudes of all Iraqi news media consumers - and not just those of Sunnis. Moreover, to the extent to which a honeymoon effect influences not just government ratings but also other political attitudes, it would likely be captured in measures of the government's performance and process legitimacy, and yet the latter did not change in the wake of the announced resignation. Finally, the 'honeymoon effect' is inherently fleeting (Brody, 1991, 32), but al-Abadi's approval rating among Sunnis remained consistently high in national polls conducted between 2014 and 2018 (see Appendix Table 45).

Second, it is implausible that the realignment of Sunni attitudes during the month of August occurred due to a shift in expectations of who would win the civil war, which might stem from renewed U.S. support to the incoming government. In hindsight, the leadership transition marked the beginning of a gradual U.S. re-engagement, which eventually helped the Iraqi government turn the tide in the civil war against ISIS in 2015 and 2016. However, in the late summer of 2014 this was far from obvious. In the second half of August the war was viewed as steadily tipping in the militants' favor and Iraq's political elite feared that the U.S. would not try to prevent the fall of Baghdad (Chulov and Hawramy, 2016), even after President Obama authorized limited U.S. airstrikes to protect American diplomats and military advisers in Erbil and Baghdad on August 7. ISIS continued a series of victories against the government in September and October (Roggio and Adaki, 2014). Evidence from the survey confirms that Sunni assessments of the security situation did not improve after the announcement of U.S. strikes (see Appendix Table 12); consequently, they cannot explain the shift in Sunni attitudes vis-à-vis the government and the armed opposition. Moreover, we show below and in the Appendix on pp. 95-96 that the major event that shifted Sunni attitudes occurred in mid-August - i.e., at the time when al-Maliki announced his resignation and not in early August when the U.S. announced limited airstrikes. Although the airstrikes by themselves cannot explain the change in Sunni attitudes toward armed opposition groups, Sunnis may still have updated their beliefs based on the airstrikes in a way that might reinforce the effect stemming from al-Maliki's announced resignation.

Finally, while the results are consistent with the 'hearts and minds' model, they do not support an alternative explanation based on zero-sum sectarianism. Sectarianism in the contemporary Middle East is sometimes described as a zero-sum game, in which each sectarian group views a gain for the other as a loss for itself (Matthiesen, 2014). Zero-sum sectarianism would imply that a major political event shifts the attitudes of Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis in opposite directions. Contrary to this expectation, Sunni and Shiite attitudes did not significantly move in opposite directions on six of the seven measures examined above.

Robustness

Date of the critical event

Although the announcement of al-Maliki's resignation was a seminal event, many notable developments took place in Iraq in August 2014. In order to verify that al-Maliki's resignation - and not some other event - triggered the shift in Sunni attitudes, we estimated 40 OLS models with different samples composed of responses gathered between July and September. For each regression, T_i was redefined so that a different day delimits treatment and control groups. Each model includes all interviews that were conducted within a 30-day time period; the responses collected during the first fifteen days serve as control group while the remainder constitutes the treatment group. For instance, the sample for the model where the cutoff





Note: The upper panel depicts the point estimates (with 95% confidence intervals) of the treatment effect for Sunnis in 40 OLS models with the same specifications as model 1. The x-axis indicates the day that constitutes the cutoff between treatment and control group in each model. The relatively high significance of the coefficient in the model where August 14 (designated by a dashed line) is the cutoff indicates that a critical event that strongly influenced Sunni attitudes vis-à-vis armed opposition groups occurred in mid-August, when al-Maliki announced his resignation. The lower left panel displays the sample sizes for the 40 models. It shows that the coefficient is highly significant in mid-August even though the sample size and statistical power are relatively small at that point. The bottom right panel indicates the shares of respondents in each sample's treatment and control groups who are correctly classified into these treatment conditions if the critical event occurred on August 14. The higher these proportions are, the larger and the more significant is the estimated change in Sunni attitudes shown in the upper panel. This supports the conclusion that the change in Sunni attitudes occurred on or in close temporal proximity to August 14.

corresponds to August 1 includes all responses gathered between July 17 and July 31 (control group) and responses provided between August 1 and August 15 (treatment group). If Iraqi attitudes changed in response to an event on August 14, then the effect size and the precision of the estimate should be relatively high when this date marks the cutoff.

The change in Sunni attitudes estimated from all 40 models is presented in Figure 3. For the first few regressions, the samples do not contain any respondents from the actual treatment group (i.e., those interviewed after the resignation was announced), and therefore it is not surprising that no significant change in attitudes is found. As the samples move forward, parts of the actual treatment group start to be included in the treatment group in the regressions, and the estimates start to become negative and significant. In the model where T_i indicates whether an interview was conducted before or after August 14, the estimated coefficient and its significance are relatively high, as expected. However, after August 14th, the effect slowly moves back to being indistinguishable from zero as the actual treatment group starts to populate both the treatment and control groups in the regressions. The most significant coefficients are thus placed symmetrically around August 14. These results increase our confidence that our main analyses capture the effect of an important event that occurred in mid-August - such as the announced resignation of a divisive prime minister.

Larger and smaller samples

As a robustness check, we replicate the main models with a sample that includes all responses that were gathered within three weeks before or after the prime minister's resignation was announced on August 14. This sample includes 43% more observations than the main sample. Even so, the results on the difference between the effect of al-Maliki's announced resignation on Shiite and Sunni attitudes hold (see Appendix Tables 13-14). Another robustness check only includes responses that were gathered within two weeks from the day when the prime minister's resignation was announced. This sample is 10% smaller than the main sample, but it yields substantively the same results (see Appendix Tables 16-17). In order to show that our results are not being driven by the varying non-response rates for each question that was used to construct the five dependent variables, we replicate the analyses on a sample of respondents who answered all five questions. Appendix Table 19 shows that we obtain similar results.

Covariate balance

While the as-if-random assignment of respondents to the treatment or control group ensures that the characteristics of these groups are equal in expectation, a regression of the treatment status on all covariates in the main models confirms that these groups are not systematically different on determinants of political attitudes such as education level and age, conditional on governorate fixed effects. The only covariate imbalances consist in a slightly smaller share of women, unemployed, and residents of mid-sized towns in the treatment group than in the control group (see Appendix Table 20). Therefore, all models control for gender, employment status, and size of home town. Moreover, the sample with all responses gathered within ± 21 days is fully balanced on all covariates; therefore, covariate imbalance is an implausible explanation of the findings.

The characteristics of respondents who were interviewed in August (i.e., respondents in the main sample) are not systematically different from those who took the survey during other months. We regressed a binary indicator of whether a respondent was interviewed in August or not on all covariates; as expected, the coefficients of all covariates from our survey are insignificant (see Appendix Table 20).

Potential bias from non-responses and direct questions

Respondents effectively selected into the sample by choosing informative answer options rather than declining to indicate an attitude. Moreover, the direct question technique may introduce social desirability bias if it made some respondents reluctant to honestly reveal their attitudes. As long as respondents in the treatment and control groups did not use different logics of self-selection, non-responses did not confound the estimate of the resignation's effect. Similarly, social desirability bias would only invalidate our estimate of the effect of the resignation if the likelihood that respondents misrepresented their attitudes systematically changed after this event. A series of tests examine these potential biases. First, the rate at which respondents refused to answer or stated that they "don't know" did not systematically change after the resignation was announced. Second, respondents who declined to indicate their attitudes before August 14 had similar characteristics as those who did so at a later date (see Appendix Tables 21-24). Third, the announced resignation did not change Shiite or Sunni respondents' choices to conduct the interview inside their home and to be alone with the enumerators during the interview (see Appendix Table 25). Fourth, the same enumerators administered interviews before and after the resignation was announced, and we do not find enumerator gender effects before or after that event (see Appendix Tables 48-50). In conclusion, we do not detect any evidence of a systematic change in social desirability bias after the announcement of the prime minister's resignation, which would bias our estimate of the effect of that event. Finally, we replicate our analyses on two subsets of respondents that are least likely to exhibit social desirability bias. Our results hold when we drop respondents who took the survey outside their home where others might overhear the interview (see Appendix Tables 26-27) and when we exclude those who were not alone with enumerators during the interview (see Appendix Tables 28-29).

Persistence of effects over time

By analyzing Iraqi attitudes in August, the main models only capture a short-term effect of the prime minister's resignation. In order to verify whether the effects last beyond August, we included the responses gathered in September into the analyses and added a binary measure to the regressions that indicates whether a respondent was interviewed in August or September. The results from the main models hold for these augmented regressions, and furthermore Sunni attitudes did not change between late August (after the resignation) and September (see Appendix Table 30). Thus, the change in attitudes lasted at least until September. We cannot use our survey to investigate whether the effect persisted after datagathering was completed in September. However, evidence from national polls conducted between 2014 and 2018 shows that al-Abadi's job approval among Sunnis remained high throughout this period (see Appendix Table 45).

Weighted OLS regressions

The investigated samples are not representative, because their composition is a function of the as-if-randomly determined timing of the interviews. While re-estimating our main models with survey weights cannot entirely resolve the lack of representativeness (because a few governorates are absent from all three samples), it helps demonstrate that the results are not being driven by the idiosyncratic composition of the samples. We reestimate the main models with observations weighted by governorate and by district, respectively. The results from the main models hold (see Appendix Tables 32-35).

Discussion and conclusion

The 'hearts and minds' model of combating rebellions indicates that a population is less likely to support violent opposition groups if it is satisfied with the provision of public goods and services by the government. It implies that a large exogenous shock that alters perceptions of future public service and security provision by the government also changes both popular perceptions of the government and support of violent groups. The announcement of the resignation of the divisive Iraqi prime minister al-Maliki on 14 August 2014 was such an event. Data from an original survey administered in 17 of Iraq's 18 governorates during the summer of 2014 enables us to test the proposition that this seminal event influenced Iraqi Sunni attitudes vis-à-vis the government and armed opposition groups. By comparing responses provided immediately before and after the resignation was announced, we find that Sunnis became less sympathetic to violent opposition groups after this event. At the same time, the announcement of the resignation rendered Sunnis more optimistic about future public service and security provision by the government. Moreover, Sunnis assigned more favorable ratings to the government in the wake of this event. These results indicate that a counterinsurgent can win over the hearts and minds of members of a displeased group if it credibly signals to the group that it will improve on delivering the most salient public goods and services.

Iraqi Shiites became slightly more sympathetic to violent opposition groups (although this result is not robust across several specifications) after al-Maliki's resignation, while their opinion about the government and their expectations of future public service provision by the government did not change. This gives us further confidence that the observed shift in attitudes is due to the dynamic described by the 'hearts and minds' model and not simply a function of zero-sum sectarian politics, which would imply that Shiite and Sunni attitudes move in opposite directions on more than just one dimension.

The findings show that neither side of the policy debate in mid-2014 on whether al-Maliki should resign correctly anticipated the consequences of such leadership change. While some experts doubted that it would win over Sunni hearts and minds (e.g., Hanna, 2014), proponents of the resignation emphasized that increased 'process legitimacy' could turn Sunni support away from ISIS and towards the government (Duefler, quoted in PBS, 2014). In contrast, we show that Sunni assessments of the government's representativeness did not improve after al-Maliki announced his resignation. Our results indicate that the shift in Sunni attitudes is consistent with rising perceptions of 'performance legitimacy' and not 'process legitimacy' among this minority in the wake of the announced leadership transition.

These findings shed new light on the question whether civilians in civil-war theaters alter their opinion about warring factions based on retrospective or prospective assessments of the parties' conduct. The literature on the effect of civilian casualties on public attitudes leaves open the question whether the effect stems from the disapproval of past harm or from an update of expectations of future casualties. Studies on the effect of development programs on popular support for militants specify conflicting expectations: Khanna and Zimmermann (2015, 3) reason that "actual and especially the expected future benefits" from a public works program incite civilian collaboration with the counterinsurgency whereas Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014, 1852) argue that insurgents sabotage a development program because "successful implementation would increase popular support for the government." While a lack of data on civilian attitudes or behavior prevents a direct test of these conflicting hypotheses in these earlier studies, this study shows that a signal about future public service and security provision by the government can change civilian attitudes in the conflict theater even before government policy changes.

One caveat is that this study only examines the short-term effect of the announcement of al-Maliki's resignation. The design of this study does not enable us to measure whether the departure of the divisive prime minister led to a lasting or transient change in Sunni attitudes. Indeed, our argument implies that the shift in attitudes does not persist if the new government fails to satisfy the displeased minorities' expectations of improved public service and security delivery. Even so, it is remarkable that during an ongoing civil war, the nomination of a new prime minister for a still Shia-dominated government caused a sharp decline in Sunni support for armed opposition groups in Iraq. Moreover, subsequent surveys indicate that the increase in Sunni support for the government in the wake of the leadership transition persisted for several years (see Appendix Table 45).

The main policy implication from the findings for the Iraqi government is that it can impair the ability of armed groups to win the hearts and minds of Sunnis by improving the provision of the most salient public goods (especially security) and services to them. The results suggest that many Sunnis are not supporting violent groups (e.g., ISIS) for ideological reasons, and are willing to switch their support away from such groups if a Shia-led government effectively signals that it will respond to their grievances. The primary implication for Iraq's development assistance providers is that aid that improves the government's willingness or ability to provide public services and security and that renders Sunnis more optimistic about future public goods provision by the state can reduce popular support for armed opposition groups in Iraq.

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Online Appendix for: Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars: Governance, Leadership Change, and Support for Violent Groups in Iraq (For Online Publication Only)

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Summary of political developments surrounding Nouri al-Maliki's resignation

Nouri al-Maliki became prime minister of Iraq after the December 2005 elections. He had been the leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, which was part of an alliance of Shia Islamic parties called the National Iraqi Alliance. The electorate was divided along religious and ethnic lines: the Alliance won a majority in the predominantly Shia governorates in the south, the Sunni Tawafuq party received the highest number of votes in Sunni-majority governorates in the north-west (such as Anbar and Nineveh), and the Kurdish DPAK got the largest vote-share in the Kurdish-majority governorates in the north-east.

Initially, al-Maliki took steps to reach out to the minority populations in Iraq. Highlevel Sunni and Kurdish politicians were represented in the cabinet with Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the Tawafuq party, being appointed Vice President and Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurdish politician, retaining his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yet soon after the United States withdrew troops from Iraq in late 2011, al-Maliki started to backtrack on this conciliatory approach. Sunni politicians and foreign commentators increasingly criticized the Iraqi prime minister for marginalizing Sunnis within his cabinet (Tariq al-Hashimi, cited in Cole, 2011; Visser, 2011). The government attempted to arrest Vice President al-Hashimi, who subsequently field the country, for allegedly being involved in terrorist activities (Al Arabiya, 2011). The government also neglected to provide Sunnis with key public services, such as electricity (Cole, 2014). A wave of protests in mostly Sunni and Kurdish areas emerged in late 2012 and continued throughout 2013 in response to the growing sentiment of neglect felt by Sunnis whose grievances included the unlawful detention of thousands of Sunnis, discrimination, and poverty (Fordham, 2013). Al-Maliki's government responded violently to the demonstrations and thereby triggered the resignation of three Sunni ministers in protest (Reuters, 2013; Al Jazeera, 2013a). The combination of bombings, sectarian killings, protests, and the perceived mistreatment by al-Maliki's government soon created the prospect of an alliance by Sunni militias in Iraq with Sunni factions in Syria, which at the time were engaged in a multi-year rebellion against Bashar al-Assad's government (Al Jazeera, 2013b,c).

ISIS, which is the successor group of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Tawhid wal-Jihad organization, ended their relationship with al-Qaeda in early 2014 due to various disagreements between the heads of the two organizations. In the summer of 2014, ISIS's achievements started to eclipse its former partner's when the group expanded its control over various areas in Iraq and Syria. In June, ISIS captured towns and villages in Nineveh and other Iraqi provinces, and on June 9th it took control of Mosul which is Iraq's second most populous city. In light of this advance, many in the US government voiced their concerns about the government led by Nouri al-Maliki. US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel declared that the Iraqi government had fallen short in uniting Sunnis, Shias and Kurds while Senators Dianne Feinstein and John McCain both called for al-Maliki to resign (Zengerle and Spetalnick, 2014). Eventually, US Secretary of State, John Kerry, visited Iraq in late June and urged Iraq's government leaders to share power with disenfranchised minorities and political opponents (Jakes and Hendawi, 2014).

In July 2014, ISIS continued to gain momentum. The group captured the largest oil facility in Syria (Abdelaziz, 2014). It also kidnapped and killed Iraqi soldiers and civilians, and it destroyed Shia mosques and monuments (Al Arabiya, 2014c). Furthermore, the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, appeared in public for the first time where, in a video recording, he called on the world's Muslims to obey and recognize him as Caliph (Strange, 2014). Nouri al-Maliki was considered to have failed in the task of bringing peace and unity to Iraq as he had consistently neglected the concerns of Iraqi Sunnis. As a result, al-Baghdadi's appeals were likely to resonate primarily with Iraqi Sunnis.

Although the majority of the international attention at this time was focused on ISIS, Iraqi Sunni tribal groups had played a key partnership role in helping ISIS advance through Iraq in 2014. Thus, a former U.S. senior intelligence officer in Iraq made the following assessment in June 2014: "The vanguard is ISIS. The breadth and depth of this is basic Sunnis who are fed up" (Sullivan and Jaffe, 2014).¹ Several prominent Sunni groups channeled

¹In a similar vein, a Jordanian journalist characterized the revolt as the "Anbar uprising against the totalitarian rule and the marginalization policies of Baghdad's Shiite government" (Omari, 2014).

their anger against al-Maliki towards supporting ISIS, and this support aided its takeover of Mosul in the early summer of 2014 (Zahriveh, 2014).² Resentful and frustrated with al-Maliki, these tribal groups were willing to support ISIS while disagreeing with the group's goals. For example, the Islamic Army of Iraq, a Sunni insurgent group, fought alongside ISIS even though the group "does not share the same extremist ideology of ISIS" according to its leader (Sherlock and Malouf, 2014). ISIS made an effort to exploit the grievances of Sunnis in order to gain support for their cause. After moving into Fallujah, a predominantly Sunni city, a commander proclaimed during Friday prayers that "his fighters were there to defend Sunnis from the government" (Al Jazeera, 2014). Furthermore, after seizing control of cities and towns, some power was delegated to local Sunnis to run the municipal affairs of certain areas (Aftandilian, 2014). This 'outreach' policy seemed to have worked in some ways. For example, when ISIS first took control of Mosul, they were greeted as heroes for removing the mostly Shiite Muslim Iraqi army (Habib, 2014). Al-Maliki's divisive policies had marginalized a substantial segment of the Iraqi population, and ISIS was able to take advantage of this discontent. Iraq's disenfranchised minorities wanted al-Maliki to leave his post, and they were willing to team up with an extreme partner in order to see this goal realized (Sherlock and Malouf, 2014).³ In sum, ISIS owes a substantial amount of credit for its progress to support from key Sunni stakeholders.

Under pressure from Iraqi and foreign sources, al-Maliki agreed to step down as prime minister on August 14, 2014. He made this announcement in a nationally televised primetime speech (Al-Iraqiyah, 2014). The timing of the announcement was unexpected according to a contemporary source (Arango, 2014). Iraqi news media (e.g., al Laythi, 2014) and foreign media that are popular with Iraq's Sunni minority (Al Arabiya, 2014*a*) featured intense coverage of this seminal event in recent Iraqi history. The announced resignation was also

²Other Sunni chiefs and clerics in Anbar province sent messages to the U.S. and Arab governments that the loss of confidence in al-Maliki made it impossible for them to confront ISIS as long as he remained in office (Al-Hayat, 2014).

³For instance, a Sunni in a camp for internally displaced people explained that his support for ISIS was motivated by his hatred of al-Maliki's divisive sectarian policies: "Of course we are grateful to [ISIS]. They liberated us from the tyrant al-Maliki." (Soguel, 2014)

a main topic of the Friday sermons on the following day (Al Arabiya, 2014b). Analyses of Iraqi media reporting on the announcement of al-Maliki's resignation and of news media consumption in Iraq appear on pp. 8-9 of this Online Appendix.

Al-Maliki's announced successor, Haider al-Abadi, was "one of Iraq's most senior politicians" (Madi, 2014) when we was designated to lead the government. He was viewed more favorably by Sunnis even though he was also a Shia Muslim that belonged to al-Maliki's party (Taylor, 2014; see Table 45). During the first 24 hours after al-Maliki announced his resignation, al-Abadi publicly called for national unity (Al Arabiya, 2014d; Press TV, 2014), promised to form a "widely accepted government" (All Iraq News Agency, 2014a), announced a new strategy for a transformed situation (All Iraq News Agency, 2014c), and reached out to Sunni former members of the military under Saddam Hussein (Gorzewski, 2014). On August 14, a spokesman for al-Abadi's Dawa party stated in an interview with a leading Iraqi newspaper that "one of the key points of the prime minister-designate['s] program ... is the handling of the refugees file and the delivery of humanitarian aid" to the mostly Sunni internally displaced Iraqis (al Laythi, 2014). These signals of change and greater concern for the plight of Iraqi minorities echoed al-Abadi's message about the "need for unity and compromise", which he conveyed in interviews during the weeks leading up to the announcement of al-Maliki's resignation (Carter and Tim Lister, 2014). In June, for instance, al-Abadi spoke of "excesses" by Iraqi security forces, which alienated Sunni Iraqis from the government, and he stressed that "we have to listen to the grievances" (Hasan, 2014). In sharp contrast to al-Maliki, al-Abadi backed a reform of the ban on members of the former Baath party from state positions and the military, which he labeled "far from just" in an interview in June (Salman, Holmes and Parker, 2014). In late August, al-Abadi promised at a press conference that the government would address Sunni complaints about damages caused by bombing and shelling during fighting in Iraq's northern and western provinces, committed to investing in developing these provinces, and he emphasized that militias would be placed under the authority of the Iraqi forces to reign in abuses (Davis, 2014). Government shelling in civilian areas was halted two weeks later (Boghani, 2014). In early September al-Abadi presented the government's program, which aimed to make the armed forces more professional and more inclusive vis-à-vis minorities, to improve public service delivery and to provide equal access to them, and to depoliticize state institutions by giving all Iraqis equal employment opportunities in the public sector (Jiyad, 2014).

Contemporaneous accounts confirm that the Iraqi public was aware of the conciliatory signals conveyed by al-Abadi and responded positively to them. In late August, a journalist filed the following report: "'People don't like ISIS, but they just hated al-Maliki. And ISIS was the only alternative,' said Ibrahim [a Sunni in a camp for internally displaced persons]. Now, there is a new alternative - Iraq's new prime minister Haider al-Abadi." (Collard, 2014). A second source agreed that al-Abadi succeeded in convincing ordinary citizens that he pursued the interests of all Iraqi communities - including Sunnis (al Kadhimi, 2014). On the day after al-Maliki's resignation was announced, a Kurdish deputy confirmed that his constituency responded optimistically to this seminal event (All Iraq News Agency, 2014*d*). Three days earlier, the historian and commentator Reidar Visser shared his assessment that al-Abadi enjoyed much broader support than his predecessor, especially from Iraq's minorities (Taylor, 2014). Editorials in independent Iraqi newspapers provide additional evidence on how the leadership transition was perceived in August 2014: Karim (2014) concluded that al-Abadi "was appointed under the slogan of change", and al Shaykh (2014) held that "he has done nothing but good so far".

Elites representing Iraq's disenfranchised minorities responded positively to the leadership transition in their public statements. On August 14, the Union of National Forces, an alliance of Sunni Muslim political parties, welcomed the change in leadership and said that al-Abadi's nomination "gave hope for change in the country" (Habib, 2014). When al-Abadi went on television shortly before al-Maliki announced his resignation, he was accompanied by the Sunni Speaker of Parliament Salim Jabouri in addition to Shiite politicians (Wing, 2014). On the day after al-Maliki announced his resignation, the Sunni governor of Salahhaddin province publicly stated that the new government was off to a good start (All Iraq News Agency, 2014*b*). Two weeks later, Sunni lawmaker Ahmed al-Misari told an interviewer that al-Abadi had a "historical opportunity to reverse tensions that had festered under previous Shiite-led governments (Associated Press, 2014). In early September, Hajem Hassani, a former parliament speaker and a Sunni from the Turkmen minority, described al-Abadi as a good friend (Salman, Holmes and Parker, 2014). Hamed al-Mutlag, another Sunni member of the Iraqi parliament, also expressed his optimism about the new government in an interview conducted in late August (Collard, 2014). Tribal leaders and clerics from Iraq's Sunnimajority provinces also offered their conditional backing for a new government. On the day of al-Maliki's announced resignation, the Group of Scholars of Iraq, which includes moderate clerics of the Sunni community in Iraq, publicly called on all political parties to support the swift formation of a new government led by al-Abadi (Shafaq, 2014). On the following day, Sheikh Ali Hatem Suleiman, who heads a tribe that dominates Anbar province, said during a televised news conference that he was willing to work with the al-Abadi government on the grounds that the new government would respect the rights of the Sunnis (Al Arabiya, 2014d). Moreover, although hostile to al-Maliki "a faction of Sunni tribes, who would be essential to any reconciliation efforts, said [on August 15] they would join al-Abadi's government if they were presented with the right terms" (Chulov, 2014). Two days earlier, the Sunni speaker of the parliament explained in an interview that he had received calls from armed Sunni groups expressing their readiness to join the political process (Abbas, 2014). Around the same time, a former special assistant to five U.S. ambassadors in Iraq reported in a newspaper op-ed that a "shadowy financier of the Sunni insurgency" had informed him that he respected al-Abadi and would give him a chance (Khedery, 2014).

In conclusion, prime minister al-Maliki's announced resignation could be seen as a credible signal that the new Iraqi government was going to embrace and address the needs of Iraqi Sunnis. Moreover, Iraqi news outlets intensely covered the leadership transition, the conciliatory statements al-Abadi made before and after he was was nominated as al-Maliki's successor, as well as the positive reactions to the leadership transition by political, tribal, and sectarian leaders of Iraq's minorities. If this was the case, the 'hearts and minds' model suggests that Iraq's displeased Sunni minority should become less likely to support violent groups like ISIS in the wake of the resignation, and that they should also become more optimistic about future government policies.

News media consumption in Iraq

How quickly did the average Iraqi learn about the announced resignation of prime minister al-Abadi? With dozens of daily newspapers, radio stations, and TV channels, Iraq had "one of the most robust domestic news media markets in the region" around the time of al-Maliki's resignation (Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2015, 1). According to data from the International Telecommunication Union (2017), which is included in the World Bank's World Development Indicators, 98 percent of Iraqi households own a television. A national survey conducted by Gallup in the fall of 2014 shows that satellite TV "is almost ubiquitous in Iraq, present in 97.3 percent of households" (Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2015, 1). The same survey indicates that television is the primary source of news, with 92.1 percent watching TV news at least weekly. The most popular TV station nationwide is Al-Iraqiyah, but Al-Arabiya and two other Sunni-oriented channels do better than Al-Iraqiyah in areas with Sunni majorities (Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2015, 1). In addition to widespread satellite TV ownership, 50 percent of households have access to the Internet and 35 percent own a radio (Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2015, 1). Respondents in our sample share these characteristics of the Iraqi public: More than half of them identify television as their primary news source, and most others list radio, Internet, or newspapers.

Both Al-Iraqiah and Al-Arabiya broadcast al-Maliki's primetime resignation announcement and extensively covered his speech (Al Arabiya, 2014a; Al-Iraqiyah, 2014). This seminal event in Iraqi history was also intensely covered by other news outlets. The summary of political developments surrounding al-Maliki's resignation (see above) cites numerous news reports and editorials that cover Iraq's first transition of the position of head of government in eight years. This event was also a key topic of Friday sermons on the day after the resignation was announced (Al Arabiya, 2014b). This makes it likely that even the 1 percent of survey respondents who identified their "mosque" or "rumors in public places" as their main source of news quickly learned about the leadership transition. Numerous reports from primary sources in the preceding section of the Appendix show that the Iraqi public was aware and responded intensely to this historical event. It is therefore safe to assume that the vast majority of respondents and Iraqi adults learned about the leadership change shortly after it was announced.

