

The Promise of Peacekeeping: Protecting Civilians in Civil Wars

Allison Carnegie and Christoph Mikulaschek*

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Abstract

When do international organizations fulfill their objectives? We argue that these institutions are often beholden to the states in which they operate, distorting their incentives and reducing their efficacy. We focus in particular on the domain of peacekeeping, asking whether United Nations' peacekeepers reach their primary goal of securing civilian safety. We argue that because these forces often need to maintain close ties with host governments, peacekeepers reduce civilian fatalities inflicted by rebels, but not those caused by these governments. To test our claim, we overcome common problems of endogeneity and selection bias by using a novel natural experiment. Specifically, we leverage exogenous variation in which countries hold power in the United Nations Security Council to demonstrate that states that wield more power send more peacekeepers to their preferred locations, and that these peacekeepers in turn help to protect civilians from rebel factions. Using new data on the location of each conflict event, we also show support for the mechanisms at work. In addition to providing an empirical strategy that is broadly applicable, we also contribute a theoretical framework that can help to answer questions about the efficacy of global governance in a variety of international domains.

*Allison Carnegie is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY (Email: allison.carnegie@columbia.edu). Christoph Mikulaschek is Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (Email: mikulaschek@gov.harvard.edu). The authors thank Peter Aronow, Stephen Chaudoin, Christina Davis, Thad Dunning, Page Fortna, Guy Grossman, Marina Henke, Michael Horowitz, Robert Keohane, Jacob Shapiro, Jack Snyder, Keren Yarhi-Milo and the participants of the 2015 APSA conference, 2016 ISA conference, 2016 PEIO conference, 2016 EPSA conference, and seminars at Dartmouth, Harvard, Princeton, the University of Michigan, and the University of Texas at Austin for helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own.

When are international organizations (IOs) effective in accomplishing their missions? The existing literature contends that IOs often fail either due to their bureaucrats' misbehavior or powerful states' use of these bodies to advance their political interests. However, we extend and revise these theories by arguing that when IOs are beholden to the states in which they operate, their incentives can become distorted, reducing their efficacy. Indeed, IOs in a variety of domains seek the consent of the states that they work in. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency often relies on members to allow inspections; the International Monetary Fund typically needs states to agree to its bailout packages; and the World Bank requires recipients to acquiesce to the terms of its aid. While the principle of consent may benefit IOs and recipients in some ways and holds normative appeal, we show that it often allows recipients to stymie IOs' objectives.

To make our claim, we focus on the domain of United Nations peacekeeping and assess its effectiveness on civilian casualties, demonstrating that the impact of intervention on these casualties depends on the relationship between combatants and peacekeepers. Specifically, we disaggregate civilian victims into those killed by government forces and those killed by rebels, and show that multilateral peace operations only have a positive effect on the latter group. Because peacekeepers rely on and are often required to collaborate with host governments, they are incentivized not to anger governments by interfering with their activities. Indeed, UN peace operations often develop close ties to governments through mentoring their military and police forces and risk disrupting these arrangements or even getting thrown out of the country by cracking down on their abuses. By contrast, peacekeepers face fewer constraints in condemning rebel groups and thus actively work to end their atrocities by, for example, disarming combatants. By isolating these two distinct causal processes, we provide a more complete account of peacekeepers' effects.¹

We evaluate our claims in the peacekeeping arena for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, civilian populations often bear the brunt of violence in civil wars, as targeting civil-

¹While Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) present an innovative design that disaggregates casualties, they argue that peacekeepers prevent civilian deaths caused by both government and rebel forces. We build on this path-breaking work by separately theorizing the effects of UN peace operations on government-inflicted and rebel-inflicted deaths.

ians is a tactic commonly used by both rebel groups and government forces. Since the end of the Cold War, efforts to protect civilians in conflict theaters have preoccupied government leaders and practitioners around the world. Yet scholars and policy-makers remain divided on whether the international community's efforts to do so are effective, inconsequential, or even detrimental. While international interventions may lessen incentives to target civilians and provide barriers between civilians and combatants,² they may also cause opposed factions to step up civilian victimization due to changes in the balance of power.³ Or, warring populations may believe that humanitarian intervention is biased towards those who inflict the most severe abuses, leading them to commit ever greater crimes.⁴ Stating that an operation's purpose is to protect civilians could prove dangerous, as armed groups might deliberately attack them to undermine the mission.⁵ In tandem, policy-makers' views have become divided, with many responding to calls for increased involvement with demands for cuts in the United Nations (UN)'s peacekeeping forces amid high levels of civilian atrocities.⁶ Our study thus allows us to provide new insights into this important debate.

Moreover, assessing our claims in the peacekeeping arena is useful empirically for two reasons. First, when peacekeepers are deployed to civil-conflict theaters, they seek to foster peace between warring factions – the government and the rebels – but only rely on the consent of the government. This allows us to evaluate our theory by testing whether there is a differential effect of peacekeeping on these two groups. Second, we are able to address common empirical concerns by employing a unique research design. A central issue that scholars must contend with is that they do not observe what would have happened had the international community not intervened. In other words, it is impossible to compare the result of an intervention in a particular state to the outcome in the same state had no intervention occurred. Instead, since international intervention is not randomly assigned, the international community becomes involved in states' domestic affairs

²See Hultman (2007).

³See Wood, Kathman and Gent (2012).

⁴See Ziemke (2012).

⁵See Paddon Rhoads (2016).

⁶See, e.g., The Guardian, 2015; Swarbrick and Soussan, 2010.

due to factors that are not independent of the treatment of civilians in those states. States may require international assistance for a variety of reasons that make it appear that the international community's involvement does not protect civilians when it is actually very effective, or vice versa. For example, since states often send peacekeepers to help civilian populations in regions with the most casualties,⁷ these policies may seem to lead to more deaths, when in fact higher levels of civilian abuse would have occurred otherwise. Further, since a variety of unobserved variables could confound the results, we cannot even know the direction of the bias *ex ante*. While randomized experiments can solve this problem, because randomly assigning the treatment ensures that – in expectation – other concerns are not driving the results, they are often impractical since governments and international institutions are typically reluctant to randomly assign their interventions.

However, international institutions often offer the next best approach: natural experiments. Because these institutions operate with pre-determined rules and procedures, they may provide “as-if random” treatments. Through careful research into the inner workings of the UN Security Council, we identify a new natural experiment using two exogenous rotation rules – the rotating Council presidency and the alternation of Council seats between geographic regions. We theorize and demonstrate empirically that when states assume power in this manner, they use their influence to increase the number of peacekeepers deployed to conflict areas within their region in order to minimize the negative externalities associated with these conflicts. These quasi-random power-sharing arrangements thus yield a novel identification strategy for disentangling the causal effects of peacekeeping on the protection of civilians from rebel and government forces.

This article makes several contributions. Most broadly, it demonstrates the importance of an often overlooked determinant of IO effectiveness – the IO's need to collaborate with and maintain the consent of the countries in which it works. Previous scholarship tends to focus on how IOs can improve cooperation for all members,⁸ while a relatively small body of work identifies the conditions under which IOs do not fulfill their intended tasks. These conditions include the divergent

⁷See Gilligan and Stedman (2003).

⁸See e.g., Keohane (1984).

incentives of states and IO bureaucrats,⁹ bureaucratic cultures that undermine an IO's mission,¹⁰ and member states that privilege their national interests over those of the international community.¹¹ IOs may also face a variety of transaction costs and collective action problems.¹² We add to this literature by showing the theoretical promise of incorporating the political relationships between international organizations and host governments when theorizing these bodies' effects.

We also help to move forward the debate over the effect of peacekeepers on civilian casualties by using a new research design to examine this question. Scholars have long recognized the need for a method to overcome the problem of endogenous intervention, but have been largely unable to identify a plausible source of exogeneity. Though researchers have developed innovative methodological approaches and have controlled for a variety of factors that determine where peacekeepers are deployed, they have not found a random, or quasi-random source of variation. Fortna (2004, 115) notes, "Instrumental variable analysis is often used to evaluate the effect of a variable, in this case peacekeepers, that is itself affected by (or endogenous to) other variables in the model. Unfortunately, it is not possible here ... Most of the variables that shape whether or not peacekeepers are deployed are likely to be directly related to the ease or difficulty of maintaining peace ... These variables [are] unsuitable as instruments."¹³ Our instrumental variables help to assuage these concerns, and can also be applied to other questions in the peacekeeping literature as well as to more diverse settings. For instance, many prominent institutions including ASEAN, APEC, the EU, the UN General Assembly, and CARICOM feature exogenous leadership rotation, and many domestic institutions such as the geographic rotation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's presidency and the U.S.

⁹See Vaubel (1986).

¹⁰See Barnett and Finnemore (1999).

¹¹See Lall (2017); Stone (2011).

¹²See Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001).

¹³Sambanis (2008, 19) concurs that valid instruments "are hard to come by in cross-country studies" so "it was not possible to find good instrumental variables" for an analysis of the effects of UN peace operations. Gilligan and Sergenti (2008, 91) claim to "have good theoretical reasons to believe that [an instrument for UN peace operations] does not exist." Other methods including matching techniques, seemingly unrelated probit, and semi parametric recursive bivariate probit can ameliorate certain concerns, but do not resolve many problems of endogeneity and selection bias and often introduce strong assumptions that may be difficult to substantively motivate (Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012).

Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee mandate rotation in the holding of leadership positions among various groups. Exploiting these institutional design features could lead to a multitude of interesting and well-identified studies. Moreover, we adopt a multi-method approach, as a qualitative case study of the protection of civilians by UN blue helmets in the Ituri district of the North-Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo complements our quantitative analyses. Our careful empirical design thus allows us to provide well identified effects of an IO that is crucial to global governance in order to tease out generalizable relationships between IOs' effectiveness and their relationships with parties on the ground.

Peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians

Targeting civilians in civil conflicts is a tactic commonly used by both government forces and rebel groups. Ambushing civilian convoys, shelling sites populated by civilians, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities occur frequently during civil wars. Indeed, from the end of the Cold War to 2004, 572,767 people were intentionally killed in one-sided violence.¹⁴ As a result, the chief goal of contemporary UN peace operations is typically to protect civilians.

Why do warring factions victimize civilians? Rebel groups do so for a variety of reasons. Weak rebel groups with collective action problems often cannot secure civilians' loyalty through benefit provision, and thus turn to coercion and violence instead.¹⁵ Rebel attacks on civilian populations may also depend on informational asymmetries,¹⁶ rebels' original resource endowments,¹⁷ and pre-war cleavages.¹⁸ Alternatively, rebels may turn to these activities when they lose battles,¹⁹ ob-

¹⁴See Eck and Hultman (2007). 72,767 people were killed if Rwanda in 1994 is excluded (Eck and Hultman, 2007).

¹⁵See Wood (2010).

¹⁶See Kalyvas (2006).

¹⁷See Weinstein (2007).

¹⁸See Balcells (2010).

¹⁹See Hultman (2007).

tain additional resources,²⁰ desire a more favorable bargaining position vis-à-vis the government,²¹ want to foster ethnic cohesion,²² or rise up to protest urban issues that cannot be addressed in major towns.²³ Further, civilian abuse may depend on the warring faction's internal characteristics, social ties between the communities and rebels, the degree of contestation in a given area, and poverty levels.²⁴

Governments, too, often target civilians, particularly when they believe that rebels enjoy broad support from the civilian population. In fact, doing so is often an explicit strategy used to gain an upper hand in the conflict. Indeed, governments may kill civilians to punish them,²⁵ to minimize their own military's fatalities, to annex land held by civilians,²⁶ to supplement their resources, or to lessen the rebels' abilities to hide among civilians for support.²⁷

UN peace operations perform a number of tasks that aim to protect civilians from intentional harm by warring factions. Armed blue helmets provide a visible deterrent, establish checkpoints to control movement and access, provide armed escort, conduct cordon and search operations, patrol vulnerable locations (e.g., IDP camps, markets), control crowds, confiscate weapons, and even attack perpetrators of violence against civilians.²⁸ Regardless of their mandate, "United Nations peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means," according to the UN's landmark *Brahimi Report*.²⁹ The UN's standing rules of engagement for blue helmets clarify that "use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to defend any civilian person who is in need of protection against a hostile

²⁰See Hoffman (2004).

²¹See Lake (2002).

²²See Byman (1998).

²³See Mkandawire (2002).

²⁴See Humphreys and Weinstein (2006).

²⁵See Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004); Valentino (2004).

²⁶See Downes (2011).

²⁷See Azam and Hoeffler (2002).

²⁸See United Nations (2003); Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010, 310).

²⁹See United Nations (2001, para. 51).

act or hostile intent, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance, is authorized.”³⁰

However, despite the prevalence of civilian deaths at the hands of both rebels and governments, few scholars have focused on the impact of peace operations on civilian protection. This is surprising for two reasons. First, protecting civilians has become the primary focus of contemporary UN peace operations. In a recent speech, the head of UN peacekeeping explains that “the Security Council has made clear that it sees the protection of civilians at the center of our responsibilities. This is also widely acknowledged by those countries contributing troops and police to UN peacekeeping.”³¹ Second, many have recognized that preventing the resumption of war is a low bar for success, and that civilian victimization impacts the quality of peace.³² Diehl and Druckman (2010) advocate measuring the overall success of a peace operation by assessing its performance on the mission’s primary goals.³³ As the top priority of today’s peace operations, the protection of civilians is thus a crucial outcome to consider when examining the overall effectiveness of a peace operation.

Moreover, extant studies of this topic find divergent results. Some claim that peacekeeping missions can reduce intentional harm to civilians, particularly when the operations contain large numbers of police and military troops,³⁴ when the Security Council explicitly considers the nature of the threat to civilians,³⁵ when they directly confront the perpetrator or assist the target of the killings,³⁶ or when the effects of neutral interventions are looked at in the long-term.³⁷ Others, however, argue that peacekeepers are ineffective or even increase violence against civilians. A recent study commissioned by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations warns that

³⁰Cited in Blocq, 2006, 205.

³¹See Ladsous (2014).

³²See Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013).

³³See also Diehl and Balas (2014, 146-52).

³⁴See Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013).

³⁵See Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009).

³⁶See Krain (2005).

³⁷See Kathman and Wood (2011).

“the ‘chain’ of events that lead from the Security Council to the field for delivering protection to civilians in peacekeeping missions is broken.”³⁸ Rebels may believe that peacekeepers tend to assist those who commit the most abhorrent violence, causing rebels to increase this behavior.³⁹ Or, intervention can alter the balance of power, leading the losing side to step up violence against civilians.⁴⁰ Further, armed groups might deliberately attack civilians to undermine missions whose purpose is to protect them.⁴¹

We argue that these assessments remain inconclusive due to empirical and theoretical issues, as civilian casualties should be disaggregated and endogeneity needs to be addressed. In contrast to the previous literature, we claim that UN peace operations only reduce the civilian fatalities caused by rebels, which occurs for two main reasons. First, governments often victimize civilians to attain military advantages in ongoing armed conflicts, and are typically loath to allow UN peace operations to prevent them from attaining these advantages. In the face of interference from UN peace operations, host governments can force them out of the country, as they did in Croatia in 1995, in Burundi in 2006, and in Chad and in the Central African Republic in 2010.⁴² As a senior French diplomat who works on the Security Council summarized: “In internal conflicts the Council is not consulting with the parties, but with the host government. The way you find a solution that is consistent with the principle of consent changes when some of the parties are non-governmental.”⁴³ Indeed, “these missions may have to choose, at times, between maintaining consent and thus being able to continue to invest in building an environment conducive to pro-

³⁸See Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009, 214).

³⁹See Hoffman (2004); United Nations (2009).

⁴⁰See Ziemke (2012).

⁴¹See Paddon Rhoads (2016).

⁴²See Gray (1996); United Nations (2006*b*, 2010). In each of these cases, the UN mission had a mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, meaning that it did not depend on the government’s consent *de jure*, even though it did *de facto* (Gray, 1996, 242). Sudan also blocked the expansion of the UN peace operation into the Darfur in 2006 (International Crisis Group, 2006) and the continuation of UNMIS in 2011 (Sievers and Daws, 2014, 507-8), and Egypt forced UNEF I to withdraw just before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Diehl and Balas, 2014, 6-7). For a discussion of additional cases of peace operations that were terminated due to the withdrawal of the host country’s consent see Sievers and Daws (2014, 506-8).

⁴³Interview conducted in Paris on 5 August 2015.

tection, and acting forcefully” when civilians are targeted.⁴⁴ To preserve the consent of the host governments, we demonstrate that UN peace operations thus adopt a cautious – and ultimately ineffective – approach to protecting civilians from government forces.

Second, an increasing number of UN peace operations is mandated to actively collaborate with the host country’s military and police by training and mentoring these forces.⁴⁵ The *Capstone Doctrine* for UN peacekeeping clarifies that all activities in today’s multidimensional peace operations “must be informed by the need to support and, where necessary, build national capacity” of the host country’s government.⁴⁶ To perform this task, UN peace operations need to maintain cooperative relationships with the armed forces and police, which gives peacekeepers an incentive not to respond harshly to civilian victimization by those same security forces.⁴⁷ For instance, UN blue helmets in the DRC fought rebel forces alongside the government even though the latter was often accused of abusing civilians.⁴⁸

However, in contrast to the hurdles that UN peace operations face in preventing government atrocities, we claim that these missions often reduce rebel-caused civilian fatalities through activities such as disarming non-state groups and conducting armed patrols at vulnerable sites. The larger the mission, the more it can protect civilians, since missions with greater resources can more easily deploy where needed, signal the UN’s determination to stop the conflict to combatants, monitor risks to civilians across the conflict theater, and forcefully respond to atrocities in a timely manner. Large UN peace operations are also highly visible and thus incur greater costs if they fail to achieve their mission or are recalled. Such demonstrations of resolve can encourage belligerents to stop fighting and thus cease targeting civilians.⁴⁹ Yet we argue that the factors leading UN peace operations to be ineffectual at protecting civilians from governments cannot be

⁴⁴See De Coning, Lotze and Stensland (2011, 11).

⁴⁵See Peter (2015); United Nations (2000).

⁴⁶See United Nations (2008, 40).

⁴⁷See Chappuis and Gorur (2015).

⁴⁸See Sheeran and Case (2014) and the subsequent case study.

⁴⁹See Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013); Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen (2013).

resolved by simply increasing the number of UN peace operations, as these missions still must depend on and collaborate with the host government regardless of their size.

Exogenous Variation in Peacekeeping

In order to isolate the effect of peacekeeping on civilian protection, we must identify “as-if random” variation in the deployment of UN blue helmets. This is important because, as Diehl and Balas (2014, 163) point out, correlations between UN peace operation size and success may be spurious: strong capabilities may enable a UN peace operation to successfully deter and punish rebel violence against civilians, but also reflect the political willingness of UN Security Council members to provide what military experts regard as an adequately sized force. The same lack of resolve that explains a mission’s insufficient capabilities may also explain why perpetrators of violence do not feel international pressure (e.g., sanctions and less tangible incentives such as private threats) independent of the peace operation. Regressions of civilian violence on UNPO size typically rely on the assumption that the models include all observable and unobservable confounders, and therefore they have trouble adjudicating between these alternative explanations.

We tackle this issue by exploiting two sources of predetermined variation in which states hold power in the Security Council: the rotating presidency and the alternation of Council seats between geographic regions. We focus on representation on the Council because it is tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security and as such, it decides on the establishment, termination, mandate, staff composition, and authorized personnel size of UN peace operations. Once it has established a peace operation, the Council regularly reviews the size and mandate of the mission. It can form new UN peace operations or wind down existing ones at any moment. The only formal prerequisite for the establishment of a peace operation is that the Council considers a particular crisis as a present or likely future threat to international peace and security. In practice, this is often preceded by the conclusion of a cease-fire by warring factions. Our identification strategy accounts for such endogeneity by assessing the effect of those UN peacekeepers who are

deployed solely as a function of two pre-determined rotation rules in the Council.

The institutional rules of the UN Security Council yield exogenous variation in two ways. First, this variation exists in the composition of the ten non-permanent Council members, which are elected to two year terms with no immediate reelection, staggered such that five new members are elected each year. These ten seats are reserved for states from specific regions, and three of them are allocated to African states. Under a formula devised in the 1960s and observed without exception since the 1970s, a Central or North African state must rotate into one of these seats once every two years, and the second seat must alternate every two years between an Eastern and Southern African state; the third seat is always held by a Western African state.⁵⁰ Once elected to the Council, these temporary members exert influence through several channels: they chair most sanctions committees and working groups, and their votes are both essential for unanimity (which is strongly desired, as 89% of votes are unanimous) and to prevent the appearance of neocolonialism.

A second source of quasi-random variation lies in the position of the Council presidency, as it rotates monthly among all Council members in alphabetical order of the members' English names. This ensures that the selection of the state holding the presidency bears no relationship to any political considerations, which is remarkable since the president holds considerable power. In particular, the president's responsibilities include calling and presiding over meetings, preparing the Council's agenda, determining the order of votes on amendments, issuing Presidential Statements and press statements, and communicating with UN member states and the UN Secretary-General on behalf of the Council.⁵¹ The president's discretion often exceeds her formal responsibilities,⁵² as she regularly consults all Council members and is often put in charge of finding compromise and maintaining consensus in the Council.⁵³

Yet it is not enough to identify exogenous power-sharing rules; we must also show that states

⁵⁰See Mikulaschek (2016).

⁵¹See Sievers and Daws (2014); Dedring (2008).

⁵²See Bosco (2009, 162, 228).