Descriptive statistics

Variable	Ν	Response rate	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Main dependent variables						
Sympathy with armed opposition (dichotomous)	1.672	88%	0.24	0.43	0	1
Bating of government	1.587	84%	2.53	0.98	1	4
Likely security improvement	1,830	97%	2.66	1.01	1	4
Likely jobs improvement	1,000 1,843	97%	2.00 2.74	0.87	1	4
Likely electricity improvement	1,040 1,873	99%	2.14	0.83	1	4
Influence on government decisions	1 691	89%	2.20	0.05	1	4
Situation of democracy	1,001 1 729	91%	2.11 2.24	0.85	1	4
Situation of democracy	1,123		2.24	0.00	1	4
Supplementary dependent variables for robustn	ess chec	ks			-	_
Sympathy with armed opposition (3-point scale)	1,672	88%	0.28	0.54	0	2
Violence against government sometimes necessary	1,707	90%	0.32	0.47	0	1
Sign petition without fear	1,336	71%	2.15	0.81	1	3
Contact gov. official without fear	1,488	79%	2.19	0.80	1	3
Run for office without fear	1,445	76%	2.20	0.78	1	3
Perceived security better	1,805	95%	2.99	1.38	1	5
Survey-based independent variables						
Pre/post resignation	1,894	100%	0.61	0.49	0	1
Shia	1,894	100%	0.51	0.50	0	1
Sunni	1,894	100%	0.19	0.40	0	1
Kurd	1,894	100%	0.21	0.41	0	1
Other affiliation	1,894	100%	0.09	0.28	0	1
Resign*Sunni	1,894	100%	0.11	0.31	0	1
Resign*Kurd	1,894	100%	0.10	0.30	0	1
Resign*Other	1,894	100%	0.06	0.23	0	1
Female	1,894	100%	0.44	0.50	0	1
Education: primary school	1,806	95%	0.20	0.40	0	1
Education: junior high school	1,806	95%	0.20	0.40	0	1
Education: senior high school	1,806	95%	0.25	0.43	0	1
Education: univ./academy	1,806	95%	0.36	0.48	0	1
Urban: population $>250k$	1,894	100%	0.23	0.42	0	1
Urban: population 50k-250k	1,894	100%	0.16	0.37	0	1
Urban: population $<50k$	1,894	100%	0.27	0.44	0	1
Rural district	1,894	100%	0.34	0.47	0	1
Working	1,659	88%	0.46	0.50	0	1
Unemployed	1,659	88%	0.07	0.27	0	1
Not gainfully employed	1,659	88%	0.47	0.50	0	1
Good personal economic situation	1,695	89%	0.41	0.49	0	1
Age: 18-24 years	1,890	<100%	0.25	0.44	0	1
Age: 25-31 years	1,890	<100%	0.23	0.42	0	1
Age: 32-38 years	1,890	<100%	0.15	0.36	0	1
Age: 39-52 years	1,890	<100%	0.25	0.43	0	1
Age: 53+ years	1,890	<100%	0.11	0.32	0	1
Female enumerator(s)	1,894	100%	0.49	0.24	0	1
Female enumerator(s)*Female	1,894	100%	0.22	0.29	0	1
Male enumerator(s)	1,894	100%	0.51	0.24	0	1
Male enumerator(s)*Male	1,894	100%	0.29	0.32	0	1
Respondent interviewed inside home	1,894	100%	0.88	0.32	0	1
Respondent mostly alone with enumerator	1,894	100%	0.54	0.50	0	1
Massumes of local security situation based on d	ata aomi	niled by START	and UC	P		
Completion	1 2011	oneu oy SIANI	12 05	96.11	0	100
Casualties (4 work period)	1,094		194 20	20.11	0	120 754
Casuallies (4-week period)	1,094		104.30	249.20	0	104
Fatalities (UCDP)	1,094		4.07	10.62	0	44 199
Deaths on government side	1 804		9.19 0.60	21.09 D.66	0	144 90
Deaths on government side	1,094		7 57	2.00	0	ა∪ 199
Civilian deaths	1 894		0.37	20.00 9.11	0	122
CITING COULD	-,00-		0.01	4.11	0	- 11

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Note: The table displays the descriptive statistics for the sample of respondents who were interviewed in August. N designates the number of respondents who neither refused to answer the question on which the measure is based nor chose the answer option "Don't know". "Resp. rate" indicates the item response

rate for that measure. The average item-specific non-response rate was 5%, and the overall response rate was 90%. The four measures of ethnic and sectarian affiliation (Shia, Sunni, Kurd, Other) are mutually exclusive; respondents who declined to indicate their affiliation were included in the 'Other' group. Note that the three binary measures of employment status are mutually exclusive; the category of those who are not gainfully employed includes retirees, students, and family members who work at home. Respondents economic situation was qualified as (relatively) good if they reported being "able to afford things like new clothes and eating at restaurants" at least occasionally. The counts of fatalities and casualties from terrorist incidents in the respondent's governorate on the day before the interview and the day of the interview was recorded by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2017). A separate measure from the same source records the count of casualties in the respondent's governorate over the four-week period prior to the interview and on the day of the interview. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2017) coded an alternative measure of fatalities in the respondent's governorate on the day of the interview or the previous day. This measure records the sum of deaths inflicted upon the government and its allies, on the insurgents, or on civilians, respectively, in addition to unknown deaths. To construct the measures of the local security situation at the time of the interview, we assumed that fatalities or casualties that resulted from multi-day violent events were evenly distributed over the course of these events.

Bivariate OLS model of support for armed opposition groups

	(8) Full Sample	(9) Sunnis	(10) Kurds	(11) Shiites	(12) Other
Resign	-0.033	-0.259**	-0.080	0.091	-0.017
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.043)	(0.084)	(0.066)
Constant	0.259^{**}	0.524^{**}	0.232^{**}	0.157^{**}	0.163^{**}
	(0.068)	(0.092)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Observations	1,672	316	362	862	132
R-squared	0.001	0.070	0.010	0.011	0.000

Table 2: Al-Maliki's resignation and support for armed opposition groups: results from bivariate OLS models

Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05. Model 8 depicts results of a model of the entire sample, with standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate in parentheses. Models 9-12 show results for different subsets. The 'other' group includes Christians, Turkmens, Assyrians, and respondents who refused to indicate their religion and ethnicity. Attitudes toward armed opposition groups were measured on an binary scale from 'at least some sympathy' (1) to 'no sympathy at all' (0). All interviews were conducted in August, and the resignation was announced on August 14.

Estimated change in attitudes (in standard deviations of the DVs)



Figure 1: Estimated change in Sunni and Shiite attitudes after the announced resignation

Note: The figure displays the estimated change in Sunni and Shiite attitudes derived from Models 1-5 and measured in standard deviations of the dependent variables. 95% confidence intervals are plotted around the point estimates. The upper panel shows that Sunni sympathy for armed opposition groups declined while Sunni ratings of the government and Sunni expectations of future public goods and service delivery by the government improved; at the same time Shiite attitudes vis-à-vis the government did not significantly change at the 95 % confidence level. The lower panel indicates that the announced resignation did not significantly change Sunni and Shiite perceptions of the government's process legitimacy. Figure 2 in the main text displays the same estimated change in attitudes on the original scale of each dependent variable.

Model with three-point outcome variable measuring sympathy for armed groups

	(13)
Dependent	Sympathy w.
variable	armed opp.
Resign	0.0958^{**}
	(0.0358)
Sunni	0.349^{*}
	(0.137)
Kurd	0.116
	(0.119)
Other	0.126
	(0.184)
Resign [*] Sunni	-0.398**
	(0.0875)
Resign*Kurd	-0.170**
	(0.0573)
Resign*Other	-0.218
	(0.156)
Casualties	-0.000895
	(0.00108)
Female	-0.0348
	(0.0221)
Educ: J.H. school	0.000423
	(0.0412)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.0162
	(0.0512)
Educ: Uni	-0.0845*
	(0.0378)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0560
	(0.0864)
Urban: < 50 k	-0.0587
	(0.122)
Rural	-0.0165
TT 1 1	(0.0916)
Unemployed	-0.0722
	(0.0734)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0823
Q	(0.0484)
Good econ. situation	(0.0100)
Construct	(0.0488)
Constant	-2.08^{+++}
Comments for	(0.131)
Governorate i.e.	res Vec
4 age controls	res
Observations	1 209
B-squared	1,302 0.124
resquared	0.124

Table 3: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: results from governorate fixed effects OLS model

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05.

Analysis of subsets of Sunni respondents

Table 4: Change in attitudes in eight subsets of Sunni respondents: estimate from OLS models

Group description	N	Sympathy w. armed opp.	Rating of government	Security improves	Jobs improve	Electricity improves
Groups with lower level	of syr	npathy for armed	opposition after	resignation u	vas announc	ed
Primary school, &	35	-0.452**	-0.224	0.0250	-0.136	0.220
not seeking employment		(0.126)	(0.230)	(0.287)	(0.259)	(0.311)
Junior high school, &	30	-0.277	0.119	0.381^{*}	0.634^{**}	0.0683
not seeking employment		(0.263)	(0.215)	(0.149)	(0.191)	(0.180)
Senior high school, &	56	-0.227	0.300	0.0394	0.0818	0.690
not seeking employment		(0.142)	(0.321)	(0.356)	(0.434)	(0.459)
Univ./ academy, &	31	-0.168	0.273	-0.105	0.708^{*}	0.466
not seeking employment		(0.208)	(0.496)	(0.567)	(0.266)	(0.415)
Senior high school, &	34	-0.240	0.214	-0.185	0.0238	0.0238
working or unemployed		(0.335)	(0.443)	(0.550)	(0.382)	(0.481)
Univ./ academy, &	95	-0.243*	-0.483	-0.0484	-0.203	-0.0858
working or unemployed		(0.0986)	(0.299)	(0.220)	(0.189)	(0.257)

Groups with higher level of sympathy for armed opposition after resignation was announced

Primary school, & working or unemployed	13	0.0556 (0.0837)	-1.700 ** (0.289)	0.444^{**} (0.0855)	$0.100 \\ (0.266)$	-0.222 (0.255)
Junior high school, working or unemployed	24	0.235 (0.125)	-0.250 (0.579)	-0.444 (0.413)	0.111 (0.478)	-0.389 (0.329)

Note: The table reports the results from 40 bivariate OLS models conducted on eight subsets of Sunni respondents. The models regress sympathy for the armed opposition or the government's performance legitimacy on a binary measure indicating whether the respondent was interviewed before or after the prime minister's resignation was announced. The sizes of the eight samples are indicated as well. We expect that in each subset of Sunni respondents the coefficients of the resignation's effect on attitudes vis-à-vis the government and on expectations of future public goods and service delivery have the opposite sign as the coefficient of the resignation's effect on sympathy for the armed opposition (in italics). Results that are in line with this expectation are displayed in bold. In five of the eight subsamples, the coefficients of at least three of the four measures of the government's performance legitimacy have the expected sign. All all but one subsample, half or more of the coefficients have the expected sign. Note that the standard errors (obtained from wild bootstrap) are relatively large due to the moderate size of the eight subsamples. Table 5 on the next page presents more disaggregated analyses of twelve subsamples, which split employed and unemployed Sunnis into separate categories. ** p < .01; * p < .05.

Group description	N	Sympathy w. armed opp.	Rating of government	Security improves	Jobs improve	Electricity improves
_			_		_	
Groups with lower level	of syn	npathy for armed	opposition after	resignation u	vas announc	ed
Primary school, &	35	-0.452**	-0.224	0.0250	-0.136	0.220
not seeking employment		(0.126)	(0.230)	(0.287)	(0.259)	(0.311)
Junior high school, &	30	-0.277	0.119	0.381^{*}	0.634^{**}	0.0683
not seeking employment		(0.263)	(0.215)	(0.149)	(0.191)	(0.180)
Senior high school, &	56	-0.227	0.300	0.0394	0.0818	0.690
not seeking employment		(0.142)	(0.321)	(0.356)	(0.434)	(0.459)
Univ./ academy, &	31	-0.168	0.273	-0.105	0.708^{*}	0.466
not seeking employment		(0.208)	(0.496)	(0.567)	(0.266)	(0.415)
Primary school, &	4	-0.667	2.333	1.000^{**}	0.667	-1.333
unemployed		(0.272)	(0.544)	(0.000)	(0.272)	(0.720)
Senior high school, &	31	-0.402	0.404	-0.360	0.046	0.146
working		(0.275)	(0.393)	(0.706)	(0.442)	(0.553)
Univ./ academy, &	89	-0.213*	-0.457	-0.016	-0.209	-0.115
working		(0.103)	(0.283)	(0.242)	(0.204)	(0.278)

Table 5: Change in attitudes in twelve subsets of Sunni respondents: estimate from OLS models

Groups with higher level of sympathy for armed opposition after resignation was announced

Junior high school,	7	0.200	-0.500	-0.400	-0.100	-0.400
unemployed		(0.179)	(1.199)	(0.654)	(0.594)	(0.456)
Senior high school,	3	0.500**	-0.000	0.500**	-0.000	-0.500**
unemployed		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Univ./ academy, &	6	0.250	-1.000	-0.600*	-0.000	-0.000
unemployed		(0.153)	(0.490)	(0.204)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Primary school, &	9	0.667^{**}	-1.429**	0.214^{**}	-0.143	0.333**
working		(0.079)	(0.115)	(0.058)	(0.231)	(0.000)
Junior high school,	17	0.250	0.000	-0.519	0.231	-0.385
working		(0.128)	(0.412)	(0.454)	(0.560)	(0.357)

Note: This table shows that the findings from the models in Table 4 on the previous page are robust to disaggregating employed and unemployed Sunnis into separate groups. The table reports the results from 60 bivariate OLS models conducted on twelve subsets of Sunni respondents. The models regress sympathy for the armed opposition or the government's performance legitimacy on a binary measure indicating whether the respondent was interviewed before or after the prime minister's resignation was announced. N indicates the sizes of the twelve samples. We expect that in each subset of Sunni respondents the coefficients of the resignation's effect on attitudes vis-à-vis the government and on expectations of future public goods and service delivery have the opposite sign as the coefficient of the resignation's effect on sympathy for the armed opposition (in italics). Results that are in line with this expectation are displayed in **bold**. In eight of the twelve subsamples, the coefficients of at least three of the four measures of the government's performance legitimacy have the expected sign. All all but one subsample, half or more of the coefficients have the expected sign. Note that the standard errors (obtained from wild bootstrap) are relatively large due to the moderate size of the twelve subsamples. We report the coefficient of the secondary measure of sympathy for violent opposition to the government for the sample of unemployed Sunnis who graduated from a university or academy, because the model with the primary measure yields unreliable coefficient estimates and infinite t-values due to an essentially perfect fit and small sample size. ** p < .01; * p < .05.

Models with standard errors clustered at district level

	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
Resign	0.0734	-0.116	-0.103	-0.0572	0.0130
	(0.0465)	(0.135)	(0.122)	(0.0903)	(0.0845)
Sunni	0.225**	-0.175	-0.507**	-0.290**	-0.328**
	(0.0562)	(0.0988)	(0.108)	(0.0806)	(0.0894)
Kurd	0.0335	0.0802	-0.162	0.0987	0.216
	(0.106)	(0.272)	(0.226)	(0.157)	(0.169)
Other	0.0439	-0.0865	-0.0577	0.137	-0.0600
	(0.0759)	(0.239)	(0.212)	(0.198)	(0.181)
Resign*Sunni	-0.270**	0.377^{*}	0.441**	0.371^{**}	0.443**
-	(0.0604)	(0.181)	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.127)
Resign*Kurd	-0.142	0.382^{*}	0.130	0.225	-0.0635
	(0.0923)	(0.177)	(0.185)	(0.170)	(0.160)
Resign*Other	-0.141	0.0225	-0.000619	-0.0465	0.324
	(0.0894)	(0.225)	(0.211)	(0.227)	(0.187)
Casualties	-0.000551	0.000356	0.00222	-0.00146	-0.00186
	(0.000639)	(0.00217)	(0.00173)	(0.00125)	(0.00124)
Female	-0.0351	-0.136*	0.0341	0.0128	0.0199
	(0.0234)	(0.0651)	(0.0538)	(0.0527)	(0.0460)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0117	0.185	-0.104	0.171*	0.153*
	(0.0441)	(0.0989)	(0.0809)	(0.0799)	(0.0680)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00565	0.245*	-0.141	0.0840	0.102
	(0.0462)	(0.0958)	(0.0833)	(0.0888)	(0.0828)
Educ: Uni	-0.0564	0.0175	-0.237**	0.0604	0.160*
	(0.0376)	(0.0988)	(0.0737)	(0.0788)	(0.0780)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0453	-0.102	-0.0505	-0.0887	-0.192*
	(0.0694)	(0.184)	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.0938)
Urban: < 50 k	-0.0420	-0.170	-0.0695	-0.114	-0.185*
	(0.0795)	(0.203)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.0844)
Rural	-0.00981	-0.00921	0.0236	-0.0389	-0.0580
	(0.0672)	(0.201)	(0.111)	(0.129)	(0.0955)
Unemployed	-0.0935*	-0.242	-0.118	-0.130	-0.00941
- •	(0.0463)	(0.160)	(0.0967)	(0.0972)	(0.0812)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0870**	-0.105	-0.0644	-0.127	-0.0569
0 1 1	(0.0321)	(0.0757)	(0.0615)	(0.0676)	(0.0572)
Good econ. situation	0.00148	-0.0980	0.152^{**}	0.0640	0.0344
	(0.0323)	(0.0769)	(0.0559)	(0.0792)	(0.0622)
Constant	-0.683**	-2.61**	-2.67**	-2.70**	-2.18**
	(0.138)	(0.309)	(0.244)	(0.238)	(0.151)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,302	1,216	1,396	1,406	1,430
R-squared	0.131	0.198	0.335	0.0845	0.216

Table 6: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

	(19)	(20)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0802	0.0688
	(0.0943)	(0.0672)
Sunni	-0.188	-0.196
	(0.123)	(0.0796)
Kurd	0.0360	-0.0915
	(0.236)	(0.214)
Other	-0.316	-0.275
	(0.193)	(0.146)
Resign*Sunni	0.117	-0.0813
	(0.146)	(0.107)
Resign*Kurd	0.0151	-0.177
-	(0.224)	(0.138)
Resign*Other	0.111	-0.188
0	(0.207)	(0.216)
Casualties	0.00113	-0.000103
	(0.000965)	(0.00120)
Female	-0.112	-0.0179
	(0.0617)	(0.0546)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0603	0.0329
	(0.0886)	(0.10190)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0565	0.0821
	(0.0945)	(0.0945)
Educ: Uni	-0.00745	-0.108
	(0.0935)	(0.109)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0507	0.0270
	(0.118)	(0.131)
Urban:< 50k	-0.335	-0.0560
	(0.111)	(0.106)
Bural	-0.0867	0.0127
	(0.105)	(0.0932)
Unemployed	-0.166	-0.0381
onomprojea	(0.151)	(0.101)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.235	-0.0793
root gammany empty	(0.0653)	(0.0611)
Good econ Situation	0.0131	0.0416
Good cooli. Situation	(0.0783)	(0.0541)
Constant	-2.68**	-2.58**
2 3110 00110	(0.187)	(0.166)
Governorate f.e	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
1 420 00101010	100	105
Observations	1.301	1.337
R-squared	0.177	0.150
	0.111	0.100

Table 7: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

Model with alternative measure of support for violent opposition to the government

A robustness check investigates an alternative measure of respondents' support for violent opposition to the Iraqi government. This analysis complements the analyses of sympathy for armed opposition groups that use violence, which are presented in the main text. The alternative measure is based on respondents' answer to the following direct question: "Which of the following statement is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. Statement 1: The use of violence by citizens against the government is never justified in Iraq/Iraqi politics today. Statement 2: In this country, it is sometimes necessary for citizens to use violence against the government in support of a just cause." Respondents could choose between expressing that they "agree with statement 1" or that they "agree with statement 2", in addition to saying that they "don't know" or that they refuse to answer. Table 1 presents the summary statistics on this dependent variable, which takes a positive value for respondents that agree with statement 2.

This complementary measure and the variable described in the main text both measure Iraqi attitudes toward violent opposition to the Iraqi government. At the same time, they capture different aspects of this underlying attitude. The measure in the main text refers to sympathy with armed opposition groups that use violence whereas the measure in the robustness check refers to the use of political violence itself. Thus, Iraqis would offer diverging responses to these questions if they support armed opposition groups without endorsing the latter's resort to violent means. Second, the main measure of violence asks respondents to indicate the extent of their sympathy with groups that have used violence over the past year, whereas the alternative measure confronts them with a forced choice between two abstract statements. Some respondents who may feel uncomfortable with indicating support for armed opposition groups may be more willing to endorse the use of anti-government violence in the abstract. If analyses of both measures yield the same results despite these differences we can be confident that our findings are not artifacts of the specific wording of either survey item.

Our analysis of this second measure of support for violent opposition against the government confirms the results from the models with the other variable. Table 8 shows that Shiites did not significantly change their attitudes toward violence against the government in the wake of the prime minister's announced resignation. In contrast, Sunnis became less supportive of violent opposition to the government after this seminal event in mid-August. To calculate the change in Sunni attitudes, we sum the coefficients of the dichotomous measure that captures whether the respondent was interviewed before or after the resignation was announced and its interaction with the respondent's affiliation with the Sunni community. These two coefficients are jointly significant (p<0.05). Model 21 estimates that after the leadership transition was announced Sunnis were nine percentage points more likely to agree that violence against the government is never justified in contemporary Iraqi politics rather than concurring that it was sometimes necessary for citizens to resort to anti-government violence in support of a just cause. The specifications of this model are the same as those of the main models reported in Table 1 in the main text.

	(21)
Dependent	Violence against government
variable	sometimes necessary
	-
Resign	-0.0932
0	(0.0585)
Sunni	-0.0717
	(0.0468)
Kurd	0.0521
	(0.0922)
Other	-0.115
	(0.0917)
Resign*Sunni	0.000537
0	(0.0612)
Resign [*] Kurd	0.0679
0	(0.0970)
Resign*Other	-0.0459
0	(0.106)
Casualties	-0.00111
	(0.000646)
Female	-0.00388
	(0.0322)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0550
	(0.0331)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0296
	(0.0408)
Educ: uni	0.0256
	(0.0301)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.00437
	(0.0537)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0109
	(0.0498)
Rural	-0.0135
	(0.0513)
Unemployed	-0.0181
1 0	(0.0497)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0364
	(0.0322)
Good econ. Situation	-0.0139
	(0.0288)
Constant	0.299**
	(0.106)
Governorate f.e.	Yes
4 age controls	Yes
Ŭ	
Observations	1,318
R-squared	0.147

 Table 8: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on attitudes toward political violence against the government: results from a governorate fixed effects OLS model

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. See the previous two pages for details on the measures and on the interpretation of the coefficients in the model.

Models with additional measures of democratic legitimacy

In addition to analyzing the two measures of democratic legitimacy for which results are reported in the main text, we investigated three additional measures that focus on individuals' access to government decision-making (rather than influence on decision-making). These three-point outcome variables are based on the response to the following survey questions: "Now I will read you nine different activities that you could participate in. Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities with 'no fear', 'some fear' or a 'lot of fear'? Signing a petition ... Contacting a government official about concerns or problems ... Running for a public office." In addition to the three choices read out by the enumerator, respondents could respond that they 'do not know' or refuse to answer. The dependent variable takes a high positive value for respondents that did not indicate fear, a low positive value for those who expressed fear, and a missing value for those who responded that they 'do not know' or refused to answer. Table 9 displays the regression results and Table 1 presents the summary statistics on these dependent variables.

	(22)	(23)	(24)
Dependent	Sign petition	Contact gov.	Run for office
variable	without fear	without fear	without fear
Resign	-0.0736	0.0637	-0.0623
	(0.112)	(0.0786)	(0.0886)
Sunni	0.259^{*}	0.168	0.262
	(0.116)	(0.201)	(0.219)
Kurd	0.111	0.0423	0.103
	(0.246)	(0.262)	(0.175)
Other	0.0412	0.0884	-0.187**
	(0.0918)	(0.129)	(0.0604)
Resign*Sunni	-0.147	-0.0430	0.0884
	(0.200)	(0.205)	(0.183)
Resign*Kurd	-0.00934	0.130	0.135
	(0.185)	(0.213)	(0.154)
Resign*Other	0.320	0.235	0.609^{**}
	(0.178)	(0.316)	(0.203)
Casualties	0.00195	-0.00177	0.00193^{*}
	(0.00183)	(0.00257)	(0.000897)
Female	0.314^{**}	0.234^{**}	0.166
	(0.0656)	(0.0839)	(0.0870)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0712	-0.0959	-0.108
	(0.109)	(0.0923)	(0.0718)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.184	-0.0469	-0.0735
	(0.159)	(0.127)	(0.140)
Educ: Uni	-0.225	-0.179	-0.182
	(0.149)	(0.115)	(0.154)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.261**	-0.369**	-0.225*
	(0.0718)	(0.0671)	(0.0931)
Urban: < 50 k	0.0323	-0.0416	-0.0809
	(0.0623)	(0.0610)	(0.0719)
Rural	-0.0260	-0.0924	-0.0864
	(0.0707)	(0.0690)	(0.0823)
Unemployed	0.0717	0.0319	-0.00929
	(0.0982)	(0.0974)	(0.103)
Not gainfully empl.	0.0888	0.0758	0.131^{*}
	(0.0676)	(0.0798)	(0.0552)
Good econ. situation	-0.0914	-0.142**	-0.136**
	(0.0661)	(0.0387)	(0.0479)
Constant	-1.93**	-2.18**	-2.21**
	(0.143)	(0.0932)	(0.197)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,045	$1,\!135$	1,120
R-squared	0.171	0.149	0.122

Table 9: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

Ordered logit and logit models

The dependent variables in our model take discrete values, which implies that generalized linear models are also appropriate alternative specifications for our main model. In this section, we report results from logit models of the binary outcome of sympathy for armed groups and ordinal logit models of the other four main dependent variables, which are coded on four-point ordinal scales.

The estimation for the ordered logit model of the causal effect of the announced resignation takes the following form:

$$DV_i^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 Z_i + \beta_4 T_i * Z_i + \beta_5 F E_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

The subscript *i* refers to the respondent. The independent variable of interest, T_i , is a binary measure that indicates whether the respondent was surveyed before or after August 14th. If the respondent was interviewed after August 14, then $T_i = 1$. The variables contained in X_i describe individual-level socio-economic characteristics, and the variables contained in Z_i designate the respondent's religious and ethnic group affiliation. We interact T_i with these religious/ethnic variables in order to investigate heterogeneity in the treatment effect across the different communities. We also include governorate fixed effects (FE_i). DV_i^* is a latent dependent variable. For example, one of the ordinal outcome variables measures respondents' ratings of the federal government. In this case, the latent dependant variable captures respondents' propensity for positive or negative attitudes vis-à-vis the government. We do not observe this latent value but instead observe the response to this question where:

$$DV_{i} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } DV_{i}^{*} \leq \mu_{1}, \\ 2, & \text{if } \mu_{1} < DV_{i}^{*} \leq \mu_{2}, \\ 3, & \text{if } \mu_{2} < DV_{i}^{*} \leq \mu_{3}, \\ 4, & \text{if } \mu_{3} < DV_{i}^{*} \end{cases}$$

and μ are the cut points on the unobserved propensity that shape the observed outcome.

	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
Resign	0.542^{*}	-0.254	-0.206	-0.0796	-0.0129
	(0.261)	(0.189)	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.173)
Sunni	1.34^{**}	-0.396	-1.172^{**}	-0.664**	-0.829**
	(0.330)	(0.259)	(0.255)	(0.249)	(0.250)
Kurd	0.296	0.262	-0.250	0.264	0.599
	(0.672)	(0.407)	(0.414)	(0.384)	(0.406)
Other	0.384	-0.118	-0.0838	0.306	-0.0939
	(0.546)	(0.375)	(0.363)	(0.368)	(0.377)
Resign*Sunni	-1.66**	0.763^{*}	1.05^{**}	0.886^{**}	1.12^{**}
	(0.427)	(0.323)	(0.315)	(0.306)	(0.312)
Resign*Kurd	-1.07*	0.808*	0.215	0.480	-0.185
	(0.492)	(0.317)	(0.336)	(0.308)	(0.316)
Resign*Other	-1.05	-0.000114	0.00748	-0.0515	0.820
	(0.667)	(0.458)	(0.425)	(0.429)	(0.446)
Casualties	-0.00380	0.0000203	0.00484	-0.00276	-0.00534
	(0.00379)	(0.00286)	(0.00263)	(0.00262)	(0.00276)
Female	-0.252	-0.314**	0.0798	0.0378	0.115
	(0.171)	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.111)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0817	0.365	-0.231	0.431*	0.421*
	(0.259)	(0.189)	(0.173)	(0.176)	(0.175)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0593	0.499**	-0.346*	0.218	0.282
	(0.259)	(0.188)	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.174)
Educ: uni	-0.401	0.0541	-0.593**	0.195	0.398*
TT 1	(0.256)	(0.177)	(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.166)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.309	-0.235	-0.0556	-0.224	-0.442*
TT 1 K01	(0.274)	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.175)	(0.184)
Urban:< 50k	-0.267	-0.320	-0.160	-0.273	-0.484**
D 1	(0.242)	(0.177)	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.168)
Rural	-0.0310	-0.000774	0.0881	-0.141	-0.128
TT 1 1	(0.228)	(0.166)	(0.157)	(0.154)	(0.156)
Unemployed	-0.729*	-0.430	-0.199	-0.312	-0.0470
N f. 11 1	(0.307)	(0.220)	(0.209)	(0.201)	(0.209)
Not gamfuny empl.	-0.054	-0.180	-0.108	-0.313	-0.18(
Cood soon Situation	(0.198)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.124)	(0.127)
Good econ. Situation	-0.0129	-0.192	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.102)
Covernameta fa	(0.108) Voc	(0.119) Voc	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.110)
d ago controls	Tes Voc	Vog	Vog	Tes Voc	Vos
4 age controls	Tes	1 27**	165	1 56**	2 04**
Out point 1		(0.367)	(0.332)	(0.334)	(0.340)
Cut point 2		(0.307) 0.101	(0.332) 0.270	(0.354) 0.454	-1 00**
Out point 2		(0.366)	(0.329)	(0.332)	(0.338)
Cut point 3		2 01**	2.023	283^{**}	1.80**
		(0.371)	(0,330)	(0.347)	(0.341)
Constant	-0.663	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.011)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	(0.484)				
	(0.101)				
Observations	1,302	1,216	1,396	1,406	1,430

Table 10: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: results from logit and ordinal logit models (latent variable representation)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

Table 11: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: results from ordinal logit models (latent variable representation)

	(30)	(31)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.223	0.176
	(0.171)	(0.173)
Sunni	-0.341	-0.389
	(0.247)	(0.251)
Kurd	0.0861	-0.140
	(0.391)	(0.400)
Other	-0.705	-0.634
	(0.382)	(0.377)
Resign*Sunni	0.195	-0.270
	(0.313)	(0.313)
Resign*Kurd	0.0405	-0.462
	(0.325)	(0.316)
Resign*Other	0.279	-0.553
-	(0.459)	(0.451)
Casualties	0.00236	-0.000447
	(0.00275)	(0.00278)
Female	-0.287*	-0.0605
	(0.115)	(0.112)
Educ: J.H. school	0.131	0.0773
	(0.184)	(0.179)
Educ: S.H. school	0.124	0.212
	(0.178)	(0.179)
Educ: uni	-0.00824	-0.215
	(0.175)	(0.173)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.190	0.0845
	(0.189)	(0.187)
Urban:< 50k	-0.793**	-0.120
	(0.178)	(0.173)
Rural	-0.272	-0.00156
	(0.164)	(0.160)
Unemployed	-0.415	-0.0774
1 0	(0.218)	(0.208)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.543**	-0.174
0 1 1	(0.134)	(0.131)
Good econ. Situation	0.0380	0.0743
	(0.119)	(0.116)
Cut point 1	-1.32**	-1.76**
•	(0.346)	(0.350)
Cut point 2	-0.0567	-0.0318
Ŧ	(0.343)	(0.346)
Cut point 3	2.65**	2.90**
. r	(0.362)	(0.365)
	()	()
Observations	1,301	1,337

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

With regards to the standard errors, we cannot use the wild bootstrap procedure with regards these non-linear models, as the wild bootstrap requires an additively separable error term (Pfaff and Hirata, 2013, p.9). We used these estimates to calculate the predicted probabilities of being in each category of the dependent variables depending on one's religious group (holding everything else at the median), and the change in the probabilities for Shia and Sunni Muslims after the announced resignation. The results correspond to those of the OLS results in the main text.⁴

### Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on perceived security situation

The dependent variable in this model indicates the response to the following question: "Over the last year, would you say that security in Iraq has: Gotten much better, gotten somewhat better, gotten somewhat worse, gotten much worse or stayed the same?". It is measured on a five-point scale from "much worse" (the lowest positive value on the dependent variable) to "somewhat worse" to "stayed the same" to "somewhat better" to "much better" (the highest positive value on the dependent variable). If Sunni perceptions of the present security situation significantly improved in August 2014, such a change would be partly captured in the responses to this question. However, the results reveal that Sunnis did not become more optimistic about the recent security situation in the wake of the announcement of al-Maliki's resignation. While this question does not address popular expectations of the future course of the conflict, it indicates that the resignation did not lead to (or coincide with) a short-term improvement in Sunni perceptions of the actual security situation in their country.

⁴The results for the predicted probabilities are available from the authors.

	(32)
Dependent	Perceived
variable	security
Resign	0.0474
	(0.130)
Sunni	0.278
	(0.367)
Kurd	0.277
	(0.335)
Other	-0.128
	(0.279)
Resign*Sunni	-0.310
	(0.296)
Resign [*] Kurd	$-0.425^{*}$
	(0.196)
Resign*Other	-0.405
	(0.534)
Casualties	0.00360
	(0.00350)
Female	0.0939
	(0.102)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0248
	(0.132)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.0436
	(0.128)
Educ: Uni	0.0543
	(0.147)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0172
	(0.115)
Urban: $< 50$ k	-0.0480
	(0.159)
Rural	-0.200
	(0.193)
Unemployed	0.223
	(0.207)
Not gainfully empl.	0.0264
	(0.0909)
Good econ. situation	-0.0773
	(0.0885)
Constant	-3.18**
	(0.274)
Governorate f.e.	Yes
4 age controls	Yes
Observations	1 202
Deservations	1,393
n-squarea	0.147

Table 12: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on perception of recent security situation: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. See previous page for details.

## Models with different sample sizes

	(33) Full Sample	(34) Sunnis	(35) Kurds	(36)Shiites	(37) Other
Resignation	0.00223	-0.215*	-0.0824*	0.114	0.0266
	(0.0775)	(0.108)	(0.0320)	(0.0765)	(0.0653)
Constant	$0.216^{**}$	$0.475^{**}$	0.235**	$0.117^{*}$	$0.130^{*}$
	(0.0566)	(0.114)	(0.0460)	(0.0398)	(0.0489)
Observations	2,370	400	508	1,280	182
R-squared	0.000	0.049	0.010	0.019	0.001

Table 13: Al-Maliki's resignation and support for armed opposition groups: results from bivariate OLS models with  $\pm 21$  day window

Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05. Model 33 depicts results of a model of the entire sample, with standard errors in parentheses. Models 34-37 show results for different subsets. The 'other' group includes Christians, Turkmens, Assyrians, and respondents who refused to indicate their religion and ethnicity. Attitudes toward armed opposition groups were measured on an binary scale from 'at least some sympathy' (1) to 'no sympathy at all' (0). All interviews were conducted within 21 days from the date of the announced resignation, and the resignation was announced on August 14.

	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
Resign	0.0651**	-0.0483	-0 175*	-0 156	-0.124
10001811	(0.0248)	(0.125)	(0.0788)	(0.0826)	(0.0842)
Sunni	0.205**	-0.0633	-0.473***	-0.350**	-0.359**
	(0.0726)	(0.144)	(0.0892)	(0.0445)	(0.0704)
Kurd	$0.0952^{*}$	0.375	-0.0102	0.159	0.0949
	(0.0395)	(0.256)	(0.148)	(0.170)	(0.126)
Other	0.0343	-0.0324	-0.189	-0.0882	-0.154
	(0.0726)	(0.202)	(0.144)	(0.155)	(0.117)
Resign*Sunni	-0.233**	$0.296^{*}$	$0.307^{**}$	$0.300^{**}$	$0.365^{**}$
	(0.0540)	(0.143)	(0.0826)	(0.0641)	(0.0782)
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.144**	0.157	0.120	0.192	0.0709
	(0.0471)	(0.204)	(0.198)	(0.135)	(0.182)
Resign*Other	-0.0580	0.0379	0.00814	0.105	$0.446^{**}$
	(0.0580)	(0.190)	(0.172)	(0.160)	(0.135)
Casualties	-0.000242	0.000991	-0.00235	-0.00359**	-0.00213**
	(0.000554)	(0.00163)	(0.00191)	(0.00109)	(0.000471)
Female	-0.0311	-0.0586	-0.00600	-0.0358	-0.0584
	(0.0290)	(0.0530)	(0.0556)	(0.05666)	(0.0610)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0543	$0.185^{**}$	-0.128*	0.0641	0.103
	(0.0424)	(0.0687)	(0.0593)	(0.0788)	(0.0545)
Educ: S.H. school	(0.0232)	$0.231^{**}$	-0.119	(0.0893)	(0.0899)
Data II.:	(0.0439)	(0.0855)	(0.0041)	(0.0893)	(0.0703)
Educ: Uni	-0.0102	(0.0990)	$-0.170^{-1}$	0.0057	$(0.183^{+})$
Urban, 50k 250k	(0.0270)	(0.0910)	(0.0013)	(0.0710)	(0.0705) 0.244*
010all. 30K-230K	(0.0453)	(0.215)	(0.152)	(0.138)	(0.114)
Urban: < 50k	(0.0433)	(0.230)	(0.152)	(0.138)	-0.246**
010an < 50k	(0.0864)	(0.236)	(0.182)	(0.131)	(0.0479)
Rural	(0.0004) 0.00877	-0.0206	-0.0668	-0.0984	-0.0910
runai	(0.0602)	(0.274)	(0.107)	(0.0997)	(0.0852)
Unemployed	-0.0754	-0.105	-0.122*	-0.0765	0.0521
••P - • J • •	(0.0473)	(0.152)	(0.0579)	(0.0452)	(0.0773)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0650	-0.0786	-0.0168	-0.0933	-0.0329
0 1	(0.0459)	(0.0656)	(0.0537)	(0.0597)	(0.0475)
Good econ. situation	0.0142	0.0586	0.0680	-0.00116	-0.0206
	(0.0377)	(0.0803)	(0.0706)	(0.0988)	(0.0917)
Constant	-0.812**	-2.83**	-2.33**	-2.36**	-2.03**
	(0.0989)	(0.263)	(0.286)	(0.225)	(0.131)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$1,\!930$	1,769	$2,\!090$	2,092	$2,\!134$
R-squared	0.122	0.186	0.294	0.0863	0.243

Table 14: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation with  $\pm 21$  day window: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

	(43)	(44)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0903	0.00944
	(0.0555)	(0.0546)
Sunni	-0.231*	-0.224**
	(0.106)	(0.0857)
Kurd	0.0780	0.0879
0.1	(0.107)	(0.311)
Other	-0.351**	-0.301*
. n* . d	(0.122)	(0.121)
Resign [*] Sunni	(0.00897)	-0.0971
D: *1/l	(0.0434)	(0.121)
Resign' Kurd	-0.0137	-0.298
Decime*Other	(0.131)	(0.0874)
Resign Other	-0.0197	-0.281
Caqualtian	(0.200)	(0.229)
Casuanties	-0.000118	-0.000829
Formalo	(0.00141) 0.107	(0.00112)
remaie	-0.107	-0.0218
Educe I H. school	(0.0032) 0.0438	(0.0313)
Educ. J.II. School	(0.0438)	(0.0233)
Educ: S.H. school	(0.0011)	(0.0845)
Eque. 5.11. School	(0.105)	(0.0007)
Educ: Uni	(0.103)	(0.0331)
Luuc. Om	(0.105)	(0.117)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0545	-0.0508
015an. 50k 250k	(0.128)	(0.108)
Urban:< 50k	-0.210	-0.0810
015000 0000	(0.129)	(0.0530)
Rural	-0.0454	-0.0647
	(0.161)	(0.0949)
Unemployed	-0.0649	-0.0192
1 0	(0.0663)	(0.0519)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.221**	-0.0851
0 1 1	(0.0670)	(0.0555)
Good econ. situation	0.0253	-0.00851
	(0.0840)	(0.0618)
Constant	-2.67**	-2.48**
	(0.110)	(0.151)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,920	1,991
R-squared	0.166	0.128

Table 15: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation with  $\pm 21$  day window: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

	(45) Full Sample	(46) Sunnis	(47) Kurds	(48)Shiites	(49) Other
Resignation	-0.0142	-0.243*	-0.0816	0.110	0.0487
	(0.0941)	(0.0946)	(0.0496)	(0.0997)	(0.0815)
Constant	$0.259^{**}$	$0.524^{**}$	$0.232^{**}$	$0.157^{*}$	$0.163^{*}$
	(0.0708)	(0.0963)	(0.0591)	(0.0549)	(0.0567)
Observations	1,536	303	350	788	95
R-squared	0.000	0.062	0.011	0.016	0.004

Table 16: Al-Maliki's resignation and support for armed opposition groups: results from bivariate OLS models with  $\pm 14$  day window

Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05. Model 45 depicts results of a model of the entire sample, with standard errors in parentheses. Models 46-49 show results for different subsets. The 'other' group includes Christians, Turkmens, Assyrians, and respondents who refused to indicate their religion and ethnicity. Attitudes toward armed opposition groups were measured on an binary scale from 'at least some sympathy' (1) to 'no sympathy at all' (0). All interviews were conducted within 14 days of the announced resignation, and the resignation was announced on August 14.

	(50)	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	$\operatorname{improves}$	improve	$\operatorname{improves}$
Design	0.0850	0.0661	0.0040	0.0199	0.00250
Resign	(0.0659)	-0.0001	-0.0940	-0.0128	(0.00250)
G:	(0.0455)	(0.181)	(0.139)	(0.109)	(0.0077)
Sunni	(0.0249)	-0.180	-0.489	$-0.277^{+1}$	-0.311
Vl	(0.0842)	(0.115)	(0.0962)	(0.0400)	(0.0720)
Kura	(0.0712)	(0.0419)	(0.102)	(0.180)	0.21(
0.1	(0.0852)	(0.303)	(0.192)	(0.180)	(0.176)
Otner	0.0383	-0.0755	-0.0120	(0.131)	0.0287
<b>D</b> • *0 •	(0.103)	(0.261)	(0.125)	(0.172)	(0.152)
Resign*Sunni	-0.272**	0.329*	0.406**	$0.350^{**}$	0.374**
	(0.0516)	(0.158)	(0.105)	(0.0850)	(0.132)
Resign*Kurd	-0.158**	0.246	0.114	0.175	-0.0970
	(0.0605)	(0.219)	(0.173)	(0.156)	(0.210)
Resign*Other	-0.0698	0.00377	0.0863	-0.0994	0.288
	(0.124)	(0.369)	(0.152)	(0.246)	(0.179)
Casualties	-0.000879	-0.00128	0.000186	-0.00199**	-0.00285**
	(0.000859)	(0.000992)	(0.00113)	(0.000593)	(0.000557)
Female	-0.0537*	-0.138*	0.0189	0.0356	0.0286
	(0.0220)	(0.0544)	(0.0717)	(0.0613)	(0.0706)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0158	$0.223^{*}$	-0.121	0.168	$0.165^{*}$
	(0.0418)	(0.0894)	(0.0873)	(0.105)	(0.0730)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00278	$0.245^{*}$	-0.111	0.0813	0.0757
	(0.0535)	(0.109)	(0.0687)	(0.0955)	(0.101)
Educ: Uni	-0.0439	0.0489	-0.193*	0.0621	0.160
	(0.0279)	(0.102)	(0.0790)	(0.0859)	(0.113)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0444	-0.0449	-0.0648	-0.0819	-0.195
	(0.0679)	(0.318)	(0.166)	(0.172)	(0.140)
Urban: $< 50$ k	-0.0141	0.00803	-0.0115	-0.104	-0.183**
	(0.0997)	(0.257)	(0.185)	(0.131)	(0.0593)
Rural	-0.00225	0.0782	0.0399	-0.00637	-0.0615
	(0.0819)	(0.326)	(0.0995)	(0.128)	(0.0627)
Unemployed	-0.0888	-0.224	-0.122	-0.117	0.00520
	(0.0624)	(0.181)	(0.0781)	(0.0698)	(0.108)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0838*	-0.0703	-0.0371	-0.135	-0.0476
0 1 1	(0.0353)	(0.0789)	(0.0475)	(0.0764)	(0.0597)
Good econ. situation	0.00181	-0.0649	$0.198^{**}$	0.0962	0.0692
	(0.0454)	(0.0789)	(0.0691)	(0.110)	(0.0838)
Constant	-0.645**	-2.55**	-2.55**	-2.66**	-2.11**
	(0.0970)	(0.252)	(0.209)	(0.204)	(0.175)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	`Yes ´	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$1,\!174$	1,087	1,232	$1,\!240$	1,264
R-squared	0.142	0.199	0.338	0.0924	0.235

Table 17: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation with  $\pm 14$  day window: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; *p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

	(55)	(56)	
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of	
variable	decisions	democracy	
Resign	-0.0543	0.0591	
	(0.0971)	(0.0526)	
Sunni	-0.167	-0.201	
	(0.130)	(0.0894)	
Kurd	0.272	-0.139	
	(0.171)	(0.237)	
Other	-0.270	-0.283	
	(0.158)	(0.134)	
Resign*Sunni	0.148	-0.0558	
	(0.0935)	(0.111)	
Resign*Kurd	-0.0357	-0.181	
	(0.130)	(0.0878)	
Resign*Other	0.248	0.203	
	(0.228)	(0.255)	
Casualties Lag28x	-0.000439	-0.000141	
	(0.00124)	(0.00135)	
Female	-0.123	-0.0405	
	(0.0816)	(0.0622)	
Educ: J.H. school	0.0779	0.0446	
	(0.0829)	(0.122)	
Educ: S.H. school	0.0814	0.0754	
	(0.164)	(0.129)	
Educ: Uni	0.00738	-0.0802	
	(0.147)	(0.167)	
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0447	0.00142	
	(0.149)	(0.175)	
Urban: < 50k	-0.224	-0.0268	
	(0.107)	(0.113)	
Rural	-0.0890	0.0142	
	(0.170)	(0.113)	
Unemployed	-0.163	0.00589	
	(0.132)	(0.102)	
Not gainfully empl.	-0.267	-0.0576	
	(0.0764)	(0.0742)	
Good econ. situation	0.0130	0.0518	
	(0.109)	(0.0416)	
Constant	-2.55	-2.54	
	(0.120)	(0.193)	
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1,146	1,179	
R-squared	0.154	0.153	

Table 18: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation with  $\pm 14$  day window: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.
#### Sample that consists of the intersection of the samples in the main models

The sample size varies across the main models in Table 1 in the main text as a function of varying non-response rates of the five questions that were used to construct each dependent variable. As an additional robustness check, we replicate these analyses on a sample that includes all respondents who replied to each of these five questions. This procedure shrinks the number of observations by 22 to 33 percent, depending on the dependent variable. Nonetheless, the main results hold, except for the effect of the resignation on Sunni ratings of the government, which still has the expected direction but becomes insignificant. This is likely due to the lack of statistical power due to the loss of observations, which inflates the standard error. Note that while the Sunni interaction term in the model of electricity improves becomes insignificant, the change in Sunni ratings of electricity remains significant.

	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	$\operatorname{improves}$
Resign	0.0594	-0.107	0.0249	-0.0727	0.101
	(0.0329)	(0.197)	(0.164)	(0.110)	(0.0705)
Sunni	0.207**	-0.0991	-0.400**	-0.296**	-0.202**
	(0.0615)	(0.141)	(0.0695)	(0.0824)	(0.0662)
Kurd	0.0267	0.0236	0.0745	0.130	0.308*
	(0.0742)	(0.303)	(0.233)	(0.159)	(0.140)
Other	0.0650	-0.206	0.220	0.0599	0.00702
	(0.108)	(0.267)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.146)
Resign [*] Sunni	-0.252**	0.205	$0.308^{**}$	$0.296^{**}$	0.225
	(0.0384)	(0.179)	(0.0931)	(0.108)	(0.126)
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.135**	0.418	-0.108	0.199	-0.260
	(0.0475)	(0.221)	(0.163)	(0.132)	(0.179)
Resign*Other	-0.188	0.0687	-0.215	-0.0583	0.207
	(0.107)	(0.264)	(0.138)	(0.187)	(0.174)
Casualties	-0.0000181	0.0000821	0.00163	-0.000279	-0.00120
	(0.000914)	(0.00193)	(0.00155)	(0.00129)	(0.00114)
Female	-0.0441	-0.158*	0.00945	0.0111	-0.00455
	(0.0281)	(0.0671)	(0.0665)	(0.0725)	(0.0734)
Educ: J.H. school	0.00889	0.129	-0.141	0.0706	0.104
	(0.0616)	(0.0911)	(0.0777)	(0.113)	(0.0863)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.00521	0.174	-0.104	0.0784	0.124
	(0.0591)	(0.101)	(0.0643)	(0.0693)	(0.123)
Educ: Uni	-0.0534	-0.0510	-0.180**	0.0566	0.159
	(0.0442)	(0.0981)	(0.0686)	(0.0626)	(0.118)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0435	-0.0231	-0.221	-0.124	-0.226
	(0.0809)	(0.351)	(0.157)	(0.208)	(0.130)
Urban: $< 50k$	-0.0557	-0.155	-0.179	-0.112	-0.185**
	(0.131)	(0.300)	(0.203)	(0.200)	(0.0575)
Rural	-0.0115	0.0237	-0.0969	-0.0332	-0.0636
	(0.100)	(0.351)	(0.120)	(0.164)	(0.0653)
Unemployed	-0.112	-0.285	-0.0983	-0.0982	-0.0269
	(0.0676)	(0.204)	(0.0973)	(0.0666)	(0.111)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0950*	-0.134	0.0362	-0.0635	-0.0187
	(0.0462)	(0.0862)	(0.0571)	(0.0537)	(0.0377)
Good econ. situation	-0.0140	-0.105	$0.166^{**}$	0.0803	0.0485
<b>a</b>	(0.0470)	(0.0749)	(0.0564)	(0.107)	(0.0774)
Constant	-0.645**	$-2.4'(^{\uparrow\uparrow})$	-2.75**	$-2.65^{++}$	$-2.24^{++}$
0	(0.152)	(0.302)	(0.230)	(0.236)	(0.144)
Governorate t.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1 056	1.056	1.056	1.056	1 056
R-squared	0.113	0.210	0.366	0.0785	0.232
ri squarea	0.110	0.210	0.000	0.0100	0.202

Table 19: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation with intersection of samples: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

# Covariate balance

	(62)	(63)	(64)
Dependent	Inclusion in	Assignment to	Assignment to
variable	August sample	treatment	treatment
		(August sample)	$(\pm 21 \text{ day sample})$
Sunni	-0.0274	-0.0873**	-0.0415
	(0.0219)	(0.0299)	(0.0236)
Kurd	-0.0779	-0.102	-0.174**
	(0.0477)	(0.0695)	(0.0586)
Other	0.000652	-0.0781**	-0.0147
	(0.0242)	(0.0254)	(0.0238)
Casualties	0.00244	-0.00495	-0.000426
	(0.00144)	(0.00440)	(0.00244)
Female	-0.0168	-0.0540*	-0.0521
	(0.0126)	(0.0246)	(0.0330)
Educ: J.H. school	0.00194	0.00874	0.0411
	(0.0227)	(0.0311)	(0.0432)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00240	-0.0175	-0.0123
	(0.0307)	(0.0325)	(0.0369)
Educ: Uni	0.00465	-0.0638	-0.0227
	(0.0300)	(0.0433)	(0.0475)
Urban: 50k-250k	0.0289	-0.109	-0.0831
	(0.0660)	(0.0565)	(0.0723)
Urban: $< 50k$	0.0803	-0.140*	-0.00823
	(0.0518)	(0.0586)	(0.0737)
Rural	0.0273	-0.0806	-0.0687
	(0.0507)	(0.0430)	(0.0445)
Unemployed	-0.0108	-0.101**	-0.0565
	(0.0311)	(0.0340)	(0.0353)
Not gainfully empl.	0.00329	-0.0247	0.0312
	(0.0162)	(0.0368)	(0.0314)
Good econ. situation	0.00650	-0.0495	0.00133
	(0.0222)	(0.0320)	(0.0286)
Age: 25 - 31	0.0104	0.00462	0.00958
	(0.0221)	(0.0334)	(0.0372)
Age: 32 - 38	-0.0261	0.0334	-0.00135
	(0.0209)	(0.0380)	(0.0313)
Age: 39 - 52	-0.0104	0.0399	0.0164
	(0.0283)	(0.0322)	(0.0299)
Age: 53+	-0.0389	-0.0103	-0.0149
	(0.0258)	(0.0441)	(0.0436)
Constant	0.0908	1.12**	$0.795^{**}$
	(0.107)	(0.196)	(0.139)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,375	1,446	2,161
R-squared	0.238	0.283	0.201

Table 20: Effect of pre-treatment covariates on likelihood of inclusion in sample & on likelihood of assignment to treatment group: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The dependent variable in the model of inclusion into the sample takes a value of 1 for respondents interviewed in August and zero otherwise; the sample includes all responses. The models of assignment to the treatment group only includes respondents in the respective sample (composed of those who took the survey in August in Model 63 and of those who completed it within 21 days from the date of the announced resignation in Model 64); the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if they were interviewed after the prime minister announced his resignation and zero otherwise.

#### Models of respondents' choice to refrain from responding

Respondents effectively selected into the sample by choosing answer options that were informative about their attitudes rather than declining to indicate an attitude. As long as respondents in the treatment and control groups did not use different logics of self-selecting into the sample, non-responses did not confound the estimate of the resignation's effect.

We do not find any evidence of an effect of the announcement of the resignation on respondents' willingness to answer the questions analyzed in models 1-7 and the additional robustness check dependent variable on whether violence against the government is justified. We estimated the OLS models with all independent variables and binary outcome variables that take a value of 1 if the respondent declined to answer the respective question. In all models, the resignation did not have a significant effect on the non-response rate for the Shiite baseline group, and the interaction term that captures the differential effect for Sunni respondents was also insignificant (see Tables 21 and 22). Between the control group and treatment group, there are no significant differences in the non-response rates of Shias and Sunnis.

Moreover, the probability of non-response was not significantly associated with almost all pre-treatment covariates. There are a few exceptions. Not gainfully employed persons were more prone to decline an answer to the questions about sympathy with armed groups and likely improvements in security and jobs while those living in small towns were less likely to respond to questions about jobs and electricity improvements. Women were more likely to indicate their expectation about electricity improvements but less likely to express an attitude on the armed opposition and the government. Middle-aged persons were more likely to refrain from answering the question about sympathy for the armed opposition. Respondents who were interviewed at a time when their governorate was targeted by terrorist attacks were less likely to indicate an opinion on likely improvements in security. Therefore, all models control for gender, employment status, the size of the respondent's home town, age, and the local security situation at the time of the interview.

	(65)	(66)	(67)	(68)	(69)	(70)
Dependent variable	Non-response: Sympathy w.	Non-response: Rating of	Non-response: Security	Non-response: Jobs	Non-response: Electricity	Non-response: Violence
	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves	necessary
Resign	0.0205	-0.00108	-0.00524	0.0138	0.0102	0.000389
0	(0.0306)	(0.0449)	(0.0157)	(0.0178)	(0.00587)	(0.0229)
Sunni	0.0563**	-0.0212	0.0294	0.0265	-0.00359	-0.00512
	(0.0210)	(0.0729)	(0.0291)	(0.0193)	(0.00332)	(0.0233)
Kurd	0.114	-0.0760	-0.00912	-0.0110	-0.00439	0.0563
	(0.139)	(0.0556)	(0.0235)	(0.0205)	(0.00499)	(0.0631)
Other	0.0800	0.00355	-0.00361	0.0191	-0.000754	0.0384
	(0.0656)	(0.0296)	(0.0102)	(0.0183)	(0.00292)	(0.0403)
Resign*Sunni	0.0113	-0.0192	0.0163	-0.0428	-0.00568	0.0366
0	(0.0367)	(0.0852)	(0.0331)	(0.0238)	(0.00971)	(0.0476)
Resign*Kurd	-0.0191	-0.0249	-0.00257	-0.00874	-0.0108	0.0899*
0	(0.0751)	(0.0583)	(0.0202)	(0.0223)	(0.00655)	(0.0362)
Resign*Other	-0.0242	0.116	0.00781	-0.0339	-0.0150*	0.0234
	(0.0639)	(0.0808)	(0.0175)	(0.0238)	(0.00702)	(0.0613)
Casualties	-0.00106	0.000280	0.000793*	0.0000345	-0.0000425	-0.000710
	(0.000642)	(0.000512)	(0.000309)	(0.000179)	(0.0000404)	(0.000563)
Female	0.0248*	0.0485*	0.00230	0.00141	-0.00559*	-0.00409
	(0.0114)	(0.0246)	(0.00696)	(0.0103)	(0.00227)	(0.0142)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0231	-0.0233	0.0265	0.00265	-0.0256	-0.0441
	(0.0337)	(0, 0446)	(0.0182)	(0.0152)	(0, 0159)	(0, 0308)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00341	-0.0326	0.0219	0.00740	-0.0109	-0.0237
Edder Shiri Seneor	(0.0271)	(0.0387)	(0.0202)	(0.0211)	(0.0103)	(0.0366)
Educ: Uni	0.0165	-0.0383	0.0128	0.00145	-0.0125	-0.0360
Educe offi	(0.0311)	(0.0283)	(0.0120)	(0.00140)	(0.00866)	(0.0395)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0551	-0.0452	-0.0210	0.000366	0.000842	-0.0298
erban. ook-200k	(0.0363)	(0.0467)	(0.0169)	(0.0112)	(0.000042)	(0.0237)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0279	0.0319	-0.00828	0.0207*	0.0149**	0.0471
orban: < box	(0.0299)	(0.0409)	(0.0114)	(0.00938)	(0.00539)	(0.0374)
Bural	-0.0194	0.0114	-0.0195	0.00219	0.00407	-0.0266
rouror	(0.0256)	(0.0500)	(0.0108)	(0.0142)	(0.00565)	(0.0251)
Unemployed	-0.0181	0.0292	0.0323	0.0302	0.00700	-0.0428
o nompio, ou	(0.0251)	(0.0202)	(0.0184)	(0.0162)	(0.00692)	(0.0311)
Not gainfully empl	0.0530**	0.0360	0.0303*	0.0202**	-0.00446	-0.0308
not gainiany empi-	(0.0205)	(0.0272)	(0.0124)	(0.00558)	(0.00664)	(0.0212)
Good econ situation	0.0367	-0.0152	0.0109	0.00273	-0.000484	0.00398
Good econ. Situation	(0.0197)	(0.0452)	(0.0172)	(0.00270)	(0.00518)	(0.0271)
Age: 25 - 31	-0.00440	0.00382	-0.0116	-0.0000694	-0.000529	-0.0440
11gc. 20 - 01	(0.0104)	(0.0164)	(0.0157)	(0.00770)	(0.00631)	(0.0230)
A ge: 32 - 38	0.0659*	0.0169	-0.00911	-0.00325	-0.00700	-0.0235
nge. 02 - 00	(0.0323)	(0.0296)	(0.0166)	(0.0141)	(0.00523)	(0.0275)
Age: 39 - 52	0.0299	0.0156	-0.00395	0.00901	-0.00554	-0.0262
nge: 00 - 02	(0.0239)	(0.0338)	(0.00916)	(0.0119)	(0.00451)	(0.0198)
A go: 53+	0.0755	0.00503	0.00353	0.00129	0.00426	0.00474
Age: 00+	(0.0408)	(0.0407)	(0.0130)	(0.0107)	(0.0103)	(0.0278)
Constant	0.00008	0.100**	0.0145	0.0240	0.0158	0.111*
Constant	(0.0593)	(0.109)	(0.0352)	(0.0249)	(0.0123)	(0.0523)
Covernorate f.e	Voc	(0.0400) Voc	(0.0002) Vos	(0.0000) Vos	(0.0120) Vos	Voc
Observations	1 446	1 446	1 446	1 446	1 446	1 446
B-squared	0.0861	0.148	0.0271	0.00807	0.0168	0.0769
10 squared	0.0001	0.110	0.0211	0.00001	0.0100	0.0105

Table 21: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on likelihood of non-response: Main model results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. In each model, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent declined to answer the question used to measure the respective DV and zero otherwise.