⁵³See Nicol (1981).

wield this power to affect peacekeeping missions. Why might states use the Council to pursue their national interests, rather than relying on their own national resources? We argue that states do so due to the high costs associated with peacekeeping. Intervention by a single state is often seen as illegitimate or as a form of neocolonialism, may involve high domestic casualties, and blame falls squarely on the intervenor if the mission fails. Countries can circumvent these problems by acting through the UN, especially since UN peace-keepers are now typically drawn from developing countries.⁵⁴ They can also split the financial cost, which amounted to \$8.3 billion in 2015.⁵⁵

Even when resources are pooled, however, the high price tag ensures that peacekeepers cannot deploy to all civil wars; instead, scholars have found that they are placed in militarily weaker states embroiled in more severe conflicts,⁵⁶ and to states in which Council members have economic interests.⁵⁷ However, we theorize and show empirically that UN peace operations are also directed to civil conflict countries within African Council members' regions in an attempt to stem their negative externalities. Because these conflicts cause refugee streams and arms proliferation, which in turn can lead to conflict contagion and political instability,⁵⁸ we demonstrate that when exogenous rotation rules allocate more influence to African Council members, the states use this leverage to sway the Council to deploy more UN blue helmets to civil conflicts in nearby states.⁵⁹

We can thus employ these two sources of quasi-random variation in influence on the UN Security Council as instruments for the size of UN peace operations. This approach should not be conflated with other empirical strategies that exploit variation in UNSC membership, as we do not require states' selection onto the Council to be quasi-random; we only need the presidency to

⁵⁴See Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

⁵⁵See United Nations (2015).

⁵⁶See Gilligan and Stedman (2003); Fortna (2008).

⁵⁷See Stojek and Tir (2014).

⁵⁸See Beardsley (2011); Gleditsch (2002).

⁵⁹Alternatively, African Security Council members use their influence to increase the number of peacekeepers in nearby conflict theaters so that they can deploy their own armed forces as blue helmets. To adjudicate between this explanation and our argument based on the negative externalities of conflict, we show that our results are robust to omitting peacekeepers that hail from the country in the conflict theater that temporarily serves on the Council (see Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix).

change hands in an as-if random fashion, and/or for African *regions* to rotate onto the council in such a manner.⁶⁰ We provide further evidence of this assertion in the following section.

Research Design

To estimate the effect of peacekeeping on the protection of civilians in civil conflict, we rely on a dataset consisting of monthly observations of UN peacekeepers during civil wars between 1989 and 2010. All civil-conflict country-month observations are included in the sample, irrespective of whether UN peacekeepers were deployed in the conflict theater at the time. We code civil conflict using the conventional definition from Themnér and Wallensteen (2014) and employ a measure of battle-related deaths from Harbom, Strand and Nygard (2009) to operationalize it. We focus on the post-Cold War period because prior to the end of the Cold War, the Security Council undertook few peacekeeping missions – and just one in Africa – due to the rivalry between the two most powerful states on the Council.⁶¹ After the Cold War, however, UN peacekeeping dramatically expanded in size, such that the UN is now actively engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding activities in the majority of civil wars around the world. Today, more than two thirds of all UN blue helmets operate in contexts with ongoing violent conflict.⁶²

We measure the number of UN peacekeeping personnel (including troops, police, and military observers) using data collected from the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and we focus on UN missions with a military component as well as those sent to ongoing conflicts, thus excluding civilian missions and post-conflict peace operations.⁶³ Our outcome vari-

⁶⁰While other work has used interesting instrumental variables designs, the potential remains for the instruments to feature unobserved heterogeneity due to incomplete knowledge of the assignment process for the composition of the set of states with a seat on the Council (Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). The Council membership of specific states, while interesting to examine (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014 and Vivaldi, 2015), is not exogenous since states are elected to these positions, and elections favor powerful, strategically important countries (Dreher et al., 2014).

⁶¹Moreover, systematically collected data on the monthly number of civilian casualties in civil wars is not available for the Cold War era.

⁶²See Ladsous (2014).

⁶³Eck and Hultman (2007, 237) state that “less than 1% of the total fatalities took place in countries which did not see armed conflict during the period.” Further, theoretically, the effects in war versus peacetime phases likely differ.

able, civilian protection, is coded as a monthly count of civilian deaths in civil conflicts and was compiled from the UCDP's Geo-referenced Event Dataset (GED v.1.5).⁶⁴ Following Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) we focus on intentional killings (as opposed to collateral casualties in the cross-fire) of civilians who were directly targeted by warring factions, excluding indirect fatalities due, e.g., to starvation.⁶⁵ To test our hypothesis that UN peace operations more effectively protect civilians against rebel-inflicted violence, we draw on the UCDP GED's distinction between civilian deaths inflicted by governments versus those by armed opposition groups.⁶⁶

Data on which African region was represented on the UN Security Council in a given month is reported in Mikulaschek (2016). This binary variable takes a positive value for all civil conflicts that took place during months when a state from the region in which the civil conflict occurred was represented on the UN Security Council; it is lagged by one month. Data on the UN Security Council presidencies come from the UN meeting records. To take into account the elevated leverage of the incoming Council president as well as delays in the deployment of any additional UN blue helmets that the Council's president secures for civil-conflict theaters in her region, the Council presidency instrument takes a non-zero value during the month the president holds office and the two preceding and two following months; this measure is also lagged by one month.⁶⁷

Our models control for several country and conflict characteristics that may influence whether a UN peace operation is begun in a civil-war setting, its size, and its prospects for success.⁶⁸ First,

⁶⁴See Sundberg and Melander (2013). Whenever a conflict event extended over more than one calendar month, an equal proportion of casualties was assumed to have occurred on each day between the start and the end of the violent event. We follow Eck and Hultman (2007) and Kreps and Wallace (2009) in excluding the Rwandan genocide in April of 1994, which represents an extreme outlier; with 146,211 civilian deaths recorded in the GED, it accounts for more non-combatant fatalities than all other 2,459 observations combined.

⁶⁵See Eck and Hultman (2007).

⁶⁶In the average country experiencing civil conflict, rebels killed 28 civilians per month, while 22 per month were killed by government forces. Data on conflict-related fatalities is inevitably susceptible to measurement error (Sundberg and Melander, 2013), but the way the data was compiled helps to ensure that our analyses establish a lower bound on the effect of UN peacekeepers on civilian casualties, especially on those inflicted by rebels. Since news reports constitute the vast majority of sources in the UCDP's GED, and UN peace operations often afford protection to foreign journalists (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, 278), the latter may be more common in areas where UN peacekeepers are deployed. Thus, the underreporting of civilian casualties is likely less severe in areas where peacekeepers are present.

⁶⁷The results are robust to operationalizing this instrument differently, as shown subsequently in the robustness checks.

⁶⁸These controls are not strictly necessary due the exogeneity of representation on the council; however, their ad-

we include a variable that records whether a peace agreement that was signed during the prior five years stipulated the initiation of a peacekeeping mission using data from Hogbladh (2011), because the baseline probability of a peace operation's success may be higher if the warring factions have formally agreed to multilateral peacekeeping.⁶⁹ Second, we use data from Sundberg (2008) to control for conflict duration, which may affect the establishment and success of peace operations.⁷⁰ Third, since the number of warring factions may impact the prospect of violence reduction,⁷¹ we include the number of simultaneous conflicts in each civil-conflict country as recorded by the UCDP's GED. Further, in addition to controlling for population size,⁷² we account for governments' per capita military expenditures,⁷³ because the baseline likelihood of peacekeeping may be lower where government forces are strong,⁷⁴ and for pre-war political rights⁷⁵ and per capita GDP in constant 2005 USD⁷⁶ since economic development and political regime characteristics may influence conflict duration and relapse risks.⁷⁷ Finally, the models include a time-varying measure of the percentage of land covered by forests to capture the difficulty of the terrain.⁷⁸ Table 1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for all variables.

Though the geographic scope of the study is limited to Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Africa – which constitute the four regions that rotate onto two Council seats – our analyses capture a central part of the UN's peacekeeping efforts. Between 1989 and 2010, 23 countries in these regions suffered from civil conflict, as shown in Figure 1, and the UN Security Council deployed

dition reduces variation and thus increases efficiency. They also can help to alleviate concerns regarding the exclusion restriction.

⁶⁹See Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2008).

⁷⁰This variable captures the number of successive years with at least 25 battle-related deaths.

⁷¹See Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Cunningham (2011).

⁷²See World Bank (2014).

⁷³See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2014).

⁷⁴See Gilligan and Stedman (2003).


⁷⁵See Freedom House (2014).

⁷⁶See World Bank (2014).

⁷⁷See Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008); Fortna (2008).

⁷⁸See World Bank (2014).

Figure 1: Civil conflicts and UN peace operations in Africa, 1989-2010



Note: The map displays the 23 countries in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa that experienced a civil conflict between 1989 and 2010 in blue. The ten countries where fifteen UN peace operations were deployed during ongoing civil conflict appear in dark blue whereas theaters of civil conflict without peacekeepers are shown in light blue. Conflicts and peacekeepers in Western Africa are not displayed, since Western Africa's representation on the UN Security Council is not subject to exogenous variation and the region is thus not part of this study.

15 new peace operations to countries with ongoing civil wars in these areas. During this era, almost one in three blue helmets in the world was deployed to one of these countries, and almost four in ten U.S. dollars that were spent on UN peacekeeping funded operations in these areas.

Model Specification

We are interested in estimating the following model:

$$DV_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Peacekeepers_{i(t-1)} + \sum_{k \in K} \beta_k I(i = k) + u_{it} \quad (1)$$

where DV_{it} measures civilian casualties for country i in month t , $Peacekeepers_{i(t-1)}$ is the number of UN peacekeepers in month $t - 1$, $I(\cdot)$ is an indicator function such that the summation represents country fixed effects, and u_{it} represents the unobserved error term. If $Peacekeepers_{i(t-1)}$ were randomly assigned (conditional on the fixed effects) we could estimate β_1 , the marginal effect of a one unit increase in the number of peacekeepers, consistently with ordinary least squares. However, this condition remains unsatisfied since peacekeepers are allocated such that they are systematically related to the intensity of violence in the host country. In other words, $Peacekeepers_i$ is an endogenous variable.

To overcome this issue, we use an instrumental variables model, exploiting the as-if-randomly-assigned rotation of African regions onto the Council along with the exogenously determined rotation of the presidency as instruments for $Peacekeepers_{i(t-1)}$. This quasi-random variation allows us to generate predicted values from the first stage regression, thereby purging $Peacekeepers_{i(t-1)}$ of endogeneity:

$$Peacekeepers_{i(t-1)} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 IV_{i(t-1)} + \sum_{k \in K} \gamma_k I(i = k) + e_{it},$$

where $IV_{i(t-1)}$ is the instrumental variable. Since we have two instruments, we employ three alternative model specifications that use both instruments individually and in combination.⁷⁹ We

⁷⁹The limited information maximum likelihood estimator is chosen for the model that includes both instruments

can now consistently estimate β_1 by regressing DV_{it} on the predicted values of $Peacekeeping_{i(t-1)}$, along with the fixed effects.

However, to obtain consistent results, our instruments must satisfy several assumptions. First, they must meet the exclusion restriction; that is, they can only affect the dependent variable through their effect on the endogenous variable.⁸⁰ While it is impossible to prove that the exclusion restriction is satisfied, we both argue that it likely holds and investigate possible violations empirically. The first potential challenge to this assumption concerns the effect of UN Security Council membership on aid receipts. A seat on the Council may be associated with additional aid and more loans,⁸¹ which might in turn alter the trajectory of civil conflict. However, the vast majority of the civil conflicts that we examine are not located in states that served on the Council themselves; thus, civil wars rarely occur in states that were eligible for this additional aid. In fact, Council members which suffered from civil conflict only account for six percent of the observations, and excluding these observations does not change the reported results.⁸² Moreover, covariate balance analyses reported in the Appendix show that countries experiencing civil war did not receive more aid when their region was represented on the Security Council or when a state in their region held the Council's presidency than at other times.

A second potential challenge to the exclusion restriction concerns UN activities other than peacekeeping, such as sanctions and mediation, through which additional power in the Council could affect the targeting of civilians in civil-conflict theaters. However, it is implausible that these temporary exogenous shifts in influence significantly alter UN sanctions or mediation in countries with ongoing civil conflict. Irrespective of rotation in the presidency and in the representation of African regions on the Council, UN sanctions are hardly ever lifted before the end of a civil war, and this study only investigates the targeting of civilians during conflicts. Moreover, UN mediation

since it performs better in terms of bias and mean absolute error than alternative estimators with two instruments in a wide range of circumstances (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).

⁸⁰ γ_1 must also be nonzero, which we verify by examining the estimated coefficients' significance.

⁸¹See Vreeland and Dreher (2014).

⁸²UN peace operation size only has a consistently negative effect on rebel-inflicted casualties and its overall negative effect on civilian casualties is significant in five out of six models (see Tables 6-7 in the Appendix).

is conducted by the UN Secretary-General and the Department of Political Affairs and not by the Security Council. Indeed, covariate balance analyses confirm that regional representation on the Council and its presidency did not have a significant impact on UN sanctions and mediation.⁸³

Besides likely satisfying the exclusion restriction, the instruments meet the requirement of not being “weak” in the statistical sense. Tables 1 and 2 present the results from a statistical test designed to probe the strength of the instrument. Critical values for the Donald-Cragg statistic test whether the nominal 5% two-stage least-squares t-test for the hypothesis that $\beta = 0$ potentially exceeds 15%.⁸⁴ In all models that include the rotating UN Security Council representation or both instruments the Donald-Cragg statistic exceeds this critical value (except in Model 9, in which the two instruments pass the 20% threshold); the rotating UN presidency as the sole instrument only exceeds the 15% threshold in Model 2. Thus, this instrument is weaker than the rotating regional representation and the combination of the two. At the same time, all three model specifications (with both IVs included separately and together) yield the same results, both in terms of the magnitude and significance of the effect of peace operations, giving us additional confidence that our instruments do not suffer from this problem.⁸⁵

Finally, all models that include both instruments pass Hansen’s test of overidentification. The assumption that an instrument is not correlated with the error term in the second stage model cannot be tested in 2SLS models with a single instrument. However, by fitting models with two instrumental variables, we are able to do so. The null hypothesis is that both instruments are valid – i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term – and that it is thus appropriate to exclude them from the second-stage model. The high p-values reported subsequently indicate that we cannot reject

⁸³Another potential challenge to the exclusion restriction is regime type; perhaps UN peace operations affect the political regime in the host country which then leads to fewer civilian deaths. However, such an impact would materialize slowly, and therefore could not easily explain the short-term variation in patterns of civilian targeting that are associated with the short-term exogenous changes in the distribution of influence in the UNSC. To ensure that this is the case, we also control for political rights in the civil conflict country.

⁸⁴See Stock and Yogo (2005).

⁸⁵We also find no evidence that the first-stage results are driven by the UN’s response to any individual civil war. We fit 63 models in which we removed all observations that describe a given civil war; regardless of which civil war was dropped, at least one of the instruments was not weak (see Table 8 in the Appendix).

this null hypothesis; therefore, Hansen's J statistic confirms that both instruments are valid.⁸⁶

Results

We begin by analyzing the overall effect of peacekeepers on civilian casualties and find that civilians are better protected when more blue helmets are present. Table 1 reports the results from six models that support this finding. Models 4-6 include the full set of control variables as well as the endogenous measure of UN peace operation size. Model 5 uses the Council's rotating presidency as an instrument; when a state in the regional neighborhood of the conflict theater holds the presidency, the Council tends to deploy additional peacekeepers to the conflict area, and thus the UN peace operation staff is larger (by 322 persons on average) than it is in other months. In turn, every 100 additional peacekeepers deployed as a function of the rotating UN Security Council presidency are associated with an average of 17 fewer civilian casualties per month ($p < 0.01$). Model 4 obtains a very similar result, finding that whenever an African region is represented on the UN Security Council, the Council tends to increase the size of UN peace operations in countries in that region that experience civil conflict by 220 persons on average. In turn, every 100 additional peacekeepers deployed due to this exogenous variation reduce the monthly number of civilian casualties by 12 on average ($p < 0.01$). Model 6 uses both instrumental variables and confirms these results, indicating that UN peace operations in civil-conflict countries tend to have 308 more peacekeepers whenever the regional neighborhood of these countries is represented on the Council; when a state in the conflict theater's neighborhood holds the presidency, the personnel size of UN peace operations is higher by 357 people on average than it is during years when the region is absent from the Council. 100 of these additional blue helmets are then associated with an average of 12 fewer civilian casualties by month ($p < 0.01$).

⁸⁶We also assume monotonicity – or no defiers – which would be violated if some states receive fewer peacekeepers when their regions are represented on the Council. While we have presented evidence suggesting that this assumption holds, the presence of defiers would simply mean that we identify a weighted average treatment effect that is weighted towards those observations the instrument has a greater effect on, which would attenuate the effect on compliers (Small et al., 2014).

Table 1: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties

Variables	Number of civilian casualties					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.050 (0.030)	-0.038 (0.023)	-0.045 (0.026)	-0.121 (0.055)	-0.166 (0.060)	-0.124 (0.055)
Peace agreement provision on PK				17.83 (158.6)	36.68 (218.5)	19.29 (162.9)
Conflict duration				2.594 (2.854)	3.013 (4.362)	2.626 (2.968)
Simultaneous conflicts				43.01 (17.95)	37.31 (14.74)	42.57 (17.66)
Political rights				-93.42 (111.8)	-140.1 (145.6)	-97.05 (113.6)
Population size (ln.)				116.0 (325.9)	328.2 (488.6)	132.4 (334.0)
Forest cover (%)				-8.313 (14.93)	-9.770 (22.56)	-8.426 (15.50)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-131.1 (186.4)	-296.3 (402.9)	-144.0 (198.8)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				0.671 (1.562)	1.294 (2.159)	0.720 (1.606)
Number of UNPO personnel						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	672.7 (365.7)		500.6 (291.6)	321.9 (180.7)		307.7 (185.4)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		866.6 (434.3)	1,090.5 (557.5)		220.3 (103.0)	356.5 (176.2)
Peace agreement provision on PK				363.8 (1,359.7)	421.5 (1,388.0)	367.1 (1,360.0)
Conflict duration				9.727 (36.01)	9.254 (36.06)	9.703 (36.02)
Simultaneous conflicts				-120.6 (125.8)	-127.2 (128.0)	-121.0 (125.8)
Political rights				-1051.9 (679.4)	-1,033.3 (677.0)	-1050.9 (679.7)
Population size (ln.)				4,567.6 (3,354.5)	4650.9 (3,415.4)	4,562.7 (3,358.1)
Forest cover (%)				-39.84 (176.5)	-35.26 (173.9)	-40.16 (176.8)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-3,648.6 (2,996.1)	-3,659.4 (3,027.6)	-3,649.4 (2,996.1)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				14.00 (15.63)	13.84 (15.62)	14.00 (15.62)
Observations	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,063	2,063	2,063
R-squared	0.007	0.007	0.010	0.194	0.190	0.194
Cragg-Donald statistic	18.28	15.99	12.27	13.04	3.18	6.58
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.467			0.785

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Since both instruments rely on pre-determined rotation rules, they are exogenous to confounding variables in expectation. Thus, we expect the estimate of the effect of UN peace operation size on civilian casualties to be robust to excluding the control variables in Models 4-6. Models 1-3 present the same analyses without these controls, which corroborate the results on the effect of UN peace operations. Even without accounting for potential confounders, the IV models find that larger UN peace operations significantly reduce civilian casualties ($p < 0.1$).

We next investigate our central hypothesis: that the effect of peacekeepers on deaths caused by rebels drives the overall negative relationship between peacekeepers and civilian casualties. The models in Table 2 show that indeed, UN peace operations have a much larger impact on rebel-inflicted civilian casualties than on those at the hands of the host governments. Models 7-9, which use both instruments individually and jointly, indicate that an additional 100 UN blue helmets that are deployed due to exogenous variation in influence on the UN Security Council are associated with 11-15 fewer civilian deaths caused by rebels every month ($p < 0.04$). At the same time, more UN peace operations do not significantly reduce civilian casualties produced by governments in any of the three models. The coefficient for the effect on government-inflicted civilian deaths is also much smaller than the corresponding quantity for rebel killings, both in absolute terms (Models 10-12) and in relative terms, when a standardized measure of civilian fatalities is used (see Table 9 in the Appendix).

What explains the discrepancy between our null finding for protection from government forces and previous findings of a significant reduction of government-inflicted civilian killings? While we cannot rule out different temporal and geographic scopes and model specifications, additional analyses lead us to suspect that endogeneity is part of the answer. As shown in Table 10 in the Appendix, regression models that do not instrument for UN peace operation size and are otherwise identical to models 4-12 in Tables 1 and 2 indicate a significant effect of peacekeepers on civilian casualties caused by both governments and rebels. The effect on government-inflicted casualties becomes insignificant when we account for the endogeneity of UN peace operations by exploiting exogenous variation in power on the UN Security Council. The effect on civilian deaths

Table 2: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: variation by faction

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.116 (0.047)	-0.149 (0.071)	-0.118 (0.047)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.025)
Peace agreement provision on PK	40.37 (145.3)	54.19 (191.8)	41.37 (148.5)	-22.54 (23.02)	-17.51 (28.16)	-22.26 (22.89)
Conflict duration	1.991 (2.989)	2.299 (3.961)	2.014 (3.059)	0.602 (0.528)	0.714 (0.769)	0.608 (0.526)
Simultaneous conflicts	29.76 (16.86)	25.58 (12.06)	29.46 (16.50)	13.25 (10.34)	11.73 (6.894)	13.17 (10.16)
Political rights	-100.7 (103.1)	-135.0 (150.0)	-103.2 (105.6)	7.315 (28.63)	-5.152 (11.30)	6.629 (26.99)
Population size (ln.)	209.2 (281.2)	364.8 (513.9)	220.5 (293.0)	-93.30 (138.2)	-36.66 (51.26)	-90.18 (131.5)
Forest cover (%)	1.958 (12.79)	0.889 (17.78)	1.880 (13.15)	-10.27 (2.912)	-10.66 (5.326)	-10.29 (3.022)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-88.77 (200.0)	-209.9 (384.6)	-97.52 (209.3)	-42.37 (43.31)	-86.45 (102.8)	-44.79 (38.85)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.574 (1.495)	1.030 (2.129)	0.607 (1.534)	0.0977 (0.290)	0.264 (0.313)	0.107 (0.273)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	321.9 (180.7)		307.7 (185.4)	321.9 (180.7)		307.7 (185.4)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		220.3 (103.0)	356.5 (176.2)		220.3 (103.0)	356.5 (176.2)
Peace agreement provision on PK	363.8 (1,359.7)	421.5 (1,388.1)	367.1 (1,360.0)	363.8 (1,359.7)	421.5 (1,388.1)	367.1 (1,360.0)
Conflict duration	9.728 (36.02)	9.254 (36.06)	9.703 (36.02)	9.728 (36.02)	9.254 (36.06)	9.703 (36.02)
Simultaneous conflicts	-120.6 (125.8)	-127.2 (128.1)	-121.0 (125.8)	-120.6 (125.8)	-127.2 (128.1)	-121.0 (125.8)
Population size (ln.)	4,567.6 (3,354.5)	4,651.0 (3,415.4)	4,562.7 (3,358.1)	4,567.6 (3,354.5)	4,651.0 (3,415.4)	4,562.7 (3,358.1)
Political rights	-1,051.9 (679.4)	-1,033.3 (677.1)	-1,050.9 (679.7)	-1,051.8 (679.4)	-1,033.3 (677.1)	-1,050.9 (679.7)
Forest cover (%)	-39.83 (176.4)	-35.26 (173.9)	-40.16 (176.8)	-39.83 (176.4)	-35.26 (173.9)	-40.16 (176.8)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,648.6 (2,996.1)	-3,659.5 (3,027.6)	-3,649.4 (2,996.0)	-3,648.6 (2,996.1)	-3,659.5 (3,027.6)	-3,649.4 (2,996.0)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	14.00 (15.63)	13.84 (15.62)	14.00 (15.62)	14.00 (15.63)	13.84 (15.62)	14.00 (15.62)
Observations	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063
R-squared	0.194	0.190	0.194	0.194	0.190	0.194
Donald-Cragg statistic	13.04	3.18	6.58	13.04	3.18	6.58
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.477			0.738

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

at the hands of government forces is also insignificant when we focus on exogenous variation in the number of armed UN troops and UN civilian police forces, thus omitting unarmed monitors following Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) (see Tables 11 and 12 in the Appendix). This suggests that results indicating a significant effect of UN peace operation size on civilian deaths at the hands of government forces may be driven by selection on unobservable variables, such as governments' resolve to improve the plight of their populations, which determine both their resort to violence against civilians and their willingness to consent to larger UN peace operations in the conflict theaters.

Robustness and sensitivity checks

To ensure that our results are not driven by our particular empirical specification, we conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we ensure that our findings are not sensitive to the addition of a linear time trend to account for the increase in the overall number of UN peacekeepers between 1989 and 2010, the time period under investigation (see Tables 13 and 14 in the Appendix). Second, we add year-fixed effects (in addition to country-fixed effects) and both the magnitude and significance of the coefficients remain the same.⁸⁷ Third, we show that our results are robust to a different operationalization of our instrumental variable that exploits the rotating presidency of the Security Council, which assigns a positive value to the presidency instrument during the three-month period that starts a month before the presidency in order to account for the elevated leverage of the incoming president and lags in the arrival of UN blue helmets whose deployment was decided as a result of the president's influence.⁸⁸ Fourth, the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for a large share of the civilian casualties investigated in this study,⁸⁹ but

⁸⁷In some of the two-way fixed-effects models some of the year-fixed effects drop out due to collinearity, and the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions is not of full rank since the number of covariates in the model becomes high relative to the sample size. See Tables 15 and 16 in the Appendix.

⁸⁸See Tables 17 and 18 in the Appendix.

⁸⁹See Table 2 in the Appendix.

excluding this conflict from the analysis leaves the results virtually unchanged.⁹⁰ Fifth, to verify that the results are not driven by a civil war that constitutes an outlier, we fit a series of models that exclude all observations that pertain to the same civil war in our sample; one country is dropped from each model. Regardless of which instrument is used, we find that UN peace operation size reduces the number of civilians killed by rebels but not civilian casualties inflicted by government forces.⁹¹

Additionally, consistent with our argument that the UN Security Council's presidency and representation of African regions are as-if-randomly determined, the two instrumental variables are weakly predicted by the other covariates.⁹² Further covariate balance analyses also confirm that the exclusion restriction is highly plausible, as they show that a given civil-war country did not experience more UN sanctions, more mediation attempts, larger aid inflows, or more support from foreign combatants allied to warring parties when its region held greater power on the Council than that same civil-war country did otherwise.⁹³ Since neither instrument has a significant effect on aid flows, UN sanctions, mediation, or foreign troop support to warring factions (at the 90% confidence level), the exclusion restriction likely holds even if these policy interventions alter the number of civilian casualties.

Moreover, we also do not find evidence that warring factions might anticipate the deployment of additional peacekeepers that results from the exogenous variation in influence on the Council. Specifically, civil war parties are not more or less likely to conclude or to break peace agreements during years when their region receives elevated influence in the Council.⁹⁴

⁹⁰The effect on rebel-inflicted casualties remains at least weakly significant ($p < 0.05$, $p < 0.06$, or $p < 0.07$ depending on which instrument is used; see Table 19 in the Appendix).

⁹¹See Table 20 for the coefficients of peace operation size in all 126 models; 122 of these (including at least four out of the six tests conducted with each subset) corroborate our finding of a differential effect on rebel- and government-inflicted deaths.

⁹²Table 21 in the Appendix demonstrates that no coefficients are significant in either of the two models that regress the instruments on the covariates and state fixed effects. The UNSC presidency is weakly associated with larger population size and greater forest coverage; we cannot think of any plausible explanation of this weak correlation besides random chance.

⁹³See Tables 22-25 in the Appendix.

⁹⁴See Tables 26-27 in the Appendix.

Alternative Explanations


We have argued that UN peace operations only halt rebel-inflicted deaths because they rely on governments' consent and cooperation and thus do not want to antagonize them by interfering in their military activities. However, a potential alternative explanation for this differential effect is that UN peace operations are better at stopping rebels from killing civilians, because they mainly deploy to areas within the civil-war country where the majority of fighting occurs and where rebels are most active.⁹⁵ To explore whether the differential effect we uncover is driven by the pattern of deployment of UN peace operations within civil-war countries, we investigate the impact of UN peace operations in combat areas versus rear areas, where the presence of rebels varies. In both parts of the conflict theater, blue helmets pursue a range of activities that aim to protect civilians.⁹⁶ If we find that UN peace operations prevent rebel-inflicted – but not government-inflicted – casualties in both areas, this would increase our confidence that UN peace operations do not want to anger the host governments and thus respond cautiously when they abuse civilians. By contrast, if we find that our differential effect holds in only one part of the conflict theater, it would suggest that UN peace operations are better at reducing the number of rebel-inflicted deaths due to their greater geographic proximity to rebel forces. We thus disaggregate casualties into those that occur in each area and perform our analysis separately in each.

We distinguish between civilian casualties in these locations as follows: Using the coordinates of each conflict event, we calculate the distance between the location of civilian killings and the closest fatal combat event (i.e., the closest event that resulted in the death of one or more govern-

⁹⁵On UN blue helmet deployments see Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis, 2016.

⁹⁶In combat areas, UN peace operations try to prevent civilian casualties primarily by positioning themselves between the warring factions (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013), by facilitating communication across the front line to prevent accidental escalations of violence (Fortna, 2008), and by stabilizing control over areas close to the front line to increase factions' confidence that they will reap the long-term benefit that results from foregoing the short-term benefits from abusing civilians (see Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) and Kalyvas (2006) on territorial control and violence). In contrast, UN peace operations attempt to protect civilians in rear areas by policing vulnerable areas such as camps for internally displaced persons (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013) and by helping conflict parties' leaders monitor the behavior of their units to reign in the latter when they engage in abusive behavior that benefits them personally while hurting the group's overall objectives. (See Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) on the underlying collective action problem).

Figure 2: Civilian deaths in combat and rear areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1989-2010



Note: The map depicts the location of all civilian deaths during periods of civil conflict in the DRC between 1989 and 2010. Locations that are further than 50 kilometers away from the closest fatal combat event that occurred within five years from the time of the civilian killing are shown in blue (rear areas). Other locations of civilian deaths are depicted in red (combat areas). Major rivers appear in blue and main roads in black. When multiple killings occurred in the same location at different times, it is coded as a combat area if the majority of fatal events took place in proximity to a prior combat event. Our analyses allow for rear areas to become combat areas and vice versa. Data source: Sundberg and Melander (2013).

ment or rebel combatant) during the previous five years. A given civilian death is coded as falling in a combat area if the casualty was preceded, within five years, by any fatal combat event that took place within 50 kilometers from the location where the civilian was killed; otherwise, the civilian death is considered to have occurred in a rear area. We investigate the plausibility of our coding by examining a specific case in detail; the map shown in Figure 2 illustrates the distinction between civilian deaths in combat areas and those in rear areas in the midst of civil conflict in the DRC. The map matches our qualitative knowledge of combat zone locations, giving us greater confidence in our measure. However, we also note that our results are robust to operationalizing the distinction between combat and rear areas using alternative cutoffs.⁹⁷

Having distinguished rear areas from combat areas, we conduct separate analyses of the effect of UN peace operations in each type of region, which show that these missions lower civilian casualties in combat areas as well as far behind the front lines. Table 28 in the Appendix indicates that the effect of peace operations is highly significant in both areas ($p < 0.01$ except for model 60 where $p < 0.05$).⁹⁸ Moreover, when we disaggregate fatalities in combat and rear areas, we find that rebel-inflicted deaths drive the result in both areas. Tables 30-31 in the Appendix show that in all parts of the conflict theater, peace operation size only has a significant effect on civilian casualties inflicted by rebels. This result is consistent with our argument based on the need to maintain the government's consent, and it is inconsistent with an alternative explanation based on the pattern of deployment of UN blue helmets within civil-war countries.

Case study: UN peacekeepers in Ituri district, DRC (2003-6)

To flesh out the mechanism that we posit, we present a case study analysis of events unfolding over a single period of the Congolese civil war (from 2003 to 2006) in Ituri – one of the DRC's 26 dis-

⁹⁷See Tables 32-34 in the Appendix.

⁹⁸The magnitude of the effect in combat areas is greater than it is in rear areas, which is partly explained by the fact that more civilians are killed in combat areas than in rear areas. A single country-month (Sudan during 1989) accounts for a sizable share of all civilian casualties in rear areas; however, the results are robust to its exclusion (see Table 29 in the Appendix).

tricts – so that we can compare the effect of an influx of blue helmets on abuses committed by each side in the same location at the same point in time. We detail both the sizable role played by the African Security Council members on the UN peace operation and the effect of UN peacekeeping on the plight of civilians. A summary is presented here and additional details are provided in the Supplemental Appendix due to space constraints.

The Influence of Countries with Temporary Power on Peacekeeping

Both the rotating council presidents and non-permanent Council members from the DRC's region exercised influence over the peacekeeping mission. These states had to combat disinterest from other Council members, as "the UN Security Council [i.e., its non-African majority] at first strongly resisted peacekeeping in the DRC."⁹⁹ However, in 1998 and 1999, Gabon – a state from the DRC's region of Central Africa – held a seat on the Council. It promoted active Security Council support of African regional initiatives to end the conflict,¹⁰⁰ and frequently criticized the UN for neglecting African conflicts.¹⁰¹ Moreover, it adopted a pro-Western position on other initiatives while it presided over the Council in May 1999,¹⁰² likely in exchange for France's support for the mission, as Gabon's president had a history of "exchanging services" with France.¹⁰³ Shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UN observers, established a regular UN observer mission, and asked the Secretary-General to prepare for the deployment of a much larger force.

This Security Council seat was then held by Tunisia in 2000 and 2001 – a state that is not in the DRC's region, and thus did not prioritize the settlement of the DRC's conflict. Central African countries continued to plead for a robust and large UN peace operation, but the Council was less

⁹⁹See Carayannis (2013, p. 197).

¹⁰⁰See United Nations (1999*a,c*).

¹⁰¹See Mandjouhou Yolla (2003, p. 215).

¹⁰²See Réseau Voltaire (1999); United Nations (1999*b*).

¹⁰³See Mandjouhou Yolla (2003, p. 216), authors' translation.

responsive than it was in 1999;¹⁰⁴ it slightly increased the number of UN peacekeepers, but they were not deployed until March 2001 despite the “urgent” need for them.¹⁰⁵ The UN Secretary-General also considered aborting the entire peace operation,¹⁰⁶ and the UN reduced the planned number of troops to protect civilians and military observers from 3,400 to 1,900.¹⁰⁷

However, in January 2002 the DRC’s region was once again represented, as Cameroon joined the Council. Cameroon repeatedly experienced an intense influx of refugees from the region,¹⁰⁸ and therefore actively worked to restore peace together with other Central African states.¹⁰⁹ While the U.S. was reluctant to increase MONUC’s size,¹¹⁰ it wanted to secure Cameroon’s support for a Security Council resolution authorizing a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq,¹¹¹ and therefore may have supported Cameroon’s initiatives in exchange. Indeed, shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council expanded MONUC to 8,700 personnel.¹¹²

The Effectiveness of Peacekeepers on Rebel-Inflicted Casualties

In 2000, many senior UN officials reported that MONUC’s size and mandate were insufficient to protect civilians (Lynch, 2000; United Nations, 2002; Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009),¹¹³ particularly in Ituri.¹¹⁴ However, after MONUC was enlarged to 10,800 staff in July 2003, 5,000 of which were deployed to Ituri,¹¹⁵ MONUC finally “had the means to take seriously its mandate to pro-

¹⁰⁴See Willame (2007).

¹⁰⁵See Roessler and Prendergast (2006).

¹⁰⁶See Roessler and Prendergast (2006).

¹⁰⁷See Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009).

¹⁰⁸See Chouala (2014, p. 236-7).

¹⁰⁹See Willame (2007, p. 78). See also Guéhenno (2015, p. 124).

¹¹⁰See Roessler and Prendergast (2006, p. 256).

¹¹¹See de La Sablière (2013).

¹¹²See Roessler and Prendergast (2006).

¹¹³See also Guéhenno (2015, p. 119-120).

¹¹⁴See Human Rights Watch (2003, p. 2). See also UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2004, p. 7) and International Crisis Group (2003, p. 12).

¹¹⁵See Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009, p. 254).

tect civilians under the imminent threat of attack.”¹¹⁶ For example, after a rebel militia killed 65 civilians in early October,¹¹⁷ the much larger Ituri brigade accelerated its deployment across Ituri and prevented additional fighting – in contrast to its failure to react to similar atrocities committed prior to the enlargement.¹¹⁸ Moreover, in the face of attacks to its staff, MONUC did not withdraw to the safety of its bases like it did before, but instead stepped-up patrols, checkpoint controls, and cordon and search operations.¹¹⁹

At the end of 2004, MONUC responded to additional attacks on the civilian population by dismantling militia camps and increasing the protection of sensitive sites.¹²⁰ After an ambush on a MONUC foot patrol, MONUC carried out a large cordon-and-search operation and successfully dismantled a headquarters of the militia (*Ibid.*, para. 19). MONUC also issued an ultimatum for all militias to disarm, and vowed that those who failed to disarm would be considered outlaws, prosecuted by the Congolese authorities, and forcefully disarmed by MONUC,¹²¹ leading 15,000 Ituri militia members to disarm.¹²²

The Ineffectiveness of Peacekeepers on Government-Inflicted Casualties

In contrast, MONUC’s response to the government forces’ widespread abuse of civilians¹²³ was muted. Rather than take action following the increase of its forces in Ituri, “MONUC planned to continue the same strategy it had been pursuing up to that point,”¹²⁴ in which it “often turned a blind eye on violations committed by the Kinshasa side.”¹²⁵ Moreover, MONUC actively cooperated

¹¹⁶See Roessler and Prendergast (2006, p. 260).

¹¹⁷See Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009, p. 256).

¹¹⁸See Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009, p. 256).

¹¹⁹See United Nations (2004*a*, para. 25).

¹²⁰See United Nations (2005, para. 15).

¹²¹See IRIN (2005).

¹²²See (Guéhenno, 2015).

¹²³See Human Rights Watch (2007); MONUC (2006, p. 113).

¹²⁴See Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009, p. 270).

¹²⁵See Guéhenno (2015, p. 121).

with Ituri's government, e.g. by refurbishing a prison, courthouse, and police headquarters; holding detainees on behalf of local authorities; training police officers; providing advisers to support local police;¹²⁶ and assisting and conducting joint operations with the Congolese armed forces (IRIN, 2005; United Nations, 2006a). Indeed, in response to the accusation that the government forces had "impunity" for their crimes, the political director of MONUC's office confirmed that they had "a high degree of impunity."¹²⁷

This weak response was closely tied to MONUC's need to 1) maintain the government's consent to continue the peace operation and 2) maintain a collaborative relationship with the Congolese security sector institutions that MONUC was tasked to train. The French ambassador on the Security Council succinctly summarized these dual constraints, stating that MONUC had to act "within the limitations of their means, and in support of the national security forces."¹²⁸ This represented an "enduring dilemma for MONUC: how to reconcile its mandate to protect civilians on the one hand, with its mandate to engage in joint operations with the [government forces] on the other, given the latter's unreliability, rampant abuse of civilians, and occasional open hostility to MONUC itself."¹²⁹

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper introduces a novel research design to analyze whether peacekeeping protects civilians. While peacekeepers seek to promote this objective, the effect of their efforts remains the subject of extensive debate. This controversy is largely the product of theoretical and empirical difficulties, as previous theories do not distinguish between civilian deaths caused by rebels and governments and endogeneity and selection bias have presented largely intractable problems for empirical examinations of the effect of peacekeepers. However, we address these issues by disaggregating civilian

¹²⁶See United Nations (2004a,b).

¹²⁷See IRIN (2005).

¹²⁸See de la Sablière (2015, p. 172), authors' translation.

¹²⁹See Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009, p. 279).

casualties and by utilizing exogenous variation in which countries hold power in the UN Security Council. We demonstrate that when states hold more power, they deploy more peacekeepers to their preferred locations, and that these additional peacekeepers positively impact the treatment of civilians who are otherwise victimized by rebels, but not by governments. Our results stand in contrast to the results from naive OLS models that control for some confounders, suggesting that endogeneity is indeed a serious issue without a credible identification strategy.

Our findings match our theoretical expectations which we derive from two considerations: First, UN peace operations rely *de facto* on the consent of the host country's government in order to operate in a given country. Second, an increasing number of peace operations is mandated to train their host countries' military and police forces and thus seek to maintain constructive relationships with them, providing an incentive not to respond harshly to civilian victimization by those same forces. We provide additional evidence for this causal mechanism by distinguishing between civilian casualties in combat areas and those in rear areas, as we find that UN peace operations reduced rebel-inflicted – but not government-inflicted – civilian casualties in both of these areas. This suggests that UN peace operations are not simply more effective at preventing rebels from killing civilians in some areas.

Furthermore, our results comport with qualitative descriptions of peacekeepers' efforts. Consider, for instance, the effect of UN blue helmets on the protection of civilians from attacks by rebels and government forces in the Ituri District in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this case, the initial small UN contingent deployed to Ituri in the spring of 2003 lacked the capacity to protect civilians from warring factions. In contrast, the much larger UN force deployed in the fall of 2003 restored stability to large parts of Ituri and leveraged their reinforced capabilities to respond successfully to rebel attacks, though they did not do so against government forces, as we detail in the case study.

However, as with any analysis, it is important to consider the scope conditions of our study. While our empirical strategy necessitates a focus on four out of five African regions, the mechanisms driving our results are highly general and thus likely apply in a variety of settings. Moreover,

our empirical strategy leverages two separate instruments, which allows us to estimate three local average treatment effects. The fact that these estimates are so similar gives us confidence in the generalizability of our findings.¹³⁰ Further, while we analyze these dynamics over a specific time period, we expect that our main effect has become stronger over time, as almost all new peace missions now come with explicit mandates to protect civilians.

Our study has a number of scholarly and policy implications. From a scholarly perspective, in addition to its contribution to the literatures on peacekeeping and IO effectiveness, our findings speak to debates over who holds power in international organizations and the effects of these arrangements.¹³¹ We document the influence obtained by temporary boosts in leverage within the Security Council, and show that states not only use these positions to try to benefit their own national considerations, but that their efforts strongly impact important humanitarian outcomes. Moreover, from an empirical standpoint, this paper demonstrates the feasibility and importance of using quasi-random variation to study international interactions, and of considering the political relationships between IOs and host governments when trying to identify these institutions' effects. In so doing, we contribute to the vast literature on the effects of international interventions more broadly.