	(71)	(72)
Dependent	Non-response:	Non-response:
variable	Influence govt.	Situation of
	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0391	0.00197
	(0.0293)	(0.0227)
Sunni	0.0289	0.0391
	(0.0345)	(0.0176)
Kurd	-0.0876	-0.0146
	(0.0607)	(0.0744)
Other	-0.0601	0.131
	(0.0396)	(0.0452)
Resign [*] Sunni	0.0365	-0.00193
	(0.0494)	(0.0203)
Resign [*] Kurd	0.0561	-0.00666
	(0.0496)	(0.0691)
Resign*Other	0.0984	-0.106
	(0.0677)	(0.0647)
Casualties	0.000459	-0.000240
	(0.000307)	(0.000490)
Female	0.0102	0.0434
	(0.0130)	(0.0105)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0128	-0.0392
	(0.0264)	(0.0368)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.0417	-0.0384
	(0.0184)	(0.0327)
Educ: Uni	-0.00985	-0.0316
	(0.0178)	(0.0356)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0245	-0.0942
	(0.0357)	(0.0230)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0408	-0.0447
	(0.0305)	(0.0223)
Rural	0.00933	-0.0613
	(0.0259)	(0.0159)
Unemployed	0.0205	-0.0111
- •	(0.0199)	(0.0244)
Not gainfully empl.	0.0371	0.0159
0 0 1	(0.0250)	(0.0132)
Good econ. situation	0.0138	-0.0469
	(0.0242)	(0.0106)
Constant	0.0959	0.0918
	(0.0406)	(0.0442)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
-		
Observations	1,446	$1,\!446$
R-squared	0.134	0.0583

Table 22: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on likelihood of non-response: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. In each model, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent declined to answer the question used to measure the respective DV and zero otherwise.

#### Models of non-respondents' treatment status

In order to investigate whether respondents' decision-making calculus on whether to reveal their attitude or to decline to answer survey questions systematically changed after the prime minister's resignation was announced, we fit models on samples that are restricted to the subset of non-respondents to the respective question. These models regress the respondent's dichotomous treatment status (i.e., whether she was interviewed before or after August 14) on her sectarian affiliation, other pre-treatment covariates, and governorate fixed effects. The model which would be restricted to the sample of respondents who did not respond to the question about their expectations for future electricity provision could not be estimated due to the low number of respondents who declined to answer this question.

Across all models (except when respondent's assessment of the situation of democracy is the dependent variable), respondents who did not answer the respective questions after August 14 were more likely to be in a slightly better security situation than respondents who declined to indicate their attitude before al-Maliki announced his resignation. Additionally, there are a few other differences. Respondents who did not answer the question about sympathy for armed groups in the wake of the prime minister's resignation were more likely to be in the age groups from 25 to 31 and 39 to 52 than those respondents who did not reply to the same question before the prime minister's announced resignation. Respondents who declined to rate the government in the wake of the announced resignation were less likely to be gainfully employed and more likely to live in rural settings than non-respondents before the announced resignation. Respondents who declined to answer the question about future security provision in the wake of the announced resignation tended to be less educated, live in less rural settings, and were more likely to be middle-aged than non-respondents before the announced resignation. Respondents who declined to answer the question about future job provision in the wake of the announced resignation were less likely to be unemployed and less likely to be from the "Other" ethnic group than non-respondents before the announced resignation. Respondents who declined to answer the question about whether violence against the government is sometimes necessary are less likely to live in large urban settings. Respondents who declined to answer the question about the ability to influence government decisions in the wake of the announced resignation were less likely to be Kurdish, tended to be less educated, more likely to be from a good economic situation, and more likely to be in the age group 39 to 52 than non-respondents before the announced resignation. Respondents who declined to answer the question about the situation of democracy in the wake of the announced resignation were less likely to be Kurdish and less likely to be from a good economic situation. Overall, respondents who did not respond to the questions before al-Maliki's announced resignation had very similar characteristics as those who declined an answer at a later date.

	(73)	(74)	(75)	(76)	(77)
DV	Post-8/14	Post-8/14	Post-8/14	Post-8/14	Post-8/14
	,	,	,	,	,
Sample	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:
	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	$\mathbf{Jobs}$	Violence
	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	necessary
Sunni	0.0550	-0.0860	0.0676	0.0390	0.00586
	(0.0883)	(0.0976)	(0.606)	(0.101)	(0.0763)
Kurd	-0.180	0.135	-0.856**	-0.165	-0.0567
	(0.126)	(0.0810)	(0.226)	(0.240)	(0.143)
Other	-0.145	0.266	0.0628	-0.575*	-0.252
	(0.0957)	(0.0353)	(0.160)	(0.267)	(0.151)
Casualties	-0.00907**	-0.00965**	-0.00871**	-0.0111**	-0.0129**
	(0.00159)	(0.00197)	(0.00248)	(0.00311)	(0.00294)
Female	0.0161	-0.0833	-0.0688	-0.280	-0.0465
	(0.0920)	(0.0486)	(0.0368)	(0.219)	(0.0654)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.168	0.0484	-0.227	0.186	-0.0999
	(0.112)	(0.0742)	(0.237)	(0.184)	(0.0842)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.152	0.0921	-0.302	0.104	-0.0404
	(0.121)	(0.0767)	(0.295)	(0.0699)	(0.0717)
Educ: Uni	-0.151	0.116	-0.567**	-0.127	-0.0987
Eddor offi	(0.0948)	(0.0721)	(0.201)	(0.212)	(0.0805)
Urban: 50k-250k	0.000134	-0.0991	-0.467	-0.190	-0.330*
0104111 0011 20011	(0.0847)	(0.112)	(0.227)	(0.175)	(0.129)
Urban: < 50k	0.0/91	(0.112) 0.0427	-0.0735	0.0667	-0.0665
orban. < 50k	(0.112)	(0.042)	(0.0650)	(0.0007	-0.0000
Bural	-0.0105	0.201**	-0.137*	0.140	-0.0481
Iturai	(0.0724)	(0.0705)	(0.0515)	(0.0044)	(0.135)
Unemployed	(0.0724)	(0.0703)	(0.0313)	(0.0344) 0.721*	(0.155)
Onemployed	-0.0393	(0.0751)	-0.404	-0.721	(0.132)
Not coinfully ompl	(0.132)	(0.0751) 0.177*	(0.298)	(0.309)	(0.122)
Not gamuny empi.	0.00810	(0.0800)	-0.141	-0.303	-0.0401
Qual and situation	(0.0095)	(0.0800)	(0.0962)	(0.173)	(0.0882)
Good econ. situation	(0.121)	-0.0717	(0.0475)	-0.197	0.0431
A 05 01	(0.0017)	(0.0553)	(0.0830)	(0.135)	(0.109)
Age: 25 - 31	0.115***	0.0869	0.433*	0.148	-0.138
1 80 80	(0.0422)	(0.0593)	(0.192)	(0.0998)	(0.0961)
Age: 32 - 38	0.168	0.0347	0.489*	-0.0343	-0.0942
1 00 50	(0.0976)	(0.0416)	(0.228)	(0.0960)	(0.103)
Age: 39 - 52	0.218**	-0.0172	0.203	0.117	0.00272
	(0.0792)	(0.0486)	(0.148)	(0.0663)	(0.0973)
Age: 53+	-0.0151	-0.0717	-0.00572	0.0214	-0.0715
	(0.0660)	(0.0788)	(0.118)	(0.158)	(0.0574)
Constant	1.04**	$0.884^{**}$	1.51**	$1.75^{**}$	1.58
	(0.191)	(0.124)	(0.317)	(0.214)	(0.259)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	144	230	50	40	128
R-squared	0.366	0.381	0.563	0.458	0.359

Table 23: Effect of pre-treatment covariates on likelihood of assignment to the treatment group: Results from governorate fixed effects OLS models of non-responses

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. In each model, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent was interviewed after August 14 and zero otherwise. Since the samples are restricted to non-responses to the questions used to measure each of the dependent variables, N varies across models due to differences in non-response rates.

	(78)	(79)
DV	Post-8/14	Post-8/14
Sample	Non-response:	Non-response:
	Influence govt.	Situation of
	decisions	democracy
Sunni	-0.0833	0.0422
	(0.0726)	(0.0696)
Kurd	-0.870**	-0.527*
	(0.217)	(0.212)
Other	0.0846	0.0141
	(0.113)	(0.168)
Casualties	-0.00666*	-0.00410
	(0.00283)	(0.00255)
Female	0.0177	-0.0476
	(0.0536)	(0.136)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0431	0.0652
	(0.0595)	(0.103)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.0887	-0.0852
	(0.0787)	(0.0891)
Educ: Uni	-0.169*	0.00346
	(0.0726)	(0.0891)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.124	0.186
	(0.0726)	(0.158)
Urban: $< 50k$	-0.159**	0.117
	(0.0586)	(0.0927)
Rural	-0.0953	-0.0925
	(0.0795)	(0.0980)
Unemployed	-0.144	-0.114
o nomproj cu	(0.0947)	(0.143)
Not gainfully empl.	0.145	0.0496
	(0.0603)	(0.148)
Good econ. situation	0.0751*	-0.196*
	(0.0366)	(0.0975)
Age: 25 - 31	0.0322	0.0571
	(0.0422)	(0.129)
Age: 32 - 38	0.0858	0.0256
1180. 02 00	(0.0639)	(0.0956)
Age: 39 - 52	0.141**	0.295
00. 00 0-	(0.0496)	(0.150)
Age: 53+	-0.0984	0.0622
	(0.0698)	(0.144)
Constant	0.964**	0.387
	(0.232)	(0.296)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
Observations	145	110
R-squared	0.452	0.356

Table 24: Effect of pre-treatment covariates on likelihood of assignment to the treatment group: Results from governorate fixed effects OLS models of non-responses

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. In each model, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent was interviewed after August 14 and zero otherwise. Since the samples are restricted to non-responses to the questions used to measure each of the dependent variables, N varies across models due to differences in non-response rates.

# Models of respondents' choice to be interviewed at home and to be mostly alone with enumerators

Note that the announced resignation has different effects on Sunni and Shiite respondents' choice to be alone throughout most of the interview, as indicated by the significant interaction term. At the same time, the average change in the likelihood to be alone with the enumerators did not change among Shiites or Sunnis. The coefficient of the resignation announcement captures the *ceteris paribus* effect of this event on Shiites. To see whether Sunni respondents became more or less likely to be alone with the enumerator after the resignation was announced, on average, we need to sum the coefficients for the resignation measure and for its interaction with Sunni sectarian affiliation. The sum of these measures is insignificant.

	(80)	(81)
Dependent	Interview inside	Respondent alone
variable	respondent's home	with enumerators
Resign	0.026	-0.115
õ	(0.025)	(0.075)
Sunni	-0.030	-0.040
	(0.011)	(0.050)
Kurd	-0.068	-0.212*
	(0.061)	(0.104)
Other	-0.092	0.054
	(0.063)	(0.085)
Resign*Sunni	0.003	$0.176^{*}$
	(0.024)	(0.071)
Resign*Kurd	0.045	0.157
	(0.044)	(0.100)
Resign*Other	0.037	0.081
	(0.056)	(0.125)
Casualties	0.0001	0.0017
	(0.0002)	(0.0009)
Female	0.111**	-0.133**
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Educ: J.H. school	0.035	-0.021
	(0.023)	(0.047)
Educ: S.H. school	0.024	0.030
	(0.022)	(0.049)
Educ: Uni	0.023	0.064
	(0.022)	(0.059)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.068*	0.114
	(0.029)	(0.067)
Urban: $< 50k$	-0.025	$0.141^{*}$
	(0.038)	(0.057)
Rural	-0.054	0.054
	(0.029)	(0.048)
Unemployed	-0.002	0.078
	(0.049)	(0.054)
Not gainfully empl.	0.038	-0.064
	(0.025)	(0.041)
Good econ. situation	0.003	0.047
	(0.013)	(0.063)
Constant	$0.923^{**}$	$0.298^{**}$
	(0.037)	(0.112)
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,446	1,446
R-squared	0.097	0.154

Table 25: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on interview location and privacy: Main model results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The dependent variables takes the value of 1 if the interview was conducted inside the respondent's home and if the enumerators were alone with the respondent throughout almost the entire interview, respectively, and zero otherwise.

# Models restricted to respondents interviewed inside their home

As mentioned in the main text, respondents were either interviewed at home or outside. Given that social desirability biases and non-response issues are more likely to arise when individuals are interviewed outside in public, we restricted our sample to only those who are interviewed at home as a robustness check. The results from the main models in the main text hold.

	(82)	(83)	(84)	(85)	(86)	(87)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity	Violence
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves	necessary
Resign	$0.0767^{*}$	-0.112	-0.147	-0.0552	-0.00267	-0.0866
	(0.0385)	(0.205)	(0.153)	(0.106)	(0.0852)	(0.0591)
Sunni	0.210*	-0.237	-0.578**	-0.331**	-0.417**	-0.0666
	(0.0887)	(0.144)	(0.132)	(0.0632)	(0.0787)	(0.0401)
Kurd	0.0555	0.107	-0.142	0.186	$0.339^{*}$	0.0509
	(0.0847)	(0.314)	(0.223)	(0.175)	(0.195)	(0.114)
Other	0.0372	-0.0166	-0.0974	0.185	-0.125	-0.136
	(0.0865)	(0.218)	(0.1463)	(0.177)	(0.194)	(0.0912)
Resign*Sunni	-0.288**	0.458*	$0.545^{**}$	$0.449^{**}$	$0.580^{**}$	-0.016
	(0.0683)	(0.183)	(0.150)	(0.0895)	(0.143)	(0.0502)
Resign*Kurd	-0.172*	0.415	0.101	0.137	-0.117	0.0716
	(0.0753)	(0.235)	(0.172)	(0.182)	(0.200)	(0.118)
Resign*Other	-0.148	-0.0335	0.0433	-0.0675	$0.471^{*}$	-0.0347
	(0.0893)	(0.238)	(0.140)	(0.214)	(0.224)	(0.107)
Casualties	-0.000367	0.000592	0.00219	-0.00149	-0.00134	-0.000942
	(0.000753)	(0.00173)	(0.00144)	(0.000831)	(0.000786)	(0.000750)
Female	-0.0311	-0.136*	0.0285	-0.0103	0.00674	-0.00716
	(0.0237)	(0.0558)	(0.0557)	(0.0645)	(0.0721)	(0.0340)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0130	$0.202^{*}$	-0.0748	0.179	0.137	$0.0724^{*}$
	(0.0460)	(0.0846)	(0.0732)	(0.0957)	(0.0729)	(0.0306)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0219	0.302**	-0.134	0.0923	0.0842	0.0391
	(0.0514)	(0.0938)	(0.0703)	(0.0870)	(0.0769)	(0.0384)
Educ: Uni	-0.0594	0.0334	-0.244**	0.0562	0.138	0.0261
	(0.0316)	(0.109)	(0.0742)	(0.0831)	(0.0967)	(0.0310)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0482	-0.147	-0.0716	-0.119	-0.211	0.00458
	(0.0634)	(0.322)	(0.173)	(0.184)	(0.149)	(0.0604)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0384	-0.158	-0.0684	-0.118	-0.182**	0.0123
	(0.100)	(0.307)	(0.206)	(0.157)	(0.0561)	(0.0553)
Rural	-0.00228	-0.00785	0.0377	-0.0259	-0.0691	0.0100
	(0.0751)	(0.337)	(0.122)	(0.142)	(0.0662)	(0.0510)
Unemployed	-0.106	-0.336*	-0.0776	$-0.157^{*}$	-0.0121	-0.00103
	(0.0577)	(0.161)	(0.0812)	(0.0669)	(0.0890)	(0.0427)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0962	-0.120	-0.0420	-0.126	-0.0479	-0.0436
	(0.0496)	(0.0833)	(0.0518)	(0.0751)	(0.0541)	(0.0335)
Good econ. situation	0.00158	-0.0940	0.134	0.0813	0.0377	-0.0121
	(0.0486)	(0.0843)	(0.0706)	(0.120)	(0.0833)	(0.0268)
Constant	-0.682**	-2.66**	-2.65**	-2.70**	-2.17**	0.278**
	(0.118)	(0.325)	(0.261)	(0.222)	(0.151)	(0.104)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
÷						
Observations	1,176	1,090	1,263	1,272	1,291	1,189
R-squared	0.131	0.192	0.332	0.101	0.228	0.180

Table 26: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation for those interviewed at home: Main model results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

	(88)	(89)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0426	0.0903
	(0.0932)	(0.0463)
Sunni	-0.229	-0.209
	(0.148)	(0.118)
Kurd	0.119	-0.124
	(0.237)	(0.258)
Other	-0.293	-0.296**
	(0.183)	(0.112)
Resign*Sunni	0.122	-0.0762
	(0.107)	(0.106)
Resign*Kurd	-0.0300	-0.119
	(0.157)	(0.119)
Resign*Other	0.0814	-0.256
	(0.234)	(0.309)
Casualties	0.00179	-0.0000149
	(0.00169)	(0.00119)
Female	-0.0623	-0.00700
	(0.0734)	(0.0553)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0462	0.0358
	(0.0786)	(0.129)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0393	0.0588
	(0.146)	(0.124)
Educ: Uni	-0.00212	-0.120
	(0.134)	(0.166)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0968	0.0463
	(0.172)	(0.162)
Urban: < 50k	-0.336*	-0.0219
	(0.142)	(0.0940)
Rural	-0.107	0.0660
	(0.181)	(0.120)
Unemployed	-0.175	0.0117
	(0.124)	(0.0925)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.270**	-0.101
	(0.0731)	(0.0776)
Good econ. situation	0.0318	0.0362
	(0.110)	(0.0568)
Constant	-2.72**	-2.59**
	(0.121)	(0.234)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,171	1,205
R-squared	0.177	0.140

Table 27: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation for those interviewed at home: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

#### Models restricted to respondents who were mostly alone with the enumerators

The presence of other persons (family members, friends, etc.) during the interview may result in social desirability bias if respondents' answer to survey questions at least partly reflects their anticipation of how these others will perceive their response. To examine whether our results are affected by this bias, we separately investigate the subset of respondents who were mostly alone with the enumerators during the entire interview and who took the survey inside their home (rather than in a public place where other persons might hear the conversation). By mostly alone we mean that family members or others were only present for a little while during the interview or not at all. Responses provided by this subset of respondents are least likely to be affected by this type of social desirability bias.

Tables 28-29 only include respondents who were mostly alone with the enumerators and who were interviewed in their home. Even though the number of observations in this robustness check is 57% smaller than it is in the full samples, these models yield the same results as the full ones. The only result that is not entirely in line with the main result is the one from the model of expectations of future security provision by the government. In this model, the change in Sunni attitudes is in the correct direction but becomes weakly significant (p<0.08). In this model the change in Sunni attitudes is attenuated mainly due to the decrease in statistical power (N declines by 57%) rather than due to a smaller effect size within this subset of respondents (i.e., the magnitude of attitudinal change among Sunnis declines by a mere 3%).

Table 28: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on performance legitimacy for those interviewed at home and alone with the enumerators for almost the entire time: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

	(90)	(91)	(92)	(93)	(94)	(95)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity	Violence
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves	necessary
Resign	0.0405	-0.356	-0.176*	-0.0898	-0.0115	-0.0879*
	(0.0575)	(0.238)	(0.0796)	(0.119)	(0.0821)	(0.0356)
Sunni	$0.325^{**}$	-0.372	-0.502**	-0.369**	$-0.479^{**}$	-0.0532
	(0.0760)	(0.195)	(0.112)	(0.143)	(0.166)	(0.0542)
Kurd	0.0148	0.470	-0.146	0.471	0.359	0.0549
	(0.0870)	(0.403)	(0.301)	(0.258)	(0.245)	(0.209)
Other	0.114	0.349	-0.214	0.198	-0.221	-0.148
	(0.101)	(0.321)	(0.153)	(0.174)	(0.204)	(0.112)
Resign*Sunni	-0.399**	$0.692^{*}$	$0.504^{**}$	0.539**	$0.569^{**}$	-0.0660
	(0.107)	(0.287)	(0.140)	(0.164)	(0.183)	(0.0727)
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.170	0.495	$0.215^{*}$	0.0923	0.0601	0.00488
	(0.113)	(0.315)	(0.105)	(0.214)	(0.297)	(0.0945)
Resign*Other	-0.200*	0.0672	0.142	0.0332	$0.565^{*}$	0.0896
	(0.0923)	(0.364)	(0.0820)	(0.281)	(0.261)	(0.151)
Casualties	-0.000220	-0.000835	0.00167	-0.00130	-0.00205*	-0.00160*
	(0.000554)	(0.000992)	(0.00137)	(0.00108)	(0.000996)	(0.000777)
Female	-0.0542	-0.148	-0.0438	0.0154	0.0207	-0.0152
	(0.0197)	(0.0843)	(0.0940)	(0.0803)	(0.109)	(0.0429)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0518	0.220	-0.182*	0.110	0.190	-0.00733
	(0.0405)	(0.122)	(0.0914)	(0.109)	(0.144)	(0.0579)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.0429	0.444**	-0.217*	0.186	0.177	-0.0500
	(0.0497)	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.152)	(0.161)	(0.0580)
Educ: uni	-0.0777	$0.265^{*}$	-0.239*	0.126	0.258	-0.0508
	(0.0349)	(0.120)	(0.104)	(0.129)	(0.138)	(0.0585)
Urban: 50k-250k	0.0905	0.109	-0.159	-0.195	-0.320	0.0112
	(0.0462)	(0.178)	(0.0917)	(0.175)	(0.168)	(0.0909)
Urban: < 50k	0.0802	0.0455	-0.232	-0.286	-0.313**	-0.107
	(0.0290)	(0.176)	(0.128)	(0.147)	(0.108)	(0.0838)
Rural	0.0950	0.0404	-0.118	-0.106	-0.104	-0.00815
	(0.0355)	(0.211)	(0.128)	(0.134)	(0.163)	(0.0820)
Unemployed	-0.118	-0.286	-0.0307	-0.000183	0.0320	-0.0194
•	(0.0491)	(0.211)	(0.0907)	(0.0799)	(0.128)	(0.0752)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0412	-0.0603	0.00604	-0.0315	-0.0139	-0.0103
8	(0.0200)	(0.0631)	(0.0386)	(0.0845)	(0.0817)	(0.0523)
Good econ. Situation	0.0267	-0.111	0.0726	0.00858	-0.106	0.0371
dood ocom predetion	(0.0397)	(0.0876)	(0.0646)	(0.0906)	(0.0761)	(0.0377)
Constant	-0.894**	-3.36**	-2.48**	-2.78**	-2.21**	0.0363**
	(0.0463)	(0.281)	(0.143)	(0.229)	(0.245)	(0.0919)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1	100	105	100	105	105	105
Observations	555	529	597	604	612	553
R-squared	0.222	0.238	0.377	0.0963	0.232	0.141

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

					(0)	۶)		(07)				
fixed effe	cts OLS	models										
home and	d alone v	with the	enumerato	rs for	$\operatorname{almost}$	the	entire	time:	results	from	governo	orate
Table 29:	Effect o	of al-Mali	iki's resign	ation of	on dem	ocrat	ic legi	timacy	y for th	ose int	terviewe	ed at

	(90)	(97)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.121	-0.00506
0	(0.154)	(0.104)
Sunni	-0.107	-0.176
	(0.125)	(0.0982)
Kurd	0.589	0.250
	(0.383)	(0.376)
Other	0.00746	-0.349*
	(0.264)	(0.157)
Resign*Sunni	0.172	0.0907
0	(0.144)	(0.133)
Resign*Kurd	-0.0593	0.00635
0	(0.231)	(0.169)
Resign*Other	0.00249	-0.114
0	(0.292)	(0.259)
Casualties	0.00259**	-0.00141
	(0.000635)	(0.000800)
Female	-0.184	-0.149*
	(0.0956)	(0.0757)
Educ: J.H. school	0.140	0.191
	(0.0894)	(0.149)
Educ: S.H. school	0.173	0.140
	(0.163)	(0.141)
Educ: uni	0.190	0.0348
	(0.144)	(0.187)
Urban: 50k-250k	0.162	0.158
	(0.156)	(0.190)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0762	-0.123
	(0.161)	(0.185)
Rural	0.172	0.123
	(0.191)	(0.162)
Unemployed	0.154	0.142
1 0	(0.208)	(0.143)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.225	0.00851
0 1 1	(0.117)	(0.100)
Good econ. Situation	0.0147	0.0556
	(0.0974)	(0.0617)
Constant	-3.39**	-2.94**
	(0.147)	(0.367)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
-		
Observations	557	578
R-squared	0.261	0.180

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

# Analyses of persistence of the effects through September

	(98)	(99)	(100)	(101)	(102)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
Destau	0.0746*	0.0052	0.190	0.0075	0.00470
Resign	$(0.0740^{\circ})$	-0.0003	-0.120	-0.0975	(0.00470)
a .	(0.0336)	(0.221)	(0.149)	(0.107)	(0.0698)
Sunni	$0.244^{**}$	-0.142	-0.431**	-0.271**	-0.327**
<b>TT</b> 1	(0.0681)	(0.149)	(0.0949)	(0.0535)	(0.0794)
Kurd	0.0683	0.115	-0.0832	0.0626	0.178
	(0.0671)	(0.315)	(0.213)	(0.162)	(0.178)
Other	0.0617	-0.0448	0.0779	0.202	-0.0553
	(0.0963)	(0.270)	(0.158)	(0.161)	(0.154)
Sept	-0.0363	-0.0587	0.114	0.144	-0.0295
	(0.0470)	(0.160)	(0.103)	(0.131)	(0.139)
Resign*Sunni	-0.276**	$0.414^{*}$	$0.306^{**}$	$0.300^{**}$	$0.383^{*}$
	(0.0476)	(0.180)	(0.0935)	(0.0825)	(0.152)
Resign*Kurd	-0.136**	0.364	0.112	0.225	-0.0754
	(0.0471)	(0.247)	(0.177)	(0.157)	(0.208)
Resign*Other	-0.127	0.0470	-0.238	-0.160	0.305
-	(0.0904)	(0.309)	(0.187)	(0.218)	(0.175)
Sept*Sunni	0.0460	-0.00647	-0.174	-0.329*	-0.258
T T	(0.0491)	(0.117)	(0.230)	(0.139)	(0.205)
Sept*Kurd	0.126	$0.452^{*}$	-0.153	-0.499*	-0.214
orr contraction of the second se	(0.0995)	(0.217)	(0.319)	(0.231)	(0.219)
Sept*Other	0.0716	0.00520	0.0773	0.0861	0.168
Sept Other	(0.115)	(0.303)	(0.264)	(0.266)	(0.190)
Casualties	-0.000439	0.00169	-0.00284	-0.00401**	-0.00187*
Casualities	(0.000455)	(0.00105)	(0.00156)	(0.00401)	(0.00101)
Fomala	(0.000331)	0.0275	(0.00150)	(0.00114)	(0.000725)
remaie	-0.0196	(0.0573)	(0.0247)	(0.00752)	-0.0430
Educe III school	(0.0232)	(0.0342)	(0.0409)	(0.0440)	(0.0491)
Educ: J.H. school	(0.0377)	(0.142)	$-0.130^{\circ}$	(0.0927)	(0.0602)
	(0.0387)	(0.0785)	(0.0500)	(0.0704)	(0.0647)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00993	0.211*	-0.120	0.115	0.0743
	(0.0476)	(0.106)	(0.0636)	(0.0699)	(0.0717)
Educ: Uni	-0.0261	0.0697	-0.227**	-0.00557	0.120
	(0.0245)	(0.103)	(0.0644)	(0.0767)	(0.0802)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0433	-0.100	-0.0697	-0.164	-0.169
	(0.0415)	(0.249)	(0.167)	(0.133)	(0.159)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0397	-0.158	-0.136	-0.179	$-0.175^{*}$
	(0.0782)	(0.227)	(0.183)	(0.127)	(0.0785)
Rural	0.000568	0.0267	-0.00464	-0.107	-0.0906
	(0.0534)	(0.260)	(0.0954)	(0.0934)	(0.0949)
Unemployed	-0.0810	-0.134	-0.139	-0.182**	0.00319
	(0.0436)	(0.146)	(0.0724)	(0.0536)	(0.0678)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0814*	-0.0678	-0.0926*	-0.168**	-0.0634
	(0.0348)	(0.0662)	(0.0424)	(0.0532)	(0.0444)
Good econ. situation	0.0392	-0.0284	0.158	0.0584	0.0565
	(0.0341)	(0.0757)	(0.0895)	(0.113)	(0.105)
Constant	-0.776**	-2.91**	-2.39**	-2.43**	-2.11**
	(0.100)	(0.419)	(0.235)	(0.201)	(0.127)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1 969	1 783	2 136	2 137	2 101
R-squared	0 1 9 0	0.156	0.256	0.0865	0.273
resquared	0.140	0.100	0.200	0.0000	0.410

Table 30: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. The September variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent was interviewed after August 31 and zero if she took the survey in August.