From a policy standpoint, our study speaks to the numerous proposals to alter the UN Security Council's composition. Specifically, our first stage results show that representation on the UNSC changes the locations to which peacekeepers are deployed, which should be taken into account when evaluating the merits of the various proposals. Further, since we determine that peacekeepers protect civilians from rebel atrocities, we call arguments to reduce peacekeeping budgets due to efficacy concerns into question. However, our null effect on government-caused deaths raises concerns about these activities. While this result indicates that peace operations may address the larger threat to human security since rebels tend to inflict more civilian casualties than do govern-

¹³⁰We expect our first stage results, however, only to obtain where states from particular regions represented on the UNSC prefer larger UN peace operations in their regional neighborhoods. Future work could determine whether this holds in other world regions.

¹³¹See Gowa and Kim (2005); Novosad and Werker (2014); Vreeland and Dreher (2014) among others.

ments embroiled in a civil war, it also casts doubt on peacekeepers' abilities to remain unbiased, which could potentially affect the quality of the peace or the type of post-conflict arrangements reached.¹³² If so, perhaps successful avenues for diminishing violence at the hands of governments should be sought; the answers to these questions remain interesting and productive areas for future research.

¹³²We are unable to test these propositions using our research design due to the frequency with which power changes hands on the Council.

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The Promise of Peacekeeping: Protecting Civilians in Civil Wars

*Appendix of Supporting Information
(Not for publication)*

Case study: UN peacekeepers in Ituri district, DRC (2003-6)

The case of UN peacekeeping in Ituri in the Eastern DRC offers the opportunity for a controlled comparison of the effect of a large increase in the number of blue helmets in the area in the fall of 2003 on civilian casualties inflicted by the rebels and the government, respectively. We focus on events unfolding over a single period of the Congolese civil war (from 2003 to 2006) in one of the DRC's 26 districts so we can compare the effect of an influx of blue helmets on abuses committed by each side in the same location at the same point in time. Ituri is roughly the size of Ireland and has four million inhabitants; it is located in Orientale province in the North East of the DRC at the border between the DRC and Uganda. The conflict in Ituri was ongoing throughout the period of investigation, and it cost some 60,000 lives by 2006 (Allen, 2006). The first UN peacekeepers arrived in Ituri in the spring of 2003 and a much larger UN force was deployed in the fall of the same year as part of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Before turning to the effect of UN peacekeeping on the plight of civilians during the conflict in Ituri, we analyze the establishment of the UN peace operation and the role of African Security Council members therein.

The Influence of Countries with Temporary Power on Peacekeeping

Both the rotating council presidents and non-permanent Council members that were from the Congo's region in Africa exercised influence over the peacekeeping mission. After an initial period of disinterest in the mission, states from the region pushed for increased UN support. We first detail the lack of interest before exploring the impact of specific states on the Council.

According to a senior diplomat posted at the United Nations, "The Congo file started in Africa, not in the United Nations. The Lusaka Agreement called for UN forces....The UN wasn't there. The UN came in with a framework that wasn't theirs" (cited in Bernath and Edgerton, 2003, p. 5). Similarly, the former UN Under-Secretary-General in charge of UN peacekeeping recalls that "[f]rom the outset, the international community had no grand design for Congo ... The July 1999

agreement, which had been negotiated by African leaders and not by the UN, nevertheless called on the United Nations for its implementation” (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 116-7). A recent analysis of the history of peacekeeping in the Congo concurs with this assessment, noting that “[e]ven though MONUC...ha[s] been the largest peace operation to date, the UN Security Council [i.e., its non-African majority] at first strongly resisted peacekeeping in the DRC. The Council had to be convinced by the region that external intervention was necessary” (Carayannis, 2013, p. 197).

The Lusaka peace process, which preceded the establishment of a UN peace operation, was a regional initiative launched by Zambia as chair of the Southern African Development Community’s summit in September 1998 in response to the outbreak of the second Congo War a month earlier. In July 1999, the parties to the conflict in the DRC convened in Lusaka to sign a peace accord that was mediated by Zambia. The United Nations was absent from the mediation process (Lanotte, 2003, p. 132-4) and was caught off guard by the warring parties’ call for a robust UN peace operation expressed in the agreement (Holt and Berkman, 2006, p. 158). The Congolese government “pushed hard for this resolution and lobbied African Security Council members and other non-permanent members through the Non-Aligned Movement” (Carayannis, 2013, p. 191).

In 1998 and 1999, Gabon represented Central Africa on the Security Council. It spoke out in favor of active Security Council support of African regional initiatives to end the conflict in the DRC (United Nations, 1999*a,c*), and it frequently criticized the UN for neglecting African conflicts (Mandjouhou Yolla, 2003, p. 215). Moreover, it adopted a pro-Western position when it held the presidency of the UN Security Council in May 1999 during NATO’s air war against the FR Yugoslavia over Kosovo.¹ In the absence of Gabonese interests in the Balkans one may wonder about its motive for introducing a pro-Western draft resolution on Kosovo; Gabon’s president at the time had a history of “exchanging services” with France by mediating foreign crises

¹The day before acceding to the presidency, Gabon submitted a draft resolution on humanitarian aid to Kosovar refugees in the name of 113 members of the Non-Aligned Movement (Réseau Voltaire, 1999), and the Council adopted a revised draft two weeks into Gabon’s Security Council presidency. The resolution’s focus on the humanitarian needs of Kosovo-Albanian refugees conflicted with China and Russia’s emphasis on the illegality under international law of NATO’s airstrikes against the FR Yugoslavia and on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 8. One month later Gabon became the only developing country on the Security Council to co-submit the draft for resolution 1244, which ended the Kosovo War by placing it under UN administration (United Nations, 1999*b*, p. 2-3).

(Mandjouhou Yolla, 2003, p. 216, authors' translation). Despite the United States' skepticism about the merits of UN peacekeeping in the DRC² the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UN observers within a month from the conclusion of the Lusaka accord. In November 1999, Security Council resolution 1279 established a regular UN observer mission and asked the Secretary-General to prepare for the deployment of a much larger force.

After Gabon's departure from the Security Council at the end of 1999, the Security Council seat that is alternately held by a Central and a North African country was held by Tunisia in 2000 and 2001; contrary to Gabon, Tunisia did not prioritize the settlement of the conflict in the DRC. Central African countries continued to plead for a robust and large UN peace operation in the DRC, but now the Security Council was less responsive than it was in 1999. Resolution 1291 of February 2001 was "largely symbolic" (Willame, 2007); it increased the number of UN peacekeepers to 5,000, but no UN troops were deployed until March 2001. Delays were partly due to troop contributors' hesitations to provide blue helmets to MONUC, the blocking of funds for MONUC by the United States Congress, and lack of progress in the peace process. Two observers concluded that "[t]he more violent the fighting became, the more urgently needed were peacekeepers, but the less likely their deployment became" (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006). In the summer of 2000 the UN Secretary-General considered aborting the entire peace operation (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006). The succession of Laurent Kabila as president of the DRC by his son in January 2001 removed a major obstacle to a speedy deployment of MONUC. Even so, the Security Council endorsed a new peacekeeping plan that reduced the planned number of UN troops to protect civilians and UN military observers from 3,400 to 1,900 (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009). In October 2001, the Security Council endorsed the start of a new phase of the peace operation – without approving additional troops (*Ibid.*).

²In March 1999, the United States' representative on the Security Council reiterated a statement by President Clinton according to which his country would consider supporting a peacekeeping operation if there were a comprehensive agreement among the belligerents to end the conflict and to observe a ceasefire (United Nations, 1999a, p. 12); this condition was not fulfilled when the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UN monitors since several parties had not even signed the agreement. According to an anonymous State Department official interviewed in early November 1999, the United States also did not view the DRC as an urgent crisis that required a massive intervention when the Security Council established a regular UN observer mission (cited in Willame, 2007, p. 21).

In January 2002, Cameroon joined the Security Council as Central Africa's representative. As an "economic locomotive" of Central Africa, Cameroon repeatedly experienced an intense influx of refugees from its region (Chouala, 2014, p. 236-7), and it therefore had a keen interest in restoring peace in its own region. In June 2002, a summit of Central African countries provided the venue for a meeting between the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda, which led to the signing of the protocol of a peace accord in July (Willame, 2007, p. 78). According to the head of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the time, this agreement was the political turning point for the DRC (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 124). In pursuit of the agreement, Rwanda withdrew its troops from the DRC in September 2002. During the same month, Angola facilitated an agreement between Uganda and the DRC on Ugandan withdrawal and convinced the DRC's ally Zimbabwe to repatriate its troops.

The UN Security Council responded to these developments by expanding MONUC to 8,700 personnel (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006). While the United States was still reluctant to increase the size of MONUC due to the financial implications (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006, p. 256), it was simultaneously engaged in an intense campaign to secure the votes of Cameroon and Angola on a Security Council resolution authorizing a United States-led invasion of Iraq (de La Sablière, 2013); Angola had joined the Council at the end of 2002 when a seat for Southern Africa opened up, thereby becoming the second state with a vital interest in the DRC to serve on the Council in 2003.

The Positive Effect of Peacekeepers on Rebel-Inflicted Casualties

On the ground in the DRC, the influx of additional UN peacekeepers authorized in late 2002 made a major difference. Back in 2000, a senior UN official complained about the insufficient size and mandate of the peace operation in the DRC: "This is Bosnia all over again. These guys are not going to be able to protect anyone" (cited in Lynch, 2000). The head of UN peacekeeping concurs that MONUC did not have much capacity to protect civilians in 2000 and 2001 (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 119-120). Cognizant of the mission's limitations, "early reports of the Secretary-General to

the Security Council did not reflect protection of civilians as a central planning objective for the mission” (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009). The Secretary-General’s June 2002 report cautioned that “[w]hile MONUC will do its utmost, it does not have the means to provide broader protection to civilians at large ... MONUC troops currently deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not equipped, trained or configured to intervene rapidly to assist those in need of protection” (United Nations, 2002).

In Ituri, less than ten UN observers monitored an area with four million inhabitants between 1999 and April 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2003*b*, p. 2). With such a small presence on the ground, the UN was manifestly incapable of protecting civilians from any warring faction. When it became clear in mid-April 2003 that the last remaining Ugandan forces would depart shortly, the UN Under-Secretary-General in charge of peacekeeping decided to redeploy a reserve contingent of Uruguayan blue helmets to Bunia, the capital of Ituri, in order to stabilize the situation (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 250). By the time the last Ugandan soldiers left Ituri on May 6, 411 MONUC troops were stationed in Bunia, and 200 more arrived a few days later (IRIN, 2003). Various primary sources agree that the force was largely incapable of protecting ethnic Hema civilians who were victimized by ethnic Hema, Lendu, and Ngiti militias, which fought over control of Bunia and exploited the climate of lawlessness to harass its civilian population.

A report produced by the UN Secretariat detailing the lessons learned offers the following assessment of MONUC’s performance in late April and May of 2003: “Given that URUBATT was principally ready for static guard duty and was not trained, configured or equipped for the kind of emergency robust deployment that was required for Bunia, it was clear from the start that there was little more it could do than provide security to MONUC and other international staff as well as the local civilians who sought refuge at the headquarters and airport base” (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2004, p. 7). The International Crisis Group (2003, p. 12), an independent think tank, reached a similar conclusion: “MONUC had initially attempted to set up roadblocks, restore order, conduct patrols, and protect civilians, but these were quickly overwhelmed, and the mandate ‘to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’

was abandoned.”³ In an internal report, the Force Commander of MONUC blamed the timidity of the contingent itself, which was presumably a function of the fact that it was greatly outnumbered by fighting militias, and he expressed his conviction that if the contingent “had used at least 50% of its potential, with 30% in Bunia, and had reacted properly, it would have managed to re-establish order” (cited in Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 252). In conclusion, the small UN peacekeeping contingent deployed to Bunia in the spring of 2003 was largely unable to protect civilians from harm inflicted by either of the warring factions.

In mid-May 2003, the apparent failure of MONUC in Ituri led the UN Secretary-General to call on France to deploy a temporary emergency force to Bunia (de La Sablière, 2013, p. 110-1). France responded favorably and insisted on deploying a European Union-led force, which received the UN Security Council’s authorization at the end of May and deployed immediately. With some 5,000 troops, the force quickly pacified the situation in Bunia. At the same time, the European Union insisted on withdrawing its force after three months and rejected the UN Secretariat’s proposal of maintaining an over-the-horizon force that might return in case of an emergency after September 1; European countries that contributed troops to the EU force also declined to remain in Bunia as part of MONUC (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 139-40). The complete withdrawal of the EU left MONUC with the responsibility to maintain order and civilian security after September 1, and the UN Secretariat anticipated that “spoilers would challenge the UN force as soon as the multinational force had left” (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 139).

Still bitter about the refusal of the majority of UN Security Council members to vote to authorize the Iraq War, the United States was at first reluctant to approve a reinforcement for MONUC that deployed to Ituri in the wake of the EU interim force’s withdrawal (Guéhenno, 2015); if past discord over Iraq was on the mind of American diplomats, so was their desire to secure the unanimity in the Council on the endorsement of the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority and on the process for transferring control to Iraqi authorities, which the United States obtained despite misgivings by several Security Council members (Ryan, 2003, p. 22). In the end, the UN Security

³See Human Rights Watch, 2003*a* for an additional assessment.

Council approved an enlargement of MONUC to 10,800 staff at the end of July. According to the head of the UN's peacekeeping department, this reinforcement was "highly significant," and turned MONUC into "a completely different mission" (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 140). In particular, 5,000 troops deployed to Ituri. While the EU force had only been located in Ituri's capital, the UN's new Ituri brigade would cover the entire district. 2,400 troops from Uruguay, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia arrived in Bunia by September 1 when the EU withdrew; in the following two months the number of UN troops in Ituri reached 4,500, and these forces were equipped with attack helicopters and armored personnel carriers (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 254). By November, the UN force was deployed to Ituri's capital and seven additional locations in Ituri where no EU forces had been stationed (United Nations, 2004a, para. 23).

As soon as the EU interim force was gone, local rebel militias tested the resolve of MONUC's new Ituri brigade; in early October a rebel militia killed 65 civilians (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 256). Whereas the small MONUC contingent had failed to react to similar atrocities committed in the spring, the much larger Ituri brigade responded by accelerating its deployment across Ituri and by intervening to prevent fighting between two rebel milita (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 256). When militias attacked MONUC staff twenty times in two months, MONUC did not withdraw to the safety of its bases like it did several months earlier, but it stepped up patrols, checkpoint controls, and cordon and search operations (United Nations, 2004a, para. 25). Throughout the winter of 2003-4, MONUC succeeded in maintaining security in Bunia, and its deployment was associated with the return of stability of many parts of Ituri where no other international peacekeepers had previously been based (United Nations, 2004a, para. 25). In short, MONUC transitioned into a new phase when its capacity increased in the late summer and fall of 2003, and "it was not until this [new] stage that MONUC had the means to take seriously its mandate to protect civilians under the imminent threat of attack" (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006, p. 260).

At the end of 2004, fighting between various rebel groups in Ituri escalated once again despite MONUC's strong presence on the ground. MONUC responded to attacks on the civilian population by dismantling militia camps, and increasing the protection of sensitive sites (e.g., camps for

internally displaced persons and premises of humanitarian aid providers) (United Nations, 2005, para. 15). In February, a militia launched a coordinated ambush on a MONUC foot patrol that killed nine UN troops. In response, MONUC carried out a large cordon-and-search operation and successfully dismantled a headquarters of the militia; during the exchange of fire between 50 and 60 militia members were killed (*Ibid.*, para. 19). MONUC issued an ultimatum for all militias to disarm by April 1, and the acting political director of its Ituri office vowed that those who failed to disarm would be considered outlaws, prosecuted by the Congolese authorities, and forcefully disarmed by MONUC (IRIN, 2005). According to the UN's Under-Secretary-General who was in charge of peacekeeping, MONUC averted further harm to its military credibility by acting on its ultimatum, eventually leading 15,000 militia members in Ituri to disarm (Guéhenno, 2015).

The Ineffectiveness of Peacekeepers on Government-Inflicted Casualties

The robust posture of MONUC's Ituri brigade vis-à-vis rebel groups that abused civilians in Ituri stands in striking contrast to its response to serious human rights violations perpetrated by the government. In March 2005, the political director of the MONUC's office in Ituri explained MONUC's position on war crimes committed by government forces in an interview with the UN's news agency: "Crimes [committed by integrated units of the Congolese armed forces] must be prosecuted by the appropriate authorities observing due process and if soldiers are found guilty of war crimes, the Congolese authorities will have to take appropriate action. Question: Human rights groups have complained there is impunity. What do you say about this? Answer: One must understand that the DRC for many years now has been close to a failed state. In such circumstances, we always face a high degree of impunity." (IRIN, 2005)

Indeed, human rights groups reported widespread abuse of civilians by government forces; for example, Human Rights Watch (2007, p. 113) accused government soldiers of using villagers as slave labor at the Bavi gold mine in Ituri in late 2005, and in the course of a military operation against a militia group in Ituri in early 2006. It stated, "Congolese army soldiers deliberately killed more than 60 civilians accused of supporting the militia, raped women and girls, and burned homes,

churches, schools, and health centers in communities suspected of harboring insurgents” (*Ibid.*, p. 110). MONUC (2006, para.3) confirmed that the “routine use of physical violence against civilians, including summary executions, beatings and rape, committed by [Congolese army] soldiers is reported wherever the army is deployed.” In fact, data gathered by MONUC (2006, para.33) indicates that 88 percent of serious human rights violations in the DRC between January and June 2006 were perpetrated by the armed forces (53 percent), the police (28 percent), and intelligence agencies (7 percent), while rebel groups ‘only’ accounted for the remaining 12 percent.⁴

MONUC’s response to violence against civilians by the DRC’s authorities was strikingly different from its reaction to atrocities committed by rebels. In a report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General explained that MONUC would strengthen civil and military coordination with the Congolese armed forces to incorporate humanitarian considerations into military planning, contingency planning for the humanitarian impact of military operations, and a dialogue with the Congolese government to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses committed by the latter’s security forces (United Nations, 2006*b*, para. 49). This led two commentators to conclude that “[w]ith these mitigation mechanisms in place, the Secretary-General essentially told the Security Council that MONUC planned to continue the same strategy it had been pursuing up to that point” (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 270).

MONUC’s reluctance to resolutely respond to abuses of civilians committed by the Congolese government was closely tied to its need to maintain the latter’s consent to the UN peace operation’s continued presence in the DRC and to the need to maintain a collaborative relationship with the Congolese security sector institutions that MONUC was tasked to train. The head of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the time concluded that while both sides used proxies to enlarge the area they controlled, “MONUC, whose headquarters was based in the capital of one of the parties, often turned a blind eye on violations committed by the Kinshasa side” (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 121). The French ambassador on the UN Security Council at the time succinctly summarized the dual constraints on the protection of civilians by MONUC - its capacity and the need

⁴Data on earlier periods has not been released.

to collaborate with the DRC's government - stating, "The blue helmets could act but within the limitations of their means, and in support of the national security forces" (de la Sablière, 2015, p. 172, authors' translation).

In Ituri, MONUC actively cooperated with the DRC's government, e.g. by refurbishing the Bunia prison, courthouse, and police headquarters, by holding detainees on behalf of local authorities, by training police officers, and by providing advisers to support local police (United Nations, 2004*a,b*), as well as by assisting the Congolese armed forces (IRIN, 2005) and by conducting joint operations with them (United Nations, 2006*a*, para. 68). In short, the need to collaborate with the DRC's armed forces and police created an "enduring dilemma for MONUC: how to reconcile its mandate to protect civilians on the one hand, with its mandate to engage in joint operations with the FARDC on the other, given the latter's unreliability, rampant abuse of civilians, and occasional open hostility to MONUC itself" (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 279).