	(103)	(104)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0797	0.0435
-	(0.0891)	(0.0606)
Sunni	-0.203	-0.208*
	(0.125)	(0.0814)
Kurd	-0.0700	-0.289
	(0.170)	(0.273)
Other	-0.286	-0.270
	(0.161)	(0.147)
Sept	-0.0377	-0.00424
	(0.0668)	(0.118)
Resign*Sunni	0.0865	-0.125
itosign Summ	(0.0998)	(0.106)
Resign*Kurd	0.0207	-0.138
Russen Rura	(0.110)	(0.100)
Posign*Other	(0.110)	(0.102)
Resign Other	-0.0210	-0.244
Cont*Comm:	(0.223) 0.267*	(0.341)
Sept-Sunn	$-0.207^{\circ}$	-0.0570
	(0.130)	(0.0747)
Sept [*] Kurd	0.195	0.281
a*ou	(0.173)	(0.355)
Sept*Other	0.239	0.0911
~	(0.234)	(0.271)
Casualties	-0.0000547	-0.000996
	(0.00148)	(0.00107)
Female	-0.0873	-0.0495
	(0.0669)	(0.0472)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0697	-0.0379
	(0.0651)	(0.0823)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0636	0.0177
	(0.114)	(0.0891)
Educ: Uni	0.00808	-0.125
	(0.0953)	(0.112)
Urban: 50k-250k	0.0265	0.00287
	(0.187)	(0.139)
Urban: < 50k	-0.167	-0.0354
	(0.160)	(0.0738)
Rural	0.0133	0.00547
	(0.175)	(0.0910)
Unemployed	-0.140	-0.112
1 0	(0.0811)	(0.0768)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.229**	-0.126*
	(0.0569)	(0.0557)
Good econ. situation	-0.0149	0.0158
5104301011	(0.0874)	(0.0735)
Constant	-2.68**	-2.39**
2 3110 00110	(0.120)	(0.140)
Governorate f.e	Yes	Vec
4 age controle	Vec	Vec
Observations	1 066	2 097
R-squared	0.131	0.124
11-byuareu	0.101	0.124

Table 31: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. The September variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent was interviewed after August 31 and zero if she took the survey in August.

# Weighted OLS regressions

Tables 32-33 report the results from OLS regression models with observations weighted by district. Tables 34-35 report the results from similar models with observations weighted by governorate. Note that in Models 106 and 113 the coefficients of the Sunni interaction terms become insignificant, but the changes in Sunni ratings of the government in the wake of the announced resignation remain significant since the sum of the coefficients of the resignation measure and its interaction with the respondent's Sunni affiliation is significant regardless of whether observations are weighted by district or by governorate.

	(105)	(106)	(107)	(108)	(109)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	$\operatorname{improve}$	$\operatorname{improves}$
Resign	$0.0982^{*}$	0.117	-0.0692	0.0116	0.100
	(0.0480)	(0.263)	(0.148)	(0.125)	(0.0958)
Sunni	$0.201^{*}$	-0.144	-0.540**	$-0.291^{**}$	-0.411**
	(0.0870)	(0.153)	(0.0948)	(0.0421)	(0.0934)
Kurd	0.0339	0.216	-0.347	0.0785	0.0793
	(0.0713)	(0.386)	(0.214)	(0.152)	(0.192)
Other	-0.0178	0.0898	-0.106	0.0546	-0.0789
	(0.103)	(0.301)	(0.149)	(0.188)	(0.210)
Resign*Sunni	-0.278**	0.316	$0.562^{**}$	$0.483^{**}$	$0.572^{**}$
	(0.0581)	(0.172)	(0.132)	(0.118)	(0.178)
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.153**	0.142	0.342	0.230	0.0123
	(0.0553)	(0.284)	(0.188)	(0.162)	(0.244)
Resign*Other	-0.0551	-0.177	0.109	0.125	0.301
	(0.110)	(0.272)	(0.166)	(0.211)	(0.190)
Casualties	0.000499	0.00331	0.00228	-0.000428	-0.00164
	(0.00113)	(0.00252)	(0.00169)	(0.000978)	(0.00100)
Female	-0.0218	-0.132*	0.000414	-0.0848	-0.0406
	(0.0254)	(0.0577)	(0.0567)	(0.0597)	(0.0624)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.00300	0.0428	-0.0936	$0.306^{**}$	0.130
	(0.0460)	(0.0899)	(0.0825)	(0.104)	(0.0778)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0101	0.194	-0.0686	$0.226^{*}$	0.141
	(0.0526)	(0.101)	(0.0688)	(0.0944)	(0.100)
Educ: Uni	-0.0591	-0.0616	-0.234**	$0.176^{*}$	0.149
	(0.0328)	(0.0982)	(0.0683)	(0.0852)	(0.109)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0517	-0.253	-0.0935	-0.237	-0.344*
	(0.0653)	(0.298)	(0.157)	(0.174)	(0.139)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0570	-0.215	-0.161	-0.254	-0.194**
	(0.0990)	(0.287)	(0.183)	(0.152)	(0.0567)
Rural	-0.0282	0.0138	0.0524	-0.0619	-0.0441
	(0.0785)	(0.336)	(0.104)	(0.135)	(0.0656)
Unemployed	-0.120*	-0.222	-0.108	-0.00794	-0.0859
	(0.0551)	(0.173)	(0.0642)	(0.0664)	(0.107)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0989*	-0.130	-0.0494	-0.0501	0.0545
	(0.0413)	(0.0837)	(0.0409)	(0.0743)	(0.0638)
Good econ. situation	-0.0223	-0.163	$0.167^{**}$	0.0112	0.0259
	(0.0407)	(0.0840)	(0.0635)	(0.112)	(0.0871)
Constant	-0.736**	-2.82**	$-2.76^{**}$	-2.91**	-2.26**
	(0.135)	(0.410)	(0.248)	(0.232)	(0.152)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,302	1,216	$1,\!396$	1,406	$1,\!430$
R-squared	0.154	0.225	0.291	0.131	0.275

Table 32: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: results from district weighted governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

	(110)	(111)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
	0.001	0.400%
Resign	-0.0315	0.108*
а ·	(0.102)	(0.0450)
Sunni	-0.299*	-0.174
Vl	(0.125)	(0.0999)
Kura	(0.103)	-0.247
Other	(0.185)	(0.282)
Other	-0.162	-0.200
Bogign*Sunni	(0.100) 0.172	(0.102) 0.184
Resign Summ	(0.172)	(0.112)
Resign*Kurd	(0.103)	(0.112)
rtesigni Kuru	(0.131)	(0.101)
Resign*Other	(0.151) 0.0582	(0.101)
rtesign Other	(0.206)	(0.310)
Casualties	0.00190	-0.0000974
Castanties	(0.00160)	(0.0000011)
Female	-0.0768	-0.0193
1 0111010	(0.0823)	(0.0557)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.000355	-0.0149
	(0.0787)	(0.121)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0178	0.0475
	(0.152)	(0.129)
Educ: Uni	-0.106	-0.155
	(0.137)	(0.161)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.152	-0.0728
	(0.150)	(0.145)
Urban: < 50k	-0.369**	-0.123
	(0.128)	(0.0941)
Rural	-0.106	-0.00784
	(0.164)	(0.105)
Unemployed	-0.213	-0.0395
	(0.130)	(0.0930)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.230**	-0.0502
	(0.0684)	(0.0738)
Good econ. situation	-0.0619	0.0577
	(0.106)	(0.0463)
Constant	-2.65**	-2.52**
	(0.144)	(0.221)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
	1.001	1.00-
Observations	1,301	1,337
R-squared	0.172	0.159

Table 33: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy: Results from district weighted governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

	(112)	(113)	(114)	(115)	(116)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	$\operatorname{improve}$	improves
Resign	0.112*	0.0861	-0.0661	-0.00955	0.0623
a .	(0.0474)	(0.243)	(0.148)	(0.117)	(0.0849)
Sunni	0.201*	-0.101	-0.543**	-0.284**	-0.403**
	(0.0910)	(0.154)	(0.0950)	(0.0425)	(0.0886)
Kurd	0.0543	0.182	-0.0112	0.196	0.304
	(0.0698)	(0.367)	(0.216)	(0.141)	(0.170)
Other	-0.0176	0.157	0.00271	0.212	0.0227
	(0.104)	(0.291)	(0.121)	(0.163)	(0.181)
Resign*Sunni	-0.286**	0.275	$0.572^{**}$	$0.481^{**}$	$0.584^{**}$
	(0.0619)	(0.171)	(0.136)	(0.112)	(0.170)
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.198**	0.248	0.0856	0.164	-0.119
	(0.0602)	(0.279)	(0.176)	(0.165)	(0.217)
Resign*Other	-0.0732	-0.254	0.0248	0.0122	0.301
	(0.108)	(0.267)	(0.153)	(0.203)	(0.189)
Casualties	0.000344	0.00191	$0.00342^{*}$	-0.000404	-0.00140
	(0.00115)	(0.00215)	(0.00173)	(0.000837)	(0.000881)
Female	-0.0228	$-0.174^{**}$	0.0701	-0.0524	0.00763
	(0.0253)	(0.0555)	(0.0625)	(0.0576)	(0.0662)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0129	0.0719	-0.0794	$0.214^{*}$	0.148
	(0.0475)	(0.0853)	(0.0817)	(0.100)	(0.0780)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00385	0.157	-0.0828	0.125	0.0929
	(0.0539)	(0.101)	(0.0683)	(0.0916)	(0.0985)
Educ: Uni	-0.0555	-0.0624	-0.189**	0.126	0.154
	(0.0339)	(0.0954)	(0.0708)	(0.0850)	(0.109)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0595	-0.239	-0.129	-0.268	-0.326*
	(0.0679)	(0.304)	(0.158)	(0.175)	(0.139)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0874	-0.278	-0.104	-0.224	-0.187**
	(0.0972)	(0.289)	(0.186)	(0.153)	(0.0570)
Rural	-0.0571	-0.0557	0.0313	-0.105	-0.0433
	(0.0813)	(0.346)	(0.106)	(0.144)	(0.0663)
Unemployed	-0.101	-0.264	-0.0863	-0.0601	-0.0757
	(0.0532)	(0.178)	(0.0663)	(0.0592)	(0.103)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0943*	-0.153	-0.111*	-0.0935	-0.0203
	(0.0410)	(0.0819)	(0.0433)	(0.0716)	(0.0567)
Good econ. situation	-0.00972	-0.136	0.179**	0.0113	0.00833
	(0.0411)	(0.0841)	(0.0623)	(0.115)	(0.0877)
Constant	-0.708**	-2.59**	-2.80**	-2.80**	-2.21**
	(0.121)	(0.345)	(0.242)	(0.221)	(0.136)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
0					
Observations	1,302	1,216	$1,\!396$	1,406	$1,\!430$
R-squared	0.133	0.205	0.315	0.135	0.313

Table 34: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: results from governorate weighted governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

	(117)	(118)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0391	0.0178
_	(0.101)	(0.0592)
Sunni	-0.272*	-0.173
	(0.127)	(0.100)
Kurd	0.110	-0.214
0.1	(0.191)	(0.274)
Other	-0.193	-0.223
<b>D</b> · *a ·	(0.159)	(0.154)
Resign*Sunni	0.196	-0.156
	(0.109)	(0.113)
Resign*Kurd	-0.0630	-0.174
	(0.138)	(0.114)
Resign*Other	0.0519	-0.271
	(0.202)	(0.310)
Casualties	0.00194	-0.000872
	(0.00158)	(0.000984)
Female	-0.0549	0.0258
	(0.0846)	(0.0595)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0823	0.0732
	(0.0694)	(0.124)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0976	0.0664
	(0.148)	(0.127)
Educ: Uni	0.00248	-0.118
	(0.124)	(0.161)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.141	-0.116
<b>TT 1 F</b> 01	(0.153)	(0.145)
Urban:< 50k	-0.388**	-0.160
	(0.124)	(0.0980)
Rural	-0.0726	-0.0189
TT 1 1	(0.171)	(0.105)
Unemployed	-0.236	-0.0512
	(0.135)	(0.0931)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.240**	-0.0903
0 1	(0.0664)	(0.0713)
Good econ. situation	-0.0165	0.0563
0	(0.104)	(0.0461)
Constant	-2.74**	-2.44**
<b>a</b>	(0.121)	(0.225)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
Ob	1 901	1 007
Observations	1,301	1,337
K-squared	0.206	0.208

Table 35: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy: Results from governorate weighted governorate fixed effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables.

# Models using alternative measures of the local security situation

	(119)	(120)	(121)	(122)	(123)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
Resign	0.0681*	-0.122	-0.107	-0.0664	0.00964
10001811	(0.0272)	(0.165)	(0.143)	(0.0993)	(0.0693)
Sunni	0.229**	-0.142	-0.484**	-0.288**	-0.336**
	(0.0677)	(0.142)	(0.0960)	(0.0501)	(0.0624)
Kurd	0.0250	0.0736	-0.162	0.0822	0.206
	(0.0716)	(0.302)	(0.212)	(0.135)	(0.171)
Other	0.0721	-0.0183	-0.0398	0.183	-0.0396
	(0.0972)	(0.261)	(0.136)	(0.162)	(0.168)
Resign*Sunni	-0.274**	0.338*	0.409**	0.370**	0.455**
0	(0.0526)	(0.164)	(0.108)	(0.0739)	(0.125)
Resign*Kurd	-0.136**	0.384	0.130	0.233	-0.0596
0	(0.0444)	(0.203)	(0.165)	(0.146)	(0.206)
Resign*Other	-0.183	-0.0868	-0.0446	-0.112	$0.303^{'}$
0	(0.0974)	(0.297)	(0.150)	(0.203)	(0.171)
Fatalities	-0.00326**	-0.00485*	0.00247	-0.00642**	-0.00500**
	(0.00115)	(0.00224)	(0.00278)	(0.00158)	(0.00151)
Female	-0.0325	-0.131*	0.0354	0.0165	0.0215
	(0.0260)	(0.0589)	(0.0589)	(0.0594)	(0.0674)
Educ: J.H. school	0.00956	0.183*	-0.106	0.167	0.151*
	(0.0424)	(0.0735)	(0.0823)	(0.101)	(0.0767)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00786	$0.254^{**}$	-0.142*	0.0869	0.105
	(0.0486)	(0.0959)	(0.0658)	(0.0863)	(0.0958)
Educ: Uni	-0.0568	0.0174	-0.242**	0.0590	0.161
	(0.0305)	(0.101)	(0.0773)	(0.0822)	(0.106)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0407	-0.0932	-0.0557	-0.0793	-0.184
	(0.0642)	(0.327)	(0.170)	(0.181)	(0.135)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0469	-0.189	-0.0847	-0.120	-0.182**
	(0.106)	(0.311)	(0.201)	(0.158)	(0.0557)
Rural	-0.00635	-0.00662	0.0206	-0.0326	-0.0528
	(0.0778)	(0.337)	(0.114)	(0.138)	(0.0680)
Unemployed	-0.0930	-0.244	-0.125	-0.127*	-0.00493
	(0.0567)	(0.180)	(0.0666)	(0.0593)	(0.0949)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0863	-0.110	-0.0705	-0.125	-0.0533
	(0.0454)	(0.0950)	(0.0442)	(0.0675)	(0.0540)
Good econ. situation	0.00169	-0.102	$0.151^{*}$	0.0639	0.0345
	(0.0413)	(0.0854)	(0.0640)	(0.107)	(0.0833)
Constant	-0.653**	-2.52**	-2.59**	-2.65**	-2.19**
	(0.119)	(0.334)	(0.227)	(0.222)	(0.154)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,302	1,216	1,394	1,406	1,430
R-squared	0.136	0.200	0.334	0.0881	0.217

Table 36: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Main model results from governorate fixed effects OLS models with fatalities measure from START

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. Fatalities records a count of deaths from terrorist incidents in the respondent's governorate on the day before the interview and the day of the interview. This measure is based on data compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2017).

	(124)	(125)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0826	0.0707
0	(0.0860)	(0.0452)
Sunni	-0.176	-0.200*
	(0.109)	(0.0895)
Kurd	0.0358	-0.0889
	(0.184)	(0.247)
Other	-0.305	-0.284*
	(0.176)	(0.143)
Resign*Sunni	0.101	-0.0766
	(0.0867)	(0.109)
Resign*Kurd	0.0155	-0.178
	(0.123)	(0.0913)
Resign*Other	0.0850	-0.173
	(0.265)	(0.348)
Fatalities	0.00116	0.000541
	(0.00171)	(0.00175)
Female	-0.111	-0.0186
	(0.0775)	(0.0553)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0587	0.0339
	(0.0708)	(0.121)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0555	0.0820
	(0.147)	(0.124)
Educ: Uni	-0.00985	-0.107
U.h 101- 9101-	(0.129)	(0.159)
Urban: 50K-250K	-0.0532	(0.0204)
Unham < FOL	(0.101)	(0.153)
Urban:< 30k	-0.544	-0.0528
Dunal	(0.130)	(0.0940)
nurai	-0.0800	(0.0123)
Unomployed	(0.171) 0.171	(0.112) 0.0376
Unemployed	(0.171)	(0.0370)
Not gainfully empl	-0.238**	(0.0331)
Not gainfuny empi.	(0.0663)	(0.0726)
Good econ situation	0.0128	(0.0120) 0.0417
Good com. Situation	(0.100)	(0.0452)
Constant	-2 64**	-2 60**
	(0.182)	(0.236)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
0		
Observations	1,301	$1,\!337$
R-squared	0.176	0.151

Table 37: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models with fatalities measure from START

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. Fatalities records a count of deaths from terrorist incidents in the respondent's governorate on the day before the interview and the day of the interview. This measure is based on data compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2017).

	(126)	(127)	(128)	(129)	(130)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
		-			
Resign	$0.0860^{*}$	-0.108	-0.0670	-0.0170	0.0399
	(0.0362)	(0.171)	(0.147)	(0.112)	(0.0870)
Sunni	0.220**	-0.166	-0.463**	-0.303**	$-0.351^{**}$
	(0.0754)	(0.125)	(0.0920)	(0.0496)	(0.0897)
Kurd	0.0360	0.0842	-0.152	0.118	0.231
	(0.0726)	(0.309)	(0.202)	(0.142)	(0.179)
Other	0.0325	-0.0767	-0.00813	0.108	-0.0995
	(0.0901)	(0.273)	(0.157)	(0.173)	(0.169)
Resign*Sunni	-0.259**	$0.367^{*}$	0.400**	0.400**	0.480**
	(0.0534)	(0.160)	(0.100)	(0.0953)	(0.150)
Resign*Kurd	-0.151**	0.375	0.0996	0.196	-0.0816
Ŭ,	(0.0486)	(0.211)	(0.166)	(0.155)	(0.215)
Resign*Other	-0.119	0.00476	-0.101	0.0112	$0.401^{*}$
	(0.0759)	(0.321)	(0.180)	(0.219)	(0.174)
Fatalities (UCDP)	0.000566	0.000459	$0.00263^{**}$	0.00197	0.00104
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.000346)	(0.00157)	(0.000999)	(0.00144)	(0.00182)
Female	-0.0365	-0.135*	0.0357	0.00926	0.0164
	(0.0251)	(0.0593)	(0.0581)	(0.0599)	(0.0673)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0131	0.186*	-0.107	0.176	0.157*
	(0.0420)	(0.0737)	(0.0837)	(0.0993)	(0.0753)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00615	0.247*	-0.138*	0.0866	0.103
	(0.0504)	(0.0973)	(0.0673)	(0.0871)	(0.0962)
Educ: Uni	-0.0544	0.0179	-0.244**	0.0658	0.166
	(0.0309)	(0.100)	(0.0828)	(0.0797)	(0.104)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0434	-0.102	-0.0478	-0.0836	-0.189
	(0.0648)	(0.325)	(0.170)	(0.179)	(0.134)
Urban:< 50k	-0.0376	-0.174	-0.101	-0.104	-0.168**
	(0.103)	(0.310)	(0.208)	(0.154)	(0.0564)
Rural	-0.00965	-0.00960	0.0211	-0.0387	-0.0578
	(0.0799)	(0.338)	(0.113)	(0.143)	(0.0695)
Unemployed	-0.0921	-0.244	-0.1295	-0.129*	-0.00546
••F-•J • •	(0.0554)	(0.179)	(0.0674)	(0.0583)	(0.0937)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0875*	-0.108	-0.0820	-0.130	-0.0554
	(0.0440)	(0.0899)	(0.0429)	(0.0665)	(0.0519)
Good econ. situation	0.00193	-0.0982	0.152*	0.0647	0.0353
	(0.0416)	(0.0855)	(0.0640)	(0.106)	(0.0828)
Constant	-0.725**	-2.61**	-2.60**	-2.81**	-2.30**
	(0.109)	(0.345)	(0.252)	(0.214)	(0.157)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
0				-	
Observations	1,302	1,216	1,394	1,406	1,430
R-squared	0.131	0.198	0.335	0.0851	0.215

Table 38: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Main model results from governorate fixed effects OLS models with fatalities measure from UCDP

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. Fatalities (UCDP) records the count of fatalities in the respondent's governorate on the day of the interview or the previous day. It captures the sum of deaths inflicted upon the government and its allies, on the insurgents, or on civilians, respectively, in addition to unknown deaths (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017).

	(131)	(132)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0913	0.0552
1000-0-1	(0.0913)	(0.0505)
Sunni	-0.174	-0.203*
	(0.107)	(0.0824)
Kurd	0.0295	-0.0966
	(0.186)	(0.246)
Other	-0.291	-0.279*
	(0.173)	(0.137)
Resign*Sunni	0.0967	-0.0766
Ŭ.	(0.0836)	(0.110)
Resign*Kurd	0.0217	-0.167
	(0.124)	(0.0944)
Resign*Other	0.0626	-0.180
0	(0.269)	(0.362)
Fatalities (UCDP)	-0.000351	-0.000793
· · · · ·	(0.00141)	(0.00119)
Female	-0.110	-0.0181
	(0.0770)	(0.0550)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0568	0.0327
	(0.0700)	(0.120)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0554	0.0810
	(0.149)	(0.124)
Educ: Uni	-0.0108	-0.108
	(0.130)	(0.160)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0523	0.0257
	(0.161)	(0.154)
Urban:< 50k	$-0.347^{*}$	-0.0523
	(0.148)	(0.0902)
Rural	-0.0874	0.0129
	(0.171)	(0.111)
Unemployed	-0.171	-0.0367
	(0.124)	(0.0926)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.237**	-0.0765
_	(0.0668)	(0.0716)
Good econ. situation	0.0126	0.0411
	(0.100)	(0.0451)
Constant	-2.62**	-2.57**
	(0.190)	(0.245)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1 901	1 997
Deservations	1,301	1,337
n-squarea	0.170	0.151

Table 39: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models with fatalities measure from UCDP

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. Fatalities (UCDP) records the count of fatalities in the respondent's governorate on the day of the interview or the previous day. It captures the sum of deaths inflicted upon the government and its allies, on the insurgents, or on civilians, respectively, in addition to unknown deaths (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017).

$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		(133)	(134)	(135)	(136)	(137)
variablearmed opp.governmentimprovesimproveimproveResign $0.0836^*$ $-0.0927$ $-0.0101$ $-0.00954$ $0.060$ Sunni $0.0226^{**}$ $-0.143$ $(0.125)$ $(0.0306)$ Kurd $0.0714$ $(0.140)$ $(0.107)$ $(0.0511)$ $(0.062)$ Kurd $0.0732$ $0.173$ $-0.200$ $0.162$ $0.263$ Other $0.0625$ $0.0400$ $0.00731$ $0.186$ $-0.022$ (0.1947) $(0.275)$ $(0.138)$ $(0.144)$ $(0.137)$ Resign*Sunni $-0.261^{**}$ $0.352^*$ $0.432^{**}$ $0.433^{**}$ $0.438^*$ Resign*Chter $-0.157^{**}$ $0.334$ $0.0744$ $0.177$ $-0.10$ Resign*Chter $-0.142$ $-0.0630$ $-0.0474$ $0.356$ (0.0986) $(0.0806)$ $(0.308)$ $(0.148)$ $(0.166)$ $(0.168)$ Civilian deaths $-0.06830^{**}$ $-0.0257^{**}$ $0.0327^{**}$ $-0.0094^{**}$ Deaths on insurgent side $0.000831^{**}$ $0.00145$ $0.0024^{**}$ $0.00077$ $(0.00772)$ $(0.00731)$ $(0.00731)$ $(0.00492)$ $(0.00767)$ Female $-0.0331$ $-0.124^{**}$ $0.0328^{**}$ $0.00024^{**}$ $0.00076^{**}$ $(0.00249)$ $(0.00773)$ $(0.0077)$ $(0.0077)$ $(0.0077)$ $(0.0077)$ Educ: J.H. school $0.0137$ $0.0145$ $0.00228^{**}$ $0.00097$ $(0.0077)$ Educ: J.H. school $0.00724$ $0.2278^{**}$ $0.0097^$	Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Resign	0.0836*	-0.0927	-0.0101	-0.00954	0.0606
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	C	(0.0396)	(0.135)	(0.143)	(0.125)	(0.0970)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Sunni	0.226**	-0.143	-0.500**	-0.300**	-0.353**
Kurd $0.0732$ $0.173$ $-0.200$ $0.162$ $0.263$ Other $0.0625$ $0.0400$ $0.0731$ $0.186$ $-0.025$ Guody 1 $0.275$ $0.138$ $0.144$ $(0.137)$ $0.186$ Resign*Sunni $-0.261^{**}$ $0.352^{*}$ $0.432^{**}$ $0.403^{**}$ $0.438^{**}$ Resign*Kurd $-0.157^{**}$ $0.334$ $0.0744$ $0.177$ $-0.01660$ Resign*Other $-0.142$ $-0.0942$ $-0.0630$ $-0.0474$ $0.356^{**}$ Civilian deaths $-0.00898^{**}$ $-0.0257^{**}$ $0.0322^{**}$ $-0.00966^{**}$ Civilian deaths $-0.00893^{**}$ $-0.0237^{**}$ $-0.0096^{**}$ $-0.0237^{**}$ Deaths on government side $0.00033^{**}$ $0.00145$ $0.00262^{**}$ $0.0039^{**}$ (0.0072)         (0.0018)         (0.00694)         (0.00097)         (0.0071           Deaths on insurgent side $0.00273$ (0.00111)         (0.00694)         (0.0097)           (0.0272)         (0.0381         (0.01560)         (0		(0.0714)	(0.140)	(0.107)	(0.0511)	(0.0962)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Kurd	0.0732	0.173	-0.200	0.162	0.265
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.0712)	(0.292)	(0.185)	(0.157)	(0.187)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Other	0.0625	0.0400	0.00731	0.186	-0.0297
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.0947)	(0.275)	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.130)
$(0.0521)$ $(0.162)$ $(0.118)$ $(0.0978)$ $(0.154)$ Resign*Kurd $-0.157^{**}$ $0.334$ $0.0744$ $0.177$ $-0.104$ Resign*Other $-0.142$ $-0.0942$ $-0.0630$ $-0.0474$ $0.356$ Civilian deaths $-0.0898^{**}$ $-0.0259^{**}$ $0.0332^{**}$ $-0.00996$ $-0.00572$ Deaths on government side $-0.00830$ $-0.0145$ $-0.0227^{**}$ $-0.0206^{**}$ $-0.0227^{**}$ Deaths on insurgent side $-0.00830^{**}$ $-0.0145$ $-0.0226^{**}$ $0.00262^{**}$ $0.00962^{**}$ Deaths on insurgent side $-0.000273$ $(0.00111)$ $(0.000492)$ $(0.000572)$ Deaths on insurgent side $-0.0331$ $-0.124^{**}$ $0.0328^{**}$ $0.00262^{**}$ $0.0097$ Educ: J.H. school $0.0137$ $0.194^{**}$ $-0.010$ $0.00072$ $0.0260^{**}$ $0.0097$ Educ: Uni $-0.0522$ $0.0338$ $-0.217^{**}$ $0.0779$ $0.138$ Urban: 50k-250k $-0.0407$ $-0.0902$	Resign*Sunni	-0.261**	$0.352^{*}$	$0.432^{**}$	0.403**	0.488**
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	8	(0.0521)	(0.162)	(0.118)	(0.0978)	(0.154)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Resign*Kurd	-0.157**	0.334	0.0744	0.177	-0.107
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	8	(0.0548)	(0.180)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.220)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Resign*Other	-0.142	-0.0942	-0.0630	-0.0474	0.356*
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.0806)	(0.308)	(0.148)	(0.196)	(0.142)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Civilian deaths	-0.00898**	-0.0259**	0.0332**	-0.00996	-0.00508
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.00249)	(0.00767)	(0.00572)	(0.00612)	(0.00723)
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Deaths on government side	-0.00830	-0.0315	-0.0237**	-0.0200**	-0.0220*
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		(0.00782)	(0.0189)	(0.00580)	(0.00492)	(0.00908)
	Deaths on insurgent side	0.000830**	0.00145	0.00286**	0.00262**	0.00190**
Female $(-0.0331)$ $(-0.124^*)$ $(0.0358)$ $(0.0142)$ $(0.0364)$ Educ:J.H. school $(0.0262)$ $(0.0581)$ $(0.0610)$ $(0.0607)$ $(0.071)$ Educ:J.H. school $0.0137$ $0.194^*$ $-0.101$ $0.180$ $0.161$ $(0.0414)$ $(0.0753)$ $(0.0839)$ $(0.0997)$ $(0.077)$ Educ:S.H. school $0.00724$ $0.259^{**}$ $-0.133$ $0.0907$ $0.106$ Educ:Uni $-0.0502$ $0.0398$ $-0.217^{**}$ $0.0786$ $0.180$ $(0.0286)$ $(0.09976)$ $(0.06099)$ $(0.0818)$ $(0.097)$ Educ:Uni $-0.0502$ $0.0398$ $-0.217^{**}$ $0.0786$ $0.180$ $(0.0286)$ $(0.0990)$ $(0.0801)$ $(0.0818)$ $(0.107)$ Urban: $50k-250k$ $-0.0407$ $-0.0902$ $-0.0469$ $-0.0779$ $-0.18$ $(0.0636)$ $(0.323)$ $(0.171)$ $(0.179)$ $(0.133)$ Urban: $50k$ $-0.0285$ $-0.139$ $-0.0547$ $-0.0757$ $-0.138$ Urban: $<0.00760)$ $(0.327)$ $(0.113)$ $(0.133)$ $(0.063)$ Rural $-0.00134$ $0.0162$ $0.0213$ $-0.0230$ $-0.044$ $(0.0760)$ $(0.327)$ $(0.113)$ $(0.133)$ $(0.088)$ Not gainfully empl. $-0.0845^*$ $-0.0959$ $-0.0693$ $-0.122$ $-0.044$ $(0.0418)$ $(0.0839)$ $(0.0385)$ $(0.0662)$ $(0.051)$ Good econ. situation $0.0027$		(0.000273)	(0.00111)	(0.000694)	(0.000492)	(0.000598)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Female	-0.0331	-0.124*	0.0358	0.0174	0.0235
	1 official of	(0.0262)	(0.0581)	(0.0610)	(0.0607)	(0.0710)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Educ: J.H. school	0.0137	0.194*	-0.101	0.180	0.161*
		(0.0414)	(0.0753)	(0.0839)	(0.0997)	(0.0771)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Educ: S.H. school	0.00724	0 259**	-0 133	0.0907	0.108
Educ: Uni $-0.0502$ $(0.0398)$ $-0.217^{**}$ $(0.0611)$ $(0.0611)$ Urban: 50k-250k $-0.0407$ $-0.0902$ $-0.0469$ $-0.0779$ $-0.18$ $(0.0636)$ $(0.323)$ $(0.171)$ $(0.179)$ $(0.138)$ Urban: $< 50k$ $-0.0285$ $-0.139$ $-0.0547$ $-0.0757$ $-0.138$ $(0.0984)$ $(0.291)$ $(0.183)$ $(0.138)$ $(0.063)$ Rural $-0.00134$ $0.0162$ $0.0213$ $-0.0230$ $-0.044$ $(0.0760)$ $(0.327)$ $(0.113)$ $(0.133)$ $(0.067)$ Unemployed $-0.0885$ $-0.227$ $-0.106$ $-0.117^*$ $0.0080$ $(0.0545)$ $(0.178)$ $(0.0656)$ $(0.0581)$ $(0.088)$ Not gainfully empl. $-0.0845^*$ $-0.0959$ $-0.6933$ $-0.122$ $-0.048$ Good econ. situation $0.00278$ $-0.0962$ $0.147^*$ $0.0647$ $0.035$ $(0.0409)$ $(0.0844)$ $(0.0625)$ $(0.105)$ $(0.082)$ Constant $-0.697^{**}$ $-2.56^{**}$ $-2.69^{**}$ $-2.78^{**}$ $-2.29^{*}$ Governorate f.e.YesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesObservations $1.302$ $1.216$ $1.396$ $1.406$ $1.430$	Eque: 5.11. Seneor	(0.0496)	(0.0976)	(0.0699)	(0.0874)	(0.0976)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Educ: Uni	-0.0502	0.0398	-0 217**	0.0786	0.180
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Laue. om	(0.0286)	(0.0990)	(0.0801)	(0.0818)	(0.105)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0407	-0.0902	-0.0469	-0.0779	-0.183
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	orban. ook-200k	(0.0636)	(0.323)	(0.171)	(0.179)	(0.135)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Urban < 50k	-0.0285	-0.139	-0.0547	-0.0757	-0.138*
Rural $(0.2034)$ $(0.213)$ $(0.100)$ $(0.100)$ $(0.100)$ $(0.0760)$ $(0.213)$ $-0.0230$ $-0.044$ $(0.0760)$ $(0.327)$ $(0.113)$ $(0.133)$ $(0.067)$ Unemployed $-0.0885$ $-0.227$ $-0.106$ $-0.117^*$ $0.0086$ $(0.0545)$ $(0.178)$ $(0.0656)$ $(0.0581)$ $(0.088)$ Not gainfully empl. $-0.0845^*$ $-0.0959$ $-0.0693$ $-0.122$ $-0.048$ $(0.0418)$ $(0.0839)$ $(0.0385)$ $(0.0662)$ $(0.051)$ Good econ. situation $0.00278$ $-0.0962$ $0.147^*$ $0.0647$ $0.035$ $(0.0409)$ $(0.0844)$ $(0.0625)$ $(0.105)$ $(0.082)$ Constant $-0.697^{**}$ $-2.56^{**}$ $-2.69^{**}$ $-2.78^{**}$ $-2.29^{*}$ Governorate f.e.YesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesObservations $1,302$ $1,216$ $1,396$ $1,406$ $1,430$	orban. < ook	(0.0984)	(0.291)	(0.183)	(0.138)	(0.0635)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Bural	(0.0504)	0.0162	0.0213	-0.0230	-0.0443
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	nulai	(0.0760)	(0.327)	(0.113)	(0.133)	(0.0670)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Unemployed	-0.0885	-0.227	-0.106	-0.117*	0.00806
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	enemployed	(0.0545)	(0.178)	(0.0656)	(0.0581)	(0.0880)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Not gainfully empl	-0.0845*	-0.0959	-0.0693	-0.122	-0.0483
Good econ. situation $(0.00178)$ $(0.0035)$ $(0.0002)$ $(0.0002)$ $(0.0002)$ $(0.0416)$ $(0.00278)$ $-0.0962$ $0.147^*$ $0.0647$ $0.035$ $(0.0409)$ $(0.0844)$ $(0.0625)$ $(0.105)$ $(0.082)$ Constant $-0.697^{**}$ $-2.56^{**}$ $-2.69^{**}$ $-2.78^{**}$ $-2.29^{*}$ Constant $(0.105)$ $(0.318)$ $(0.238)$ $(0.206)$ $(0.155)$ Governorate f.e.YesYesYesYesYes4 age controlsYesYesYesYesYesObservations $1,302$ $1,216$ $1,396$ $1,406$ $1,430$	Not gainfung empi.	(0.0418)	(0.0303)	(0.0395)	(0.0662)	(0.0516)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Good econ situation	(0.0410) 0.00278	-0.0962	(0.0303) 0.147*	(0.0002)	0.0352
Constant $-0.697^{**}$ $-2.56^{**}$ $-2.69^{**}$ $-2.78^{**}$ $-2.29^{*}$ Constant $-0.697^{**}$ $-2.56^{**}$ $-2.69^{**}$ $-2.78^{**}$ $-2.29^{**}$ Covernorate f.e.YesYesYesYesYes4 age controlsYesYesYesYesYesObservations $1,302$ $1,216$ $1,396$ $1,406$ $1,430$	Good econ. situation	(0.00210)	(0.0844)	(0.147)	(0.105)	(0.0302)
Constant $-0.097$ $-2.50$ $-2.69$ $-2.78$ $-2.29$ (0.105)(0.318)(0.238)(0.206)(0.15)Governorate f.e.YesYesYesYes4 age controlsYesYesYesYesObservations1,3021,2161,3961,4061,430	Constant	0.607**	0.56**	2 60**	0.100)	2 20**
Governorate f.e.YesYesYesYesYes4 age controlsYesYesYesYesYesObservations1,3021,2161,3961,4061,430	Constant	(0.105)	(0.318)	(0.238)	-2.18	(0.153)
Governorate i.e.resresresresres4 age controlsYesYesYesYesYesObservations1,3021,2161,3961,4061,430	Covernorate f.e	(0.105) Vec	(0.510) Vec	(0.250) Ves	(0.200) Ves	(0.155) Vec
Observations         1,302         1,216         1,396         1,406         1,430	4 age controls	Vec	Vec	Vec	Vec	Vee
Observations         1,302         1,216         1,396         1,406         1,430	- age controis	1 62	1.62	162	162	162
	Observations	1,302	1.216	1,396	1.406	1.430
B-squared 0.135 0.207 0.344 0.0808 0.220	R-squared	0.135	0.207	0.344	0.0898	0.990

Table 40: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Main model results from governorate fixed effects OLS models with disaggregated fatalities measures from UCDP

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. The three fatalities measures record death counts in the respondent's governorate on the day of the interview or the previous day based on data compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2017).

	(138)	(139)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0569	0.0822
	(0.102)	(0.0517)
Sunni	-0.188	-0.209*
	(0.116)	(0.0839)
Kurd	0.0402	-0.0881
	(0.188)	(0.255)
Other	-0.246	-0.244
	(0.178)	(0.139)
Resign*Sunni	0.117	-0.0663
	(0.0809)	(0.107)
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.00506	-0.188*
	(0.127)	(0.0949)
Resign*Other	0.0537	-0.195
	(0.244)	(0.339)
Civilian deaths	0.00493	0.00197
	(0.00634)	(0.00588)
Deaths on government side	-0.0203	-0.0140**
	(0.0110)	(0.00523)
Deaths on insurgent side	0.000418	-0.0000871
	(0.000631)	(0.000535)
Female	-0.106	-0.0145
	(0.0782)	(0.0557)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0606	0.0349
	(0.0697)	(0.121)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0597	0.0844
	(0.149)	(0.125)
Educ: Uni	0.00455	-0.0979
	(0.127)	(0.159)
Urban: $50k-250k$	-0.0500	0.0271
	(0.163)	(0.155)
Urban: < 50k	-0.318*	-0.0342
	(0.124)	(0.0832)
Rural	-0.0813	0.0171
	(0.169)	(0.108)
Unemployed	-0.155	-0.0279
	(0.121)	(0.0900)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.228**	-0.0719
	(0.0668)	(0.0693)
Good econ. situation	0.0124	0.0405
	(0.0997)	(0.0435)
Constant	-2.65**	-2.60**
	(0.182)	(0.241)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
Ob	1 901	1 997
Observations	1,301	1,337
K-squared	0.179	0.151

Table 41: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models with disaggregated fatalities measures from UCDP

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. The three fatalities measures record death counts in the respondent's governorate on the day of the interview or the previous day based on data compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2017).

	(140)	(141)	(142)	(143)	(144)		
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity		
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves		
		0	1	1	1		
Resign	0.0778*	-0.111	-0.113	-0.0405	0.0255		
-	(0.0342)	(0.166)	(0.146)	(0.100)	(0.0799)		
Sunni	0.212**	-0.181	-0.474**	-0.345**	-0.367**		
	(0.0628)	(0.164)	(0.0887)	(0.0573)	(0.0835)		
Kurd	0.0333	0.0827	-0.170	0.104	0.224		
	(0.0693)	(0.309)	(0.209)	(0.139)	(0.177)		
Other	0.0342	-0.0696	-0.0107	0.125	-0.0938		
	(0.0939)	(0.258)	(0.151)	(0.172)	(0.169)		
Resign*Sunni	-0.253**	$0.383^{*}$	$0.396^{**}$	0.442**	0.493**		
0	(0.0568)	(0.187)	(0.0754)	(0.0728)	(0.149)		
Resign*Kurd	-0.145**	0.376	0.134	0.212	-0.0717		
0	(0.0477)	(0.206)	(0.165)	(0.148)	(0.213)		
Resign*Other	-0.123	-0.00957	-0.0913	-0.0249	$0.389^{*}$		
0	(0.0841)	(0.291)	(0.171)	(0.222)	(0.179)		
Casualties (4-week period)	0.000165	0.000446	-0.0000647	$0.00105^{**}$	0.000357		
	(0.000380)	(0.00114)	(0.000941)	(0.000404)	(0.000475)		
Female	-0.0362	-0.135*	0.0378	0.00994	0.0170		
	(0.0250)	(0.0591)	(0.0574)	(0.0591)	(0.0675)		
Educ: J.H. school	0.0127	0.185*	-0.108	0.174	0.156*		
	(0.0421)	(0.0727)	(0.0823)	(0.100)	(0.0746)		
Educ: S.H. school	0.00607	0.249*	-0.141*	0.0875	0.103		
	(0.0502)	(0.0971)	(0.0671)	(0.0875)	(0.0948)		
Educ: Uni	-0.0556	0.0157	-0.244**	0.0605	0.164		
	(0.0312)	(0.0988)	(0.0773)	(0.0779)	(0.102)		
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0452	-0.103	-0.0522	-0.0900	-0.192		
	(0.0652)	(0.323)	(0.167)	(0.180)	(0.135)		
Urban:< 50k	-0.0381	-0.179	-0.0920	-0.112	-0.170**		
	(0.102)	(0.310)	(0.198)	(0.159)	(0.0547)		
Rural	-0.0104	-0.0119	0.0233	-0.0430	-0.0591		
	(0.0793)	(0.338)	(0.110)	(0.144)	(0.0696)		
Unemployed	-0.0918	-0.244	-0.125	-0.128*	-0.00441		
r system	(0.0556)	(0.180)	(0.0667)	(0.0586)	(0.0954)		
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0859	-0.107	-0.0719	-0.125	-0.0522		
Grand Jack P	(0.0443)	(0.0934)	(0.0442)	(0.0687)	(0.0546)		
Good econ. situation	0.00126	-0.0997	0.151*	0.0633	0.0346		
	(0.0414)	(0.0838)	(0.0645)	(0.106)	(0.0831)		
Constant	-0.823**	-2.89**	-2.51**	-3.47**	-2.52**		
	(0.314)	(0.868)	(0.797)	(0.406)	(0.354)		
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
5							
Observations	1,302	1,216	1,396	1,406	1,430		
R-squared	0.130	0.199	0.333	0.0852	0.214		

Table 42: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Main model results from governorate fixed effects OLS models with measure of casualties over four-week period from START

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. Casualties (4-week period) records a count of deaths from terrorist incidents in the respondent's governorate over the four-week period prior to the interview and on the day of the interview based on data compiled by the (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017).

	(145)	(146)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.110	0.0494
	(0.103)	(0.0700)
Sunni	-0.0995	-0.136
	(0.141)	(0.0994)
Kurd	0.0315	-0.0877
	(0.184)	(0.246)
Other	-0.334*	-0.315*
	(0.168)	(0.132)
Resign*Sunni	0.00352	-0.154
	(0.108)	(0.0803)
Resign*Kurd	0.0409	-0.158
	(0.139)	(0.107)
Resign*Other	0.153	-0.100
	(0.265)	(0.358)
Casualties (4-week period)	-0.00213**	-0.00208**
	(0.000536)	(0.000565)
Female	-0.112	-0.0193
	(0.0766)	(0.0540)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0581	0.0285
	(0.0694)	(0.119)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0504	0.0719
	(0.145)	(0.120)
Educ: Uni	0.0000260	-0.102
	(0.127)	(0.155)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0477	0.0319
	(0.159)	(0.150)
Urban: < 50k	-0.319*	-0.0262
	(0.135)	(0.0782)
Rural	-0.0780	0.0227
	(0.172)	(0.109)
Unemployed	-0.168	-0.0373
	(0.124)	(0.0902)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.234**	-0.0761
	(0.0650)	(0.0694)
Good econ. situation	0.0146	0.0430
	(0.100)	(0.0458)
Constant	-1.20**	-1.20**
	(0.369)	(0.443)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
Observertierer	1 901	1 997
Deservations	1,301	1,337
n-squarea	0.182	0.197

Table 43: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation: Democratic legitimacy results from governorate fixed effects OLS models with measure of casualties over four-week period from START

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. Casualties (4-week period) records a count of deaths from terrorist incidents in the respondent's governorate over the four-week period prior to the interview and on the day of the interview based on data compiled by the (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017).

#### Analysis of effect of daily security situation on number of survey responses

If the local security situation at a given point in time affected the number or location of survey responses gathered, the results of our analyses might be biased. To investigate this potential source of bias, we modeled the daily number of survey responses gathered in a given governorate as a function of violent events in that governorate on that day and the previous day. The unit of analysis in these models is the governorate-day. The four models below are estimated on four different samples: the full sample, which covers the entire period from the start to the completion of the data collection, and three samples whose temporal scope corresponds to the scope of the three samples that are the focus of our analyses of the effect of the announced resignation of prime minister al-Maliki. All four models yield the same result: the local security situation in a governorate did not significantly impact the number of survey responses gathered there. Thus, variation in the local security situation did not introduce bias in our results by affecting the timing and location of interviews in the 17 Iraqi governorates where the survey was administered. The survey could not be administered in Nineveh due to security concerns (see research design section of the main text for details).

	(147)	(148)	(149)	(150)
Dependent	Number of	Number of	Number of	Number of
variable	responses	responses	responses	responses
	(August sample)	$(\pm 21 \text{ day sample})$	$(\pm 14  { m day  sample})$	(full sample)
Casualties	0.004	0.008	0.008	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	558	774	522	2,322
R-squared	0.068	0.052	0.071	0.025

Table 44:	Effect of	of dai	ly nu	ımber	of ca	asualties	in a	governorate	on d	laily	numbe	r of	survey
responses	gathere	d in t	hat g	governo	orate	: results	from	governorate	fixe	d eff	ects OI	LS m	odels

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05.

# Evidence from national polls in Iraq (2007-2018)

The national polls reveal that since coming to power in 2014, prime minister al-Abadi's support among Sunni Muslims has stayed strong for several years. This pattern indicates that the effect of al-Maliki's announced resignation on Sunni attitudes cannot just simply be explained as a honeymoon effect (see the section on alternative explanations in the main text). Moreover, it suggests that the results from the original survey conducted for this study are consistent with the findings from other public opinion polls.

1g:	$\mathbf{K}\mathbf{urds}$	60	33	68	51	19	$0^c$	$13^c$	$13^c$	$12^{c}$	$12^{c}$		$53^{c}$	$53^{c}$	$NA^h$	ļ	17	$24^{c}$	14	$15^{c}$	$18^{c}$	$40^{c}$	$60^{c}$
oval amoi	Sunnis	n	2	x	31	2	$25^b$	$42^d$	$40^d$	$20^d$	$30^{b}$		$69^{e}$	$72^{b}$	$57^{g}$	(	53	$45^{b}$	48	$60^{e}$	$78^{i}$	$62^{b}$	$88^{j}$
Appr	$\mathbf{Shiites}$	29	54	52	02	51	$36^{a}$	$69^{a}$	$68^a$	77a	$77^{a}$		$26^{a}$	$78^{a}$	$70^{f}$		84	$52^{a}$	26	$32^a$	$57^{a}$	$59^a$	$81^a$
Question wording		Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri Kamel al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri Kamel al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri Kamel al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri Kamel al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Indicate your attitude towards these leaders? Nuri al Maliki [Favorable/ Unfavorable]	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?	Haider al-Abadi succeeds Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister.	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Haider al-Abadi is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Haider al-Abadi is handling his job as prime minister?	Thinking about the persons and the groups which are working now in Iraq, generally,	do you think that their influence is negative or positive on the matters in lraq; Haydar Al Ebadi.	Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the job Abadi is doing?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Haider al-Abadi is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you support the policies of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Haider al-Abadi is handling his job as prime minister?	Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the job Abadi is doing?	Do you approve or disapprove of the way Haider al-Abadi is handling his job as prime minister?	Do you approve or disapprove of Haider Al-Abadi's performance as prime minister?
Polling firm		D3 Systems, KA Research	Zogby	Gallup	Gallup	Gallup	Gallup	Gallup		Gallup	Gallup	ORB International	; - - - (	Greenberg Quinlan Kosner	Gallup	Rawabet Center	Gallup	Greenberg Quinlan Rosner	Gallup	N.N. for 1001 Iraqi Thoughts			
Date		3/2007	8/2007	2/2008	2/2009	9/2011	3/2012	9/2013	9-10/2013	5/2014	5-6/2014		11/2014	11-12/2014	7/2015		8-9/2015	10/2015	11/2015	4/2016	3-4/2017	4-5/2017	3/2018

Table 45: Prime ministers' approval ratings over time: results from national polls conducted between 2007 and 2018

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Sources: Langer, 2009; Zogby, 2011; Randle, 2015; Owen and Fakhreddine, 2015; Gallup, 2015, 2016; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, 2015; ORB International, 2015; Fakhreddine, 2016; Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, 2015; Lyons and Reinhart, 2017; Gallup, 2017; 1001 Iraqi ģ x Note: Figures for specific regions are only reported when figures for the three ethnic/ religious groups are unavailable. N.N. for 1001 Iraqi Thoughts Do you approve or disapprove of Haider Al-Abadi's performance as prime minister? 3/2018

 a Figure for Southern region.

Thoughts, 2018.

 b Figure for Sunni heartland.

^cFigure for Iraqi Kurdistan.

 d Figure for ISIL-held areas.

^eFigure for areas with heavy ISIL presence.

^fIncludes Shiite Kurds.

^gIncludes Sunni Kurds.

^hSee notes f and g.

^{*i*}Figure for Western region.

^{*i*}Figure for liberated provinces.
# Comparison between full sample and population estimates

Since the last official census prior to this survey dates back to 1997, the sampling frame was based on a combination of 2011 population estimates by Iraq's Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology and the 2007-8 UN World Food Program survey. Tables 46-47 below show that the survey sample's demographic characteristics and its distribution across provinces are very similar to the best population estimates for 2014 that have become available more recently.

Governorate	Sample size	Sample share	Pop. size	Pop. share
		in $\%$		in $\%$
Northern region	844	14.5	3,957,000	11.3
Dohuk	211	3.6	$1,\!050,\!000$	3.0
Erbil	287	4.9	$1,\!476,\!000$	4.2
Sulaymaniya	346	5.9	$1,\!431,\!000$	4.1
Northern triangle	1,325	22.7	8,290,000	23.7
Anbar	273	4.7	1,516,000	4.3
Nineveh	$555^a$	9.5	$3,\!687,\!000$	10.5
Kirkuk	248	4.3	$1,\!639,\!000$	4.7
Salahhadin	249	4.3	$1,\!448,\!000$	4.1
Central region	2,392	41.1	14,587,000	41.7
Babil	313	5.4	1,882,000	5.4
Diyala	258	4.4	$1,\!375,\!000$	3.9
Karbala	201	3.5	1,187,000	3.4
Najaf	235	4.0	$1,\!305,\!000$	3.7
Wasit	219	3.8	$1,\!278,\!000$	3.7
Baghdad	1,166	20.0	7,560,000	21.6
Southern region	1,265	21.7	8,171,000	23.3
Basra	422	7.2	2,976,000	8.5
Maysan	190	3.3	1,107,000	3.2
Muthanna	128	2.2	829,000	2.4
Qadisiya	210	3.6	1,237,000	3.5
Dhi Qar	315	5.4	2,022,000	5.8

Table 46: Comparison between full sample and population estimates: distribution by governorate

*Note*: This table compares the distribution of respondents by governorate (province) according to the sampling frame for this study to the distribution of the Iraqi population in 2014 according to the World Bank's subnational population data, which are based on national Iraqi statistics and estimates from the Earth Institute at Columbia University and were published after the sampling frame was devised based on a combination of 2011 population estimates by Iraq's Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology and the 2007-8 UN World Food Program survey. For the distribution of respondents in the three main samples investigated for this study see Figure 1 in the article. The sampling frame provides for a distribution of respondents that is remarkably similar to the distribution of Iraq's population that the World Bank published after the survey was administered (average of absolute values of differences between governorates' sample share and estimated population share = 0.5 percentage points). The most plausible explanation of discrepancies consists in different ways of accounting for internal displacement in Iraq prior to 2014.

 $^{^{}a}$  The survey could not be administered in Nineveh due to security concerns. See research design section of the main text for details.

		Value based	
	Value based	on population	
Variable	on sample	estimate	Source of population estimate
Religion: Shia Muslims (in %)	59.7	55-60	U.S. Department of State (2017)
Religion: Sunni Muslims (in %)	39.2	40	U.S. Department of State (2017)
Religion: Christians and other (in $\%$ )	1.1	3	U.S. Department of State (2017)
Ethnicity: Arabs (in $\%$ )	81.0	75-80	Central Intelligence Agency (2017)
Ethnicity: Kurds (in %)	16.8	15-20	Central Intelligence Agency (2017)
Ethnicity: Other (in $\%$ )	2.2	5	Central Intelligence Agency (2017)
Age structure: Ages 25-38 as share of			
sample $(18 + \text{ years})$ or adult population	36.5	$41.6^{a}$	United Nations (2017)
Age structure: Ages 39-52 as share of			
sample $(18 + \text{ years})$ or adult population	26.2	$24.8^{b}$	United Nations (2017)
Age structure: Ages $53 + as$ share of			
sample $(18 + \text{ years})$ or adult population	12.2	$15.2^{c}$	United Nations (2017)
Gender: proportion of women	44.9	49.5	United Nations (2017)
Education: primary school incomplete	5.4	$11^{d}$	World Bank (2015)
Education: primary school	14.7	$19^d$	World Bank (2015)
Education: junior high school	18.2	$21^d$	World Bank (2015)
Education: senior high school	24.5	$17^d$	World Bank (2015)
Education: university/ academy	37.2	$33^d$	World Bank (2015)

Table 47: Comparison between full sample and population estimates: demographic characteristics

*Note*: The first column in this table describes the full sample. For descriptive statistics of the subset of responses gathered in August, see Table 1. United Nations (2017) reports an estimate for 2015. U.S. Department of State (2017) summarizes Iraqi government statistics from 2010. Central Intelligence Agency (2017) presents 1987 government estimates and notes that more recent reliable figures are not available. United Nations (2017) presents estimates for 2015. World Bank (2015) reports data from a nationally representative household-level survey conducted in 2012-2013.

 $^{^{}a}$  Data for ages 25-39 (as a share of the population aged 20 or more) is reported due to limited data availability.

 $^{^{}b}$  Data for ages 40-54 (as a share of the population aged 20 or more) is reported due to limited data availability.

 $[^]c$  Data for ages 55+ (as a share of the population aged 20 or more) is reported due to limited data availability.

^d Maximum education in the household is reported due to limited data availability.