Conclusion

Several key findings emerge from this case study of MONUC's response to the victimization of civilians in Ituri district between 2003 and 2006. First, the small UN contingent of some 700 Uruguayan troops deployed to Bunia in the spring of 2003 was incapable of fulfilling its mandate to protect civilians. Vastly outnumbered by rival militias that fought over control of the town, it adopted a passive posture and largely failed to improve the plight of civilians. In contrast, the much larger UN force deployed in the fall of 2003, which numbered 4,500 by November, fared much better. It maintained stability in Bunia, where an EU interim force had been deployed for three months over the summer, and restored order in other parts of Ituri where no international peacekeepers had previously been deployed. When rebel militias tested its resolve, the reinforced MONUC responded by dismantling their headquarters, disrupting their military activities, and by issuing and enforcing an ultimatum for their disarmament. While MONUC leveraged its reinforced capabilities to respond actively and successfully to rebel attacks on civilians, it responded much more cautiously and much less effectively to atrocities committed by government forces. The dual

mandate to protect civilians and to closely collaborate with the government's army and police in Ituri confronted MONUC with a dilemma, which it sought to escape by limiting its response to human rights abuses perpetrated by the government to capacity-building, training, dialogue, and subtle pressure. Ultimately, the increase in MONUC deployments in Ituri in late 2003 led to a decline in violence against civilians at the hands of rebel forces while it did not end attacks on civilians by government forces.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	St.dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Dependent variables</i>					
Civilian deaths	2,459	50.49	402.2	0	13,095
Civilian deaths by rebels	2,459	28.26	377.8	0	12,844
Civilian deaths by government	2,459	22.22	116.4	0	2,631
Civilian deaths in combat areas	2,459	45.24	397.1	0	13,058
Civ. deaths by gov. in combat areas	2,459	18.71	109.3	0	2,631
Civ. deaths by rebels in combat areas	2,459	26.53	375.6	0	12,807
Civilian deaths in rear areas	2,459	5.243	37.71	0	1,004
Civ. deaths by gov. in rear areas	2,459	3.267	30.29	0	1,004
Civ. deaths by rebels in rear areas	2,459	1.974	19.55	0	553
Civilian deaths in combat areas (100 km)	2,459	47.64	399.3	0	13,095
Civ. deaths by gov. in combat areas (100 km)	2,459	20.21	112.3	0	2,631
Civ. deaths by rebels in combat areas (100 km)	2,459	27.43	376.7	0	12,844
Civilian deaths in rear areas (100 km)	2,459	2.843	30.54	0	1,004
Civ. deaths by gov. in rear areas (100 km)	2,459	1.768	25.46	0	1,004
Civ. deaths by rebels in rear areas (100 km)	2,459	1.079	14.62	0	500
<i>Instrumental variables</i>					
UNSC representation	2,459	0.526	0.499	0	1
UNSC presidency	2,459	0.153	0.359	0	1
UNSC presidency (± 1 month)	2,459	0.096	0.295	0	1
<i>Independent variables</i>					
UNPO size	2,459	1,036.3	4,226.6	0	32,698
UNPO size without unarmed observers	2,459	995.7	4,101.6	0	31,981
UNPO size w/o temp. UNSC member's forces	2,459	1,034.9	4,217.6	0	32,559
Peace agreement provision on PK	2,459	0.036	0.188	0	1
Conflict duration	2,459	8.967	8.003	1	33
Simultaneous conflicts	2,459	1.845	1.554	0	9
Political rights	2,411	6.059	0.890	3	7
Population size (ln.)	2,459	16.50	1.060	12.91	18.28
Forest cover (%)	2,459	18.67	18.95	0.0487	69.91
GDP per cap. (ln.)	2,291	6.132	0.922	4.736	8.052
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	2,123	26.92	34.18	1.362	192.9
UN sanctions	2,255	0.231	0.422	0	1
UN mediation	2,459	0.046	0.210	0	1
Mediation	2,459	0.110	0.313	0	1
Multilateral aid	2,459	0.407	2.938	0	36.37
All aid	2,459	21.83	70.82	0	840.1
Foreign troop support	2,327	0.175	0.380	0	1
New peace agreement	2,459	0.022	0.147	0	1
Peace agreement collapse	2,459	0.005	0.070	0	1
Year	2,459	1998.9	6.137	1989	2010

Note: Data on aid commitments was extracted from the Aid Data 2.1 dataset (Tierney et al., 2011). The aid variables record the total amount of all aid commitments and multilateral aid commitments, respectively, to a country in a given year in millions of constant 2011 USD. A country-month dataset on UN sanctions was coded for this study from the data presented in Biersteker (2015). Analyses of sanctions is limited to the period starting in 1991 due to data availability. The binary UN sanctions variable takes a positive value if sanctions were in place against any actor in the civil-war country at the end of the month. Data on mediation was compiled by DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011). The binary UN mediation takes a positive value for when a mediation episode was ongoing at the end of the month if the UN or a UN representative were identified as a third-party mediator in DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011); the mediation measure captures whether any mediation episode was unfolding at the end of the month. The binary foreign troop support variable takes a positive value when a foreign state or non-state actor provides troops that fight alongside governments or rebels in civil conflicts. The data was coded for the period ending in 2009 and is presented in Hogbladh, Pettersson and Thaler (2011).

Table 2: Number of civilian deaths in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa by country

Country	Total number of civilian deaths	Share of civilian deaths in %	Number of civilians killed by rebels	Number of civilians killed by government
Algeria	1,934	1.6	1,710	224
Angola	3,976	3.2	2,326	1,634
Burundi	8,253	6.6	2,794	5,459
Cameroon	2	0.0	0	2
Central African Republic	348	0.3	157	191
Chad	2,171	1.7	1,053	111,8
Comoros	0	0.0	0	0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	52,756	42.5	43,404	9,353
Djibouti	2	0.0	0	2
Egypt	244	0.2	205	39
Eritrea	140	0.1	0	140
Ethiopia	3,129	2.5	212	2,917
Lesotho	0	0.0	0	0
Mauritania	0	0.0	0	0
Morocco (Western Sahara)	34	0.0	34	0
Mozambique	1,573	1.3	1,323	250
Republic of Congo	1,567	1.3	127	1,440
Rwanda	16,824	13.6	2,290	14,534
Somalia	5,062	4.1	650	4,412
Sudan	20,675	16.7	8,386	12,289
Uganda	5,503	4.4	4,876	627
Sum	124,193	100	69,513	54,647

Note: The table shows the number of civilian casualties during ongoing civil conflicts in Central, Eastern, Southern, and North Africa between 1989 and 2010. Note that the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for a large share of all civilian casualties; to ensure that the results of this study are not driven solely by this conflict some of our robustness checks exclude the Congolese observations. The figures exclude the 146,211 identified casualties of the Rwanda genocide in April 1994, because this event is an extreme outlier; as a single country-month observation, it accounts for more civilian fatalities in a single month than all other 2,459 civil-conflict-month observations combined. Data source: Sundberg and Melander (2013).

Table 3: Names and size of UNPOs in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa

Country	Names of UNPOs	UNPO size mean	UNPO size max.
Angola	UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, MONUA	1,125.4	7,302
Burundi	ONUB	699.2	5,665
Central African Republic	MINURCAT	98.88	296
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	MONUC, MONUSCO	6,315.8	18,536
Chad	MINURCAT	241.9	3,518
Rwanda	UNAMIR	232.0	5,645
Somalia	UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, UNSOA	1,374.4	24,566
Sudan	UNMIS, UNAMID	4,607.4	32,860
Uganda	UNOMUR	2.452	81
Total		1,043.8	32,860

Note: The table indicates the names and size of the fifteen UN peace operations deployed during ongoing civil conflicts in Central, Eastern, Southern, and North Africa between 1989 and 2010. The average (maximal) size represents the mean (maximal) number of troops, military observers, and civilian police deployed as part of the peace operation while the conflict was ongoing. For each country, the minimal number of UN peace operation staff deployed while the conflict was ongoing was zero. Two additional peace operations were established in the aftermath of conflicts in Morocco and Mozambique. Moreover, an additional peace operation was deployed on the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea in response to an interstate war between these two countries and not in the context of a civil conflict. Peace operations in Western Africa are not included in the table, because Western Africa is outside the scope of the natural experiment of seats on the Security Council that rotate between the four other African regions.

Table 4: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: omitting peacekeepers from country with temporary UNSC seat

Variables	Number of civilian casualties					
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.050 (0.030)	-0.038 (0.023)	-0.045 (0.026)	-0.121 (0.055)	-0.166 (0.060)	-0.124 (0.055)
Peace agreement provision on PK				17.60 (158.4)	36.31 (218.2)	19.06 (162.8)
Conflict duration				2.590 (2.859)	3.006 (4.364)	2.622 (2.973)
Simultaneous conflicts				42.99 (17.94)	37.29 (14.73)	42.54 (17.65)
Political rights				-93.55 (111.8)	-140.2 (145.6)	-97.18 (113.7)
Population size (ln.)				116.4 (326.2)	328.2 (488.6)	132.9 (334.3)
Forest cover (%)				-8.328 (14.93)	-9.788 (22.56)	-8.442 (15.51)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-131.7 (186.6)	-296.6 (402.9)	-144.5 (199.1)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				0.672 (1.564)	1.294 (2.160)	0.721 (1.607)
	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	669.9 (364.1)		498.2 (290.3)	321.6 (180.6)		307.4 (185.3)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		1,086.9 (554.9)	1,090.5 (557.5)		220.3 (102.9)	356.3 (176.2)
Peace agreement provision on PK				361.6 (1,357.2)	419.1 (1,385.5)	364.8 (1,357.4)
Conflict duration				9.684 (36.00)	9.211 (36.05)	9.660 (36.00)
Simultaneous conflicts				-120.6 (125.8)	-127.2 (128.0)	-121.1 (125.8)
Political rights				-1,051.8 (679.4)	-1,033.3 (677.1)	-1,050.8 (679.7)
Population size (ln.)				4,566.8 (3,354.3)	4650.0 (3,415.3)	4,561.9 (3,358.0)
Forest cover (%)				-39.92 (176.4)	-35.36 (173.9)	-40.25 (176.7)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-3,649.3 (2,996.0)	-3,660.1 (3,027.5)	-3,650.1 (2,996.0)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				13.99 (15.62)	13.83 (15.62)	13.99 (15.62)
Observations	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,063	2,063	2,063
Cragg-Donald statistic	18.21	15.97	12.24	13.02	3.18	6.57
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.467			0.315

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 5: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: omitting peacekeepers from country with temporary UNSC seat: variation by faction

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.088 (0.035)	-0.102 (0.048)	-0.089 (0.035)	0.530 (0.658)	-0.256 (0.262)	0.522 (0.656)
Peace agreement provision on PK	28.10 (109.4)	33.80 (130.6)	28.44 (110.6)	-418.5 (732.8)	-92.49 (444.9)	-414.7 (722.1)
Conflict duration	1.354 (2.217)	1.479 (2.604)	1.361 (2.240)	1.539 (22.09)	8.718 (12.43)	1.622 (21.84)
Simultaneous conflicts	15.49 (7.065)	13.77 (4.994)	15.39 (6.897)	172.7 (165.7)	73.84 (79.31)	171.6 (164.8)
Political rights	-73.57 (76.76)	-87.84 (101.8)	-74.42 (77.89)	655.2 (698.0)	-160.9 (234.9)	645.7 (690.1)
Population size (ln.)	162.3 (213.8)	227.4 (335.3)	166.1 (218.8)	-2,929.7 (2,449.3)	792.5 (1,346.2)	-2,886.6 (2,423.4)
Forest cover (%)	-0.178 (10.34)	-0.630 (12.45)	-0.205 (10.47)	-121.8 (88.50)	-147.7 (82.61)	-122.1 (86.84)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-83.98 (149.0)	-134.5 (241.8)	-86.99 (152.7)	292.7 (1,337.6)	-2,594.9 (2,493.7)	259.3 (1,312.9)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.483 (1.160)	0.674 (1.449)	0.494 (1.173)	-4.338 (8.718)	6.557 (6.792)	-4.212 (8.518)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	324.9 (181.9)		310.8 (186.7)	324.9 (181.9)		310.8 (186.7)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		221.5 (103.2)	358.9 (176.9)		221.5 (103.2)	358.9 (176.9)
Peace agreement provision on PK	359.6 (1,357.1)	417.9 (1,385.7)	362.9 (1,357.3)	359.6 (1,357.1)	417.9 (1,385.7)	362.9 (1,357.3)
Conflict duration	9.567 (36.09)	9.095 (36.14)	9.544 (36.09)	9.567 (36.09)	9.095 (36.14)	9.544 (36.09)
Simultaneous conflicts	-119.6 (125.2)	-126.3 (127.5)	-112.0 (125.2)	-119.6 (125.2)	-126.3 (127.5)	-112.0 (125.2)
Political rights	-1,053.7 (680.2)	-1,034.8 (677.8)	-1,052.7 (680.4)	-1,053.7 (680.2)	-1,034.8 (677.8)	-1,052.7 (680.4)
Population size (ln.)	4,594.7 (3,372.8)	4,676.4 (3,433.5)	4,589.8 (3,376.5)	4,594.7 (3,372.8)	4,676.4 (3,433.5)	4,589.8 (3,376.5)
Forest cover (%)	-40.56 (177.3)	-35.83 (174.7)	-40.88 (177.7)	-40.56 (177.3)	-35.83 (174.7)	-40.88 (177.7)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,657.0 (2,999.8)	-3,667.5 (3,031.6)	-3,657.8 (2,999.7)	-3,657.0 (2,999.8)	-3,667.5 (3,031.6)	-3,657.8 (2,999.7)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	14.02 (15.68)	13.87 (15.68)	14.02 (15.68)	14.02 (15.68)	13.87 (15.68)	14.02 (15.68)
Observations	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058
Donald-Cragg statistic	13.24	3.20	6.68	13.24	3.20	6.68
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.641			0.360

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 6: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

Variables	Number of civilian casualties					
	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.060 (0.031)	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.048 (0.027)	-0.146 (0.044)	-0.163 (0.063)	-0.147 (0.044)
Peace agreement provision on PK				38.39 (186.3)	45.05 (207.9)	38.57 (186.8)
Conflict duration				1.545 (4.938)	1.523 (5.659)	1.544 (1.545)
Simultaneous conflicts				33.62 (13.25)	30.79 (12.86)	33.54 (13.18)
Political rights				-127.7 (109.6)	-145.1 (144.7)	-128.2 (110.1)
Population size (ln.)				279.3 (315.7)	362.6 (517.4)	281.5 (318.5)
Forest cover (%)				-1.656 (21.24)	-2.755 (23.85)	-1.684 (21.31)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-81.42 (215.0)	-136.3 (352.5)	-82.84 (217.0)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				0.748 (1.755)	0.963 (2.032)	0.753 (1.760)
Number of UNPO personnel						
	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	717.0 (390.0)		532.6 (311.1)	382.4 (222.7)		376.1 (231.6)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		925.7 (466.1)	1,153.4 (592.3)		236.7 (119.7)	397.1 (208.8)
Peace agreement provision on PK				322.3 (1,344.6)	398.9 (1,375.4)	323.7 (1,344.8)
Conflict duration				-0.516 (42.26)	-1.032 (43.08)	-0.507 (42.28)
Simultaneous conflicts				-165.9 (145.9)	-170.4 (148.0)	-166.1 (145.7)
Political rights				-1,054.1 (661.4)	-1,035.0 (660.6)	-1,053.7 (662.0)
Population size (ln.)				4,823.2 (3,460.6)	4,909.0 (3,533.8)	4,820.6 (3,465.6)
Forest cover (%)				-85.90 (212.2)	-71.92 (207.8)	-86.14 (212.3)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-3,269.0 (2,992.2)	-3,269.1 (3,025.7)	-3,269.1 (2,992.8)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				13.08 (15.29)	12.87 (15.29)	13.08 (15.30)
Observations	2,316	2,316	2,316	1,944	1,944	1,944
Cragg-Donald statistic	18.23	15.75	12.08	16.38	3.21	8.20
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.069			0.739

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 7: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: variation by faction: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.118 (0.045)	-0.160 (0.070)	-0.120 (0.046)	-0.029 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.030 (0.013)
Peace agreement provision on PK	42.89 (147.8)	59.65 (203.5)	43.51 (149.7)	-4.491 (38.97)	-14.60 (7.253)	-3.983 (40.85)
Conflict duration	1.153 (3.949)	1.099 (5.695)	1.151 (4.012)	0.392 (1.103)	0.424 (0.263)	0.390 (1.154)
Simultaneous conflicts	27.34 (16.11)	20.20 (10.99)	27.07 (15.91)	6.286 (6.535)	10.59 (5.072)	6.070 (6.484)
Political rights	-105.4 (102.0)	-149.3 (153.9)	-107.0 (103.2)	-22.27 (13.18)	4.150 (11.56)	-23.60 (13.56)
Population size (ln.)	242.8 (288.4)	452.7 (570.0)	250.5 (295.2)	36.52 (49.37)	-90.02 (72.26)	42.88 (50.21)
Forest cover (%)	3.503 (15.46)	0.735 (23.15)	3.401 (15.74)	-5.159 (5.998)	-3.491 (1.213)	-5.243 (6.240)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-42.00 (182.9)	-180.2 (395.7)	-47.11 (188.4)	-39.41 (36.66)	43.89 (54.49)	-43.60 (39.20)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.489 (1.465)	1.031 (2.191)	0.509 (1.489)	0.259 (0.320)	-0.068 (0.213)	0.275 (0.335)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	382.4 (222.7)		376.2 (231.6)	382.4 (222.7)		376.2 (231.6)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		220.3 (119.7)	397.1 (208.8)		220.3 (119.7)	397.1 (208.8)
Peace agreement provision on PK	322.3 (1344.7)	399.0 (1,375.3)	323.7 (1,344.8)	322.3 (1344.7)	399.0 (1,375.3)	323.7 (1,344.8)
Conflict duration	-0.516 (42.26)	-1.032 (43.08)	-0.507 (42.28)	-0.516 (42.26)	-1.032 (43.08)	-0.507 (42.28)
Simultaneous conflicts	-165.9 (145.9)	-170.4 (148.0)	-166.1 (145.7)	-165.9 (145.9)	-170.4 (148.0)	-166.1 (145.7)
Population size (ln.)	-1,054.1 (661.4)	-1,034.98 (660.6)	-1,053.7 (662.0)	-1,054.1 (661.4)	-1,034.98 (660.6)	-1,053.7 (662.0)
Political rights	4,823.2 (3,460.6)	4,909.0 (3,533.8)	4,820.6 (3,465.7)	4,823.2 (3,460.6)	4,909.0 (3,533.8)	4,820.6 (3,465.7)
Forest cover (%)	-85.90 (212.2)	-71.92 (207.8)	-86.14 (212.3)	-85.90 (212.2)	-71.92 (207.8)	-86.14 (212.3)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,269.0 (2992.3)	-3,269.1 (3,025.7)	-3,269.1 (2,992.8)	-3,269.0 (2,992.3)	-3,269.1 (3,025.7)	-3,269.1 (2,992.8)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	13.08 (15.29)	12.87 (15.29)	13.08 (15.30)	13.08 (15.29)	12.87 (15.29)	13.08 (15.30)
Observations	1,944	1,944	1,944	1,944	1,944	1,944
Donald-Cragg statistic	16.38	3.21	8.20	16.38	3.21	8.20
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.412			0.112

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 8: Two-stage least squares: First-stage effect of UNSC seats and UNSC presidencies on UNPO size: coefficient of instruments from 63 models that omit all observations from a single civil-war country

Omitted country (<i>N</i>)	IV: UNSC seats	Cragg-D. Wald F st.	IV: UNSC pres.	Cragg-D. Wald F st.	Both IVs: UNSC seats	Both IVs: UNSC pres.	Cragg-D. Wald F st.
Algeria (240)	348.2 (190.9)	12.24 15%	242.4 (114.1)	3.17	330.8 (195.3)	389.3 (189.6)	6.19 15%
Angola (180)	313.1 (194.2)	11.71 15%	223.9 97.75	3.08	296.3 (200.8)	354.7 (181.1)	5.94 15%
Burundi (192)	268.2 (130.5)	8.09 20%	142.8 (71.77)	1.21	269.9 (148.0)	264.1 (108.4)	4.04 25%
Cameroon (12)	322.6 (181.4)	13.00 15%	220.3 (103.2)	3.16	308.5 (186.2)	356.9 (176.8)	6.56 15%
Central Afr. Rep. (12)	329.2 (184.3)	13.18 15%	223.9 (103.9)	3.14	315.4 (189.6)	363.4 (178.5)	6.65 15%
Chad (60)	383.7 (185.4)	15.43 15%	227.4 (117.6)	2.84	378.5 (186.8)	396.2 (190.8)	7.72 15%
Comoros (24)	322.0 (180.7)	13.04 15%	220.3 103.0	3.18	307.7 (185.4)	356.5 (176.2)	6.58 15%
Dem. Rep. Congo (108)	127.9 (100.5)	6.51 25%	106.2 (63.23)	2.33	115.8 (106.4)	157.9 (97.69)	3.41
Djibouti (48)	342.4 (190.5)	14.09 15%	230.3 (105.8)	3.34	328.6 (196.1)	375.7 (183.6)	7.10 15%
Egypt (72)	332.7 (187.2)	12.96 15%	228.1 (107.0)	3.18	317.8 (191.8)	368.9 (183.0)	6.54 15%
Eritrea (60)	333.7 (188.0)	13.13 15%	227.3 (108.7)	3.19	318.6 (192.0)	370.8 (185.5)	6.63 15%
Ethiopia (240)	302.8 (159.0)	9.57 15%	217.5 (100.6)	2.57	286.0 (163.2)	343.4 (159.7)	4.86 20%
Lesotho (12)	322.0 (181.0)	12.97 15%	220.3 (103.2)	3.16	307.7 (185.7)	356.5 (176.6)	6.55 15%
Mauritania (60)	321.9 (180.7)	13.04 15%	220.3 (103.0)	3.18	307.7 (185.4)	356.5 (176.2)	6.58 15%
Morocco (60)	321.9 (181.0)	12.97 15%	222.2 (104.0)	3.18	307.8 (185.9)	356.5 (176.2)	6.55 15%
Mozambique (48)	337.1 (188.0)	13.66 15%	231.1 (107.6)	3.32	322.0 (192.6)	374.3 (183.9)	6.90 15%
Rep. of Congo (60)	307.1 (171.3)	11.67 15%	207.8 (95.54)	2.77	294.5 (177.5)	338.0 (164.0)	5.88 15%
Rwanda (167)	370.7 (217.3)	15.16 15%	234.6 123.3	3.13	361.9 (221.6)	392.0 (212.4)	7.16 15%
Somalia (168)	322.0 (180.7)	13.04 15%	220.3 (103.0)	3.18	307.7 (185.4)	356.5 (176.2)	6.58 15%
Sudan (264)	254.6 (188.2)	7.49 20%	208.1 (116.5)	2.62	231.6 (189.8)	310.4 (191.5)	3.9
Uganda (252)	426.7 (210.7)	18.52 10%	309.7 (122.7)	5.09	401.2 (213.2)	488.7 (209.8)	9.43 10%

Note: The specifications of all 63 models are identical to those of Models 4-6, except that all observations from the civil-war country listed in the table are omitted. *N* indicates the number of observations that are dropped. All coefficients in the Table display the effect of the instruments on UNPO size. All models in column 1 include the rotating UNSC seats as instruments; models in column 3 leverage the rotating UNSC presidency as an instrument; and models in columns 5-6 include both instruments. Columns 2, 4, and 7 indicate the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and the lowest critical value that the test whether the nominal 5% two-stage least-squares t-test for the hypothesis that $\beta = 0$ potentially exceeds 15% passes. The coefficients of the controls, fixed-effects, and second-stage results are not displayed.