## Analysis of potential enumerator gender effects on revealed respondent attitudes

The survey was administered by pairs of enumerators who conducted interviews in person. Enumerators were instructed to conduct the interview in the privacy of the respondent's home unless the respondent preferred to take the survey in a public setting outside his or her home. The way the survey was administered would introduce bias in the results obtained from it if both of the following two conditions hold: First, respondents' willingness to reveal their honest attitudes systematically varied across pairs of enumerators. For instance, some female respondents might be less willing to answer sensitive questions if they were interviewed by two male enumerators than women who were interviewed by a mixed-gender or allfemale team of enumerators. Second, any such enumerator effects systematically changed in mid-August. For instance, this would be the case if female respondents interviewed after al-Maliki announced his resignation were more likely to answer sensitive questions about political attitudes if they were interviewed by mixed-gender or all-female pairs of enumerators whereas female respondents who took the survey before mid-August did not offer fewer honest responses to two male enumerators than to mixed-gender or all-female enumerator teams. Our results would only be biased if both conditions hold.

Additional analyses presented below do not uncover evidence that supports either of these two conditions. Specifically, they show that women who were likely interviewed by two male enumerators were not less likely to reveal their political attitudes than women who were likely interviewed by all-female or mixed-gender enumerator teams. Specifically, the sum of the coefficients of likely enumerator gender and its interaction with respondent gender is insignificant in four of the five models shown in Table 48 below. Both male and female respondents were less likely to indicate their expectations of improvements in employment if they were interviewed by mixed-gender or all-female enumerator teams instead of allmale teams. Second, the effect of likely enumerator gender on female respondents' choice to answering sensitive questions (or to refrain from doing so) did not significantly change in the wake of the resignation; the sum of the coefficients of likely enumerator gender and its interaction with the timing of the interview is insignificant in all models in Table 49 below, including in the model of expectations about jobs improvements. Third, female respondents who were likely interviewed by two men were not more prone to choose to conduct the interview in a public setting (rather than at home) than women whose interview was likely conducted by all-female or mixed-gender enumerator teams (see Table 50 below). In conclusion, these analyses suggest that the enumerators' gender and its interaction with the respondents' gender did not introduce bias in the results from this study.

Overall, 18 enumerator teams consisted of two men, 16 included a man and a woman, and 3 were composed of two women. The teams worked in their own home governorate. Unfortunately, we cannot match individual respondents to their enumerator pair, because the survey company did not record this data in the dataset. One of the two enumerators wrote his or her name on each survey form by hand. When we asked ten fluent Arabic speakers to determine enumerators' gender based on their handwritten name on a random sample of survey forms, we obtained diverging answers on 76 percent of names due to bad handwriting. Therefore, we analyzed the effect of enumerators' likely gender based on a list of survey teams who worked in each governorate. Specifically, we determined a given respondent's likelihood of being interviewed by an all-male, all-female, or mixed-gender team based on how many teams of each type were active in his or her governorate. The measure ranges from 0 (for governorates where all enumerator teams were composed of two men) to 1 (for governorates where all teams included at least one woman). This implies that the measure of enumerators' likely gender varies by - but not within - governorate. For this reason the models of potential enumerator effects do not contain governorate fixed effects in contrast to our other models. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the enumerator gender measures.

	(151)	(152)	(153)	(154)	(155)	(156)
Dependent	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:
variable	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	$\mathbf{Jobs}$	Electricity	Violence
	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves	necessary
Resign	0.0488	-0.0411	-0.0105	0.00334	0.0112	0.0226
	(0.0328)	(0.0696)	(0.0179)	(0.0172)	(0.00755)	(0.0374)
Sunni	0.0500*	-0.110	0.0143	0.0156	-0.00442	-0.0279
	(0.0235)	(0.0744)	(0.0334)	(0.0205)	(0.00292)	(0.0348)
Kurd	0.0535	-0.223*	-0.0175	-0.0295	-0.0138*	0.0237
	(0.0298)	(0.0895)	(0.0169)	(0.0165)	(0.00559)	(0.0380)
Other	0.106	-0.0421	-0.00356	0.00967	0.000303	0.0436
	(0.0670)	(0.0512)	(0.0166)	(0.0228)	(0.00402)	(0.0436)
Resign*Sunni	0.0219	-0.00919	0.00399	-0.0384	-0.00612	0.0384
	(0.0403)	(0.0755)	(0.0347)	(0.0209)	(0.00854)	(0.0515)
Resign*Kurd	-0.0421	0.0319	0.000405	0.00392	-0.0121	0.0913
	(0.0838)	(0.0747)	(0.0226)	(0.0231)	(0.00838)	(0.0510)
Resign*Other	-0.0768	0.0928	-0.0179	-0.0330	-0.0221	-0.00572
	(0.0678)	(0.0853)	(0.0241)	(0.0300)	(0.0119)	(0.0613)
Female	-0.0223	0.0261	0.0129	0.0209	-0.00727	-0.00706
	(0.0282)	(0.0485)	(0.0280)	(0.0145)	(0.00623)	(0.0290)
Female enumerator(s)	-0.118	-0.0631	0.00755	-0.0323*	-0.0133	-0.0254
	(0.0631)	(0.0394)	(0.0269)	(0.0161)	(0.0134)	(0.0667)
Female enumerator(s)*Female	0.0828	0.0604	-0.0135	-0.0334	0.00610	0.00397
	(0.0474)	(0.0983)	(0.0558)	(0.0181)	(0.0102)	(0.0522)
Casualties	-0.000989**	-0.000967	0.000143	-0.000318*	-0.000236*	-0.000950**
	(0.000268)	(0.000861)	(0.000238)	(0.000129)	(0.000111)	(0.000257)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0165	-0.0162	0.00818	0.00716	-0.0216	-0.0460
	(0.0327)	(0.0424)	(0.0193)	(0.0152)	(0.0151)	(0.02954)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00641	-0.0134	0.0273	0.0111	-0.00794	-0.0307
	(0.0258)	(0.0418)	(0.0208)	(0.0206)	(0.00966)	(0.0307)
Educ: Uni	0.0175	-0.0489	0.00549	-0.00286	-0.0139	-0.0496
	(0.0278)	(0.0291)	(0.0153)	(0.0135)	(0.00878)	(0.0363)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0417	-0.01581	-0.0275	-0.00827	-0.00747	-0.0228
	(0.0381)	(0.0477)	(0.0178)	(0.0113)	(0.00613)	(0.0217)
Urban:< 50k	0.00865	-0.0000591	-0.0330*	0.00110	0.00349	0.0526
	(0.0530)	(0.0714)	(0.0141)	(0.00665)	(0.00463)	(0.0555)
Rural	0.00960	0.0236	-0.0244*	-0.00196	0.000948	-0.00561
	(0.0378)	(0.0558)	(0.0114)	(0.0140)	(0.00631)	(0.0193)
Unemployed	-0.0218	-0.00859	0.0294	$0.0277^{*}$	0.0104	-0.0467
	(0.0261)	(0.0267)	(0.0184)	(0.0137)	(0.00793)	(0.0364)
Not gainfully empl.	$0.0482^{*}$	0.00892	0.0301*	$0.0207^{**}$	-0.00237	-0.0319
	(0.0193)	(0.0249)	(0.0129)	(0.00606)	(0.00542)	(0.0232)
Good econ. situation	0.0275	-0.0468	0.0106	0.00198	0.00130	-0.0112
	(0.0214)	(0.0521)	(0.0195)	(0.0108)	(0.00350)	(0.0328)
Constant	0.0578	0.293*	0.0343	0.0379	0.0374	0.158*
	(0.0576)	(0.140)	(0.0220)	(0.0253)	(0.0686)	
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,446	1,446	1,446	1,446	1,446	1,446
R-squared	0.0350	0.0641	0.00631	0.00190	0.00326	0.0329

Table 48: Effect of enumerator gender on likelihood of non-response: Main OLS model results

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. In each model, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent declined to answer the question used to measure the respective DV and 0 otherwise.

Table 49: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on likelihood of non-response with enumerator gender effects: Main OLS model results

	(157)	(158)	(159)	(160)	(161)	(162)
Dependent	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:	Non-response:
variable	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity	Violence
	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves	necessary
Resign	0.0127	-0.0398	-0.0217	-0.00255	0.00724	-0.0476
	(0.0627)	(0.0762)	(0.0269)	(0.0169)	(0.00784)	(0.0498)
Sunni	0.0508*	-0.110	0.0145	0.0158	-0.00433	-0.0263
	(0.0227)	(0.0743)	(0.0334)	(0.0205)	(0.00291)	(0.0342)
Kurd	0.0548	-0.223*	-0.0171	-0.0293	-0.0137*	0.0262
	(0.0307)	(0.0893)	(0.0165)	(0.0162)	(0.00547)	(0.0382)
Other	0.106	-0.0421	-0.00378	0.00955	0.000224	0.0423
	(0.0668)	(0.0512)	(0.0166)	(0.0228)	(0.00406)	(0.0423)
Resign*Sunni	0.0169	-0.00900	0.00243	-0.0392	-0.00668	0.0286
	(0.0419)	(0.0753)	(0.0353)	(0.0207)	(0.00885)	(0.0495)
Resign*Kurd	-0.0500	0.0322	-0.00202	0.00265	-0.0129	0.0761
D	(0.0823)	(0.0741)	(0.0210)	(0.0230)	(0.00912)	(0.0530)
Resign*Other	-0.0763	0.0927	-0.0177	-0.0329	-0.0220	-0.00470
	(0.0676)	(0.0854)	(0.0240)	(0.0300)	(0.0118)	(0.0614)
Male	-0.0590*	-0.0866	0.00101	0.0127	0.00134	0.00600
	(0.0232)	(0.0600)	(0.0301)	(0.0129)	(0.00447)	(0.0305)
Male enumerator(s)	-0.0111	0.00446	-0.00860	0.0581**	0.00203	-0.0695
	(0.0403)	(0.0673)	(0.0310)	(0.0134)	(0.00723)	(0.0455)
Male enumerator(s)*Male	0.0783	0.0606	-0.0149	-0.0341	0.00560	-0.00472
	(0.0516)	(0.0998)	(0.0575)	(0.0192)	(0.00996)	(0.0518)
Resign [*] Male enumerator(s)	0.0779	-0.00296	0.0242	0.0127	0.00855	0.151
Constant in the second s	(0.137)	(0.0522)	(0.0383)	(0.0238)	(0.0133)	(0.104)
Casualties	-0.00101	-0.000966	0.000136	$-0.000322^{\circ}$	-0.000238*	-0.000995***
Educe III school	(0.000269)	(0.000864)	(0.000233)	(0.000129)	(0.000112)	(0.000259)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0107	-0.0102	0.00814	(0.0152)	-0.0210	-0.0402
Educe CII ashaal	(0.0328)	(0.0423)	(0.0195)	(0.0152)	(0.0151)	(0.0297)
Educ: S.H. school	(0.00557)	-0.0134	(0.0271)	(0.0110)	-0.00805	(0.0324)
Educe Uni	(0.0200)	(0.0418)	0.00578	(0.0207)	(0.00903)	0.0478
Educ. Olli	(0.0278)	-0.0489	(0.0152)	-0.00270	-0.0138	-0.0478
Urban, 50k 250k	(0.0218)	0.0157	0.0270	0.00840	0.00762	0.0254
01ball: 30k-230k	-0.0430	(0.0137)	(0.0279)	-0.00849	-0.00702	-0.0234
Urban: < 50k	0.00803	0.000356	0.0332*	0.00100	(0.00022)	0.0239)
orban. Cook	(0.0523)	(0.0715)	(0.0140)	(0.00100)	(0.0042)	(0.0544)
Bural	0.00737	0.0237	-0.0251*	-0.00232	0.000703	-0.00994
Iturai	(0.0365)	(0.0560)	(0.0112)	(0.0144)	(0.00645)	(0.0202)
Unemployed	-0.0211	-0.00861	0.0296	0.0278*	0.0105	-0.0454
enemployed	(0.0255)	(0.0267)	(0.0183)	(0.0210)	(0.00795)	(0.0357)
Not gainfully empl	0.0483*	0.00891	0.0301*	0.0207**	-0.00236	-0.0317
not guinning ompri	(0.0194)	(0.0250)	(0.0129)	(0.00607)	(0.00541)	(0.0233)
Good econ. situation	0.0270	-0.0468	0.0105	0.00190	0.00125	-0.0122
	(0.0213)	(0.0521)	(0.0195)	(0.0107)	(0.00355)	(0.0331)
Constant	0.0229	0.316**	0.0485**	-0.00314	0.0255	0.175**
	(0.0645)	(0.121)	(0.0176)	(0.0160)	(0.0179)	(0.0606)
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
0						
Observations	1,446	1,446	1,446	1,446	1,446	1,446
R-squared	0.0356	0.0634	0.00576	0.00125	0.00262	0.03479

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. In each model, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent declined to answer the question used to measure the respective DV and 0 otherwise.

	(103)
Dependent	Outside
variable	home?
Resign	-0.0513
C	(0.0298)
Sunni	0.0472**
	(0.0103)
Kurd	0.105
	(0.0542)
Other	0.0679
o their	(0.0531)
Resign*Sunni	-0.0136
itesign Summ	(0.0233)
Bosign*Kurd	(0.0233)
nesign Rura	(0.0473)
Degime*Other	(0.0473)
Resign Other	-0.0414
	(0.0527)
Male	$0.139^{+}$
	(0.0642)
Male enumerator(s) $(s)$	0.0958
	(0.0648)
Male enumerator(s)*Male	-0.0621
	(0.0830)
Casualties	-0.000679*
	(0.000284)
Educ: J.H. school	-0.0434
	(0.0235)
Educ: S.H. school	-0.0363
	(0.0255)
Educ: Uni	-0.0371
	(0.0217)
Urban: 50k-250k	$0.0596^{*}$
	(0.0253)
Urban: $< 50k$	0.0217
	(0.0372)
Bural	$0.0545^{*}$
Turur	(0.0248)
Unemployed	0.00121
enempioyed	(0.0474)
Not gainfully empl	(0.0474)
Not gamfuny empi.	(0.0268)
Cood even situation	(0.0208)
Good econ. situation	(0.00754)
	(0.0150)
Constant	-0.984**
	(0.0536)
Governorate f.e.	Yes
4 age controls	Yes
Observations	$1,\!446$
R-squared	0.0726

Table 50: Effect of enumerator gender effects on choice to conduct interview outside home: Main OLS model results (163)

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. In each model, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent chose to answer the survey outside their home and 0 otherwise. 78

# Trends in Sunni respondents' attitudes vis-à-vis warring factions and in their expectations of public goods and service delivery



Figure 2: Sunni respondents' average responses over time

Note: This figure displays trends in the average attitudes of all Sunnis in the main sample, which consists of all responses gathered in August. In the five panels the responses are grouped by the date of their interview around the critical event date of August 14th. Each group includes Sunni respondents who were interviewed during the same five-day period. Each group's circle appears above the last date at which some member of the group was interviewed (8/5, 8/10, 8/20, 8/25, and 8/30; no Sunni respondents were interviewed between 8/11 and 8/15). The size of the circle indicates the number of responses in each group. The red vertical line designates the day on which the prime minister announced his resignation. The dashed horizontal lines indicate the mean responses before and after this event.

## Trends in Sunni and Shiite attitudes before announcement of resignation

To show that trends in Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish attitudes vis-à-vis armed opposition groups were similar to each other before al-Maliki announced his resignation on August 14, we examine all survey responses gathered before this date. The models in Table 51 have the same specifications as the main models, but they are fit on two different samples of respondents. Model 164 examines a sample that consists of all respondents who were interviewed from the start of the survey in May to August 13. We compare the first half of responses, which were gathered on or before July 21, to the more recent survey responses, which were collected during the subsequent three weeks. The binary variable 'late interview' captures the distinction between these two sets of respondents. If there were differences between trends in the attitudes of Shia respondents, on the one hand, and Sunni and Kurdish respondents, on the other, then the interaction terms of 'late interview' with the Sunni and Kurdish group affiliations would have significant coefficients. However, the coefficients of both the Sunni and Kurdish interaction terms are insignificant. Moreover, the difference between the coefficients of these two interaction terms, which indicates whether the attitudes of Sunni and Kurdish respondents trended in different directions, is also insignificant. The absence of significant discrepancies between change in Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish attitudes prior to the prime minister's announced resignation is remarkable insofar as the relatively large sample size would have made it possible to detect even small divergences in Model 164.

Model 165 presents the same analysis as Model 164 but for a shorter time period. Whereas Model 164 investigates change in attitudes toward armed opposition groups between mid-May and mid-August, Model 165 only investigates respondents who took the survey within 30 days before the prime minister announced his resignation. Once again we compare the older half of survey responses to the other half of this sample, which consists of more recent survey responses that were gathered before August 14. The variable 'late interview' takes the value 0 for the former observations and 1 for the latter. The insignificant interaction terms indicate that change in Shiite sympathy for armed groups did not significantly differ from changes in Sunni and Kurdish attitudes, respectively. Moreover, the difference between the Kurdish and Sunni interaction terms is insignificant, which implies that changes in Sunni attitudes were also indistinguishable from changes in Kurdish attitudes over this 30-day period.

In conclusion, we can be confident that trends in Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish attitudes vis-à-vis armed opposition groups did not diverge between mid-May and mid-August when prime minister al-Maliki announced his resignation.

	(164)	(165)	
	Sample:	Sample:	
	May to $8/13$	Mid-July to $8/13$	
Dependent	Symp. w.	Symp. w.	
variable	armed opp.	armed opp.	
Late interview	-0.016	-0.058*	
	(0.019)	(0.026)	
Sunni	$0.102^{**}$	$0.141^{**}$	
	(0.039)	(0.046)	
Kurd	$0.136^{*}$	0.126	
	(0.054)	(0.071)	
Other	0.030	-0.011	
	(0.017)	(0.026)	
Late interview*Sunni	0.052	0.036	
	(0.053)	(0.058)	
Late interview [*] Kurd	-0.038	0.003	
	(0.056)	(0.061)	
Late interview*Other	0.013	0.092	
	(0.049)	(0.067)	
Casualties	0.001	0.00002	
	(0.001)	(0.0003)	
Female	-0.022	-0.023	
	(0.011)	(0.012)	
Educ: J.H. school	0.033	0.039	
	(0.022)	(0.024)	
Educ: S.H. school	0.047	0.058	
	(0.025)	(0.033)	
Educ: Uni	0.019	0.028	
	(0.018)	(0.023)	
Urban: 50k-250k	0.057	0.074	
	(0.029)	(0.039)	
Urban: $< 50$ k	$0.063^{*}$	$0.086^{*}$	
	(0.028)	(0.039)	
Rural	$0.072^{**}$	$0.083^{**}$	
	(0.023)	(0.021)	
Unemployed	-0.039	-0.036	
	(0.031)	(0.039)	
Not gainfully empl.	0.007	0.013	
	(0.013)	(0.016)	
Good econ. situation	-0.009	-0.007	
	(0.032)	(0.039)	
Constant	-0.997**	0.051	
	(0.041)	(0.044)	
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	
Observations	2,418	1,991	
R-squared	0.127	0.145	

Table 51: Trends in attitudes vis-à-vis armed opposition groups between May and 13 August 2014: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

Note: Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The dependent variable is respondent's sympathy with armed opposition groups. In both models, the variable 'late interview' takes the value 0 for the older half of survey responses included in the sample, and it takes the value 1 for the other half of survey responses, which were provided more recently.

# Models without governorates that are close to the fighting

	(166)	(167)	(168)	(169)	(170)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	$\operatorname{improve}$	$\operatorname{improves}$
Resign	0.0850	-0.231	-0.163	0.00647	-0.0134
~ .	(0.0439)	(0.179)	(0.150)	(0.0980)	(0.0735)
Sunni	0.246**	-0.216	-0.546**	-0.290**	-0.311**
	(0.0774)	(0.139)	(0.0995)	(0.0429)	(0.0833)
Kurd	0.0313	-0.0120	-0.210	0.156	0.225
	(0.0697)	(0.299)	(0.221)	(0.134)	(0.175)
Other	0.0136	-0.141	-0.0263	0.292**	0.0816
	(0.112)	(0.294)	(0.141)	(0.0820)	(0.117)
Resign*Sunni	-0.296**	$0.452^{*}$	$0.484^{**}$	$0.355^{**}$	$0.426^{**}$
	(0.0454)	(0.176)	(0.115)	(0.0917)	(0.147)
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.149**	$0.495^{*}$	0.181	0.150	-0.0551
	(0.0541)	(0.206)	(0.175)	(0.136)	(0.209)
Resign*Other	-0.133	0.0543	-0.0626	-0.225	0.180
	(0.114)	(0.320)	(0.157)	(0.178)	(0.135)
Casualties	-0.000535	0.000210	0.00198	-0.00123	-0.00232**
	(0.000959)	(0.00148)	(0.00134)	(0.000802)	(0.000680)
Female	-0.0266	-0.129*	0.0394	-0.00620	-0.00168
	(0.0272)	(0.0648)	(0.0639)	(0.0622)	(0.0686)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0100	$0.186^{*}$	-0.117	0.169	0.152
	(0.0432)	(0.0738)	(0.0818)	(0.103)	(0.0783)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0111	$0.207^{*}$	-0.145*	0.102	0.0959
	(0.0523)	(0.0919)	(0.0686)	(0.0872)	(0.0986)
Educ: uni	-0.0607*	0.0276	-0.213**	0.0724	0.180
	(0.0305)	(0.102)	(0.0721)	(0.0790)	(0.104)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0291	-0.0975	-0.0401	-0.0815	-0.189
	(0.0647)	(0.337)	(0.176)	(0.192)	(0.155)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0378	-0.118	-0.0467	-0.0993	$-0.172^{**}$
	(0.107)	(0.314)	(0.210)	(0.165)	(0.0610)
Rural	0.000860	-0.0241	0.00328	-0.0435	-0.0948
	(0.0796)	(0.352)	(0.119)	(0.149)	(0.0687)
Unemployed	-0.0990	-0.230	-0.109	-0.115	0.0270
	(0.0589)	(0.187)	(0.0695)	(0.0612)	(0.0887)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.100*	-0.118	-0.0527	-0.111	-0.0245
	(0.0461)	(0.0932)	(0.0427)	(0.0703)	(0.0462)
Good econ. Situation	-0.00169	-0.106	$0.178^{**}$	0.103	0.0714
	(0.0430)	(0.0833)	(0.0620)	(0.103)	(0.0798)
Constant	-0.691**	-2.51**	$-2.64^{**}$	$-2.79^{**}$	$-2.18^{**}$
	(0.114)	(0.314)	(0.254)	(0.204)	(0.154)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$1,\!334$	$1,\!140$	$1,\!300$	$1,\!310$	1,333
R-squared	0.378	0.200	0.344	0.0917	0.227

Table 52: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on performance legitimacy for those respondents not in Babil: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

	(171)	(172)	
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of	
variable	decisions	democracy	
Resign	-0.133	0.0533	
	(0.0864)	(0.0531)	
Sunni	-0.276*	-0.256**	
	(0.116)	(0.0621)	
Kurd	-0.0256	-0.106	
	(0.165)	(0.245)	
Other	-0.354	-0.258	
	(0.191)	(0.187)	
Resign*Sunni	$0.196^{*}$	-0.0434	
	(0.0800)	(0.110)	
Resign*Kurd	0.0640	-0.176	
	(0.130)	(0.0913)	
Resign*Other	0.110	-0.241	
	(0.219)	(0.327)	
Casualties	0.00130	-0.00000535	
	(0.00153)	(0.00102)	
Female	-0.139	-0.0470	
	(0.0769)	(0.0517)	
Educ: J.H. school	0.0660	0.0214	
	(0.0692)	(0.116)	
Educ: S.H. school	0.0527	0.0896	
	(0.146)	(0.123)	
Educ: uni	0.00891	-0.125	
	(0.122)	(0.160)	
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0128	0.0378	
TT 1 K01	(0.160)	(0.159)	
Urban:< 50k	-0.328*	-0.0353	
	(0.137)	(0.0959)	
Kural	-0.104	-0.0224	
TT 1 1	(0.172)	(0.110)	
Unemployed	-0.113	-0.00163	
	(0.114)	(0.0859)	
Not gainfully empl.	-0.213**	-0.0465	
Q 1 Q''	(0.0658)	(0.0726)	
Good econ. Situation	0.0417	0.0749*	
0 1 1	(0.102)	(0.0368)	
Constant	$-2.07^{**}$	$-2.58^{++}$	
Q 6	(0.119)	(0.229)	
Governorate i.e.	Yes	Yes	
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1,208	1,243	
R-squared	0.189	0.160	

Table 53: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy for those respondents not in Babil: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

0	(173)	(174)	(175)	(176)	(177)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	$\operatorname{improves}$
Resign	0.0619*	-0.0845	-0.0488	-0.0972	-0.0250
1000-811	(0.0315)	(0.197)	(0.173)	(0.122)	(0.0816)
Sunni	0.229*	-0.114	-0.400**	-0.224**	-0.237**
	(0.103)	(0.158)	(0.108)	(0.0741)	(0.0464)
Kurd	0.113	0.213	-0.262	-0.0230	0.0926
	(0.0895)	(0.364)	(0.213)	(0.108)	(0.166)
Other	0.167	-0.218	-0.239	-0.00964	-0.213
	(0.128)	(0.387)	(0.154)	(0.224)	(0.242)
Resign*Sunni	-0.234**	$0.328^{*}$	0.349**	0.319**	0.310**
	(0.0572)	(0.165)	(0.114)	(0.0836)	(0.0705)
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.119*	0.364	0.125	$0.294^{*}$	0.00549
	(0.0468)	(0.259)	(0.189)	(0.149)	(0.202)
Resign*Other	-0.0364	0.456	0.228	-0.00900	0.440
	(0.126)	(0.384)	(0.208)	(0.378)	(0.287)
Casualties	-0.00142	-0.00282	-0.000213	-0.00185	-0.00184*
	(0.000730)	(0.00150)	(0.000831)	(0.00125)	(0.000895)
Female	-0.0494*	-0.0944	0.0523	0.0672	0.0835
	(0.0226)	(0.0706)	(0.0731)	(0.0472)	(0.0508)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0167	0.168	-0.101	0.169	0.150
	(0.0381)	(0.0877)	(0.0927)	(0.114)	(0.0806)
Educ: S.H. school	0.000618	$0.254^{*}$	-0.128	0.0784	0.128
	(0.0503)	(0.114)	(0.0709)	(0.0970)	(0.107)
Educ: uni	-0.0219	0.1241	-0.160	0.0708	0.165
	(0.0280)	(0.102)	(0.0825)	(0.0941)	(0.123)
Urban: 50k-250k	0.0301	0.266	0.157	0.109	-0.0469
	(0.0517)	(0.283)	(0.0889)	(0.137)	(0.0938)
Urban: < 50k	0.0902	0.162	0.179	0.0545	-0.194**
	(0.0738)	(0.268)	(0.131)	(0.105)	(0.0720)
Rural	0.0763	0.229	0.159	0.109	-0.0206
, ,	(0.0630)	(0.314)	(0.0748)	(0.0691)	(0.0706)
Unemployed	-0.0355	-0.153	-0.0843	-0.101	0.0408
	(0.0541)	(0.177)	(0.0856)	(0.0743)	(0.104)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0307*	0.0121	-0.0181	-0.0911	-0.0577
Q 1 Q.	(0.0133)	(0.0582)	(0.0453)	(0.0798)	(0.0626)
Good econ. Situation	0.0338	-0.0293	0.109	0.0616	0.0185
0	(0.0297)	(0.0491)	(0.0696)	(0.123)	(0.0976)
Constant	-0.569**	$-2.64^{++}$	-3.U5 ^{↑↑}	-2.80 ^{**}	$-2.64^{++}$
() ()	(0.0891)	(0.262)	(0.211)	(0.232)	(0.158)
Governorate i.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1.057	995	1.148	1.150	1.172
R-squared	0.159	0.231	0.368	0.0893	0.239

Table 54: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on performance legitimacy for those respondents not in Baghdad: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

	(178)	(179)	
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of	
variable	decisions	democracy	
	0.0001	0.0001	
Resign	-0.0991	0.0801	
а ·	(0.112)	(0.0495)	
Sunni	-0.0490	-0.112	
Vund	(0.0919)	(0.0951)	
Kura	(0.215)	(0.124)	
Other	(0.213) 0.400*	(0.165)	
Other	(0.210)	(0.299)	
Resign*Sunni	(0.213) 0.107	(0.208) 0.0470	
nesign Summ	(0.115)	(0.0410)	
Resign*Kurd	0.0771	-0.159*	
nooigii mara	(0.135)	(0.0723)	
Resign*Other	0.670**	0.575**	
	(0.198)	(0.176)	
Casualties	-0.00183*	-0.00285**	
	(0.000780)	(0.000888)	
Female	-0.0907	-0.0120	
	(0.0908)	(0.0619)	
Educ: J.H. school	0.0523	0.508	
	(0.0789)	(0.127)	
Educ: S.H. school	0.128	0.118	
	(0.163)	(0.131)	
Educ: uni	0.0801	-0.0109	
	(0.146)	(0.175)	
Urban: 50k-250k	0.157	0.249*	
	(0.131)	(0.110)	
Urban:< 50k	-0.142	0.0831	
	(0.141)	(0.0869)	
Rural	0.0265	0.131	
TT 1 1	(0.211)	(0.115)	
Unemployed	-0.133	(0.103)	
Not minfully overl	(0.149) 0.201*	(0.102)	
Not gamuny empi.	$-0.201^{\circ}$	-0.0230	
Good ocon Situation	(0.0304) 0.00526	(0.0784) 0.0423	
Good Coll. Situation	(0.123)	(0.0423)	
Constant	-2 55**	-2.92**	
CONSUMIT	(0.126)	(0.184)	
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	
-0	- 00		
Observations	1,133	1,087	
R-squared	0.166	0.176	

Table 55: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy for those respondents not in Baghdad: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

	(180)	(181)	(182)	(183)	(184)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	$\operatorname{improves}$	$\operatorname{improve}$	$\operatorname{improves}$
Resign	0.0740*	-0.118	-0.0973	-0.0503	0.0177
a .	(0.0350)	(0.190)	(0.142)	(0.103)	(0.0727)
Sunni	0.228**	-0.180	-0.531**	-0.295**	-0.349**
	(0.0813)	(0.130)	(0.0945)	(0.0489)	(0.0806)
Kurd	0.0430	-0.0626	-0.176	0.0745	0.0978
	(0.0803)	(0.369)	(0.244)	(0.173)	(0.152)
Other	0.0535	0.00320	-0.0276	0.157	-0.0696
	(0.106)	(0.257)	(0.122)	(0.172)	(0.189)
Resign*Sunni	-0.276**	$0.385^{*}$	0.463**	0.377**	0.465**
	(0.0535)	(0.161)	(0.118)	(0.0905)	(0.152)
Resign*Kurd	-0.193**	0.509	0.176	0.300	0.185
	(0.0391)	(0.292)	(0.183)	(0.181)	(0.102)
Resign*Other	-0.152	-0.0353	-0.0159	-0.0451	0.353
	(0.0975)	(0.276)	(0.147)	(0.217)	(0.193)
Casualties	-0.000574	0.000382	0.00233	-0.00124	$-0.00152^{*}$
	(0.000831)	(0.00150)	(0.00146)	(0.000682)	(0.000742)
Female	-0.0339	-0.124*	0.0552	0.0176	0.0137
	(0.0271)	(0.0625)	(0.0595)	(0.0635)	(0.0701)
Educ: J.H. school	0.00866	$0.193^{*}$	-0.112	0.143	0.136
	(0.0453)	(0.0791)	(0.0866)	(0.104)	(0.0822)
Educ: S.H. school	0.000495	$0.282^{**}$	-0.160*	0.0566	0.0710
	(0.0524)	(0.0984)	(0.0675)	(0.0893)	(0.0979)
Educ: uni	-0.0660*	0.000954	-0.250**	0.0275	0.138
	(0.0313)	(0.101)	(0.0805)	(0.0841)	(0.115)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0551	-0.233	-0.0537	-0.180	-0.251
	(0.0678)	(0.289)	(0.171)	(0.154)	(0.132)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0467	-0.151	-0.0598	-0.108	-0.176**
	(0.108)	(0.307)	(0.203)	(0.162)	(0.0627)
Rural	-0.0299	0.0598	0.0198	-0.0507	-0.0711
	(0.0831)	(0.334)	(0.116)	(0.146)	(0.0721)
Unemployed	-0.0965	-0.247	-0.137	-0.131*	-0.00593
	(0.0597)	(0.192)	(0.0717)	(0.0644)	(0.104)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0857	-0.146	-0.0746	$-0.155^{*}$	-0.0557
	(0.0477)	(0.0807)	(0.0435)	(0.0664)	(0.0574)
Good econ. Situation	0.00631	-0.0842	$0.151^{*}$	0.0828	0.0362
	(0.0453)	(0.0900)	(0.0684)	(0.114)	(0.0912)
Constant	-0.666**	-2.62**	-2.67**	-2.67**	-2.16**
	(0.11791413)	(0.317)	(0.242)	(0.224)	(0.142)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1 919	1 110	1 200	1 207	1 991
R sourced	1,210	1,110	1,290	1,007	1,001
n-squared	0.139	0.209	0.209	0.0903	0.198

Table 56: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on performance legitimacy for those respondents not in Dahuk: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

	$(1\overline{85})$	(186)	
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of	
variable	decisions	democracy	
Resign	-0.0640	0.0664	
	(0.0856)	(0.0464)	
Sunni	-0.171	-0.174	
	(0.112)	(0.0938)	
Kurd	0.00592	-0.242	
	(0.222)	(0.271)	
Other	-0.239	-0.159	
	(0.144)	(0.104)	
Resign*Sunni	0.108	-0.105	
	(0.0961)	(0.108)	
Resign [*] Kurd	-0.0553	-0.126	
	(0.119)	(0.138)	
Resign*Other	0.0405	-0.282	
	(0.186)	(0.300)	
Casualties	0.00111	-0.000174	
	(0.00146)	(0.00102)	
Female	-0.0759	0.00174	
	(0.0789)	(0.0553)	
Educ: J.H. school	0.0116	-0.0228	
	(0.0582)	(0.117)	
Educ: S.H. school	-0.0240	0.0153	
	(0.135)	(0.120)	
Educ: uni	-0.0973	-0.204	
	(0.104)	(0.145)	
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.125	-0.0480	
	(0.135)	(0.137)	
Urban: < 50k	-0.349**	-0.0594	
	(0.131)	(0.101)	
Rural	-0.151	-0.0563	
	(0.158)	(0.0857)	
Unemployed	-0.203	-0.0579	
- v	(0.135)	(0.0951)	
Not gainfully empl.	-0.256**	-0.126*	
0 1	(0.0685)	(0.0587)	
Good econ. Situation	0.0779	0.0356	
	(0.0889)	(0.0480)	
Constant	-2.65**	-2.49**	
	(0.116)	(0.216)	
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1,204	1,243	
R-squared	0.190	0.169	

Table 57: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy for those respondents not in Dahuk: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

	(187)	(188)	(189)	(190)	(191)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
Resign	0.0736*	-0.121	-0.0990	-0.0523	0.0155
1001511	(0.0357)	(0.189)	(0.142)	(0.104)	(0.0710)
Sunni	0.216**	-0.168	-0 513**	-0.309**	-0.337**
Sami	(0.0836)	(0.134)	(0.0959)	(0.0401)	(0.0768)
Kurd	0.0560	0.303	-0.111	0.0829	0.323
ituru	(0.0811)	(0.310)	(0.225)	(0.142)	(0.182)
Other	0.0488	-0.136	-0.0403	0.0913	-0.00454
0 ther	(0.107)	(0.271)	(0.126)	(0.169)	(0.165)
Resign*Sunni	-0.259**	$0.348^{*}$	0.439**	0.401**	0.433**
	(0.0540)	(0.167)	(0.115)	(0.0906)	(0.143)
Resign*Kurd	-0.142**	0.274	0.132	0.257	-0.119
roongir frank	(0.0534)	(0.210)	(0.177)	(0.160)	(0.239)
Resign*Other	-0.143	0.0383	-0.001	0.0368	0.276
rtoolgii o thoi	(0.101)	(0.293)	(0.147)	(0.195)	(0.182)
Casualties	-0.000524	0.000297	0.00224	-0.00120	-0.00191**
Cabdattiob	(0.000870)	(0.00152)	(0.00140)	(0.000698)	(0.000739)
Female	-0.0374	-0.169**	0.0358	0.0245	0.0135
1 0111010	(0.0268)	(0.0533)	(0.0603)	(0.0615)	(0.0711)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0147	0.161*	-0.119	0.169	0.128
	(0.0440)	(0.0770)	(0.0844)	(0.104)	(0.0738)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00746	0.192*	-0.133	0.0899	0.0832
	(0.0524)	(0.0929)	(0.0683)	(0.0912)	(0.0991)
Educ: uni	-0.0589	-0.0331	-0.262**	0.0559	0.121
	(0.0318)	(0.0910)	(0.0709)	(0.0846)	(0.104)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0455	-0.0640	-0.0473	-0.101	-0.188
	(0.0677)	(0.338)	(0.165)	(0.185)	(0.138)
Urban:< 50k	-0.0395	-0.129	-0.0800	-0.135	-0.179**
	(0.107)	(0.324)	(0.198)	(0.159)	(0.0610)
Rural	-0.0113	0.0562	0.0177	-0.0661	-0.0579
	(0.0828)	(0.350)	(0.116)	(0.148)	(0.0774)
Unemployed	-0.106	-0.275	-0.0816	-0.118*	-0.0140
I J	(0.0559)	(0.180)	(0.0568)	(0.0599)	(0.100)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0902*	-0.0984	-0.0630	-0.149*	-0.0585
	(0.0453)	(0.0937)	(0.0441)	(0.0672)	(0.0566)
Good econ. Situation	-0.00153	-0.0927	0.171**	0.0687	0.0509
	(0.0417)	(0.0865)	(0.0622)	(0.110)	(0.0847)
Constant	-0.680**	-2.54**	-2.69**	-2.69**	-2.16**
	(0.115)	(0.311)	(0.236)	(0.218)	(0.146)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
0					
Observations	1,257	1,164	$1,\!345$	$1,\!353$	1,377
R-squared	0.129	0.201	0.330	0.0815	0.222

Table 58: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on performance legitimacy for those respondents not in Erbil: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

	(192)	(193)	
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of	
variable	decisions	democracy	
Resign	-0.0825	0.0702	
õ	(0.0883)	(0.0437)	
Sunni	-0.190	-0.210*	
	(0.120)	(0.0863)	
Kurd	-0.101	-0.0163	
	(0.157)	(0.271)	
Other	-0.263	-0.248	
	(0.158)	(0.149)	
Resign*Sunni	0.120	-0.0929	
	(0.0958)	(0.103)	
Resign*Kurd	0.0258	-0.156	
	(0.113)	(0.0908)	
Resign*Other	0.0952	-0.202	
	(0.220)	(0.347)	
Casualties	0.001	0.00000951	
	(0.00152)	(0.000985)	
Female	-0.115	-0.0423	
	(0.0804)	(0.0522)	
Educ: J.H. school	0.0618	0.0363	
	(0.0746)	(0.124)	
Educ: S.H. school	0.0941	0.108	
	(0.153)	(0.127)	
Educ: uni	-0.000624	-0.0972	
	(0.130)	(0.165)	
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0821	0.0270	
	(0.158)	(0.160)	
Urban: < 50k	-0.384**	-0.0452	
	(0.121)	(0.101)	
Rural	-0.118	0.0107	
	(0.172)	(0.121)	
Unemployed	-0.154	-0.0169	
	(0.129)	(0.0945)	
Not gainfully empl.	-0.238**	-0.0709	
	(0.0682)	(0.0738)	
Good econ. Situation	0.0342	0.0362	
	(0.106)	(0.0465)	
Constant	-2.68**	-2.60**	
	(0.121)	(0.232)	
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1,248	1,286	
R-squared	0.168	0.149	

Table 59: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy for those respondents not in Erbil: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

	(194)	(195)	(196)	(197)	(198)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	improves
Resign	0.0735*	-0.125	-0.0988	-0.0535	0.0140
	(0.0361)	(0.188)	(0.143)	(0.102)	(0.0716)
Sunni	$0.225^{**}$	-0.175	-0.507**	-0.290**	-0.329**
	(0.0795)	(0.129)	(0.0988)	(0.0485)	(0.0788)
Kurd	0.0337	0.0857	-0.170	0.0902	0.216
	(0.0690)	(0.318)	(0.208)	(0.143)	(0.178)
Other	0.0444	-0.0821	-0.0625	0.137	-0.0600
	(0.103)	(0.259)	(0.134)	(0.165)	(0.175)
Resign*Sunni	-0.271**	0.398*	$0.427^{**}$	$0.362^{**}$	$0.446^{**}$
	(0.0517)	(0.159)	(0.113)	(0.0861)	(0.145)
Resign*Kurd	-0.142**	0.391	0.127	0.224	-0.0653
	(0.0489)	(0.222)	(0.162)	(0.147)	(0.209)
Resign*Other	-0.143	0.0480	-0.0295	-0.0756	0.315
	(0.0983)	(0.284)	(0.140)	(0.207)	(0.181)
Casualties	-0.000565	0.000355	0.00208	-0.00166*	-0.00190*
	(0.000857)	(0.00166)	(0.00144)	(0.000757)	(0.000762)
Female	-0.0349	-0.137*	0.0293	0.0219	0.0129
	(0.0260)	(0.0605)	(0.0592)	(0.0613)	(0.0680)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0111	$0.191^{**}$	-0.111	0.165	0.126
	(0.0443)	(0.0731)	(0.0853)	(0.106)	(0.0745)
Educ: S.H. school	0.00549	$0.247^{*}$	-0.153*	0.0701	0.0804
	(0.0523)	(0.0974)	(0.0676)	(0.0881)	(0.0969)
Educ: uni	-0.0571	0.0147	-0.242**	0.0534	0.142
	(0.0329)	(0.0993)	(0.0750)	(0.0835)	(0.107)
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0462	-0.103	-0.0462	-0.0797	-0.187
	(0.0675)	(0.326)	(0.164)	(0.185)	(0.139)
Urban: < 50k	-0.0433	-0.172	-0.0664	-0.106	-0.173**
	(0.106)	(0.303)	(0.197)	(0.159)	(0.0555)
Rural	-0.0111	-0.00138	0.0260	-0.0309	-0.0599
	(0.0827)	(0.341)	(0.113)	(0.146)	(0.0724)
Unemployed	-0.0953	-0.252	-0.127	-0.144*	-0.0125
	(0.0592)	(0.179)	(0.0721)	(0.0635)	(0.0987)
Not gainfully empl.	-0.0887	-0.109	-0.0608	-0.129	-0.0583
	(0.0455)	(0.0893)	(0.0425)	(0.0697)	(0.0550)
Good econ. Situation	0.00138	-0.107	$0.158^{*}$	0.0696	0.0341
	(0.0421)	(0.0831)	(0.0633)	(0.107)	(0.0839)
Constant	-0.679**	-2.61**	-2.65**	-2.67**	$-2.15^{**}$
	(0.118)	(0.317)	(0.238)	(0.221)	(0.142)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,280	1,205	1,372	1,382	1,406
R-squared	0.128	0.199	0.340	0.0838	0.209

Table 60: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on performance legitimacy for those respondents not in Karbala: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

	(199)	(200)	
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of	
variable	decisions	democracy	
Resign	-0.0744	0.0735	
~ .	(0.0887)	(0.0453)	
Sunni	-0.188	-0.200*	
·	(0.121)	(0.0914)	
Kurd	0.0260	-0.0954	
	(0.180)	(0.248)	
Other	-0.319	-0.278	
	(0.164)	(0.146)	
Resign*Sunni	0.0954	-0.0868	
	(0.0947)	(0.107)	
Resign [*] Kurd	0.0106	-0.180*	
	(0.124)	(0.0914)	
Resign*Other	0.0769	-0.200	
	(0.201)	(0.338)	
Casualties	0.000980	0.0000173	
	(0.00151)	(0.00101)	
Female	-0.107	-0.0156	
	(0.0787)	(0.0569)	
Educ: J.H. school	0.0453	0.0227	
	(0.0714)	(0.122)	
Educ: S.H. school	0.0360	0.0814	
	(0.148)	(0.128)	
Educ: uni	-0.01619	-0.112	
	(0.129)	(0.162)	
Urban: 50k-250k	-0.0495	0.0295	
	(0.159)	(0.154)	
Urban: < 50k	-0.340*	-0.0488	
	(0.134)	(0.0960)	
Rural	-0.0875	0.00626	
	(0.174)	(0.115)	
Unemployed	-0.192	-0.0280	
	(0.127)	(0.0939)	
Not gainfully empl.	-0.239**	-0.0891	
	(0.0665)	(0.0733)	
Good econ. Situation	0.0130	0.0422	
	(0.101)	(0.0453)	
Constant	-2.65**	-2.58**	
	(0.119)	(0.223)	
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1,283	1,318	
R-squared	0.178	0.150	

Table 61: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy for those respondents not in Karbala: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

	(201)	(202)	(203)	(204)	(205)
Dependent	Sympathy w.	Rating of	Security	Jobs	Electricity
variable	armed opp.	government	improves	improve	$\operatorname{improves}$
Resign	0.0961	0.128	-0.0178	-0.0245	0.0153
0	(0.0576)	(0.129)	(0.177)	(0.129)	(0.0948)
Sunni	0.0917	-0.00682	-0.503**	-0.273**	-0.397**
	(0.0850)	(0.136)	(0.166)	(0.0891)	(0.111)
Kurd	0.00134	0.353	-0.120	0.0871	0.192
	(0.0728)	(0.286)	(0.223)	(0.151)	(0.185)
Other	-0.0610	0.192	-0.0629	0.136	-0.0884
	(0.0571)	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.172)	(0.187)
Resign*Sunni	-0.181*	0.260	0.522**	0.425**	0.567**
0	(0.0842)	(0.207)	(0.159)	(0.112)	(0.171)
Resign*Kurd	-0.156*	0.142	0.0752	0.219	-0.0566
	(0.0664)	(0.177)	(0.192)	(0.166)	(0.213)
Resign*Other	-0.0447	-0.222	0.0444	-0.0298	0.356
1000-01 0 0000	(0.0717)	(0.146)	(0.155)	(0.211)	(0.194)
Casualties	0.000681	0.00207	0.00384*	-0.00138	-0.00165
	(0.000743)	(0.00244)	(0.00179)	(0.00146)	(0.00136)
Female	-0.0380	-0.117	0.00182	-0.0104	-0.0149
1 officie	(0.0273)	(0.0695)	(0.0533)	(0.0604)	(0.0626)
Educ: J.H. school	0.0236	0.162	-0.128	0.186	0.109
Educ: 9.11. School	(0.0200)	(0.102)	(0.020)	(0.100)	(0.0746)
Educ: S.H. school	0.0300	(0.0502) 0.250*	(0.0302)	(0.114)	0.0364
Educ. 5.11. School	(0.0556)	(0.230)	(0.0740)	(0.0403)	(0.0304)
Educ: uni	0.0300	(0.110) 0.0232	(0.0740) 0.971**	(0.0342)	(0.0802)
Dauc. um	(0.0300)	(0.0232)	(0.0737)	(0.0131)	(0.0002)
Urban: 50k 250k	(0.0330)	(0.121) 0.0073	0.0467	0.100	(0.0352)
UIDall. JUK-2JUK	(0.0505)	-0.0973	(0.155)	(0.178)	(0.136)
Urban < 50k	(0.0393)	(0.319)	(0.133)	(0.178)	(0.130) 0.170**
UIDall. < JUK	-0.0300	-0.193	-0.0880	-0.134	$-0.170^{-1}$
Dunal	(0.103)	(0.280)	(0.195)	(0.131)	(0.0040)
nurai	-0.00213	0.0557	(0.0520)	-0.00008	-0.0390
Unomployed	(0.0755) 0.0847	(0.339)	(0.0955)	(0.132) 0.126*	(0.0748)
Unemployed	-0.0647	-0.505	-0.109	$-0.130^{\circ}$	-0.0497
Not minfully apprl	(0.0010)	(0.170)	(0.0724) 0.0817*	(0.0050)	(0.0948)
Not gamfully empl.	-0.0858	-0.138	-0.0817	-0.144	-0.0082
Q 1 Q.1	(0.0488)	(0.0855)	(0.0409)	(0.0720)	(0.0570)
Good econ. Situation	-0.00558	-0.107	$0.155^{+}$	0.0684	0.0530
0	(0.0487)	(0.0959)	(0.0709)	(0.120)	(0.0915)
Constant	$-0.747^{++}$	-2.89**	$-2.76^{++}$	$-2.68^{++}$	-2.10**
0	(0.105)	(0.290)	(0.298)	(0.266)	(0.155)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,139	1,058	1,227	1,240	1,261
R-squared	0.143	0.168	0.352	0.0924	0.236

Table 62: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on performance legitimacy for those respondents not in Salahhadin: results from governorate fixed-effects OLS models

*Note:* Standard errors obtained from wild bootstraps and clustered by governorate are in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05. The resignation was announced on August 14, 2014, and all interviews were conducted in August 2014. N varies across models due to missing values on the dependent variables. Note that the change in Sunni government ratings is weakly significant (p<0.07) even though the interaction term capturing the difference between the change in Sunni and Shiite (baseline) attitudes is insignificant.

	(206)	(207)
Dependent	Influence govt.	Situation of
variable	decisions	democracy
Resign	-0.0741	0.0631
a ·	(0.135)	(0.0643)
Sunni	-0.225	-0.109
TZ 1	(0.240)	(0.164)
Kurd	0.0424	-0.0761
0.1	(0.215)	(0.267)
Otner	$-0.303^{+}$	-0.2(1)
Daging * Curry:	(0.177) 0.125	(0.157)
Resign Summ	(0.150)	-0.130
Dogion*Kund	(0.212) 0.0158	(0.110) 0.172
Resign' Kura	(0.0138)	-0.172
Deging *Other	(0.100)	(0.0909)
Resign Other	(0.109)	-0.175
Cognalting	(0.208)	(0.339)
Casuanties	(0.00109)	-0.000280
Fomala	(0.00240) 0.102	(0.00150)
remaie	-0.105	(0.0275)
Educe III cohool	(0.0659) 0.0425	(0.0587)
Educ: J.II. School	(0.0455)	-0.0300
Educe S H. cohool	(0.0807)	(0.111)
Educ. 5.11. School	(0.132)	-0.00729
Educe uni	(0.132)	(0.117)
Eque, um	(0.120)	(0.145)
Urban: 50k 250k	(0.129) 0.0345	0.0145)
010all, 30k-230k	(0.151)	(0.153)
Urban: < 50k	-0.382**	_0.0020
01ball. V bok	(0.107)	(0.0929)
Rural	-0.0707	0.0189
Itulai	(0.175)	(0.117)
Unemployed	-0.186	-0.0674
onempioyed	(0.138)	(0.0981)
Not gainfully empl	-0.211**	-0.0954
riot gaintany ompi	(0.0662)	(0.0774)
Good econ. Situation	0.0162	0.0263
Good coolin productori	(0.113)	(0.0485)
Constant	-2.64**	-2.44**
	(0.149)	(0.218)
Governorate f.e.	Yes	Yes
4 age controls	Yes	Yes
0		
Observations	1,133	1,180
R-squared	0.166	0.127

Table 63: Effect of al-Maliki's resignation on democratic legitimacy for those respondents not in Salahhadin: results from governorate fixed effects OLS models

### Results from 40 OLS models on U.S. airstrikes as an alternative explanation

The findings from 40 OLS models of the date on which Sunni attitudes changed (see Figure 3 in the main text) are inconsistent with the proposition that the announcement of limited U.S. airstrikes on August 7 caused the change in Sunni Arab attitudes. Even so, we acknowledge that these airstrikes might have reinforced the effect of al-Maliki's announced resignation on Sunni Arab attitudes and could have played a role in the updating of the beliefs of Sunni Arab Iraqis.

To be clear, the announcement of U.S. airstrikes alone cannot fully account for the change in Sunni Arab attitudes. This conclusion becomes apparent from the top and lower right plots in Figure 3 in the main text. In the 40 OLS models, the effect already becomes significant when August 8 is the cutoff between control and treatment group but, if August 14 is the date of the critical event that primarily drove the change in attitudes of Sunni Arabs, then we would expect to pick up a significant effect in the model that considers August 8 as the cutoff. This is because the model with the August 8 cutoff correctly classifies 100% of the control group observations and 86% of the treatment group observations if August 14 was the date of the critical event, and therefore the change in attitudes should be significant in this model even if the resignation announcement on August 14 led to the change in attitudes.

If it was the case that the announcement of U.S. airstrikes on August 7 alone caused the change in Sunni attitudes, this change would be captured in models with cutoff dates at the start of August, because these models 'correctly' classify most observations in the sense of separating those interviewed before or after the airstrikes were announced. For instance, if the event that caused the change in Sunni attitudes coincided with the U.S. airstrikes on August 7, the model with a cutoff of August 5 correctly classifies 100% of its control group observations and almost 70% of the treatment group observations, and the model with a cutoff of August 6 correctly classifies 100% of its control group observations and 96% of its treatment group observations. However, in the models in which August 5 and August 6 are the cutoffs, the changes in Sunni attitudes are insignificant, which is contrary to what we

would expect if the U.S. airstrikes were the sole driver of the change in attitudes.

In conclusion, the results from 40 OLS models indicate that the initiation of U.S. airstrikes could not, by itself, explain the shift in Sunni attitudes. At the same time, we acknowledge that Sunni Arabs may still have updated their beliefs based on the airstrikes in a way that might reinforce the effect stemming from al-Maliki's announced resignation.

# The Ethics of Asking Direct Questions About Sensitive Subjects in Wartime Contexts

This study relies on data from a survey conducted by Mercy Corps in 2014, which measures respondents' political attitudes with direct question techniques.⁵ Direct questions about sensitive subjects may expose respondents and enumerators to risks and discomfort especially in environments where there is an ongoing conflict. To conduct the survey in an ethical manner, Mercy Corps took several steps to mitigate these risks and discomfort, which are summarized below. Numerous recent studies have relied on direct question techniques to inquire about attitudes toward violent groups in conflict settings, consistent with our assessment that research relying on such direct question techniques can be ethical as long as stringent safeguards to protect respondents and enumerators are in place (e.g., Shaver, 2016; Berger, 2014; Berman et al., 2014; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013; Cherney and Povey, 2013; Jaeger et al., 2012; Ginges and Atran, 2009; Moaddel, Tessler and Inglehart, 2008; Fair and Shepherd, 2006).⁶

In administering the survey, Mercy Corps took the following steps to protect the safety and wellbeing of respondents and enumerators. First, the survey was not administered in Ninewa since ISIS was in control of a substantial proportion of the governorate at the time. Administering the survey in this governorate would have been too risky for both enumerators and respondents. Second, the questions on the survey did not ask respondents to reveal any identifying information. This gave respondents the opportunity to indicate their attitudes anonymously and without negative repercussions if security forces or militias gained access to the survey forms at checkpoints or elsewhere. Third, the hard copies of the survey forms were stored in the U.S. after the completion of the survey in order to avoid the risk that any actor gained unauthorized access to them. Fourth, enumerators emphasized from the beginning that participation in the survey was completely voluntary, and they stressed that

⁵For the question wording see the subsection on measurement in the main text.

⁶To clarify, we do not mean to suggest that using this question technique in conflict settings is ethical since other researchers also employ it in similar contexts, but we merely seek to demonstrate that others share our assessment that doing so is ethical if respondents' safety and comfort are safeguarded.

respondents could refrain from answering individual questions. Fifth, in order to minimize the risk that members of the public overheard the interviews, respondents were instructed to administer the survey in the privacy of respondents' homes unless the latter preferred a different setting.⁷ 88 percent of respondents chose to be interviewed at their home, and 74 percent of respondents were alone with the enumerators during the interview. Sixth, enumerators were chosen based on prior survey experience, and most of them had previously conducted interviews on sensitive political topics. The survey company 4points had been conducting surveys in Iraq since 2009, and it had assembled a pool of experienced surveyors. Seventh, enumerators underwent training by 4 points prior to the administration of the survey, and Mercy Corps supervised this training. The training included best practices for safe data collection and advice on asking sensitive questions about armed groups. Eighth, the survey company prioritized forming mixed-gender enumerator teams in order to minimize the risk that some female respondents might feel uncomfortable while being interviewed by two male enumerators.⁸ Finally, Mercy Corps took on a legal obligation to report any serious incident (resulting in death, serious injury, significant property damage or other serious consequences) to USAID within four hours of the incident and to undergo external review by USAID, U.S. government investigators, and auditors. No such event occurred during the administration of the survey.

In asking the direct questions about sensitive issues, Mercy Corps took the following steps to minimize risks and discomfort to respondents and enumerators. First, Mercy Corps piloted sensitive survey questions on sympathy for armed opposition groups, on attitudes toward the use of violence against the government, on the situation of democracy in Iraq, and those on other sensitive topics by conducting interviews in two cities. The purpose of these interviews was to find out whether these questions made respondents feel uncomfortable

⁷Similarly, the survey with direct questions on attitudes toward warring factions analyzed in Moaddel, Tessler and Inglehart (2008) was conducted at Iraqi respondents' homes.

⁸The section on enumerator gender effects in the Online Appendix provides more details on the gender composition of enumerator teams. It also summarizes results from numerous analyses that do not find evidence of enumerator gender effects. On the benefit of gender balance in teams conducting field research in conflict settings see Paluck (2009, 46-7).

and to modify the survey instrument in response to the feedback from the interviewees. None of the interviewees indicated discomfort about answering these questions. Second, survey respondents could select the 'don't know' answer option if they felt uncomfortable expressing an opinion. At the start of the interview, enumerators stressed that participation in the survey was voluntary and that respondents could refrain from answering individual questions, as explained above. Third, respondents could choose to 'refuse an answer' and proceed with the rest of the survey if they did not want to express that they did not have a view. Fourth, respondents could also end their participation in the survey at any time. These survey design choices are in line with recommendations in recent studies on the ethics of conducting interviews in conflict settings to give respondents the authority to decline to answer specific questions and to withdraw their participation at any point (Campbell, 2017; Wood, 2006).

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