Table 9: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on standardized measure of civilian casualties: variation by faction

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)
UNPO size (<i>t-I</i>)	-0.031 (0.013)	-0.040 (0.019)	-0.031 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.021)
Peace agreement provision on PK	0.108 (0.392)	0.146 (0.517)	0.112 (0.400)	-0.199 (0.196)	-0.156 (0.235)	-0.196 (0.195)
Conflict duration	0.005 (0.008)	0.006 (0.011)	0.005 (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.006 (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)
Simultaneous conflicts	0.080 (0.045)	0.068 (0.032)	0.079 (0.044)	0.115 (0.090)	0.102 (0.059)	0.114 (0.088)
Political rights	-0.272 (0.278)	-0.364 (0.403)	-0.278 (0.284)	0.070 (0.249)	-0.036 (0.102)	0.064 (0.235)
Population size (ln.)	0.568 (0.760)	0.987 (1.386)	0.598 (0.792)	-0.835 (1.199)	-0.352 (0.460)	-0.809 (1.141)
Forest cover (%)	0.005 (0.035)	0.002 (0.048)	0.005 (0.036)	-0.090 (0.025)	-0.093 (0.045)	-0.090 (0.025)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-0.241 (0.541)	-0.568 (1.039)	-0.266 (0.567)	-0.355 (0.384)	-0.730 (0.892)	-0.375 (0.346)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)
UNSC representation (<i>t-I</i>)	3.219 (1.807)		3.077 (1.854)	3.219 (1.807)		3.077 (1.854)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-I</i>)		2.203 (1.030)	3.565 (1.762)		2.203 (1.030)	3.565 (1.762)
Peace agreement provision on PK	3.638 (13.60)	4.214 (13.88)	3.671 (13.60)	3.638 (13.60)	4.214 (13.88)	3.671 (13.60)
Conflict duration	0.097 (0.360)	0.093 (0.361)	0.097 (0.360)	0.097 (0.360)	0.093 (0.361)	0.097 (0.360)
Simultaneous conflicts	-1.205 (1.258)	-1.272 (1.280)	-1.209 (1.258)	-1.205 (1.258)	-1.272 (1.280)	-1.209 (1.258)
Population size (ln.)	45.67 (33.54)	46.51 (34.15)	45.63 (33.58)	45.67 (33.54)	46.51 (34.15)	45.63 (33.58)
Political rights	-10.52 (6.794)	-10.33 (6.771)	-10.51 (6.797)	-10.52 (6.794)	-10.33 (6.771)	-10.51 (6.797)
Forest cover (%)	-0.398 (1.765)	-0.353 (1.739)	-0.402 (1.768)	-0.398 (1.765)	-0.353 (1.739)	-0.402 (1.768)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-36.49 (29.96)	-36.59 (30.28)	-36.49 (29.96)	-36.49 (29.96)	-36.59 (30.28)	-36.49 (29.96)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.139 (0.156)	0.138 (0.156)	0.140 (0.156)	0.139 (0.156)	0.138 (0.156)	0.140 (0.156)
Observations	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063
Donald-Cragg statistic	13.04	3.18	6.58	13.04	3.18	6.58
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.504			0.111

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses. For improved legibility, the 2nd-stage coefficient of UNPO size displays the marginal effect of 100 UN blue helmets on civilian casualties (measured in s.d.), and the 1st-stage coefficients indicate the marginal effects on the deployment of 100 UN blue helmets.

Table 10: State f.e. OLS regressions: Size of UNPOs on civilian casualties

Variables	Number of all civilian casualties (43)	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government (44)	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels (45)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.028 (0.004)	-0.023 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.002)
Peace agreement provision on PK	-21.01 (39.68)	1.794 (31.23)	-22.81 (14.16)
Conflict duration	1.731 (0.909)	1.134 (1.095)	0.596 (0.525)
Simultaneous conflicts	54.77 (29.94)	41.44 (32.12)	13.33 (8.022)
Political rights	2.837 (18.81)	-5.140 (16.94)	7.977 (4.144)
Population size (ln.)	-321.4 (241.5)	-225.1 (225.2)	-96.30 (35.23)
Forest cover (%)	-5.309 (7.195)	4.941 (6.258)	-10.25 (3.656)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	209.2 (286.1)	249.2 (255.8)	-40.03 (58.55)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	-0.613 (0.722)	-0.702 (0.612)	0.089 (0.155)
Constant	4,123 (2,231)	1,830 (1,911)	2,293 (972.4)
Observations	2,063	2,063	2,063
R-squared	0.120	0.089	0.111

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 11: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size without unarmed monitors on civilian casualties

Variables	Number of civilian casualties					
	(46)	(47)	(48)	(49)	(50)	(51)
UN troops& police size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.051 (0.030)	-0.039 (0.023)	-0.046 (0.027)	-0.127 (0.057)	-0.175 (0.063)	-0.130 (0.057)
Peace agreement provision on PK				12.53 (156.5)	29.72 (217.2)	13.84 (160.9)
Conflict duration				2.532 (2.931)	2.935 (4.496)	2.563 (3.048)
Simultaneous conflicts				42.61 (17.85)	36.64 (14.68)	42.15 (17.56)
Political rights				-95.06 (112.1)	-143.3 (146.8)	-98.75 (114.0)
Population size (ln.)				120.6 (326.5)	338.7 (493.7)	137.3 (334.6)
Forest cover (%)				-8.362 (14.93)	-9.867 (22.80)	-8.477 (15.60)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-131.6 (186.3)	-300.1 (404.0)	-144.4 (198.5)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				0.694 (1.577)	1.338 (2.179)	0.743 (1.620)
Variables	Number of UNPO troops and police					
	(46)	(47)	(48)	(49)	(50)	(51)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	661.0 (359.1)		492.7 (286.4)	306.2 (174.1)		293.1 (178.9)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		849.3 (425.7)	1,069.6 (546.9)		208.5 (99.37)	338.2 (169.5)
Peace agreement provision on PK				304.2 (1,273.3)	359.0 (1,299.6)	307.2 (1,273.4)
Conflict duration				8.765 (34.59)	8.314 (34.64)	8.742 (34.59)
Simultaneous conflicts				-117.8 (120.3)	-124.1 (122.5)	-118.2 (120.2)
Political rights				-1,013.4 (653.4)	-995.8 (651.1)	-1,012.5 (653.7)
Population size (ln.)				4,381.1 (3,211.5)	4,460.6 (3,270.3)	4,376.5 (3,215.1)
Forest cover (%)				-38.28 (169.1)	-33.91 (166.6)	-38.58 (169.4)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-3,473.6 (2,860.6)	-3,483.9 (2,890.6)	-3,474.4 (2,860.6)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				13.49 (14.94)	13.34 (14.93)	13.50 (14.94)
Observations	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,063	2,063	2,063
Cragg-Donald statistic	18.65	16.23	12.50	12.86	3.10	6.49
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.469			0.312

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 12: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size without unarmed monitors on civilian casualties: variation by faction

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)
UN troops& police size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.092 (0.036)	-0.107 (0.050)	-0.093 (0.036)	0.558 (0.695)	-0.271 (0.277)	0.550 (0.695)
Peace agreement provision on PK	24.40 (108.4)	29.75 (129.9)	24.71 (109.6)	-396.1 (714.7)	-102.7 (442.6)	-393.4 (706.7)
Conflict duration	1.312 (2.270)	1.436 (2.689)	1.319 (2.294)	1.794 (22.25)	8.609 (12.42)	1.856 (22.06)
Simultaneous conflicts	15.22 (6.995)	13.37 (4.961)	15.12 (6.827)	174.4 (167.8)	72.84 (78.36)	173.4 (167.1)
Political rights	-74.66 (76.96)	-89.75 (102.7)	-75.53 (78.07)	661.7 (708.0)	-165.8 (239.0)	654.2 (702.2)
Population size (ln.)	165.3 (213.8)	233.8 (338.9)	169.2 (218.7)	-2,947.8 (2,478.4)	808.8 (1,358.1)	-2,913.6 (2,460.8)
Forest cover (%)	-0.203 (10.43)	-0.680 (12.62)	-0.231 (10.56)	-121.7 (89.27)	-147.8 (82.87)	-121.9 (87.90)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-83.85 (148.1)	-136.6 (242.7)	-86.90 (151.6)	291.9 (1,331.9)	-2,600.3 (2,496.8)	265.6 (1,314.8)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.499 (1.168)	0.700 (1.464)	0.510 (1.182)	-4.432 (8.826)	6.625 (6.840)	-4.331 (8.661)

Variables	Number of UNPO troops and civilian police					
	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	309.4 (175.3)		296.4 (180.3)	309.4 (175.3)		296.4 (180.3)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		209.6 (99.61)	340.7 (170.3)		209.6 (99.61)	340.7 (170.3)
Peace agreement provision on PK	302.4 (1,273.2)	357.8 (1,299.8)	305.3 (1,273.3)	302.4 (1,273.2)	357.8 (1,299.8)	305.3 (1,273.3)
Conflict duration	8.653 (34.68)	8.203 (34.73)	8.632 (34.68)	8.653 (34.68)	8.203 (34.73)	8.632 (34.68)
Simultaneous conflicts	-116.8 (119.7)	-123.2 (122.0)	-117.2 (119.7)	-116.8 (119.7)	-123.2 (122.0)	-117.2 (119.7)
Population size (ln.)	4,407.9 (3,229.3)	4,486.0 (3,287.8)	4,403.4 (3,232.9)	4,407.9 (3,229.3)	4,486.0 (3,287.8)	4,403.4 (3,232.9)
Political rights	-1,015.2 (654.1)	-997.3 (651.8)	-1,014.3 (654.4)	-1,015.2 (654.1)	-997.3 (651.8)	-1,014.3 (654.4)
Forest cover (%)	-38.90 (169.9)	-34.38 (167.5)	-39.20 (170.3)	-38.90 (169.9)	-34.38 (167.5)	-39.20 (170.3)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,481.0 (2,864.2)	-3,491.0 (2,894.5)	-3,481.7 (2,864.1)	-3,481.0 (2,864.2)	-3,491.0 (2,894.5)	-3,481.7 (2,864.1)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	13.52 (14.99)	13.37 (14.99)	13.52 (14.99)	13.52 (14.99)	13.37 (14.99)	13.52 (14.99)
Observations	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058
Donald-Cragg statistic	13.08	3.13	6.60	13.08	3.13	6.60
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.636			0.363

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 13: Two-stage least squares with linear time trend: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties

Variables	Number of civilian casualties					
	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.054 (0.032)	-0.042 (0.026)	-0.051 (0.031)	-0.116 (0.059)	-0.164 (0.059)	-0.119 (0.058)
Year	5.579 (8.182)	3.473 (5.497)	4.965 (7.365)	12.76 (11.77)	16.82 (19.60)	13.05 (12.21)
Peace agreement provision on PK				9.057 (156.0)	26.88 (218.8)	10.30 (160.2)
Conflict duration				1.412 (3.201)	1.494 (4.937)	1.418 (3.320)
Simultaneous conflicts				41.18 (17.53)	34.34 (13.89)	40.69 (17.22)
Political rights				-85.65 (112.2)	-134.2 (142.6)	-89.06 (113.7)
Population size (ln.)				-328.7 (556.1)	-238.1 (686.8)	-322.4 (566.2)
Forest cover (%)				-8.970 (14.03)	-10.77 (22.38)	-9.096 (14.57)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-87.95 (161.9)	-254.9 (371.0)	-99.65 (172.2)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				0.309 (1.468)	0.875 (1.966)	0.348 (1.504)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	581.5 (303.5)		473.4 (262.4)	331.9 (182.6)		318.9 (187.1)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		634.4 (307.3)	846.6 (417.1)		222.0 (102.9)	363.3 (177.7)
Year	185.6 (140.4)	184.6 (140.2)	184.1 (140.2)	89.83 (119.1)	84.93 (116.2)	89.69 (119.1)
Peace agreement provision on PK				313.3 (1,371.2)	375.3 (1,398.7)	316.3 (1,371.4)
Conflict duration				1.714 (39.44)	1.664 (39.36)	1.704 (39.43)
Simultaneous conflicts				-137.2 (131.9)	-143.0 (133.9)	-137.5 (131.8)
Political rights				-1,029.7 (665.0)	-1,011.8 (662.9)	-1,028.9 (665.3)
Population size (ln.)				1,579.0 (4,351.6)	1,828.8 (4,309.8)	1,579.1 (4,350.7)
Forest cover (%)				-45.69 (176.3)	-40.60 (173.4)	-45.98 (176.5)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-3,457.4 (2,901.8)	-3,478.9 (2,937.3)	-3,458.4 (2,901.5)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				11.88 (14.29)	11.83 (14.35)	11.88 (14.29)
Observations	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,063	2,063	2,063
Cragg-Donald statistic	14.70	9.17	8.69	13.88	3.24	6.99
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.456			0.312

Table 14: Two-stage least squares with linear time trend: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: variation by faction

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(64)	(65)	(66)	(67)	(68)	(69)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.086 (0.034)	-0.101 (0.048)	-0.087 (0.034)	0.569 (0.703)	-0.240 (0.232)	0.568 (0.711)
Year	4.799 (7.794)	6.045 (10.03)	4.865 (7.893)	115.7 (49.23)	183.3 (106.7)	115.8 (49.61)
Peace agreement provision on PK	24.99 (108.8)	30.53 (131.0)	25.28 (109.9)	-498.2 (785.4)	-197.8 (448.8)	-497.8 (785.2)
Conflict duration	0.914 (2.324)	0.939 (2.857)	0.915 (2.352)	-9.152 (20.33)	-7.763 (13.02)	-9.150 (20.30)
Simultaneous conflicts	14.81 (6.977)	12.71 (4.672)	14.70 (6.811)	155.8 (170.5)	41.58 (58.00)	155.6 (170.6)
Political rights	-70.57 (75.55)	-85.71 (100.2)	-71.37 (76.53)	724.4 (722.4)	-97.20 (199.5)	723.2 (723.7)
Population size (ln.)	-5.247 (313.4)	23.85 (384.1)	-3.722 (316.8)	-6,959.5 (2,417.7)	-5,379.9 (2,609.8)	-6,957.1 (2,414.4)
Forest cover (%)	-0.413 (9.983)	-0.979 (12.34)	-0.443 (10.10)	-127.8 (101.7)	-158.5 (86.62)	-127.8 (101.3)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-67.43 (131.4)	-119.4 (228.2)	-70.15 (134.9)	680.1 (1,454.2)	-2,143.3 (2,185.8)	675.9 (1,460.9)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.345 (1.082)	0.522 (1.354)	0.354 (1.093)	-7.633 (9.101)	1.959 (4.296)	-7.619 (9.047)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(64)	(65)	(66)	(67)	(68)	(69)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	334.9 (183.7)		322.2 (188.5)	334.9 (183.7)		322.2 (188.5)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		223.2 (103.1)	365.8 (178.4)		223.2 (103.1)	365.8 (178.4)
Year	88.74 (119.3)	83.83 (116.4)	88.60 (119.3)	88.74 (119.3)	83.83 (116.4)	88.60 (119.3)
Peace agreement provision on PK	312.3 (1,371.1)	374.9 (1,398.9)	315.3 (1,371.3)	312.3 (1,371.1)	374.9 (1,398.9)	315.3 (1,371.3)
Conflict duration	1.716 (39.45)	1.666 (39.37)	1.706 (39.44)	1.716 (39.45)	1.666 (39.37)	1.706 (39.44)
Simultaneous conflicts	-135.9 (131.1)	-141.9 (133.2)	-136.2 (131.1)	-135.9 (131.1)	-141.9 (133.2)	-136.2 (131.1)
Population size (ln.)	1,642.5 (4,389.4)	1,891.0 (4,346.2)	1,642.5 (4,388.5)	1,642.5 (4,389.4)	1,891.0 (4,346.2)	1,642.5 (4,388.5)
Political rights	-1,031.8 (665.8)	-1,013.6 (663.7)	-1,030.9 (666.2)	-1,031.8 (665.8)	-1,013.6 (663.7)	-1,030.9 (666.2)
Forest cover (%)	-46.25 (177.2)	-41.00 (174.3)	-46.53 (177.5)	-46.25 (177.2)	-41.00 (174.3)	-46.53 (177.5)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,467.2 (2,906.5)	-3,488.4 (2,942.4)	-3,468.2 (2,906.2)	-3,467.2 (2,906.5)	-3,488.4 (2,942.4)	-3,468.2 (2,906.2)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	11.91 (14.36)	11.87 (14.42)	11.91 (14.36)	11.91 (14.36)	11.87 (14.42)	11.91 (14.36)
Observations	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058
Donald-Cragg statistic	14.08	3.26	7.09	14.08	3.26	7.09
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.603			0.364

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 15: Two-stage least squares with country and year fixed effects: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties

Variables	Number of civilian casualties					
	(70)	(71)	(72)	(73)	(74)	(75)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.044 (0.019)	-0.040 (0.022)	-0.043 (0.020)	-0.103 (0.034)	-0.160 (0.058)	-0.109 (0.034)
Peace agreement provision on PK				28.11 (129.3)	50.70 (208.8)	30.53 (137.4)
Conflict duration				2.656 (2.196)	3.830 (3.451)	2.782 (2.294)
Simultaneous conflicts				55.73 (23.85)	54.30 (21.17)	55.57 (23.54)
Political rights				-69.92 (72.10)	-126.4 (115.1)	-75.98 (75.27)
Population size (ln.)				807.4 (828.7)	1,446.6 (1,316.2)	876.0 (869.1)
Forest cover (%)				-11.14 (13.50)	-14.62 (23.71)	-11.51 (14.60)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-281.4 (277.5)	-603.7 (598.8)	-316.0 (306.6)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				0.865 (1.092)	1.575 (1.796)	0.941 (1.168)
Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(70)	(71)	(72)	(73)	(74)	(75)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	547.0 (319.6)		412.0 (271.7)	365.0 (217.2)		342.7 (217.3)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		877.8 (334.9)	846.6 (454.1)		258.1 (133.7)	419.1 (225.4)
Peace agreement provision on PK				321.7 (1,380.5)	399.7 (1,415.9)	327.4 (1,380.9)
Conflict duration				21.24 (27.22)	20.63 (26.79)	21.22 (27.20)
Simultaneous conflicts				-20.17 (75.52)	-26.28 (76.85)	-20.86 (75.75)
Political rights				-1,004.6 (619.2)	-987.5 (619.1)	-1,003.0 (618.8)
Population size (ln.)				11,086 (7,314.9)	11,180 (7,351.9)	11,087 (7,316.3)
Forest cover (%)				-72.58 (185.6)	-64.91 (184.0)	-73.02 (186.1)
GDP per cap. (ln.)				-5,715.0 (3,950.3)	-5,673.7 (3,966.6)	-5,718.7 (3,951.3)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)				12.98 (13.25)	12.49 (13.11)	12.96 (13.24)
Observations	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,063	2,063	2,063
Cragg-Donald statistic	11.43	9.82	7.67	16.80	4.59	8.57
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.717			0.203

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses. Some year-fixed effects drop out of the models due to collinearity, and the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions is not of full rank since the number of covariates in the models is high relative to the sample size.

Table 16: Two-stage least squares with country and year fixed effects: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: variation by faction

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(76)	(77)	(78)	(79)	(80)	(81)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.070 (0.026)	-0.094 (0.045)	-0.072 (0.027)	0.332 (0.426)	-0.458 (0.511)	0.291 (0.385)
Peace agreement provision on PK	33.66 (82.83)	43.44 (119.3)	34.52 (85.89)	-334.8 (495.7)	-22.58 (726.6)	-318.4 (439.1)
Conflict duration	1.163 (1.655)	1.671 (2.105)	1.208 (1.683)	-0.439 (11.91)	15.77 (20.00)	0.412 (10.89)
Simultaneous conflicts	23.77 (13.82)	23.15 (12.32)	23.71 (13.69)	138.1 (128.7)	118.2 (111.8)	137.1 (127.1)
Political rights	-49.64 (50.99)	-74.21 (80.86)	-51.81 (53.07)	386.9 (393.6)	-397.3 (496.4)	345.7 (352.5)
Population size (ln.)	565.8 (577.8)	843.9 (938.6)	590.4 (603.7)	-4,053.8 (3,456.3)	4,821.8 (5,086.5)	-3,587.7 (3,141.6)
Forest cover (%)	-1.676 (8.426)	-3.178 (12.55)	-1.809 (8.792)	-121.8 (54.52)	-169.8 (127.7)	-124.4 (47.41)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-161.5 (202.2)	-301.6 (387.4)	-173.8 (215.5)	493.8 (1,459.1)	-3,979.6 (3,885.3)	258.9 (1,272.9)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.484 (0.779)	0.795 (1.161)	0.511 (0.810)	-0.115 (4.247)	9.826 (10.75)	0.407 (3.509)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(76)	(77)	(78)	(79)	(80)	(81)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	366.4 (217.8)		344.5 (218.1)	366.4 (217.8)		344.5 (218.1)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		258.0 (133.6)	419.5 (225.5)		258.0 (133.6)	419.5 (225.5)
Peace agreement provision on PK	319.8 (1,379.7)	398.2 (1,415.3)	325.3 (1,380.1)	319.8 (1,379.7)	398.2 (1,415.3)	325.3 (1,380.1)
Conflict duration	21.13 (27.27)	20.53 (26.83)	21.10 (27.26)	21.13 (27.27)	20.53 (26.83)	21.10 (27.26)
Simultaneous conflicts	-20.28 (75.61)	-26.41 (76.88)	-20.95 (75.83)	-20.28 (75.61)	-26.41 (76.88)	-20.95 (75.83)
Population size (ln.)	11,094 (7,323.7)	11,188 (7,360.7)	11,094 (7,325.1)	11,094 (7,323.7)	11,188 (7,360.7)	11,094 (7,325.1)
Political rights	-1,005.4 (619.5)	-988.1 (619.3)	-1,003.8 (619.2)	-1,005.4 (619.5)	-988.1 (619.3)	-1,003.8 (619.2)
Forest cover (%)	-46.25 (177.2)	-64.39 (184.8)	-72.62 (187.0)	-46.25 (177.2)	-64.39 (184.8)	-72.62 (187.0)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-5,717.5 (3,953.3)	-5,676.5 (3,969.9)	-5,721.2 (3,954.4)	-5,717.5 (3,953.3)	-5,676.5 (3,969.9)	-5,721.2 (3,954.4)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	13.08 (13.34)	12.60 (13.20)	13.06 (13.33)	13.08 (13.34)	12.60 (13.20)	13.06 (13.33)
Observations	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,058
Donald-Cragg statistic	16.87	4.57	8.60	16.87	4.57	8.60
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.203			0.203

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses. Some year-fixed effects drop out of the models due to collinearity, and the estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions is not of full rank since the number of covariates in the models is high relative to the sample size.

Table 17: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: alternative operationalization of presidency instrument

Variables	Number of civilian casualties			
	(82)	(83)	(84)	(85)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.037 (0.022)	-0.047 (0.028)	-0.214 (0.073)	-0.123 (0.056)
Peace agreement provision on PK			56.91 (291.1)	19.23 (162.8)
Conflict duration			3.462 (6.094)	2.624 (2.963)
Simultaneous conflicts			31.18 (16.35)	42.58 (17.79)
Political rights			-190.2 (178.8)	-96.89 (113.9)
Population size (ln.)			556.0 (687.3)	131.7 (337.5)
Forest cover (%)			-11.34 (30.11)	-8.421 (15.44)
GDP per cap. (ln.)			-473.6 (567.0)	-143.4 (197.5)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)			1.963 (2.868)	0.718 (1.614)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel			
	(82)	(83)	(84)	(85)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)		582.2 (323.5)		318.1 (181.9)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)	792.3 (428.4)	1,073.9 (573.6)	186.6 (107.5)	339.1 (184.6)
Peace agreement provision on PK			417.8 (1,387.7)	364.5 (1,359.2)
Conflict duration			9.219 (36.10)	9.716 (36.03)
Simultaneous conflicts			-128.0 (128.6)	-120.8 (126.0)
Political rights			-1,034.1 (678.4)	-1,051.6 (679.6)
Population size (ln.)			4,675.5 (3,422.7)	4,566.5 (3,356.3)
Forest cover (%)			-34.15 (173.5)	-39.96 (176.7)
GDP per cap. (ln.)			-3,664.1 (3,033.5)	-3,649.4 (2,996.1)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)			13.85 (15.65)	14.00 (15.63)
Observations	2,459	2,459	2,063	2,063
Cragg-Donald statistic	9.01	10.72	1.53	6.53
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)		0.4374		0.1259

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses. Replications of models 2, 3, 5, and 6.

Table 18: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: alternative operationalization of presidency instrument

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels		Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government	
	(86)	(87)	(88)	(89)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.200 (0.088)	-0.119 (0.048)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.026)
Peace agreement provision on PK	75.36 (266.8)	41.89 (149.9)	-18.45 (27.21)	-22.80 (22.57)
Conflict duration	2.770 (5.677)	2.026 (3.102)	0.692 (0.754)	0.595 (0.533)
Simultaneous conflicts	19.29 (11.57)	29.42 (16.47)	11.89 (7.083)	13.20 (10.25)
Political rights	-187.4 (191.7)	-104.4 (105.9)	-2.883 (16.38)	7.896 (28.39)
Population size (ln.)	602.4 (746.2)	225.4 (295.4)	-46.35 (84.56)	-95.33 (136.9)
Forest cover (%)	-0.685 (26.04)	1.904 (13.38)	-10.65 (4.760)	-10.31 (2.839)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-394.2 (593.5)	-100.8 (212.4)	-79.45 (91.88)	-41.34 (43.51)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	1.729 (2.975)	0.622 (1.555)	0.234 (0.307)	0.091 (0.287)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel			
	(86)	(87)	(88)	(89)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)		318.1 (181.9)		318.1 (181.9)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)	186.6 (107.5)	339.1 (184.6)	186.6 (107.5)	339.2 (184.6)
Peace agreement provision on PK	417.8 (1,387.6)	364.5 (1,359.2)	417.8 (1,387.6)	364.5 (1,359.2)
Conflict duration	9.219 (36.10)	9.716 (36.03)	9.219 (36.09)	9.716 (36.03)
Simultaneous conflicts	-127.9 (128.6)	-120.8 (126.0)	-127.9 (128.6)	-120.8 (126.0)
Population size (ln.)	4675.4 (3422.7)	4,566.5 (3,356.3)	4,675.4 (3,422.6)	4,566.5 (3,356.3)
Political rights	-1,034.1 (678.5)	-1,051.6 (679.6)	-1,034.1 (678.4)	-1,051.6 (679.6)
Forest cover (%)	-34.15 (173.5)	-39.95 (176.7)	-34.15 (173.4)	-39.95 (176.7)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,664.1 (3,033.5)	-3,649.4 (2,996.1)	-3,664.13 (3,033.5)	-3,649.4 (2,996.1)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	13.85 (15.65)	14.00 (15.62)	13.85 (15.65)	14.00 (15.63)
Observations	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063
Donald-Cragg statistic	1.53	6.53	1.53	6.53
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)		0.268		0.746

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses. Replications of models 8, 9, 11, and 12.

Table 19: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: omitting DRC

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(90)	(91)	(92)	(93)	(94)	(95)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.051 (0.027)	-0.055 (0.028)	-0.052 (0.026)	0.014 (0.071)	-0.045 (0.021)	0.007 (0.068)
Peace agreement provision on PK	26.97 (65.97)	29.67 (72.94)	27.37 (66.55)	-36.57 (54.08)	6.676 (58.98)	-31.29 (53.88)
Conflict duration	1.855 (1.230)	2.001 (1.388)	1.876 (1.188)	-0.099 (2.810)	2.246 (1.130)	0.186 (2.703)
Simultaneous conflicts	8.813 (2.529)	8.890 (2.529)	8.824 (2.521)	16.30 (6.817)	17.54 (8.517)	16.45 (6.928)
Political rights	-14.89 (15.51)	-16.02 (16.75)	-15.06 (15.39)	12.20 (23.66)	-6.043 (11.56)	9.971 (22.46)
Population size (ln.)	42.12 (48.93)	46.58 (47.19)	42.78 (47.31)	-98.09 (94.62)	-26.67 (29.99)	-89.38 (94.02)
Forest cover (%)	-0.331 (4.034)	-0.269 (4.405)	-0.321 (4.084)	-10.57 (3.434)	-9.583 (5.859)	-10.45 (3.715)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-33.18 (34.36)	-35.41 (38.15)	-33.51 (34.39)	-53.24 (32.77)	-89.08 (84.97)	-57.61 (32.15)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	-0.066 (0.302)	-0.072 (0.356)	-0.067 (0.309)	0.229 (0.228)	0.133 (0.326)	0.217 (0.221)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(90)	(91)	(92)	(93)	(94)	(95)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	127.9 (100.5)		115.8 (106.4)	127.9 (100.5)		115.8 (106.4)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		106.2 (63.22)	157.9 (97.69)		106.2 (63.22)	157.9 (97.69)
Peace agreement provision on PK	710.4 (1,393.6)	735.1 (1,415.3)	713.7 (1,396.2)	710.4 (1,393.6)	735.1 (1,415.3)	713.7 (1,396.2)
Conflict duration	39.81 (19.49)	39.66 (19.32)	39.78 (19.50)	39.81 (19.49)	39.66 (19.32)	39.78 (19.50)
Simultaneous conflicts	23.18 (30.86)	20.27 (30.04)	22.71 (30.93)	23.18 (30.86)	20.27 (30.04)	22.71 (30.93)
Population size (ln.)	1,166.0 (511.3)	1,188.7 (494.7)	1,162.1 (510.8)	1,166.0 (511.3)	1,188.7 (494.7)	1,162.1 (510.8)
Political rights	-318.9 (243.3)	-309.3 (244.3)	-318.2 (243.9)	-318.9 (243.3)	-309.3 (244.3)	-318.2 (243.9)
Forest cover (%)	13.70 (86.62)	15.31 (85.96)	13.41 (86.83)	13.70 (86.62)	15.31 (85.96)	13.41 (86.83)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-614.0 (594.3)	-611.3 (597.4)	-615.1 (594.8)	-614.0 (594.3)	-611.3 (597.4)	-615.1 (594.8)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	-1.483 (5.431)	-1.583 (5.408)	-1.480 (5.429)	-1.483 (5.431)	-1.583 (5.408)	-1.480 (5.429)
Observations 1,967	1,967	1,967	1,967	1,967	1,967	
R-squared	0.113	0.111	0.113	0.113	0.111	0.113
Donald-Cragg statistic	6.51	2.33	3.41	6.51	2.33	3.41
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.888			0.499

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 20: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: coefficient of UNPO size from 126 models that omit all observations from a single civil-war country

Omitted country (<i>N</i>)	Effect on number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Effect on number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	IV: UNSC seats	IV: UNSC pres.	IV: both	IV: UNSC seats	IV: UNSC pres.	IV: both
Algeria (240)	-0.125 (0.053)	-0.153 (0.078)	-0.127 (0.054)	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.026)
Angola (180)	-0.131 (0.053)	-0.155 (0.086)	-0.133 (0.055)	-0.007 (0.027)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.025)
Burundi (192)	-0.125 (0.068)	-0.211 (0.186)	-0.127 (0.070)	-0.004 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.035)
Cameroon (12)	-0.117 (0.047)	-0.150 (0.071)	-0.119 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.025)
Central Afr. Rep. (12)	-0.117 (0.047)	-0.148 (0.071)	-0.119 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.025)
Chad (228)	-0.107 (0.046)	-0.160 (0.075)	-0.109 (0.047)	-0.001 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.027)
Comoros (24)	-0.121 (0.055)	-0.165 (0.060)	-0.124 (0.055)	-0.117 (0.047)	-0.150 (0.071)	-0.119 (0.048)
Dem. Rep. Congo (108)	-0.052 (0.028)	-0.056 (0.029)	-0.052 (0.026)	0.015 (0.072)	-0.044 (0.021)	0.008 (0.068)
Djibouti (48)	-0.115 (0.046)	-0.147 (0.068)	-0.117 (0.046)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.024)
Egypt (72)	-0.117 (0.047)	-0.117 (0.047)	-0.120 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.025)
Eritrea (60)	-0.110 (0.044)	-0.142 (0.067)	-0.112 (0.045)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.024)
Ethiopia (240)	-0.133 (0.065)	-0.166 (0.095)	-0.136 (0.067)	0.001 (0.032)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.000 (0.029)
Lesotho (12)	-0.117 (0.047)	-0.150 (0.071)	-0.119 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.025)
Mauritania (60)	-0.117 (0.047)	-0.150 (0.071)	-0.119 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.025)
Morocco (60)	-0.116 (0.047)	-0.149 (0.071)	-0.119 (0.048)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.025)
Mozambique (48)	-0.116 (0.047)	-0.146 (0.069)	-0.118 (0.047)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.024)
Rep. of Congo (60)	-0.123 (0.052)	-0.160 (0.081)	-0.126 (0.053)	-0.003 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.027)
Rwanda (167)	-0.117 (0.040)	-0.161 (0.066)	-0.119 (0.041)	-0.024 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.024 (0.008)
Somalia (168)	-0.117 (0.047)	-0.150 (0.071)	-0.119 (0.048)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.025)
Sudan (264)	-0.148 (0.057)	-0.172 (0.071)	-0.152 (0.056)	0.011 (0.038)	-0.010 (0.016)	0.009 (0.033)
Uganda (252)	-0.102 (0.040)	-0.125 (0.054)	-0.104 (0.041)	-0.004 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.020)

Note: The specifications of all 126 models are identical to those of Models 7-12, except that all observations from the civil-war country listed in the table are omitted. *N* indicates the number of observations that are dropped. All coefficients in the Table display the effect of UNPO size on the number of civilians killed by rebels (columns 1-3) or the government (columns 4-6). All models in columns 1 and 4 include the rotating UNSC seats as instrument; models in columns 2 and 5 leverage the rotating UNSC presidency as an instrument; and models in columns 3 and 6 include both instruments. The coefficients of the instruments, controls, and fixed effects in the 2SLS models are not

Table 21: State f.e. regression: instruments on covariates

Variables	UNSC presidency (96)	UNSC representation (97)
Peace agreement provision on PK	0.166 (0.156)	-0.019 (0.077)
Conflict duration	-0.001 (0.005)	0.0001 (0.001)
Simultaneous conflicts	-0.018 (0.011)	0.004 (0.005)
Pre-conflict pol. rights	0.055 (0.049)	-0.005 (0.021)
Population size (ln.)	0.409 (0.261)	0.220 (0.106)
Forest cover (%)	0.024 (0.012)	0.014 (0.006)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-0.03 (0.221)	0.009 (0.085)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	-0.0006 (0.0008)	-0.0002 (0.0004)
Constant	-6.808 (3.217)	-3.773 (1.433)
Observations	2,063	2,063
R-squared	0.016	0.007

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 22: State f.e. regression: instruments on potential determinants of civilian casualties

Variables	UN sanctions		UN mediation		Mediation	
	(98)	(99)	(100)	(101)	(102)	(103)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	0.004 (0.027)		0.001 (0.013)		-0.021 (0.019)	
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		0.011 (0.021)		-0.018 (0.022)		-0.014 (0.029)
Constant	0.229 (0.013)	0.230 (0.003)	0.046 (0.007)	0.049 (0.003)	0.121 (0.010)	0.112 (0.004)
Observations	2,255	2,255	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,459
R-squared	0.0001	0.0004	0.0001	0.001	0.0001	0.000

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 23: State f.e. regression: instruments and controls on potential determinants of civilian casualties

Variables	UN sanctions		UN Mediation		Mediation	
	(104)	(105)	(106)	(107)	(108)	(109)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.019 (0.025)		0.012 (0.012)		-0.019 (0.024)	
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		-0.006 (0.0132)		-0.011 (0.0131)		-0.014 (0.027)
Conflict duration	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Simultaneous conflicts	0.018 (0.019)	0.018 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)
Political rights	0.036 (0.070)	0.035 (0.069)	0.016 (0.022)	0.016 (0.022)	0.025 (0.034)	0.024 (0.033)
Population size (ln.)	0.782 (0.329)	0.774 (0.328)	-0.313 (0.195)	-0.306 (0.195)	-0.287 (0.198)	-0.291 (0.197)
Forest cover (%)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.031 (0.011)	-0.031 (0.011)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-0.670 (0.401)	-0.671 (0.398)	0.199 (0.222)	0.198 (0.222)	0.349 (0.272)	0.350 (0.272)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Constant	-8.786 (3.919)	-8.660 (3.977)	4.141 (3.156)	4.023 (3.154)	3.073 (3.509)	3.143 (3.458)
Observations	1,931	1,931	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063
R-squared	0.149	0.148	0.241	0.240	0.148	0.019

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 24: State f.e. regression: instruments on potential determinants of civilian casualties

	Multilateral aid		All aid		Foreign troop support	
	(110)	(111)	(112)	(113)	(114)	(115)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	-0.414 (0.358)		12.78 (7.933)		0.051 (0.041)	
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		-0.394 (8.233)		10.87 (7.369)		0.039 (0.029)
Constant	0.625 (0.187)	0.468 (0.043)	15.14 (4.151)	20.18 (1.124)	0.149 (0.021)	0.169 (0.004)
Observations	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,327	2,327
R-squared	0.006	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.003

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 25: State f.e. regression: instruments and controls on potential determinants of civilian casualties

	Multilateral aid		All aid		Foreign troop support	
	(116)	(117)	(118)	(119)	(120)	(121)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.477 (0.390)		13.28 (8.366)		0.068 (0.049)	
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		-0.494 (0.309)		7.575 (6.953)		0.045 (0.036)
Conflict duration	0.007 (0.010)	0.007 (0.009)	-0.244 (0.876)	-0.256 (0.875)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.004)
Simultaneous conflicts	0.358 (0.239)	0.368 (0.245)	-2.939 (4.776)	-3.190 (4.875)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)
Political rights	0.201 (0.236)	0.174 (0.237)	-14.35 (16.77)	-13.63 (16.66)	0.048 (0.0583)	0.051 (0.058)
Population size (ln.)	-2.956 (3.267)	-3.039 (3.344)	77.34 (53.80)	81.00 (55.11)	-0.132 (0.289)	-0.122 (0.292)
Forest cover (%)	0.092 (0.074)	0.088 (0.073)	-4.114 (5.219)	-3.935 (5.096)	-0.029 (0.039)	-0.029 (0.039)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	4.885 (3.800)	4.907 (3.835)	23.19 (69.11)	22.65 (70.13)	0.451 (0.226)	0.444 (0.221)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)	0.241 (0.372)	0.234 (0.374)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Constant	16.57 (29.66)	17.83 (30.61)	-1,248 (775.9)	-1,306 (782.0)	-0.302 (5.009)	-0.418 (5.094)
Observations	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	1,967	1,967
R-squared	0.062	0.059	0.105	0.098	0.139	0.129

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 26: State f.e. regression: instruments on potential determinants of civilian casualties

	New peace agreement		Peace agreement collapse	
	(122)	(123)	(124)	(125)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	0.000 (0.007)		-0.004 (0.003)	
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		0.006 (0.007)		-0.002 (0.004)
Constant	0.022 (0.003)	0.022 (0.001)	0.007 (0.002)	0.005 (0.001)
Observations	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351
R-squared	0.000	0.0003	0.001	0.0001

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses. Data on the conclusion and collapse of peace agreements was extracted from the UCDP's Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0 (Hogbladh, 2011). 'New peace agreement' is a binary measure that indicates whether civil conflict parties concluded a new agreement during a given month. The dichotomous measure 'peace agreement collapse' takes a positive value for months that marked the failure of the implementation of the pact.

Table 27: State f.e. regression: instruments and controls on potential determinants of civilian casualties

	New peace agreement		Peace agreement collapse	
	(126)	(127)	(128)	(129)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	0.004 (0.008)		-0.005 (0.003)	
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		0.008 (0.009)		-0.001 (0.004)
Conflict duration	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)
Simultaneous conflicts	0.007 (0.003)	0.007 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Political rights	-0.014 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Population size (ln.)	-0.085 (0.054)	-0.085 (0.054)	-0.040 (0.014)	-0.042 (0.015)
Forest cover (%)	-0.009 (0.002)	-0.009 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	0.042 (0.046)	0.042 (0.046)	0.008 (0.025)	0.009 (0.025)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.00007 (0.0001)	0.00007 (0.0001)	0.00005 (0.00005)	0.00005 (0.00005)
Constant	1.400 (0.776)	1.404 (0.789)	0.682 (0.157)	0.705 (0.164)
Observations	1,991	1,991	1,991	1,991
R-squared	0.014	0.014	0.007	0.005

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses. Data on the conclusion and collapse of peace agreements was extracted from the UCDP's Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0 (Hogbladh, 2011). 'New peace agreement' is a binary measure that indicates whether civil conflict parties concluded a new agreement during a given month. The dichotomous measure 'peace agreement collapse' takes a positive value for months that marked the failure of the implementation of the pact.

Table 28: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: spatial variation

Variables	Number of civilian casualties in combat areas			Number of civilian casualties in rear areas		
	(130)	(131)	(132)	(133)	(134)	(135)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.043 (0.017)	-0.049 (0.015)	-0.044 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.003)
Peace agreement provision on PK	-2.711 (61.80)	-0.178 (70.16)	-2.545 (62.33)	0.491 (12.08)	1.036 (14.57)	0.525 (12.23)
Conflict duration	0.592 (1.173)	0.662 (1.356)	0.597 (1.186)	0.326 (0.224)	0.335 (0.266)	0.327 (0.226)
Simultaneous conflicts	17.79 (8.914)	17.13 (9.914)	17.74 (8.962)	7.747 (3.433)	7.373 (3.305)	7.724 (3.415)
Political rights	-29.37 (16.41)	-35.71 (23.08)	-29.79 (16.48)	-9.341 (6.806)	-10.97 (10.30)	-9.443 (6.921)
Population size (ln.)	51.46 (90.55)	79.67 (118.2)	53.31 (90.91)	16.52 (29.63)	23.78 (45.47)	16.98 (30.14)
Forest cover (%)	-6.883 (6.080)	-7.058 (7.052)	-6.895 (6.143)	-0.396 (1.516)	-0.430 (1.778)	-0.398 (1.532)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-99.69 (51.85)	-121.1 (91.04)	-101.1 (53.20)	-11.35 (21.62)	-17.09 (37.35)	-11.71 (22.24)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.372 (0.463)	0.453 (0.484)	0.377 (0.463)	0.0733 (0.130)	0.0951 (0.172)	0.0747 (0.132)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(130)	(131)	(132)	(133)	(134)	(135)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	309.3 (175.2)		296.0 (180.4)	334.3 (188.0)		320.5 (193.0)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		210.4 (98.83)	341.5 (169.6)		226.3 (106.0)	368.4 (182.5)
Peace agreement provision on PK	360.1 (1,362.3)	415.7 (1,389.7)	363.2 (1,362.7)	291.6 (1,379.3)	348.5 (1,407.1)	294.6 (1,380.1)
Conflict duration	11.72 (34.49)	11.36 (34.56)	11.70 (34.49)	5.930 (36.23)	5.458 (36.31)	5.898 (36.23)
Simultaneous conflicts	-101.0 (114.9)	-107.3 (116.5)	-101.5 (114.9)	-235.3 (111.6)	-239.4 (115.5)	-235.9 (111.6)
Political rights	-1,046.4 (677.9)	-1,028.7 (675.7)	-1,045.5 (678.2)	-1,048.7 (686.2)	-1,029.8 (684.0)	-1,047.7 (686.5)
Population size (ln.)	4,462.2 (3,297.4)	4,541.5 (3,353.7)	4,457.9 (3,301.1)	4,461.0 (3,248.7)	4,541.0 (3,310.8)	4,455.8 (3,252.8)
Forest cover (%)	-36.05 (174.8)	-31.27 (172.3)	-36.34 (175.1)	-29.70 (162.5)	-24.44 (159.2)	-29.99 (162.7)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,478.6 (2,910.3)	-3,480.2 (2,934.7)	-3,479.1 (2,910.4)	-3,627.4 (2,943.2)	-3,635.3 (2,977.4)	-3,628.1 (2,943.2)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	13.43 (15.36)	13.25 (15.35)	13.42 (15.35)	14.01 (15.35)	13.84 (15.34)	14.01 (15.35)
Observations	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,064	2,064	2,064
R-squared	0.188	0.185	0.188	0.196	0.192	0.196
Cragg-Donald statistic	12.06	2.91	6.09	14.13	3.36	7.13
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.620			0.746

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 29: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in rear areas without outlier (Sudan in 1989)

Variables	Number of civilian casualties in rear areas		
	(136)	(137)	(138)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.009 (0.003)	-0.010 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.003)
Peace agreement provision on PK	0.490 (12.08)	1.036 (14.56)	0.524 (12.22)
Conflict duration	0.326 (0.223)	0.335 (0.266)	0.327 (0.226)
Simultaneous conflicts	7.747 (3.433)	7.373 (3.304)	7.724 (3.414)
Political rights	-9.341 (6.805)	-10.97 (10.30)	-9.443 (6.921)
Population size (ln.)	16.52 (29.62)	23.77 (45.47)	16.97 (30.14)
Forest cover (%)	-0.396 (1.515)	-0.430 (1.778)	-0.398 (1.531)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-11.35 (21.62)	-17.09 (37.35)	-11.71 (22.23)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.073 (0.130)	0.095 (0.171)	0.074 (0.132)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(136)	(137)	(138)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	334.3 (187.9)		320.4 (192.9)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		226.3 (105.9)	368.3 (182.4)
Peace agreement provision on PK	291.6 (1,379.3)	348.5 (1,407.1)	294.5 (1,380.1)
Conflict duration	5.930 (36.23)	5.458 (36.31)	5.898 (36.23)
Simultaneous conflicts	-235.3 (111.5)	-239.4 (115.4)	-235.9 (111.6)
Political rights	-1,048.7 (686.2)	-1,029.8 (684.0)	-1,047.7 (686.5)
Population size (ln.)	4,461.0 (3,248.6)	4,541.0 (3,310.8)	4,455.8 (3,252.8)
Forest cover (%)	-29.70 (162.4)	-24.44 (159.2)	-29.99 (162.7)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,627.3 (2,943.2)	-3,635.3 (2,977.4)	-3,628.1 (2,943.2)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	14.01 (15.34)	13.84 (15.34)	14.01 (15.34)
Observations	2,064	2,064	2,064
Cragg-Donald statistic	14.13	3.36	7.13
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.745

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 30: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in combat areas: variation by faction

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(139)	(140)	(141)	(142)	(143)	(144)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.107 (0.044)	-0.144 (0.070)	-0.110 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.023)
Peace agreement provision on PK	37.26 (134.9)	52.54 (187.2)	38.35 (138.4)	-19.79 (20.96)	-15.02 (25.58)	-19.54 (20.77)
Conflict duration	1.413 (2.911)	1.833 (3.940)	1.443 (2.987)	0.363 (0.533)	0.494 (0.649)	0.370 (0.521)
Simultaneous conflicts	37.94 (23.27)	33.36 (17.15)	37.61 (22.86)	14.66 (10.43)	13.24 (7.247)	14.59 (10.27)
Political rights	-93.56 (97.15)	-132.1 (147.6)	-96.33 (99.84)	9.081 (27.24)	-2.931 (9.930)	8.453 (25.76)
Population size (ln.)	163.4 (246.8)	339.2 (494.8)	176.1 (259.1)	-91.59 (127.7)	-36.79 (51.52)	-88.73 (121.7)
Forest cover (%)	3.002 (10.19)	1.776 (15.75)	2.914 (10.58)	-9.610 (2.377)	-9.992 (4.494)	-9.630 (2.455)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-65.44 (176.1)	-200.7 (373.7)	-75.16 (185.9)	-46.12 (34.48)	-88.30 (100.0)	-48.32 (30.80)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.527 (1.360)	1.033 (2.081)	0.563 (1.405)	0.101 (0.253)	0.259 (0.301)	0.109 (0.239)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(139)	(140)	(141)	(142)	(143)	(144)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	309.3 (175.2)		296.0 (180.4)	309.3 (175.2)		296.0 (180.4)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		210.4 (98.83)	341.5 (169.6)		210.4 (98.83)	341.5 (169.6)
Peace agreement provision on PK	360.1 (1,362.3)	415.7 (1,389.7)	363.2 (1,362.7)	360.1 (1,362.3)	415.7 (1,389.7)	363.2 (1,362.7)
Conflict duration	11.72 (34.49)	11.36 (34.56)	11.70 (34.49)	11.72 (34.49)	11.36 (34.56)	11.70 (34.49)
Simultaneous conflicts	-101.0 (114.9)	-107.3 (116.5)	-101.5 (114.9)	-101.0 (114.9)	-107.3 (116.5)	-101.5 (114.9)
Political rights	-1,046.4 (677.9)	-1,028.7 (675.7)	-1,045.5 (678.2)	-1,046.4 (677.9)	-1,028.7 (675.7)	-1,045.5 (678.2)
Population size (ln.)	4,462.2 (3,297.4)	4,541.5 (3,353.7)	4,457.9 (3,301.1)	4,462.2 (3,297.4)	4,541.5 (3,353.7)	4,457.9 (3,301.1)
Forest cover (%)	-36.05 (174.8)	-31.27 (172.3)	-36.34 (175.1)	-36.05 (174.8)	-31.27 (172.3)	-36.34 (175.1)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,478.6 (2,910.3)	-3,480.2 (2,934.7)	-3,479.1 (2,910.4)	-3,478.6 (2,910.3)	-3,480.2 (2,934.7)	-3,479.1 (2,910.4)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	13.43 (15.36)	13.25 (15.35)	13.42 (15.35)	13.43 (15.36)	13.25 (15.35)	13.42 (15.35)
Observations	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063
R-squared	0.188	0.185	0.188	0.188	0.185	0.188
Cragg-Donald statistic	12.06	2.91	6.09	12.06	2.91	6.09
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.440			0.729

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 31: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in rear areas: variation by faction

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(145)	(146)	(147)	(148)	(149)	(150)
UNPO size ($t-1$)	-0.008 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)
Peace agreement provision on PK	2.668 (10.26)	2.634 (10.40)	2.666 (10.27)	-2.178 (1.920)	-1.599 (4.208)	-2.148 (2.028)
Conflict duration	0.184 (0.200)	0.183 (0.195)	0.184 (0.199)	0.143 (0.076)	0.152 (0.092)	0.143 (0.076)
Simultaneous conflicts	2.954 (1.873)	2.977 (1.849)	2.955 (1.867)	4.792 (2.013)	4.395 (1.876)	4.771 (1.996)
Political rights	-7.791 (6.207)	-7.690 (6.965)	-7.786 (6.221)	-1.544 (2.815)	-3.276 (4.610)	-1.636 (2.822)
Population size (ln.)	26.10 (24.62)	25.65 (28.97)	26.08 (24.72)	-9.591 (12.86)	-1.882 (19.66)	-9.184 (12.79)
Forest cover (%)	0.067 (1.237)	0.069 (1.216)	0.067 (1.235)	-0.463 (0.307)	-0.499 (0.579)	-0.464 (0.321)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-17.45 (20.18)	-17.09 (22.96)	-17.43 (20.23)	6.115 (9.710)	0.0151 (16.35)	5.793 (9.634)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.073 (0.114)	0.071 (0.112)	0.073 (0.113)	0.001 (0.042)	0.024 (0.070)	0.002 (0.042)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(145)	(146)	(147)	(148)	(149)	(150)
UNSC representation ($t-1$)	334.3 (188.0)		320.5 (193.0)	334.3 (188.0)		320.5 (193.0)
UNSC presidency ($t-1$)		226.3 (106.0)	368.4 (182.5)		226.3 (106.0)	368.4 (182.5)
Peace agreement provision on PK	291.6 (1,379.3)	348.5 (1,407.1)	294.6 (1,380.1)	291.6 (1,379.3)	348.5 (1,407.1)	294.6 (1,380.1)
Conflict duration	5.930 (36.23)	5.458 (36.31)	5.898 (36.23)	5.930 (36.23)	5.458 (36.31)	5.898 (36.23)
Simultaneous conflicts	-235.3 (111.6)	-239.4 (115.5)	-235.9 (111.6)	-235.3 (111.6)	-239.4 (115.5)	-235.9 (111.6)
Political rights	-1,048.7 (686.2)	-1,029.8 (684.0)	-1,047.7 (686.5)	-1,048.7 (686.2)	-1,029.8 (684.0)	-1,047.7 (686.5)
Population size (ln.)	4,461.0 (3,248.7)	4,541.0 (3,310.8)	4,455.8 (3,252.8)	4,461.0 (3,248.7)	4,541.0 (3,310.8)	4,455.8 (3,252.8)
Forest cover (%)	-29.70 (162.5)	-24.44 (159.2)	-29.99 (162.7)	-29.70 (162.5)	-24.44 (159.2)	-29.99 (162.7)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,627.4 (2,943.2)	-3,635.3 (2,977.4)	-3,628.1 (2,943.2)	-3,627.4 (2,943.2)	-3,635.3 (2,977.4)	-3,628.1 (2,943.2)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	14.01 (15.35)	13.84 (15.34)	14.01 (15.35)	14.01 (15.35)	13.84 (15.34)	14.01 (15.35)
Observations	2,064	2,064	2,064	2,064	2,064	2,064
R-squared	0.196	0.192	0.196	0.196	0.192	0.196
Cragg-Donald statistic	14.13	3.36	7.13	14.13	3.36	7.13
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.970			0.605

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 32: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: spatial variation (with alternative classification of combat and rear areas)

Variables	Number of civilian casualties in combat areas			Number of civilian casualties in rear areas		
	(151)	(152)	(153)	(154)	(155)	(156)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.109 (0.054)	-0.164 (0.057)	-0.114 (0.054)	-0.005 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.002)
Peace agreement provision on PK	12.96 (145.0)	35.83 (218.9)	14.91 (150.9)	1.834 (7.483)	1.953 (8.046)	1.839 (7.503)
Conflict duration	2.095 (2.566)	2.683 (4.406)	2.145 (2.717)	0.191 (0.111)	0.193 (0.118)	0.191 (0.112)
Simultaneous conflicts	49.15 (21.29)	42.93 (17.09)	48.62 (20.93)	4.865 (2.587)	4.782 (2.307)	4.861 (2.572)
Political rights	-84.66 (105.9)	-141.9 (143.7)	-89.53 (108.3)	-5.380 (5.128)	-5.736 (7.364)	-5.395 (5.190)
Population size (ln.)	56.98 (292.6)	318.5 (475.2)	79.23 (303.3)	15.29 (20.39)	16.84 (31.34)	15.36 (20.71)
Forest cover (%)	-7.691 (11.82)	-9.382 (21.05)	-7.835 (12.56)	-0.031 (0.890)	-0.040 (0.932)	-0.031 (0.892)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-105.0 (154.9)	-305.8 (396.9)	-122.1 (170.5)	-8.277 (15.02)	-9.535 (24.33)	-8.331 (15.30)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.595 (1.406)	1.350 (2.138)	0.659 (1.466)	0.039 (0.080)	0.044 (0.106)	0.039 (0.081)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(151)	(152)	(153)	(154)	(155)	(156)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	320.6 (179.8)		305.7 (183.6)	350.2 (196.7)		338.4 (203.2)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		221.5 (98.83)	356.6 (177.2)		228.4 (107.5)	379.1 (188.0)
Peace agreement provision on PK	358.6 (1,361.4)	416.6 (1,389.7)	362.0 (1,361.6)	289.7 (1,386.0)	350.8 (1,415.8)	292.2 (1,386.9)
Conflict duration	11.00 (35.12)	10.57 (35.17)	10.98 (35.12)	5.662 (36.74)	5.486 (36.88)	5.639 (36.75)
Simultaneous conflicts	-104.7 (117.0)	-113.4 (119.5)	-105.3 (117.1)	-254.5 (147.5)	-246.0 (145.5)	-254.9 (147.4)
Political rights	-1,051.2 (679.5)	-1,032.2 (677.0)	-1,050.1 (679.7)	-1,057.0 (691.5)	-1,037.9 (689.7)	-1,056.2 (691.9)
Population size (ln.)	4,581.2 (3,375.0)	4,668.5 (3,437.0)	4,576.4 (3,378.2)	4,374.9 (3,202.1)	4,461.8 (3,268.9)	4,370.3 (3,206.4)
Forest cover (%)	-37.89 (176.9)	-33.53 (174.8)	-38.24 (177.3)	-36.34 (155.8)	-30.55 (152.7)	-36.59 (156.1)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,612.0 (2,976.0)	-3,623.4 (3,007.2)	-3,613.0 (2,975.9)	-3,678.6 (2,962.4)	-3,680.9 (2,996.6)	-3,679.2 (2,962.5)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	13.82 (15.54)	13.66 (15.53)	13.82 (15.53)	14.58 (15.57)	14.37 (15.56)	14.58 (15.57)
Observations	2,058	2,058	2,058	2,064	2,064	2,064
Cragg-Donald statistic	12.90	3.21	6.52	15.45	3.41	7.77
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.236			0.916

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 33: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in combat areas: variation by faction (with alternative classification of combat areas)

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(157)	(158)	(159)	(160)	(161)	(162)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.108 (0.044)	-0.147 (0.070)	-0.111 (0.045)	-0.001 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.025)
Peace agreement provision on PK	36.81 (136.1)	53.13 (191.1)	38.09 (140.2)	-23.85 (21.36)	-17.29 (29.50)	-23.49 (21.17)
Conflict duration	1.647 (2.852)	2.066 (3.998)	1.680 (2.943)	0.448 (0.567)	0.616 (0.754)	0.457 (0.552)
Simultaneous conflicts	34.25 (20.58)	29.81 (15.05)	33.90 (20.16)	14.90 (10.24)	13.11 (7.253)	14.80 (10.10)
Political rights	-94.86 (98.25)	-135.7 (150.1)	-98.07 (101.3)	10.20 (28.71)	-6.226 (12.11)	9.308 (27.17)
Population size (ln.)	167.3 (249.9)	353.9 (505.4)	182.0 (263.9)	-110.4 (139.5)	-35.41 (57.56)	-106.3 (133.4)
Forest cover (%)	2.416 (10.57)	1.209 (16.60)	2.322 (11.03)	-10.10 (2.426)	-10.59 (5.011)	-10.13 (2.511)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-69.64 (176.7)	-212.9 (382.2)	-80.88 (188.0)	-35.39 (45.00)	-92.97 (105.1)	-38.53 (40.84)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.526 (1.380)	1.065 (2.123)	0.568 (1.431)	0.068 (0.286)	0.285 (0.327)	0.080 (0.271)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(157)	(158)	(159)	(160)	(161)	(162)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	320.6 (179.8)		305.7 (183.6)	320.6 (179.8)		305.7 (183.6)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		221.5 (104.7)	356.6 (177.2)		221.5 (104.7)	356.6 (177.2)
Peace agreement provision on PK	358.6 (1,361.4)	416.6 (1,389.7)	362.0 (1,361.6)	358.6 (1,361.4)	416.6 (1,389.7)	362.0 (1,361.6)
Conflict duration	11.00 (35.12)	10.57 (35.17)	10.98 (35.12)	11.00 (35.12)	10.57 (35.17)	10.98 (35.12)
Simultaneous conflicts	-104.7 (117.0)	-113.4 (119.5)	-105.3 (117.1)	-104.7 (117.0)	-113.4 (119.5)	-105.3 (117.1)
Political rights	-1,051.2 (679.5)	-1,032.2 (677.0)	-1,050.1 (679.7)	-1,051.2 (679.5)	-1,032.2 (677.0)	-1,050.1 (679.7)
Population size (ln.)	4,581.2 (3,375.0)	4,668.5 (3,437.0)	4,576.4 (3,378.2)	4,581.2 (3,375.0)	4,668.5 (3,437.0)	4,576.4 (3,378.2)
Forest cover (%)	-37.89 (176.9)	-33.53 (174.8)	-38.24 (177.3)	-37.89 (176.9)	-33.53 (174.8)	-38.24 (177.3)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,612.0 (2,976.0)	-3,623.4 (3,007.2)	-3,613.0 (2,975.9)	-3,612.0 (2,976.0)	-3,623.4 (3,007.2)	-3,613.0 (2,975.9)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	13.82 (15.54)	13.66 (15.53)	13.82 (15.53)	13.82 (15.54)	13.66 (15.53)	13.82 (15.53)
Observations	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063
Cragg-Donald statistic	12.90	3.21	6.52	12.90	3.21	6.52
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.422			0.729

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Table 34: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in rear areas: variation by faction (with alternative classification of rear areas)

Variables	Number of civilian casualties inflicted by rebels			Number of civilian casualties inflicted by government		
	(163)	(164)	(165)	(166)	(167)	(168)
UNPO size (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.004 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Peace agreement provision on PK	1.560 (1.560)	1.973 (7.405)	1.583 (5.646)	0.273 (1.995)	-0.019 (1.125)	0.264 (1.958)
Conflict duration	0.124 (0.090)	0.131 (0.130)	0.124 (0.093)	0.067 (0.030)	0.062 (0.041)	0.067 (0.030)
Simultaneous conflicts	2.742 (1.527)	2.456 (1.327)	2.726 (1.516)	2.122 (1.116)	2.326 (1.122)	2.128 (1.111)
Political rights	-4.067 (3.861)	-5.300 (5.059)	-4.136 (3.905)	-1.313 (1.798)	-0.435 (2.808)	-1.287 (1.822)
Population size (ln.)	13.04 (15.18)	18.40 (21.90)	13.34 (15.42)	2.249 (7.062)	-1.563 (11.68)	2.137 (7.185)
Forest cover (%)	-0.001 (0.680)	-0.034 (0.840)	-0.003 (0.689)	-0.029 (0.216)	-0.006 (0.124)	-0.028 (0.212)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-7.817 (11.70)	-12.18 (17.26)	-8.060 (11.92)	-0.459 (5.055)	2.646 (9.129)	-0.368 (5.172)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	0.029 (0.064)	0.046 (0.082)	0.030 (0.065)	0.009 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.034)	0.009 (0.023)

Variables	Number of UNPO personnel					
	(163)	(164)	(165)	(166)	(167)	(168)
UNSC representation (<i>t-1</i>)	350.2 (196.7)		338.4 (203.2)	350.2 (196.7)		338.4 (203.2)
UNSC presidency (<i>t-1</i>)		228.4 (107.5)	379.1 (188.0)		228.4 (107.5)	379.1 (188.0)
Peace agreement provision on PK	289.7 (1,386.0)	350.8 (1,415.8)	292.2 (1,386.9)	289.7 (1,386.0)	350.8 (1,415.8)	292.2 (1,386.9)
Conflict duration	5.662 (36.74)	5.486 (36.88)	5.639 (36.75)	5.662 (36.74)	5.486 (36.88)	5.639 (36.75)
Simultaneous conflicts	-254.5 (147.5)	-246.0 (145.5)	-254.9 (147.4)	-254.5 (147.5)	-246.0 (145.5)	-254.9 (147.4)
Political rights	-1,057.0 (691.5)	-1,037.9 (689.7)	-1,056.2 (691.9)	-1,057.0 (691.5)	-1,037.9 (689.7)	-1,056.2 (691.9)
Population size (ln.)	4,374.9 (3,202.1)	4,461.8 (3,268.9)	4,370.3 (3,206.4)	4,374.9 (3,202.1)	4,461.8 (3,268.9)	4,370.3 (3,206.4)
Forest cover (%)	-36.34 (155.8)	-30.55 (152.7)	-36.59 (156.1)	-36.34 (155.8)	-30.55 (152.7)	-36.59 (156.1)
GDP per cap. (ln.)	-3,678.6 (2,962.4)	-3,680.9 (2,996.6)	-3,679.2 (2,962.5)	-3,678.6 (2,962.4)	-3,680.9 (2,996.6)	-3,679.2 (2,962.5)
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	14.58 (15.57)	14.37 (15.56)	14.58 (15.57)	14.58 (15.57)	14.37 (15.56)	14.58 (15.57)
Observations	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063
Cragg-Donald statistic	15.45	3.41	7.77	15.45	3.41	7.77
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.486			0.685

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

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